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This research is concerned with issues of episteme, epistemology, and community. It asks how 
and why an epistemic community emerges? It looks at the study of the Northern Ireland conflict 
and peace process as covered in the British and Irish political science academy in order to 
answer this question. This research is thus ultimately about knowledge, knowledge creators, 
and the circumstances and conditions in which they develop. It is also a case study of what 
happens when academics engage with political events. Do they act as innovators or simply as 
scholar who react to changing political environments? This research explains the emergence 
of the Northern Ireland epistemic community using the boundary object concept. It asserts that 
knowledge communities do not develop de novo but instead emerge through academics 
struggles and frustrations with existing knowledge paradigms. A boundary object is the means 
by scholars can come together and challenge such paradigms and build new knowledge 
infrastructures. Through the emergence of the Northern Ireland peace process and scholar’s 
(re)engagement with and application of consociational theory and comparative methods this 
epistemic community was made possible. This research looks at the barriers that prevented the 
emergence of this community during the Troubles, its emergence following the outbreak of the 
Northern Ireland peace process, and its evolution following the signing of the Good Friday 
Agreement. Additionally, we look at the conflicts that developed between members of this 
community and how these academics define themselves both professionally and in relation to 
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This research is concerned with issues of episteme, epistemology, and community. It asks how 
and why an epistemic community emerges? It looks specifically at the study of the Northern 
Ireland conflict and peace process as covered in the British and Irish political science academy 
in order to answer this question. This research is thus ultimately about knowledge, knowledge 
creators, and the circumstances and conditions in which they develop. It is also a case study of 
what happens when academics engage with political events. Do they act as innovators or 
simply as scholars who react to changing political environments?  
The question is born out of a desire to make sense of developments in the study of 
Northern Ireland. Specifically, the lack of intellectual engagement from the political science 
community within the U.K. and Ireland around what was seen as the “the Northern issue” 
during the time of the Troubles. The conflict in Northern Ireland had long been regarded as 
one of the most researched in the world (See: Whyte, 1990). Yet the interest in the subject was 
not shared within the U.K. and Ireland, in whose very backyards the conflict was taking place. 
Yet this all changed in the early 1990s with the onset of the Northern Ireland peace process.1  
Prior to the peace process the Northern Ireland issue—which was one of the most 
pressing and prevalent political issues in the U.K. and Ireland—was terra incognita in U.K. 
and Irish political science discourse.  Michael Cox (1997, 1998), as well as Dennis O’Hearn 
and Sam Porter (S. Porter & O'Hearn, 1995), pointed out that the subject received only minimal 
recognition in British and Irish journals. Yet today a scholar would be hard pressed to publish 
a piece of work on any Northern Ireland issue and the ongoing peace process without 
referencing at least one of several dozen scholars from a British or Irish political science 
academy or a research report from any of the academy’s now internationally recognized 
institutes. The debates and theories that have emanated from academics in this field have taken 
                                                 
1 The common term “Irish peace process”, or simply the “peace process”, refers to the series of attempts to achieve 
an end to the civil conflict and a political settlement of the differences that divide the community in Northern 
Ireland. There is no general agreement among scholars or journalists on the start date of the peace process. A 
majority marks this date with the announcement of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) “cessation” of military action 
on 31 August 1994, while some people consider that the process dates to 11 January 1988, when John Hume, then 
leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), had a meeting with Gerry Adams, then President of 
Sinn Féin (SF). This was the first in a series of discussions that were to take place between the two men from 
1988 to 1993. However, the first series of talks broke down, and talks were not resumed until 1993, which 
ultimately led to the IRA cease fire in 1994 and began the end of one part of the process and the beginning of 
another phase (Melaugh, 2006). 
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centre stage in discourse regarding not only Northern Ireland but also in the wider debates on 
conflict resolution and peace-building. Evidence of this can be seen in a steady, yet dramatic, 
increase in publications on Northern Ireland and its peace process emanating from the British 
political science academy since the peace process began in the early 1990’s.  This increase is 
visualised in the table below: 
Table 1.1: Publications Since the Peace Process Began2 
 
Of note is that the table displays an uptick in publications and academic interest leading up to 
and following key dates of the peace process. The two most notable dates are the singing of 
the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 and the St Andrews Agreement in 2006, which restored 
                                                 
2 The figures in this table are derived from bibliometric data found on Reuters, Web of Science database. This is 
an online subscription-based scientific citation indexing service. Its allows for in-depth and comprehensive 
exploration into political sciences journals throughout the globe. The search criteria were limited to peer reviewed 
journal articles in major British political science journals, other countries were excluded. The criteria was limited 
to British Political science journals given variables such as impact and journal ranking as well as their 
establishment and recognition both inside and outside the academy. IPS, for example, is an Irish political science 
journal but was excluded from analysis as its international ranking and impact ranking are low in comparison to 
British journals. IPS was also among several dozen journals, to lose their impact factor ratings in 2012 and 2013, 
a loss that occurred because the journals were "found to have anomalous citation patterns resulting in a significant 
distortion of the Journal Impact Factor, so that the rank does not accurately reflect the journal's citation 
performance in the literature"(Reuters, 2013). Because of this complication, it was determined that analysis which 
included these references could skew data. Instead, publication data from IPS was visualised separately in Table 
1.2. Displaying the spike in publications in British political science journals alone proves an empirical point which 
will be made again and again, that interest in the subject spiked following the collapse of the USSR and initiation 
of the peace process and did not exist during the period of the Troubles. Book publications and book reviews were 
also excluded from this search. Article publications were identified with its engagement about Northern Ireland 



























Total Articles Published: 226
Average Citation: 21
Source: Rueters, Web of Science (2016)
Article Publications in UK Political Science Journals on Northern Ireland from 1990-
2016 
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the Northern Ireland Assembly. The period following St Andrews in 2006 displays the starkest 
increase in publications as many scholars, and statesmen’s, noted this ended a period of 
uncertainty around the peace process and the survival of the Good Friday Agreement (See: 
O’Learly, 2015; English, 2015; Shirlow, 2015).   
 This is not limited to the British political science academy or its journals. As an 
example, Irish Political Studies (IPS), journal of the Political Studies Association of Ireland 
(PSAI), which was founded in 1986 and is Ireland’s only major political science journal. This 
association and its journal were founded with the aim of producing high-quality academic 
articles and discussions on all issues related to Irish politics (PSAI, 2017). IPS covers topics 
such as: politics in the Republic of Ireland, in Northern Ireland, the politics of their bilateral 
relationship and the politics of their relationship with the United Kingdom, and the European 
Union. Since 1990 IPS has publish 302 articles dedicated to the Northern Ireland situation and 
its on-going peace process. This surge in interest is visualised in table 1.2 below.  
Table 1.2: Total IPS Publications on Northern Ireland Since the Peace Process Began3 
  
This data displays similar trends to that of British political science journals in terms of 
publication spikes leading up to and following key dates around the Northern Ireland peace 
process; such as the Good Friday and St. Andrews Agreements. The sheer volume of 
                                                 
3 This data was taken directly from the IPS electronic journal available through ProQuest and the LSE library. 
Like the previous search criteria book reviews were excluded and articles were identified with authors engagement 
on and about Northern Ireland and the topics of consociationalism, power-sharing, the Troubles, terrorism, peace 
process, and political violence. The searches also excluded articles which focused only on issues Northern Ireland 
elections and institutions such as the catholic church. However, these subjects were included into analysis if they 
pertained to the political conflict. For example, there were several analyses which looked at the political and 
religious nature of certain political parties in Northern Ireland such as the Smyth (1986) article looking at the 
DUP. Yet even with the exclusion of such articles it made little difference in the number of publications on 
Northern Ireland, especially between the period of 1986 to 1990. In this respect, even controlling for such 
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publications in this one journal alone displays the voracious appetite Ireland’s political science 
discipline developed for research pertaining to Northern Ireland in the peace process period. 
This is a stark contrast to the three articles IPS produced addressing issues on Northern Ireland 
and its political conflict from its inception in 1986 until 1990. One of which only did so 
indirectly, looking at the political/religious nature of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 
(Smyth, 1986). 
With the onset of the peace process, a series of debates emerged concerning potential 
political solutions for the Northern Ireland issue. These debates centred around various theories 
of conflict resolution. They were largely the result of the application of  primarily top-down, 
elite-based approaches that sought to establish mechanisms of political accommodation that 
could house divided  identities in a many-roomed political mansion (Taylor, 2009a, p. 16). This 
is what political scientists called power-sharing or consociational theory. This theory was first 
applied to Northern Ireland by the theory’s pioneer Arend Lijphart (1975a) in the British 
Journal of Political Science. Lijphart observed that consociational principles were evident in 
the ill-fated power-sharing experiment of the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973–1974. Arguing 
that consociational democracy was the most appropriate form of governance for Northern 
Ireland, he was pessimistic about its prospects in the region (Lijphart, 1975a; J. McGarry & 
O'Leary, 2006). This discussion and its theoretical framework was picked up by, modified, and 
applied to Northern Ireland by John McGarry (1988) and Brendan O’Leary (1989b). The pair 
published The Future of Northern Ireland (1990b) with the aim of laying out the case for 
consociationalism in Northern Ireland and directly taking on the dominate paradigm that “the 
problem with Northern Ireland is that there is no solution” (R. Rose, 1976a, p. 139). This 
sparked off a series of debates and an enormity of literature. 
 Looking at these debates it’s apparent that a conflict that had defined the region for 
over thirty years was refought within British and Irish political science academic circles. 
During the Troubles political scientists in the U.K. and Ireland were largely absent from and/or 
reluctant to take on the Northern Ireland topic. However, once scholars began to engage with 
the Northern Ireland issue, they were as divided on the subject and with each other as the region 
they researched. The evidence of the pervasiveness of these debates on Northern Ireland can 
be found not only in the volume of publications but also in the fact that these debates were so 
central to the literature. This is apparent in that scholars labelled these debates Northern 
Ireland’s “meta-conflict” – meaning the intellectual debate about the conflict and (potential) 
prescriptions for its solution (B. O'Leary & McGarry, 1996).  
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 Scholars in this research describe these debates as being “vitriolic” (McGarry, 2015) 
with some claiming the debates were seeped more in ideology than in any type of scientific 
epistemology or empiricism (Patterson, 2015). These divisions, though still in the backdrop of 
discussions, have been largely reconciled between scholars since the signing of the Belfast 
Good Friday Agreement of 1998 – the Agreement. This is highlighted by scholars like 
Professor Michael Kerr at Kings College London who went so far as to claim that, “there may 
not be reconciliation [today] in Northern Ireland, but scholars of Northern Ireland have 
reconciled themselves to the study of the Agreement” (Kerr, 2015), meaning that scholars 
today recognize the Agreement as the legitimate framework for peace and the centre of political 
analysis in the region.  
An aim of this research will be to empirically display that following the signing of the 
Agreement the study of Northern Ireland, which was previously seen as an “eccentricity” 
(English, 2015) in U.K. and Irish political science, had become a staple in the discipline’s 
academic diet. While the question of how and why an epistemic community emerges concerns 
what happened to facilitate the emergence of that community, this study also looks at how this 
community flourished and expanded and how it has evolved within a changing political and 
educational environment. 
Such inquiries are important because a common misconception around the formulation 
of scientific knowledge is that it develops out of and within a consensus (Leigh Star, 2010; 
Star, 1989). By looking at this community this research will show that, in fact, the opposite is 
true. Science and scientific enterprises develop out of and through a series of epistemological, 
ontological, and paradigmatic conflicts. Michael Burawoy’s (2009) research on the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and Zambia’s post-colonial transition noted that science moves and evolves 
through a series of obsessions, refutations, and frustrations. Science is inherently conflictual. 
Yet amid these conflicts scientists are forced to look for the opportunity to open, and then 
maintain, spheres of direct and constructive interaction to collaborate with each other. Such 
collaborative efforts are essential to developing new findings, furthering research in a scholar’s 
discipline as well as helping scholars to establish authority over domains of knowledge.    
Collaboration hinges on the ability to discover some kernel around which individuals 
can come together, to open a forum in which they can research, debate, and refute issues openly 
with each other and to sustain these interactions once they have begun. Yet investigations into 
how epistemic communities come together, or fail to do so, is not well understood in the 
literature. As an example, research by scholars like Schmidt (2010) has looked at the 
relationship between knowledge agents and knowledge structures. This research has largely 
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aimed to show how knowledge structures aid in constructing the meanings internal to these 
agents whose “background ideational abilities” enable them to create and maintain such 
institutions. Other research has sought to look at the influence of ideology and national context 
on the policy beliefs of scientific elites in places like the European Union and the United States 
(N. J. Mitchell, Herron, Jenkins-Smith, & Whitten, 2007; Radaelli, 1995, 1997). All this 
research has focused mainly on scholars in the fields of economic, climate, and energy 
regulation and policy. It has been inspired by earlier scholarship that centred on how 
knowledge elites personal pursuits for power (Foucault, 1970; Foucault & Sheridan, 1979; 
Foucault, Sheridan, & Dreyfus, 1987), politics (Woolgar, 1988), and prestige (Bourdieu, 1984, 
1986) affects their decision-making. Yet these analyses are weighted towards understanding 
institutions rather than individuals and fail to address how knowledge experts come together 
and communities emerge.   
Northern Ireland offers a compelling and interesting case study that builds on and adds 
to such analysis by addressing these how questions. Unlike issues of, say, economic or energy 
regulation, climate change, or nuclear proliferation (areas typically covered in this field of 
literature) the overwhelming majority of academics that make up this epistemic community 
come from within or have personal links to the various communities in the region. These 
academics do not reside in the “ivory tower”, from which academics have traditionally been 
seen to observe and analyse socio-political phenomena (Zook, 2015). Members of this 
community had (and have) intimate and sometimes direct experience of the conflict in Northern 
Ireland. Many have, at times, positioned themselves on various sides of the political divide, 
some of them have been directly involved in the conflict and its resolution. This research then 
offers the opportunity to discover how academics manage (or fail to manage) their personal 
and professional biographies in relation to their research as well as other scholars who might 
hold opposing political, personal, or epistemological views.  
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CONCEPTUALIZING EPISTEMIC COMMUNITIES 
In a project concerning epistemic communities it is important to begin by clarify this concept. 
In this study, the “epistemic community” refers to the community of political science scholars 
that focus on Northern Ireland. The concept of epistemic communities became widely known 
(and utilized) within political science thanks largely to Haas’s (1992) introduction of the 
concept almost twenty-five years ago. Epistemic community as a term was first employed by 
Burkart Holzner (1968), who applied the concept in sociology, but it was Haas (1992) who 
introduced his concept to political science as a means of understanding groups of scientists. 
Haas looked to build on the previous work of scholars, such as Ludwik Fleck’s (1979) idea of 
the thought collective and how the emergence and development of scientific knowledge takes 
place. He did this while employing Michael Foucault’s (1973a) adaptation of the concept of 
episteme.4 Scholars like Thomas Kuhn (1962) had previously explored the idea of scientific 
communities. These communities are groups of individuals from a discipline whose work 
revolves around a shared paradigm (Kuhn, 1962). This consists of shared beliefs and 
methodological standards for the pursuit of scientific research. Scholars have since sought to 
broaden the scope of Kuhn’s paradigm, arguing that epistemic communities can arise from 
anywhere, such as bureaucratic position, technocratic training, similarities in scientific outlook, 
and shared disciplinary theories or methods (Cross, 2013; Dunlop, 2013). International 
relations scholars like John Gerard Ruggie (1975) noted that epistemic communities share 
intentions, expectations, symbols, behavioural rules, and points of reference. The key point 
which scholars agree on is the episteme which unites a community together (Ruggie, 1975, p. 
570).  
Cross (2013) put forward the idea that the internal cohesiveness of an epistemic 
community ultimately provides them with an episteme. With this logic, the argument goes that 
when a group of professionals can speak with one voice, that voice is then seen as more 
legitimate because it is based on a well-reasoned consensus among those in the best position 
to know. Yet what Northern Ireland highlights is that epistemic communities often lack 
consensus and cohesion around key issues. They speak with many (and often dissenting) 
voices. We therefore focus on degrees of internal cohesion and how that process unfolds over 
time. By looking at the process of how academics on Northern Ireland can come together 
                                                 
4 Foucault refers to episteme as the “orderly unconscious structures” underlying the production of scientific 
knowledge in a “time and place”. According to Foucault, episteme is developed within an “epistemological field” 
which forms the conditions of possibility for knowledge in a particular time and space and has often been 
compared to Kuhn’s notion of paradigm (Cross, 2013; Foucault, 1973a).  
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despite a lack of consensus one can also gain an understanding of what the episteme of an 
epistemic community is.    
To this point, it’s important to recognize that epistemic communities do not simply exist 
or not exist. Nor do they simply appear and disappear, as has been the assumption in much of 
the literature to date (see Cross, 2013; Dunlop, 2016). The emergence of an epistemic 
community is not a de nova phenomena sparking from the various “big bangs” that occur within 
a political landscape. If one is aiming to better understand the origins of an epistemic 
community, it is then necessary to examine the broader (social, political, educational) context 
within which they exist. One could call this the “primordial ooze” which they emerge out of. 
This is a process rather than an event. This is particularly true when looking at epistemic 
communities that develop out of or within areas of protracted political conflict such as Northern 
Ireland.  
The concept of epistemic communities used here is consistent with Haas’s (1992) 
definition. It is a group of professionals, often from a variety of different disciplines, who 
produce policy-relevant knowledge about complex social issues (Haas, 1992, p. 16). What 
constitutes this epistemic community is that it embodies a belief system around one or more 
issues that contains four knowledge elements: 
1.) A shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value 
based rationale for the social action of community members; 2.) Shared 
causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or 
contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which then 
serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible 
policy actions and desired outcomes; 3.) Shared notions of validity – that is, 
inter-subjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating 
knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and 4.) A set of common 
practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional 
competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human 
welfare will be enhanced as a consequence (Haas, 1992, p. 3) 
  
 The community under investigation here fits within Haas’s criteria, as the individuals 
identified as part of the Northern Ireland epistemic community are: (a) Professionals – 
academics with official education and training in social science methods and theory. In the case 
of U.K. and Irish academics, their training has come in a variety of forms but the standards are 
consistent across national borders; (b) There is a consistent frequency and quality to the 
meetings of these individuals, meeting regularly at conferences such as the Political Science 
Association Ireland (PSAI) and publishing regularly in its journal. The more time actors spend 
together face-to-face, the more likely they are to build strong ties, strengthen shared 
 17 
professional norms, and cultivate a common knowledge culture (Cross 2013). Informal 
meetings in smaller groups enable a richer environment for socialization and the development 
of a common knowledge culture (Checkel, 2001). Frequent meetings also help to solidify a 
body of shared norms such as epistemological, methodological, research, and peer-review 
standards within an epistemic community; and (c) The members of this community share and 
are connected by a sense of professional purpose, identity, practice, and cultural heritage. In 
the case of the Northern Ireland epistemic community, what unites these individuals is more 
than simply an esprit de corps; it is a common ground by which the actors can identify with 
one another. Cross (2013) again has noted that an epistemic community with a strong common 
culture is likely to remain cohesive irrespective of the circumstances and differences they face. 
In relation to Northern Ireland, this common culture is not simply a commitment to the 
Agreement, the peace process and the epistemological grounds by which these are studied. It 
is also a sense of being connected to the region and a desire to find a solution to its problems 
of violence, a commitment to peace.  
This usage of the epistemic community framework places this research within the wider 
“renaissance of knowledge” movement that has unfolded since the 1990s (Dunlop, 2013; 
Radaelli, 1995). This means that along with the traditional interests and institutions, ideas and 
individuals also matter in explaining political and intellectual decision-making. Although 
material power, identities, and policy legacies remains central to the analysis, this ideational 
turn focuses its emphasis on decision-makers as “sentient” agents (Schmidt, 2010). They are 
therefore sensitive to new ideas or new representations of existing ideas. The politics of ideas 
agenda has been followed eagerly by scholars and resulted in an array of empirical analysis 
that sheds light on how policy emerges from new ways of thinking, beliefs, rhetoric, and 
discourse (For example, see reviews in: Dunlop, 2013). The main contribution of the epistemic 
communities concept as it applies to this research is to remind us that “ideas would be sterile 
without carriers” (Haas, 1992, p. 27). This is what Radaelli (1997) called an “anthropomorphic 
conceptualization of knowledge” (p. 169). This research assumes that experts who create 
knowledge should be a central point of political analysis. To identify an epistemic community 
is to identify individuals with a degree of professional and social stature to make authoritative 
claims on politically pertinent and socially relevant issues of the day (Dunlop, 2013).  
 Over the last twenty-five years the literature has become saturated with publications 
and problems facing research on epistemic communities. Dunlop (2013) noted over 600 book 
chapters and articles on the subject since Haas’s 1992 article, pointing out that the term is 
firmly embedded in the social sciences lexicon. Political science sub-fields such as 
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Government, Law, Public Administration, and International Relations have widely employed 
the epistemic community framework as a means of explaining the role of experts with complex 
policy problems that dominate the politics of contemporary society (For examples see: Cross, 
2013; Dunlop, 2013, 2016; Walker, 2001). Despite the discipline’s long engagement with the 
term, the actual identification of epistemic communities and understandings into how and why 
they emerge and develop over time remains rare.  
Wright (1997) and Verdun (1998) argued this is because the term is often utilized 
metaphorically to describe any group of experts giving policy advice. Because of this 
understanding the emergence and evolution of epistemic communities can be a difficult 
process, as identifying, locating, and gaining access to those believed to be members of an 
epistemic community is often problematic (Wright, 1997). There are a few studies though on 
how power structures affect an epistemic community’s decision-making and create 
stratification within the community (Van Waarden, 2002). There is also interesting research 
that looks at the various “battles” between both epistemic communities and interest groups 
(Youde, 2007).5  
Yet in the political science literature even the above examples are the exception rather 
than the rule (Dunlop, 2013). Even in the research where scholars do aim to determine the 
origin and development of beliefs that epistemic communities embody (For example: N. J. 
Mitchell et al., 2007) the community itself is rarely the centre of analytical attention. Instead 
they are secondary to the analysis of interest and political groups or institutions. Disciplinary 
preferences provide a plausible explanation for this phenomenon. A political scientists’ 
attention is almost inherently predisposed towards focusing on political institutions and actors 
rather than the world of professionals and academics. Using narrative accounts of members of 
the Northern Ireland epistemic community this research looks to correct this disposition and 
determine how this community emerged and developed over time. It also seeks to uncover how 
scholars of this community came to hold the epistemic positions they have and how their 
interactions with other members of the community and research shaped and possibly altered 
these positions over time. As the exploration of epistemic communities in the political science 
subfield of peace and conflict studies has to date been terra incognito, this work looks to 
pioneer the application and analysis of this concept to a new territory in political science. Yet 
                                                 
5 This research by Youde (2007) is particularly interesting as it touches upon the various “epistemic battles” which 
exist between members of an epistemic community and that of various “interest groups” in relations to public 
policy approaches and treatments of AIDS in South Africa.  
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to do this one needs a theory to explain and link the boundaries these individuals the episteme 
that binds them; thus, the next section is dedicated to theory.  
THEORY AND BOUNDARY OBJECTS 
The Northern Ireland case is useful because it resides within a discipline – political science – 
that is extremely heterogeneous to begin with. That is, the work of political science is 
conducted by an extremely diverse group of actors: scholars from different disciplines with 
varying epistemological and methodological traditions. The work of any science, irrespective 
of the discipline, requires cooperation. Scientific actors cooperate to create common 
understandings, ensure information reliability across domains and to gather information which 
retains its integrity across time, space, and local contingencies (Star & Griesemer, 1989).  
There is a “central tension” in science between divergent viewpoints and the need for 
generalizable findings (ibid.). When these tensions arise, collaborative efforts such as 
developing objective and generalizable findings become difficult. These tensions are 
exacerbated in political science not only because of the discipline’s inherently heterogeneous 
nature – drawing from historical, philosophical, sociological, economic, and anthropological 
approaches – but also because of its relative infancy and (often) contested relevance or 
existence as a discipline.6 There is a theoretical need in this thesis to explain not only how this 
tension can be bridged within and between a heterogeneous group but also in helping to identify 
and explain what the episteme of this community is. This thesis will therefore utilize the 
boundary object – a concept to be explained in the following – as means of explaining and 
understanding how and why an epistemic community emerges, as well as how ongoing 
collaboration and cooperation was and is maintained following its emergence. Thus, even 
though this is a case study of the Northern Ireland epistemic community it is one that reflects 
similar communities of conflict management research such as the Balkans, Israel/Palestine, 
South Africa, and Sri Lanka, to name a few. 
By employing the term boundary object, it is recognized that the tension in research 
and collaboration in scientific affairs occurs along and between a series of boundaries. Whether 
we speak of learning as the transition from novice to expert in a particular discipline or the 
shift from peripheral participation to being a full member of a scientific community (Lave & 
Wenger, 1991), the boundary of the discipline or community is constitutive of what counts as 
                                                 
6  For example, off the record many scholars noted the contested nature and existence of political science as a 
discipline in the U.K. and Ireland and the inherent “tension” and battle that the discipline has undergone.   
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expertise or as central participation (Akkerman & Bakker, 2011). Boundaries are becoming 
more explicit with the increase of specialization in scientific research, despite the increase in 
heterogeneity. The search for ways to connect and mobilize individuals across social and 
cultural practices to avoid fragmentation has thus become more important (Hermans & 
Hermans Konopka, 2010). The challenge is therefore to learn how to create and discover 
possibilities for participation and collaboration across a diversity of positions. This is true both 
within institutions and across disciplines (Akkerman, Admiraal, & Simons, in press; Daniels, 
Edwards, Engestrom, Gallagher, & Ludvigsen, 2010; Ludvigsen, Lund, Rasmussen, & Saljo, 
2010). Cooperation rather than consensus is necessary for the successful conducting of 
scientific research. Such findings have been confirmed in disciplines such as biology and 
zoology, where scientific work is neither thwarted nor homogenized by a lack of consensus but 
is rather enhanced by it (See for example: Hughes, 1971; Latour & Woolgar, 1986; J. M. Ruane 
& Cerulo, 2008). This research holds that this is also true in political science, a discipline where 
individuals are coming from differing social worlds and methodological backgrounds and 
where theoretical paradigms intersect. 
The term boundary object will be used to mean an analytic concept of one or more 
scientific objects that inhabit several intersecting social worlds. This object satisfies the 
informational requirements of each of world and acts to bring such actors and worlds together 
(Latour, 2005). A boundary object is something that is both malleable enough to adapt to local 
needs and the constraints of the various parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain 
common principles across multiple spectrums (social, political, intellectual). Such an object 
often has a weak structure in collective use, but takes on a strong structure in individual use. 
The object(s) may be abstract or concrete can, and often do, have different meanings in 
different social worlds but their structure is common enough to more than one world to make 
them recognizable – that is, a means of translation (Leigh Star, 2010; Star, 1989).  Let’s now 
look at a practical example of a boundary object that will be used in this research.   
CONSOCATIONALISM AND BOUNDARIES 
Consociationalism theory is one of the central boundary objects of the Northern Ireland 
epistemic community. In the abstract form, a consociation can be either democratic or 
authoritarian, but consociational democracies respect four organizational principles (J. 
McGarry & O'Leary, 2006). These principles are that (1) Each of the main communities share 
in executive power, with the executive chosen by the people; (2) Each community enjoys some 
distinct measure of autonomy and self-government, particularly around cultural concerns; (3) 
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Each is represented proportionally in key public institutions and is a proportional beneficiary 
of public resources and expenditures; and (4) Each can prevent changes that adversely affect 
their vital interests; they have veto power (ibid.). These principles allow the application of 
consociation to be somewhat flexible in terms of structure; however, in application to social 
worlds by individuals or groups (i.e. Northern Ireland and scholars) this flexibility allows it to 
adopt a more pronounced structure.  
Lijphart’s application of the theory, for example, makes no significant distinction 
between cleavages that fall along linguistic, ethno-national, or religious lines. In contrast,  
McGarry and O’Leary (1995) argued that Northern Ireland has primarily experienced a self-
determination dispute spanning two states. In their application of this theory this aspect is 
crucial (both for explanation and prescription). They argue that aside from consociational 
institutions, from a structural standpoint Northern Ireland requires all-island and all-Ireland 
cross-border institutions, as well as those linking the United Kingdom and Ireland. These 
distinctions have been vital in both explanations, analyses (and debates) surround the practical 
application and implementation of the Good Friday Agreement. These themes are consistent 
across consociational theory as applied to places such as Lebanon, Kurdistan, and Bosnia and 
the peace agreements implemented there. Yet despite the differences in structure, differing 
scholars can place themselves under the tent of consociationalism. Though O’Leary, McGarry, 
and the like would regard themselves as revisionist consociationalist, they nonetheless reside 
underneath the tent of consociationalism with what they regard as its “skepticism about the 
universal merits of adversarial majoritarian and integrationist institutions” (J. McGarry & 
O'Leary, 2006, p. 44). In this research a boundary object is the means of explaining how 
political scientists and other actors contributing to the development of literature and research 
in a discipline can translate, negotiate, debate, triangulate, and simplify in order to work 
together in and across various institutional settings. In this respect it is not only 
consociationalism and its application to Northern Ireland but also the Good Friday Agreement 
as well as the peace process (before and after the Agreement) are the objects this research uses 
to explain both how and why the Northern Ireland epistemic community emerged.  
For these objects the issue of translation is especially important. This is because a 
central tenant of this work is that actors from more than one social world (for example, political 
scientists, historians, sociologists, etc.) are trying to conduct translations of the boundary object 
simultaneously. Northern Ireland is not simply a case of non-scientists translating for scientists 
(or vice versa) but between political scientists that come from various methodological, 
academic, and political backgrounds. These individuals do often inhabit different 
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epistemological worlds. Each translator must therefore maintain the integrity of his own 
research while looking to ensure the interests of the other audiences to retain them as allies. 
This is ideally done in a way that increases the centrality and importance of his work. What 
has been described as the n-way nature of the interessement cannot be understood from a single 
viewpoint (Akrich, Callon, & Latour, 1988). It requires a more holistic analysis which will be 
outline in the following chapter.  
 This analysis does not presuppose an epistemological primacy for any one viewpoint; 
the viewpoints of the consociationalists are not inherently better or worse than that of its critics, 
for instance. Latour (1986) encourages us by pointing out that the important question concerns 
the flow of concepts through the network of participating actors and the social and intellectual 
worlds they occupy. The holistic viewpoint is therefore anti-reductionist in that the unit of 
analysis is the whole enterprise, not simply the point of view of an individual academic or 
researcher, but it nevertheless utilizes these individual points of view to draw inferences about 
the whole (Leigh Star, 2010; Star & Griesemer, 1989). It is on this point that the choice of 
method employed becomes key.  
THE QUESTION OF METHODOLOGY 
In this attempt to understand how epistemic communities emerge and how they have developed 
over time, one is faced with various challenges, one of which is to determine how one selects 
and measures the variables in question. Because in social science research the selection and 
measurement of variables can be infinitely divisible, one is left with no choice but to attempt 
to sketch something that one cannot precisely delineate, to generalize, to abstract. In creating 
these abstractions one should be free to combine a variety of interdisciplinary techniques, 
including those of the biologist, sociologist, psychologist, and anthropologist (See: McGraw, 
1996; Schatz, 2009; Yin, 2003). In fact, Gaddis (2002) argues that because scientists have 
discovered that “what exists in the present has not always done so in the past”, they have 
“begun to derive structures from [past] processes” and in doing so have “brought history into 
science” (p. 39). 
This has brought into question purely reductionist approaches adopted in social science 
as a way of making sense of human societies, many of which have run into major problems 
given the complexities involved in human relations and the political, religious, and economic 
interactions between societies (Gaddis, 2002; Shapiro, 2002; A. Wendt, 1992; A. E. Wendt, 
1987). After all, societies are not “complicated” in the way a nuclear reactor is complicated 
and can be broken into its constituent parts and understood. Rather, they are highly “complex”, 
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involving interdependent variables that interact, often in irregular ways, over any given period. 
To properly sketch out and control for this complexity one must employ dynamic methods for 
organizing knowledge that rely on the micro rather than the macro to develop these 
abstractions. And it is here where the use of narrative story lines, the tool of choice for this 
research, brings a force and utility.  
The narrative approach employed here is a subgenre that uses the life stories of 34 
individuals of the Northern Ireland epistemic community. These individuals have been 
identified and selected based on several criteria, the first being their participation in and 
publications in the Political Studies Association of Ireland (PSAI) and its journal Irish Political 
Studies (IPS), as well as their participation (and positions) within research institutes within the 
U.K. and Ireland. These scholars were identified based on their publications on and 
engagement with consociationalism and its debates concerning Northern Ireland. All 34 
individuals interviewed have at one time or another published something (criticising, 
reviewing, refuting, exploring, comparing, or defending) consociationalism. They have all 
engaged with this topic. This research also greatly relied on snowballing in selecting many 
participants. During the interview process scholars regularly noted the imperativeness of 
speaking with certain individuals based on their contribution to the discipline and expertise on 
Northern Ireland as well as their participation in the community. Scholars’ recommendations 
were also based on professional collaboration projects, as well as professional disagreements 
regarding theory and academic points of view. This study thus encompasses a variety of 
scholars with sometime dissenting views. Well over 50 individuals were contacted and asked 
to participate. In the end, 34 individuals agreed to participate, of which only three are 
(identified as) female, the rest being male (see Appendix 1). Several academics wished to be 
anonymized (with respect to name, gender, or, in some cases, both) and all academics had the 
opportunity to read and edit transcripts to ensure anonymity, review content, and approve and 
request the omission of that content.  
The British/Irish political science community is a small one. The Northern Ireland 
community is an even smaller one, all with strong ties, prejudices, paranoia, and opinions about 
one another and the subject they are close to (biographically and/or geographically). I gave my 
interviewees oral and written information about myself and the research that I was conducting. 
At first some were sceptical and, surprisingly, some were hostile and/or outright offended at 
the prospect of participating in such a study. However, some were enthusiastic and saw the 
merit and necessity of my research. As I conducted more interviews, it became less necessary 
to introduce myself: they already knew me, and what had transpired in previous interviews. 
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This eased many of the academics concerns that I was just “stirring trouble” or writing an 
academic “gossip piece”. This also brought into light what others had told me: “there are no 
secrets in Northern Ireland” (Arthur, 2015).  
Nevertheless, I began these semi-structured narrative interviews either by requesting 
personal information from my interviewees, such as where and when they were born or who 
their supervisor was, or by asking their specialisation to the discipline. Then, I asked them how 
they had become interested in the study of Northern Ireland, what kinds of work they had 
conducted on the subject, and with whom. I also asked them about their opinions regarding the 
development of consociationalism and its application to Northern Ireland, what they thought 
about this, and how they viewed the contribution and evolution of the discipline. Conducting 
these narrative based (semi-structured) interviews allowed me to engage with questions that I 
had prepared and provided the academics with before, but the approach also allowed my 
respondents to reflect more freely on their ideas, memories and personal life histories in a free-
style manner. The questions merely acted as sign-posts which allowed me to keep them on 
track in the narrating their lives. With some more sign-posting was needed than with others. 
The interviews all lasted between 40 minutes (at the shortest) to two hours and fifteen minutes 
(the longest).    
These interviews were “co-produced identity performances” (Elliot George Mishler, 
1999b); meaning, as a researcher, I was not only listening to life stories but also co-producing 
them. All interviewees who agreed to participate showed a general respect for my academic 
identity as a PhD candidate from the LSE. However, I did often get the sense that many were 
feeling me out to see what I was “really” getting at with regards to my research and were 
somewhat cautious and calculating in choosing their words and how they talked about their 
experiences within the discipline. This certainly was not the case with all academics. Several 
were more than candid with their opinions and criticisms. Academics could be extremely harsh 
in their accusations and critiques of others, the discipline, and their work at times. Irrespective 
of what was said I made sure to remain neutral and not to comment either way. At times, I 
would play devil’s advocate in terms of pressing them on counter opinions but in most cases I 
tried to remain as neutral as possible. I think my position as an American (outsider) with no 
Irish (or British, for that matter) roots or links helped greatly in conducting my research and 
interviews. This soothed many concerns that I may have biases one way or the other. Though 
I did get the sense that many wondered why I would be interested in such a subject having no 
personal links to it. 
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 The life stories approach utilized is defined by specific assumptions and 
methodological procedures. Two of these assumptions are particularly important, the first 
being that an interview is a dialogic process (Elliot George Mishler, 1986). Interviews are an 
intricate sequence of exchanges through which the interviewer and interviewee negotiate in 
advance some degree of agreement on what will be talked about and how the material will be 
approached. In this case the respondents’ accounts of their life experiences are situated in that 
context and can be seen as co-produced (Elliot George Mishler, 1999b). Through doing this 
one seeks to bypass a problem that is often recognized in survey research, namely, that too 
much is often inferred by taking answers at face value to questions of suspicious value, since 
answers can vary depending on the way the question is framed (King, Keohane, & Verba, 
1994). Secondly, narratives are social acts. Through speaking, an individual performs their 
identity, making various “moves” along the landscape of social relationships (Found in: 
Brockmeier & Carbaugh, 2001). This pragmatic view of language underscores what social 
actors are doing in their selection and organization of discourse to tell stories in ways that fit 
the occasion and are appropriate for specific intentions, audiences, and contexts.  
This research aims to thematize the 34 narratives of the academic participants of this 
research. To do this the research must be rooted in a set of assumptions that guides a dialogue 
with participants. Michael Polanyi (1958) first elaborated on this in his rejection of positivists’ 
notions of objectivity based on sense data in favour of a commitment to what he called the 
“rationality of theory”, often described as cognitive maps, or, dare one say, abstractions, 
through which one apprehends the world (Found in: Burawoy, 1998, p. 5). Through “dwelling 
in theory” (See: Burawoy, 1991, 1998, 2009; Burawoy & Skocpol, 1982) this research forms 
the basis of a reflexive model that embraces engagement with the messiness of narratives as a 
way of understanding them. This is a reflexive approach to narratives as a means of extracting 
the general from the specific; that is, this research looks to use the micro to connect to the 
macro, and in doing so connect the present to the past. For example, in this text you will read 
of the personal reflections by scholars like Brendan O’Leary and John McGarry who reflect on 
their personal engagements with consociational theory and its application to Northern Ireland 
as a means of showing the emergence of the Northern Ireland epistemic community. By 
employing the “narrative as praxis” framework, one operates under the idea that personal 
stories are socially situated actions, life performances, and fusions of both form and context 
that allows researchers to identify patterns from the micro and connect them to the macro.   
QUESTIONS OF STRUCTURE VS AGENCY 
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A central concern in asking how an epistemic community emerges is whether academics act as 
innovators or simply respond to a changing political and social landscape. That is, do groups 
of (or individual) academics emerge simply as a response to the political events on the ground 
or do they, in fact, shape them? This is important in the case of Northern Ireland (as well as 
other areas of protracted conflict) as upon simple observation one simply could argue that the 
emergence of the epistemic community was a result of the peace process and the signing of the 
Agreement. Yet it is important to highlight the fact that the current peace process and the peace 
deal agreed to in 1998 were not Northern Ireland’s first. There was also a peace process in the 
1970s, which resulted in the Sunningdale Agreement in 1973–1974. The 1980s also saw a 
process that culminated in the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985. Both peace processes and 
agreements were the result of British and Irish government initiatives, as well as political 
developments on the ground. Yet why, considering these events, did the study of Northern 
Ireland remain an “eccentricity” (English, 2015) in British and Irish political science?   
In addressing such questions this research comes into contact with age-old debates over 
structure and individual agency (Dahms, 1997). These debates somewhat resemble the classic 
question “which came first, the chicken or the egg”? Yet the question of how and why an 
epistemic community emerges aims to see not just which came first but also the relationship 
between the “chicken and the egg”. Also, to what extent do these two variables interact with 
and influence one another. It is not a case of “either/or” but rather “both/and”. This study is 
interested in how the chicken relates to the egg and vice versa; it assumes a synergetic 
relationship. There is the acknowledgement and premise that scientific activity is socially 
rooted. Recalling that Marx (1975) himself stated that: 
When I am active scientifically – an activity which I can seldom perform in 
direct community with others – then my activity is social, because I perform it 
as a man. Not only is the material of my activity given to me as a social product 
(as is even the language in which the thinker is active): my own existence is a 
social activity and therefore that which I make of myself; I make of myself for 
society being (p. 298). 
 
Individuals in a knowledge community do not escape their social character or the greater 
socials influences and barriers they exist within. Instead there is an acceptance of the symmetry 
between structure and agency, in that knowledge carriers in any society will have to overcome 
and/or adjust to certain limitations due to the inherent and pre-existing 
social/economic/political structures (William T Lynch & Fuhrman, 1991). For example, 
scholars like Brendan O’Leary and other were interested in understanding and researching 
Northern Ireland long before the peace process. With the social and institutional stigma within 
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academia, they were warned by their supervisors and department heads of “being labelled 
Irish” (O’Leary, 2015) in terms of their research focus. Therefore, during this time scholars 
pursued more mainstream topics in British political science in efforts to establish and cement 
their careers in the academy with the intention of pursuing the subject later.  
In the relationship between structure and agency is an emphasis on praxis. Praxis looks 
at the interplay between knowledge carriers’ positions as subjects – looking to actively affect 
the world they change – operating in the context of external social conditions. Actors must 
respond to, adapt to, make, and remake these conditions in efforts to transform not only 
themselves but the conditions they face (Elliot George Mishler, 1999b). This elevates the 
actions (or agency) of knowledge carriers by making them purposeful and contextually 
situated. That is, this research sees academics actions as responses to a series of personal, 
political, professional, and social conditions. In doing this it acknowledges that these 
individuals are not cultural zombies, mindlessly restricted to a limited cultural/social script in 
the roles they play. Knowledge carriers adapt to, resist, and selectively appropriate various 
cultural and social changes that present themselves at various times.  
However, speaking to this one must also address issues of reflexivity, i.e. asking 
knowledge carriers to examine their own general philosophic premises (William T. Lynch, 
1994). Here it is argued that reflexivity doesn’t contribute to a tendency toward a “fictionalist” 
understanding of the knowledge carrier’s role as scholar (See: Latour & Woolgar, 1986; M. 
Lynch, 2000; William T Lynch & Fuhrman, 1991). This is because ideas are always rooted in 
real social activity. If one can point out the limitations of certain forms of knowledge, it is not 
due to one’s sheer brilliance of intelligence but rather that social change brought about by 
contradictions in society makes these new insights possible. As Marx and Engels put it (Marx 
& Engels, 2008, p. 29): 
When people speak of ideas that revolutionize society, they do but express the 
fact that within the old society the elements of a new one have been created, and 
that the dissolution of the old ideas keeps even pace with the dissolution of the 
old conditions of existence.  
 
With this understanding one can reveal how the materialization of social processes7 
leads to the development of certain cultural products.8 These products are often seen as taking 
on a life of their own, apart from the very social processes that created them. For example, in 
                                                 
7 For example, the peace process, developments within and around higher education, and the marketization of 
research. 
8 Like the emergence of a specific epistemic community, research emphasis on aspects of knowledge, the 
knowledge industry, and transitioning lines between politics, power, and academia.  
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looking at knowledge carriers there is a precedent set in Marx’s critiques of religion. In this 
analysis Marx claimed that “the foundation of irreligious criticism is this: man makes religion; 
religion does not make man” (Marx & O'Malley, 1970, p. 131). But this does not mean that 
religion doesn’t matter. The asocial quality that religion takes on must itself be understood as 
produced socially by humans. This is because “religion is, in fact, the self-consciousness and 
self-esteem of man who has either not yet gained himself or has lost himself again. . . this state, 
this society, produce religion, which is an inverted world-consciousness because they are an 
inverted world” (ibid.).  
This line of reasoning also applies to scientific knowledge and its carriers, the religion 
and priests of conventional societies (Althusser, 2001). Academics make up the academy. But 
while the individuals make up the whole, this doesn’t mean that the whole can’t exert influence 
on the individual. The academics studying Northern Ireland (and academics generally), the 
knowledge they produce, and the institutions they belong to are often seen as existing beyond 
the fray of disputing social interests. This research seeks to deconstruct these myths. By saying 
this, it sides with scholars such as Lynch & Fuhrman (1991), who argued that the alleged 
“objectivity” and “impartiality” of science is itself a datum in need of explanation. The roles 
of knowledge carriers do not fully conform to deterministic laws, nor are they always self-
consciously and successfully able to pursue their interests. This study acknowledges that these 
“men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it 
under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, 
given and transmitted from the past” (Marx, 2005, p. 103).  
This challenges the naïve views concerning actors espoused in some of the new 
sociology of knowledge programs. For example, programs emphasizing laboratory studies 
have focused on the locally constructed character of knowledge, underestimating the extent to 
which actors, though able to engage their culture in an active manner, still cannot avoid 
responding to the historical and disciplinary contexts in which they find themselves (K. Knorr-
Cetina, 1999; K. D. Knorr-Cetina, 2007; Latour & Woolgar, 1986; William T Lynch & 
Fuhrman, 1991). This research sees context and structure affecting what it is an actor “freely 
decides” to do. One must acknowledge it is similarly naïve, though, to assume that actors will 
easily be able to decide what their interests are and successfully pursue them. The social and 
historical conflicts and contradictions existing in a society at any given time can and often do 
hide actors’ real interests and/or threaten their conscious intentions to pursue them. The risk 
here is of overemphasizing the extent to which ideas produced by a society tend to uniformly 
support the “ruling class”, to borrow a term from the Marxist lexicon. Yet to this point one 
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recalls research by Fuller (2002), who revealed that ideas produced to support one set of 
interests can and are often used to support another, even opposed set of interests. The position 
here is then that knowledge and its carriers are not detached from social interests, but rather 
that an understanding of these actors, their emergence, and how that knowledge is developed 
and evolves over time is made possible by discovering their interests, how they conflict, and at 
times coincide.  
ARGUMENTS 
Having said all of this, this research aims to test and argue several positions. It acknowledges 
the obvious fact that the advent of the Troubles complicated British and Irish intellectuals’ 
engagement with the Northern Ireland issue. Given the localized nature of the conflict and 
academics’ close geographic and social proximity to it would have likely caused any of their 
findings or positions concerning the Troubles to be seen as subjective, polemic, and/or partisan. 
Such positions and research could have been viewed as supporting one or the other partisans. 
viewpoints. This would have caused reputational harm to intellectuals, and potentially also 
physical harm. However, with onset of the peace process and the engagement of some scholars 
such a Brendan O’Leary and John McGarry with consociationalism provided an opportunity 
to overcome such obstacles. This is our first assumption, that the onset of the peace process 
and scholars’ engagement with consociationalism provided the necessary boundary objects that 
allowed intellectuals to address and debate the various aspects of the conflict without risk of 
falling into the ideological pitfalls. 
Next, because of the localized nature of the Northern Ireland conflict and its proximity 
to the U.K. and Ireland, the conflict was viewed as a regional dispute, anomalous and unique 
to the U.K. and Ireland. The localized and, according to some (Cox, 1997), provincial way in 
which the conflict was understood was further complicated by the existing international 
conflict management norms of the time. In the context of the Cold War international conflict 
management took place on a self-help basis (Crawford, 2000). Here it is also important to 
highlight the fact that the dominant intellectual consensus on Northern Ireland was that the 
conflict had no solution (Guelke, 1994; R. Rose, 1976a). This changed with the ending of the 
Cold War and the internationalization of conflict resolution.  
This research argues that these events changed the general intellectual and political 
habitus towards and paradigms for approaching conflict management. One of the main 
consequences of this was that many conflicts previously seen as regional or civil wars were 
now understood and treated as international conflicts that should be placed in and understood 
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in a comparative framework (O’Leary, 2015). With these shifts academics began to understand, 
approach, and research the conflict in Northern Ireland in a different way. The 
internationalization of conflict management also had the consequence of raising the profile of 
academics who researched and/or attempted to study the Northern Ireland conflict as new 
resources (and a wider audience) emerged.  
This coincided with the mass expansion of higher education in the U.K. and Ireland. 
The advent of neo-liberal education reforms in the 1980s and 1990s introduced new forms of 
“managerialism” in higher education, shifting the culture of universities from institutions of 
public learning to what some have called “academic enterprises”(Dunne, 2013; K. Lynch, 
Grummell, & Devine, 2012). The emergence of the Northern Ireland epistemic community 
began in the early 1990s. It further coalesced with the signing of the Belfast Good Friday 
Agreement of 1998. And following the signing of the Agreement and within the context a 
rapidly changing university environment, the utility offered by consociationalism, comparative 
methods, and the peace process aided in the expansion of the Northern Ireland epistemic 
community.  
THESIS LAYOUT 
To present its findings, the first chapter of this research begins with a survey of the literature 
and debates around Northern Ireland. This includes a survey of the fundamental ideas 
associated with consociation theory and the various debates that arose out of its application to 
the Northern Ireland conflict both before and leading up to the Agreement. By looking at the 
literature which has arisen following the implementation of the Agreement it shows the shift 
in the emphasis of academic focus from historical interpretations and debates regarding 
consociationalism to an emphasis on interpreting and explaining the success of the Agreement 
and the peace process which has followed. This section of the chapter reveals that though the 
scholarship on Northern Ireland following the Agreement has been painstaking in its efforts to 
explain and analyse various aspects of the Northern Ireland peace process and the ongoing 
peace building transition taking place in the region, there has been lack of focus and analysis 
on the transition of the academics and policymakers involved in this process. This will be 
accompanied by a general outline and review of the literature surrounding the role, nature, and 
study of knowledge in the social sciences. A review of this literature is important as this 
research is interested in the ways by which knowledge is produced in an academic discipline 
and how external forces might affect, shape, and link both knowledge and its producers. 
 31 
This is folded in with the further conceptualizing of the boundary object. This thesis 
will be putting forward modifications to the interessement model discussed by Latour, Callon, 
and Law (Callon, 1999; Callon & Law, 1997; Latour, 1981, 1988; Law, 1986), urging a more 
holistic approach. It looks to utilize this concept in a way which displays that disciplines such 
as political science, much like the politics they study, are often marked by and develop 
alongside great internal conflict. 
Chapter 2 lays out and details the method used for this research. At its very core this 
method is nothing more than a tool. This tool will act to “keep us erect while we navigate a 
terrain that moves and shifts as we attempt to pass through it” (Burawoy, 2009, p. 19). The tool 
utilized is a reflective method that uses narrative interviews. The structure of these interviews 
allows respondents to give their own account – to tell a story – of the various stages of their 
professional and personal development as a means of extracting the general from the unique 
or, rather, using the “micro” to account for the “macro” (Burawoy, 2009). In doing this it will 
also display the utility of employing such a technique.  
The substantive chapters of this text will first look at what I call the “pre-epistemic 
community” period of the 1970s and 1980s. This is Chapter 3. This chapter will focus on the 
academic and political environment surrounding the study of Northern Ireland during this time. 
It aims to investigate why and how, irrespective of the various peace processes taking place 
during this period, no apparent epistemic community emerged. This will be supported using 
both interview materials and empirical evidence found (or rather not found) in publications 
emanating from the U.K. and Ireland. In this section, the argument will be put forward that 
irrespective of the peace processes taking place there was no clear episteme in relation to the 
study of Northern Ireland. This chapter will show that though no community existed regarding 
the study of Northern Ireland that the emergence and presence of a small cluster of actors 
existed. These scholars, though seen as an “eccentricity” (English, 2015), were writing on and 
addressing the issues concerning the North Ireland conflict. This chapter will therefore look at 
the influence of such actors on the creation and emergence of the epistemic community that 
developed later.  
Chapter 4 will focus on the emergence and development of the epistemic community 
during the late 1980s and into the 1990s leading up to the signing of the Agreement. Focusing 
specifically on the development of the peace process, changes in the academic and political 
environment, and the emergence of the various debates concerning solutions to the Northern 
Ireland issue. The goal here is to identify and address the central research question: How and 
why does an epistemic community emerge? But also, this chapter looks to identify and point to 
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the greater socio-political changes taking place around academia in the U.K. and Ireland. It 
will identify and outline distinctions between the two areas as well as how this changing 
political and social environment affected academics and the political science discipline. It also 
seeks to analyse how academics are able (or unable) to navigate their own personal/political 
ties and background with Northern Ireland and how and if these variables impact their research.  
Chapter 5 will focus on the community as it exists today and where it goes from here. 
It looks at the implications of the changing academic environment and the impact of variables 
such as the REF, the new managerialism of academic institutions, and increasing pressures 
regarding funding on research and researchers. The aim here will be to display the robustness 
of the boundary object in helping scholars adapt to such a changing environment. This will 
include its implications for the epistemic community and its evolution as the Northern Ireland 
case has increasingly becomes folded into wider discussions of conflict management. 
 Chapter 6 of this dissertation will address the notion of insiders and outsiders and the 
utility of the boundary object in bridging the two together. This discussion will largely be 
focused on the internal dynamics – and tensions – of the epistemic community. The aim will 
be to elicit further insights into the state of the “community” around this community. Whereas 
the other chapters are largely focused on addressing the central question of this thesis – how 
and why does an epistemic community emerge? – this chapter looks to investigate the 
boundaries of this community, as well as how members determine their (as well as others’) 
position(s) as an insider and outsider in relation to Northern Ireland and the members of the 
epistemic community.  
 Chapter 7 will be the conclusion of this text. It looks to review and re-assert the 
fundamental arguments and findings of this dissertation as well as address its limitations and 




LITERATURE REVIEW & THEORY 
 
INTRODUCTION  
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the knowledge surrounding the subject of Northern 
Ireland in the discipline of political science. But in looking at Northern Ireland one must look 
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at the study of knowledge more generally. In looking at Northern Ireland, though, it should be 
made clear that the aim here is not to engage in a historical revision of the Troubles or the 
Northern Ireland peace process. This research does not wish to engage with the various 
historical (re)interpretations of the conflict, nor is it interested in “root” causes or conditions of 
the conflict. Neither does it look to position itself within the debates concerning the 
consociational makeup and effectiveness of the Agreement and the peace process which has 
followed. This has been done and will continue to be done for some time (For notable examples 
see: Horowitz, 2002; John McGarry & O'Leary, 2004; Taylor, 2009a). But this research will 
use this literature on Northern Ireland to assist in the overall aim of this project. This is to 
understand and uncover the processes, practices, and shifts in political science that explain the 
emergence of the Northern Ireland epistemic community.9 
Firstly, this chapter looks at the ideas associated with consociation theory. It looks at 
the various debates (and complications) that arose out of its application to the Northern Ireland 
conflict both before and leading up to the Agreement. This work is important as it displays a 
series of intellectual shifts that have occurred prior to peace process as well as those following 
the implementation of the Agreement. The next step is to confront the role, nature, and study 
of the key piece to this research puzzle: knowledge. This is the literature on the sociology of 
knowledge. This literature is essential, as the ways by which knowledge is produced and how 
external forces affect and shape that production and its producers is key to understanding how 
and why an epistemic community emerges. This study particularly looks at the ways in which 
the relationship between knowledge, power, and politics has been explored and, in doing so, 
raises question regarding the ways these relationships might affect intellectuals’ choice and 
production of knowledge. In doing this it will highlight influence of Bourdieu on this literature 
and its emphasis on intellectual choice as being based on the pursuit of intellectual status. In 
doing this the aim is to highlight the need for alternative understandings. Specifically, arguing 
for alternatives that consider that intellectuals’ individualized stories of selfhood may 
sometimes centre on their position in intellectual fields or other aspects of their reputations, 
but that academics’ considerations of status do not usually comprise the entirety of such 
narratives. Lastly, this chapter will develop its theoretical concept for explaining how and why 
                                                 
9 Recall from the introduction that this thesis utilizes Haas’ (1990, 1999; 2014) notion of “epistemic 
communities”, which constitutes “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a 
particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area” 
(1989, 1992). 
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the Northern Ireland epistemic community developed and what made this possible. This is the 
boundary object concept.   
NORTHERN IRELAND 
Northern Ireland is one of many examples of democratization, since the fall of Soviet Union, 
which has sought to utilize international support and intervention as a means of ending and 
managing protracted ethno-national conflict. These efforts at conflict management have 
adopted various theories of democratization. Northern Ireland is an example of a top-down 
approach that utilizes political accommodation mechanisms (Taylor, 2009a, p. 16). Similar 
approaches can be found in the South African (Taylor, 1992) and Bosnian peace agreements 
(Sandler & Schoenbrod, 2003), to name a few.   
This literature has been informed greatly by theories utilizing “internal” democratic 
mechanisms for managing conflict groups in divided areas. Consociationalism is one of most 
influential among these. Arend Lijphart developed this theory through his investigation of 
democratic stability in the divided Dutch political system (Lijphart, 1969). Consociationalism 
has since been an important evolution in conflict regulation theory. It is rooted in the thinking 
of Carl J. Friedrich (1950), E. E. Schattschneider (1960), and Bernard Crick (1962), who 
stressed the idea that both conflict and reconciliation are essential to the democratic process.  
For Lijphart, the Dutch example was evidence that conflict could be institutionalized 
into an existing political system as a means of creating peace and stability in divided societies. 
Liphart’s findings were consistent with previous research in the United States by David B. 
Truman (1951) who attributed the vitality of American democratic institutions to the citizens’ 
“multiple membership in potential groups” (p. 514). Similarly, Seymour Martin Lipset (1963) 
identified stable political relationships in America as having “crosscutting politically relevant 
associations” (p. 88). And Robert A. Dahl (1961) observed that democratic stability requires a 
commitment to democratic values or rules, not a commitment on the part of the electorate at 
large but on the part of the professional politicians who are connected through effective ties of 
political organization, that is, on the part of elites. These ideas have formed the basis for 
consociational – also known as power sharing – thinking and is foundational for 
democratization and conflict management theory and practices not only in Northern Ireland 
but in Iraq, Kurdistan, Sri Lanka, Israel/Palestine, Cyprus, Bosnia, Macedonia, Lebanon, and, 
more recently, Colombia (Sriram, 2008). 
The utility of these ideas is that many can and do work harmoniously with each other 
and also be held independently (Rustow, 1970). This synthesis has resulted in an enormous 
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body of writing that spans across political science and its subdisciplines. Dahl (1956), for 
instance, was one of the first to propose that in a polyarchy – system where minorities rule – 
the policies of successive governments tend to fall within a broad range of majority consensus. 
This thinking was revolutionary at the time, as it departed with the preoccupation with 
consensus in the World War II years. It accepted that democracy is a process of 
“accommodation” involving a combination of “division and cohesion” and of “conflict and 
consent” (Dahl, 1967; Rustow, 1970). 
Liphart’s application of his specific theory began as a critique of Gabriel Almond’s 
typology of democratic systems. Almond asserted that division in a democracy would lead to 
institutional instability and result in conflict. Lijphart claimed, however, that the history of 
Dutch democracy suggested something different. Again, he asserted that despite the 
Netherlands’ long history of religious and class cleavages, Dutch institutions prevailed. 
Lijphart concluded that Almond’s analysis failed to recognize that elite cooperation could 
result in long-term settlements and political stability. The term consociational democracy was 
coined in his later work, which utilized the term “power-sharing” more broadly to encapsulate 
various forms of consociationalism (Lijphart, 1977).  
Lijphart’s consociational model for democracy contains four main features: (1) “grand 
coalitions”, (2) “mutual veto”, (3) “proportionality”, and (4) segmental autonomy. In addition 
to this Lijphart lists other “favorable conditions” that might incline divided societies to adopt 
the consociation model. These include items such as numerical balance among groups, a multi-
party system with dominant parties in each segment, small-country, crosscutting cleavages, 
overarching loyalties, and a tradition of elite accommodation (Lijphart, 1977).   
When Lijphart began applying this theory to the Northern Ireland case he noted that 
consociation principles were already present in its previous failed peace attempts, such as the 
Sunningdale Agreement of 1973–1974. Regardless of its failure, Northern Ireland was 
evidence that governments can promote consociation in certain circumstances (Lijphart, 
1975a). This application to Northern Ireland came under immediate criticism. Brian Barry 
(1975) noted that Lijphart’s “favourable conditions” were rarely fulfilled in areas of ethno-
national conflict. For this reason, consociation theory was not applicable to deeply divided 
societies like Northern Ireland. In areas of ethno-national conflict the differences and divisions 
are not only based on classic internal European ideological cleavages (i.e. like those in the 
Netherlands or Belgium) but over ethnic divisions that question the very existence of the state 
and are often affected and influenced by external actors (Barry, 1975, pp. 499-505). Lijphart’s 
attention to “internal” settlements were said to fall into a “territory trap” – assuming ethno-
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national societies agree with their territorial borders. Because Lijphart made no important 
distinction between polities that were linguistically, ethno-nationally, or religiously divided, 
scholars argued that Northern Ireland primarily experienced a self-determination dispute 
spanning two states, and that this diagnosis was crucial, for both an accurate explanation and 
compelling solutions to the conflict (John McGarry & O'Leary, 1995).  
Lijphart’s theoretical application to Northern Ireland faced a much greater problem 
though. This was the prevailing intellectual and social paradigm which saw the region’s 
conflict as one with no enduring solution. At the time Lijphart began applying his theory to 
Northern Ireland, neither intellectuals or elites believed a consociational (or any other) model 
would offer a solution to the conflict (For example, Guelke, 1994; R. Rose, 1971, 1976a; 
Whyte, 1990). Lijphart himself admitted that though a consociational model was the best fit 
for Northern Ireland, it wasn’t likely to work given the longevity of the conflict and the regions 
culture of division (Cox, 1997; Lijphart, 1975a). Though the discussions were earnest about 
different “solutions” to the problem – from power-sharing and joint authority, to legislating for 
equal rights and integrated education – none of them seemed viable in light of events on the 
ground and prevailing intellectual paradigms (J. Ruane & Todd, 1996). Because of the depth 
of the divide between the two communities and the fact that the costs of the conflict were never 
enough to force either of the protagonists to the negotiating table led many scholars to conclude 
that the conflict in Northern Ireland would persist indefinitely (Cox, 1997; O'Malley, 1993).  
And, from an international point of view, the Troubles took place during the Cold War. 
International relations scholars such as Waltz (2008) have noted that during this time nation 
states took a “self-help” approach to international conflict resolution. Nations by and large 
stayed out of the internal affairs of others nations to avoid major conflicts that might ultimately 
involve the two dominant superpowers of the time (Waltz, 2008). Yet even after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and following the settlement of other regional disputes in the 1990s, 
intellectuals remained unoptimistic regarding Northern Ireland. One prominent academic 
lamented that in spite of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the wave of democratization taking 
place across the globe, and the possibility of achieving true peace in the Middle East and South 
Africa, such good fortune was probably beyond the realm of possibility in Northern Ireland 
(Guelke, 1994). This sense of what has been termed “widespread despair” based on “solid 
empirical foundations” was perpetuated by the belief that the main culprits of the conflict – the 
Provisional IRA – either could not or would not call off its campaign of military violence (B. 
O'Leary & McGarry, 1993, p. 325).  
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Then John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary published The Future of Northern Ireland 
(1990b) with the aim of laying out the case for consociationalism in Northern Ireland. They 
specifically used consociationalism as a means of taking on the dominant paradigm that “the 
problem with Northern Ireland is that there is no solution” (R. Rose, 1976a, p. 139). This 
sparked a series of debates and controversies. The pair first began by re-evaluating the merits 
of consociationalism to Northern Ireland (See: B. O'Leary, 1989b; B. O'Leary & McGarry, 
1990).  
Looking at O’Leary & McGarry’s work one can see striking parallels with Lijphart’s 
(1968) “politics of accommodation” model. Their modification to Lijphart’s theory makes a 
point to address previous criticisms by emphasizing the ethno-national nature of the conflict, 
noting that elites in Northern Ireland are not interested in assimilating the “other” group, at 
least in the short-term (John McGarry & O'Leary, 1995; B. O'Leary & McGarry, 1993). For 
this reason, McGarry and O’Leary emphasize the need for creating conditions which allow 
elite maneuverability regarding national allegiances through shared sovereignty, not as a 
transitional arrangement to a united Ireland or United Kingdom but as a durable settlement that 
could be changed only by weighted majorities (John McGarry & O'Leary, 1995, 1996; B. 
O'Leary, 1993; B. O'Leary & McGarry, 1993). The aim of this is not to allow one group to 
oppress another but to achieve equality and proportionality between divided communities. 
They argue that this results in the eroding of discrimination and unrestrained majority control 
while also permitting cultural autonomy (John McGarry & O'Leary, 1996; B. O'Leary & 
McGarry, 1993).  
Yet this theory was not without its critics in its application. Opponents of the model 
primarily argued that the consociational framework propagated the very divisions it was 
supposed to be disentangling. Paul Dixon (1996), for example, argued that such elite-centred 
models actually promote a non-representative form of democracy that would enhance 
hostilities between various ethnic groups by institutionalizing the segregation of the 
populations. Consociationalism was therefore seen as rejecting the “one community” approach 
to politics offered by Northern Ireland’s existing political centre (Evans & Tonge, 2003). And 
scholars such as Dixon went so far as to argue that, given the intermixed nature of the ethno-
national groups in Northern Ireland, consociationalism would result in a form of “ethnic 
cleansing” which segregationist models such as these could be seen as condoning (Paul Dixon, 
1996).   
By institutionalizing ethno-national cleavages in Northern Ireland many argued that the 
Agreement would ensure that, at least in the formalized political arena, possibilities for 
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cultivating a political atmosphere that supersede ethnic divisiveness would be greatly hindered 
(McCann, 1993; McGovern, 1997; Wilford, 1992a). Similarly, scholars such as Wilford 
(1992a) argued that because the consociationalist supporters assume that ethno-nationalisms 
are primordial and exclusive, rather than relational, they advanced “a rather bleak view of 
humanity” and threatened to cast such divisions in stone (p. 31). 
 The debates became increasingly hostile between advocates of the differing 
prescriptions for the conflict, prime examples being those between Paul Dixon, Brendan 
O’Leary, and John McGarry in journals such as Irish Political Studies (See: Paul Dixon, 1996; 
John McGarry & O'Leary, 1996).10 These debates weren’t limited to the dispute between two 
or three individuals, though. Rather they formed a staple of the political diet for many in 
Northern Ireland throughout the 1990s. Its framework was not just condemned by and debated 
between academics but by Irish republicans, by unionists, and by the political parties that 
represented what they insisted was the “middle ground” between the two ethno-national blocs 
(e.g. members of the Alliance, Democratic Left, and the Women’s Coalition) (See for example: 
J. McGarry & O'Leary, 2006).  
O’Leary and McGarry were seen as, among other things, developing an “uncritical 
acceptance of the primacy and permanency of ethnicity” (Taylor, 1994). Several scholars 
maintained that a consociation would not resolve the conflict but instead would 
“institutionalize” divisions, casting them in “marble” (Rooney, 1998). Its basic principles were 
seen as incompatible with democratic stability and, therefore, a consociational democracy in 
Northern Ireland would be “impermanent”, “dysfunctional”, and “unworkable” and was 
declared a “macabre” parody of “real democracy” (McCartney, 2000). And some went so far 
as to claim that consociationalists – especially O’Leary – were “segregationists”, whose 
message could be “condoning… ethnic cleansing” (Paul Dixon, 1996; P. Dixon, 1998). 
Viewing the Northern Ireland conflict in this way was seen by many scholars as “presumptive, 
inscriptive and far from progressive” (See arguments in: Taylor, 2006, p. 223). While its 
supporters, such as O’Leary (1999), asserted that such claims are “either utopian, myopic, 
partisan or a combination of all three” (Found in: McGovern, 2000, p. 141).  
Yet irrespective of these disagreements there is one consensus among these academics 
– that consocationalism has played a central part in Northern Ireland’s intellectual and political 
discourse. The evidence of this can be found in the fact scholars have developed a name for 
these debates. They call it Northern Ireland’s “meta-conflict” – the intellectual debates about 
                                                 
10 Other such debates can be found in (Paul Dixon, 1997a; Gilligan & Tonge, 1997; McGovern, 1997, 2000). 
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the nature of the conflict and developing the appropriate prescriptions to tackle it (John 
McGarry & O'Leary, 1995, pp. 320-326, 334-338). Proponents of the theory point to its success 
as it has widely been exported for establishing power-sharing agreements in various divided 
societies,11 also, pointing out the success of Northern Irish political parties negotiating a 
consociation. The achievement of the Belfast Good Friday Agreement in 1998 certainly 
confronted criticisms against consociationalism which claimed that it is only achievable in 
societies where divisions are moderate (For example, Horowitz, 2002). They advocate that the 
framework of the Agreement, and its subsequent success, has reversed the trends of criticisms 
against political science by scholars such as Thomas A. Spragens (1973) and David M. Ricci 
(1984). These individuals claimed that political science has long suffered from a shortage of 
useful findings or meaningful research. The success and endurance of the Agreement and the 
consociational principles that underpin it demonstrate that the discipline has created something 
that matters. Critics and advocates of the theory agree that it has created the necessary links 
between empirical enquiry and normative theory (Munck & Snyder, 2007; Taylor, 2008, 
2009a). 
In lieu of the Agreement and following the apparent success of consociationalism, one 
notices a shift in the scholarship on Northern Ireland. Before the Agreement and the process 
that led to it, Northern Ireland was widely seen as a region plagued by conflict with no solution 
in sight. During this time analyses focused on explaining the root causes of the conflict, 
discussions which largely took place between historians rather than political scientists (English, 
2015). Then, as we have discussed with the onset of the peace process and the application of 
consociationalism political scientists in the region focused discussions on the merits of various 
“power-sharing” models. From there the analyses have shifted to those that emphasize and 
explain the importance of “external” state relations as a way of explaining the successful 
implementation of the Agreement. These approaches have sought to expand on the existing 
consociational framework, placing emphasis on the links between the “internal” power-sharing 
elements and the “external” variables of intergovernmentalism as way of examining and 
explaining the Northern Ireland peace process (Sircar, 2006). Such approaches draw on the 
frameworks found in the comparative politics literature as well as writings on nationalism.  
As an example, Stefan Wolff’s (2003) examination of the roles that “external” powers 
played in the power-sharing settlements in Northern Ireland, as well as a breadth of other case 
                                                 
11 For example, other power-sharing models have been utilized and compared with Northern Ireland in places 
such as Bosnia & Macedonia (J. McEvoy, 2015), Iraq (Nations, 2004), and Lebanon (M. Kerr, 2006).  
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studies. Wolff’s work reflects the influence on research by Rogers Brubaker (1996), which 
utilized a triptych understanding of ethno-national conflicts. Wolff’s theoretical framework 
focuses on the ethno-territorial nature of cross-border conflict by examining the external 
conditions that ensure the long-term stability of a settlement. Wolff pays a considerable amount 
of attention to the role the international community plays in ending conflict. Out of this 
framework he offers three possible explanations for stable solutions: (1) Internal settlements, 
either through integration or consociation; (2) External settlement, secession/irredenta – 
implying a change in the sovereignty over a debated territory; (3) Bilateral settlements – 
consociation with permanent and formal external involvement along with a democratized 
condominium – a system where a territory is ruled by two or more nations. Condominium is a 
possibility when the definitive aims of both groups are at such opposite extremes with respect 
to one another that there are only a limited number of possibilities for jointly executing 
territorial power sharing (Kogej, 2006; Sircar, 2006, pp. 17-20; Wolff, 2003, pp. 217-243).  
Wolff presents the Northern Ireland settlement as a consociation with the permanent 
institutional involvement of the external ethnic minority’s kin-states – Ireland and the United 
Kingdom – that was reached through the Agreement in 1998. The involvement of the U.S. and 
the EU furthered external pressures exerted on both communities, allowing a political 
agreement to be reached. Wolff’s interpretation presents Northern Ireland within a now popular 
comparative analysis of various other settlements that had proven to be successful. 
This comparative theme has been overwhelmingly adopted by academics in Northern 
Ireland and beyond. Michael Kerr’s (2006) examination of the power-sharing agreements in 
Northern Ireland and Lebanon is an example. Regarding Northern Ireland, Kerr concludes that 
regional stability was supported by the “intergovernmental unity of purpose” represented by 
the London–Dublin joint strategy for settling the region’s constitutional dispute between 
“British” and “Irish” ethno-national aspirations (M. Kerr, 2006). This work brings together the 
connections between “external” intergovernmentalism and “internal” power-sharing as means 
of explaining the peace process.     
While Sicar (2006) expanded consideration of ethno-territorial conflicts – Northern 
Ireland and Bosnia – in which there are two conflict groups with corresponding “reference 
states”. “Reference states” are internationally recognized states with co-nationals residing in a 
disputed territory. Arguing that much of the focus on Northern Ireland has centred on elite 
accommodation within the conflict zone, viewing other agents as “external” to the dispute. The 
settlement following the Agreement exhibits the traits of transnational consociation, with the 
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strong intergovernmental Dublin–London axis acting as the reliable long-term guarantors of 
the settlement (Sircar, 2006).  
A more recent example is Joanne McEvoy’s (2015) investigation of international 
organizations and institutional rules in promoting cooperation between political elites 
representing the contending groups in divided societies – Northern Ireland, Macedonia, and 
Bosnia. McEvoy argues that Northern Ireland, alongside the others, offers a prescriptive 
example of how internal and external incentives provide a unique political space of joint 
governance or accommodation – consociation – between political elites. The success of 
Northern Ireland’s consociation is the outcome of multilateral bargaining among internal and 
external actors. The bargaining over rewards (e.g. arms decommissioning, devolution, and all-
Ireland institutions) and compliance with external incentives for power sharing ultimately 
helped elites negotiate the constitutional issue (J. McEvoy, 2015).     
 The emphasis on analysis and explanation of the peace process and its success is not 
limited to book and article publications. It is also reflected in the PhD research projects that 
focus on Northern Ireland in the post-Agreement period. Dissertations emanating from U.K. 
and Irish institutions have produced a number of research projects that look to explain the 
success of the peace process by looking at the design of executive formation under the 
Agreement (J. McEvoy, 2006), building and sustaining trust in local district councils alongside 
the structural reforms arising from the Agreement (Goldie, 2008), the role of exogenous actors 
– such as British, Irish, and U.S. officials – in providing incentives and disincentives to share 
power (Clancy, 2010), and the role of third-party mediators in implementing various stages of 
the Agreement (Walsh, 2014). Yet this is only the tip of the iceberg. Peer-reviewed articles 
published in leading Irish, British, and North American academic journals examining and 
comparing the merits of the Northern Ireland model and various aspects power sharing in the 
last decade alone number almost three hundred. These figures are visualised in Table 2 below.12 
Table 2: Articles Comparing Northern Ireland’s Power-Sharing Model to other Regions 
Since 2006 
                                                 
12 The chart displays only peer-reviewed articles, in major political science journals, from the U.K., Ireland, the 
United States, and Canada, from 2006–2016. The publications are specifically about the topic of Northern Ireland 
and power-sharing. It should be noted that in these articles Northern Ireland may not be central topic but its model 
is the central point of (favourable) comparison for other countries related to power-sharing. Again with this chart 
publications from PSI were excluded given the journals (lack) of international ranking and due to complicaitons 
with factors concerning impact as referenced in table 1.1.   
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In addition to the articles published on the success of power-sharing in Northern 
Ireland, a multitude of research centres have been established throughout the U.K. and Ireland 
since the Agreement. Many of these enterprises have focused their efforts on research 
pertaining to power-sharing and comparative applications of aspects of the Northern Ireland 
case to areas such as the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Southeast Asia as means of 
successful peace building (see Table 2.1). Many institutes, such as the Centre for the Study of 
Divided Society at Kings College London, see themselves as platforms and flagships for the 
development of scholarly enterprises to further knowledge on ethnic-conflict regulation, peace 
processes, third-party intervention and truth and reconciliation processes (Kings, 2016). And, 
as with many of these institutes, Northern Ireland is at the centre of these analyses. Research 
efforts on Northern Ireland are therefore aimed at explaining the success of the peace process 
in Northern Ireland, identifying the variables that made it possible, and placing them in a 
comparable context (For example: Drake & McCulloch, 2011; John McGarry & O’Leary, 
2007; McGlynn, Tonge, & McAuley, 2014; Rice & Somerville, 2013; Tannam, 2012).  
Table 2.1: List of Research Institutes & Centres Established in the U.K. and Republic of 
Ireland Since 1998 
University Research Organization Year Est Location 
Trinity College Dublin  Centre for Post-Conflict Justice  2009 
Republic of 
Ireland 
University College Dublin Institute for British Irish Studies  1999 
Republic of 
Ireland 
Dublin City University Institute for International Conflict Resolution and Reconstruction 2012 
Republic of 
Ireland 
National University of Ireland, Galway  Whitaker Institute for Innovation and Societal Change 2012 
Republic of 
Ireland 
National University of Ireland, Maynooth  The Edward M Kennedy Institute for Conflict Intervention 2012 
Republic of 
Ireland 
Queens University Belfast 























2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Source: ProQuest (2016)
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Ulster University  Transitional Justice Institute 2003 
Northern 
Ireland 
St Andrews Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies  2005 Scotland 
Surrey The Centre for International Intervention 2011 England  
Birmingham Institute for Conflict, Cooperation and Security (ICCS) 2012 England 
Kings College London Centre for the Study of Divided Societies 2013 England  
Kent Conflict Analysis Research Centre 2005 England  
Liverpool  Tony Blair Chair in Irish Studies (within Institute of Irish Studies) 2008 England  
 
This above table displays some 13 organizations established in the last 18 years in the 
U.K. and Ireland. Five of these 13 organizations were set up in 2012 alone and more than half 
of these institutes have been established in Ireland and Northern Ireland. The importance of 
research pertaining to power-sharing and comparative applications of aspects of the Northern 
Ireland case to these institutes is displayed not only in their inception but also in the funding 
they have received from the governments. The Tony Blair Chair at University of Liverpool (est 
2008) is an example of this. Despite being established during the onset of the global financial 
crises and during a time of dramatic austerity measures in the Republic of Ireland, the Blair 
Chair received a €7.5 million grant from the Irish government. This grant displayed the 
governments recognition of the necessity and centrality of Irish Studies and understanding the 
peace-building programmes within communities experiencing conflict (Purcell, 2008).  
The literature on the peace process from its initiation in the early 1990s until the signing 
of the Agreement reveals several things. The first is the aforementioned intellectual schisms 
arising between academics who adopted different approaches and perspectives in their 
interpretations of the Troubles and their mixed, and sometimes hostile, responses to the 
proposed power-sharing agreements. A prime of example of the hostile positions taken 
between the differing academic interpretations of the conflict and animosities over different 
prescriptions for the conflict can be seen in the debates between Paul Dixon, Brendan O’Leary, 
and John McGarry in journals such as Irish Political Studies (B. O'Leary, McGarry, & Ṣāliḥ, 
2005).13 Yet the differences over consociational versus civil society and integrationist 
approaches to conflict resolution were only some of the cleavages between academics during 
this time (Paul Dixon, 1996, 1997a, 1997b; John McGarry & O'Leary, 1996; N. Porter & 
Aughey, 1997). Other areas of dispute were focused on issues like whether security efforts 
designed to alter allegiances of militaries and paramilitaries could be successful (McSweeney 
& Smith, 1996), perceptions of Northern Ireland as a part of greater neo-liberal peace agendas 
                                                 
13 Other debates can be found between Paul Dixon (1996) and McGarry & O’Leary (1996) in Irish Political 
Studies.   
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(Crighton, 1998; Lipschutz et al., 1998), and the role of potential third party actors in mediating 
the Agreement (Arthur, 1997; Byrne, 1995; MacGinty, 1997; O'Clery & Guelke, 1997). These 
are only a few of the examples.  
What is important about these disputes is not that they took place. Academics arguing 
is hardly unique to either Northern Ireland or political science literature. Rather, what is needs 
highlighting is the way they fell to the wayside following the success of the Agreement. 
Looking at this literature in the post-Agreement era there was, and continues to be, a 
widespread theme whereby the Agreement became the framework for peace in Northern 
Ireland (and beyond). Today, the Agreement is the centrepiece of political and conflict analysis 
in the region and a piece of public policy that almost every academic in the field of political 
science goes along with.14 The nexus of this acceptance centers on scholar’s acknowledgement 
that through the Agreement’s multi‐ layered institutional power-sharing arrangements, a 
unique political space for the people of Northern Ireland has been created. This arrangement 
has allowed the region to gain greater autonomy and has, in turn, created significant cross‐
border opportunities for co‐ operation (P. Bew, 2006; Evans & Tonge, 2003; Hazelton, 2000; 
Kaufmann & Patterson, 2006; John McGarry & Bose, 2002; J. Ruane & Todd, 2001; Tannam, 
2001).   
It should be made clear here that whether the impact and effectiveness of the Agreement 
has been debated or not within and between the various disciplines is not under question (For 
examples see: Coakley, 2011; Paul Dixon, 2013; Ginty, Muldoon, & Ferguson, 2007; 
Horowitz, 2002; Mac Ginty, 2006; John McGarry & O'Leary, 2004; Robin  Wilson, 2009). Yet 
even these debates fall within research themes that look at the theoretical merits and critiques 
of consociationalism (and consociationalists) and its influence on the peace process. Yet 
nowhere within these debates do the constitutional merits of the Agreement come into question. 
Since the Agreement was implemented it has been widely embraced and overwhelmingly 
endorsed by the academic and political community. Scholars and politicians like Lord 
Professor Paul Bew, David Trimble as well as a host of others acknowledged that “the 
Agreement ‘ended the Cold War’ within the Island of Ireland” (Belfast Telegraph, 2013). Even 
the most ardent critics of consociationalism note that they “never questioned the merits of the 
                                                 
14 There are dissenting opinions and critics of the Agreement and the peace process who reject both it and the 
literature on it on the basis that the political class simply act(ed) to reinforce Northern Ireland’s union with the 
United Kingdom, at the expense of Irish Republicanism, and aims to further greater neo-liberal economic agendas. 
Yet these views are not expressed within the mainstream of academic writing but can be found in alternative 
sources such as The Blanket and The Pensive Quill and often by individuals who do hold doctorates in political 
science but do not hold positions within academic institutions (e.g. Anthony McIntyre, 2008; O Ruairc, 2014).  
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Agreement. It’s great. I just argue that the Agreement isn’t a consociational one” (Dixon, 
2015). The point is that the characterization of the Northern Ireland conflict and the subsequent 
peace process has shifted drastically since the Agreement. What was once seen as an 
insurmountable conflict is now seen as a leading method for conflict resolution. Since the 
signing of the Agreement in 1998 applying Northern Ireland’s lessons to other global conflicts 
has been widely touted, for better or worse, as a veritable cottage industry and the only export 
in the region (For a few examples see: Paul Dixon, 2011; Knox, 2001; Lustick, 1997).  
THE KNOWLEDGE OF KNOWLEDGE 
This naturally raises question as to the conditions that establish such norms and how certain 
forms of knowledge become dominate (or exportable) in a discipline. The existence of 
hierarchies among knowledge carriers and how knowledge within a discipline becomes 
dominant has been of concern within the sociology of knowledge. The earliest writings in this 
field suggest that thinkers’ desire for movement within those hierarchies (search for status) 
could influence the ideas they hold and promote (See for example: Gouldner, 1967; Mannheim, 
Wirth, & Shils, 1936). Yet although these scholars understood the quest for status to be 
important, no overarching theory of intellectual life centred on this objective emerged until the 
1970s. Since then three powerful theoretical themes have emerged.  
The first of these was Collins’s (1975, 1998) theory that intellectual life revolves around 
a view of the emotional dynamics underlying all face-to-face encounters (R. Collins, 1987). 
Whatever an encounter’s manifest purpose, its participants are driven to come away either 
feeling solidarity with other participants or feeling dominant over them. According to Collins, 
encounters in the intellectual arena that generate emotions of these kinds are those in which 
thinkers are recognized, because of their ideas, to be members of an intellectual group or 
intellectual leaders. He therefore reasons that intellectuals formulate their ideas with the aim 
of winning the “attention” of their colleagues – a willingness to “listen to” (Collins, 1998, 
p. 38) and seriously engage with another’s arguments.  
 The second theme is associated with the sociology of ideas. It attends to thinkers’ quests 
for status (Bourdieu 1971, 1988, 2000; also, see Ringer 1990). Bourdieu (1988) argues that as 
the relative independence of intellectuals from the realms of economic or political power was 
institutionalized in the modern university, what came to be prized in intellectual fields was 
“scientific success and specifically intellectual prestige” (p. 99). Yet the autonomy of 
intellectual judgement is never complete. For Bourdieu, intellectuals are not vulgar apologists 
for their class. Their socio-economic backgrounds do however endow them with different kinds 
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and amounts of social, cultural, and intellectual capital. Scholars such as Peter Shirlow and 
Aaron Edwards, as examples, noted that it was their backgrounds in various “working class” 
unionist areas of Northern Ireland which affords them a certain “insider” access to these 
communities. This social location gives them a certain capital in terms of conducting research 
on and developing insights regarding such communities. These scholars note that this capital 
advantages or disadvantages them in the ongoing struggle to secure prestigious disciplinary 
and institutional affiliations (see also Gross 2002; 2008). This struggle takes place 
subconsciously, and because of this an intellectual “knows nothing of the base calculations of 
careerist ambition” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 37). Academic institutions and departments also 
struggle for prestige by strategically emphasizing certain intellectual orientations, approaches, 
and concerns. Everything else being equal, Bourdieu suggests, individual thinkers tend to be 
drawn toward the intellectual approaches associated with their current institutional locations or 
with the institutional locations to which they aspire. Because this is so, and because an 
intellectual’s socio-economic background affects his or her chances of securing an academic 
post, homology comes to be established between positions in social space and positions in the 
space of ideas (Bourdieu 1988).  
The third theme emphasizing status-based choice underwrites many of these studies in 
the sociology of knowledge and has been greatly influenced by the previous work of Bourdieu. 
These studies have set out to show that knowledge claims can only be effectively advanced if, 
in the eyes of various audiences, the claims-makers possess “credibility” (See: Charmaz, 2011; 
Collins, 1998; Latour & Woolgar, 1986; Shapin, 1994). Credibility is understood as a 
characteristic or status that some agents – by the practices they engage in, their institutional 
position, prior research record, or other qualifications – are judged to have. Credibility serves 
to guarantee the veracity of their claims, even when others do not scrutinize these claims. 
Credibility is a valuable commodity for which thinkers contend. This also what Bourdieu 
(1986) referred to as “capital”. In certain circumstances, thinkers may choose between 
otherwise equally plausible ideas depending on how those choices would affect their stocks of 
credibility (Camic, 1992). 
These theories of status-based choice have provided analytical weight in relation to 
explanations concerning knowledge claims in professional literature. This has been particularly 
apparent in evidence-based practices in the field of social work (Hyland, 2003), the effects of 
performance-based research funding on academic elites within the university system 
(Gambrill, 2011), the developments in knowledge selection and the evolution of international 
political economy field (Cohen, 2011), and the implications of entrepreneurialism and the 
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seeking of prestige in higher education institutions (Breault & Callejo-Pérez 2012)    (Hicks, 
2012) (Hicks, 2012). Breault & Callejo-Pérez’s (2012) work is of particular interest as they 
show that prestige, a term they link with status under a Bourdieuian framework, is the modern 
currency in U.S. universities. Intellectual elites and administrators are constantly seeking this 
capital to enhance the status of their institution. Prestige creates meaning for the members 
within the institution and also secures the future of the university by enabling it to bring in top 
students and top grant-writing faculty. Considering such findings, researchers have begun to 
ask whether desires for power and status are the only social factor that directly influences 
intellectual choice? 
In the last two decades’ theoretical trends have roughly sought to answer such questions 
with an ardent no. Gross (2002, 2008) became increasingly interested in the role that 
individualized stories about who one is, one’s past experiences, and one’s plans for the future 
play in human life (for earlier influences see also Castells 1997; Giddens 1991; Lash and Urry 
1987; Levine 1995; Sennett 1998). This literature has largely argued that self-narratives are 
crucial points where the individual and society intersect. Scholars like Cohen (1994), Gross 
(2002), and Camic (1995, 2008) have called for some new avenues in the sociology of ideas. 
Avenues that bring to reality the experiences individuals have not only provide the “facts” that 
their self-narratives make sense of, but they also provide the concepts, categories, metaphors, 
frames of meaning, and plot lines that underpin them.  
This becomes important to the study of Northern Ireland because an academic field 
may be said to exist when a coherent body of knowledge is developed to define a subject of 
inquiry (Cohen, 2011). Out of this body of knowledge, recognizable standards are developed 
to train and certify “specialists”, employment opportunities arise within universities, learned 
societies are created to promote study and dialogue, and publishing sites are set up to 
disseminate new ideas and analysis. An institutionalized network of scholars is born that has 
its own distinct set of boundaries, rewards, and careers.  
The Northern Ireland epistemic community offers an interesting case in relation to this. 
Irrespective of the fact that Northern Ireland as a subject of inquiry has existed for more than 
forty years, a recognizable institutionalized network of scholars has only come into being in 
the last twenty-five. Can this emergence be explained simply by the status-based calculations 
of a few individuals? If so, how were incentives and disincentives, which may or may not have 
existed before the emergence, overcome? And, as highlighted previously, during a substantial 
part of this period, the scholars were largely divided across this field. Because an academic 
field rests on ideas that train them how to think about incidents (i.e. how they work, are 
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evaluated, explained, or resolved), a sociology of ideas that looks at scholars individually and 
the community of scholars collectively adds to an understanding of where a field of ideas comes 
from, how it originated, and how it develop(ed) over time. 
Nothing within the analyses on Northern Ireland explains how academic debates that 
once seemed either so resolved or so contentious in their respective interpretive camps before 
the Agreement have acquiesced so markedly to interpretations of the process that has followed 
its implementation. Though many of the works reviewed here offer a variety of insights into 
the apparent success of the Northern Ireland peace process, they don’t offer explanations of the 
processes that made this academic transition possible. Any writings concerning Northern 
Ireland aiming to explain or account for the lack of academic literature and publication on this 
subject prior to the current (and ongoing) peace process have only touched upon the lack of 
engagement on the Northern Ireland issue on the part of British journals (e.g. Cox, 1998; S. 
Porter & O'Hearn, 1995), and they only done so superficially – stating more personal reflection 
than empirical findings.  
Nor has there been anything written which addresses and looks at the role (and at times 
absence) of academics in the U.K. and Ireland studying Northern Ireland. What where the 
barriers (personal, professional, or political) that prevented this, if any? What changed and 
how?  
Certain pioneering academics in the field of Northern Ireland have recently voiced their 
personal reflections. Richard Rose (2014), for example, recently released a series of memoirs 
reflecting on his research and contribution in this field. Yet this work has not looked at the 
greater community nor sought to elicit insights into how the landscape of political science has 
changed in relation to this subject. Early work by scholars such as Rupert Taylor (1988) touch 
on this subject through his investigation of Queens University of Belfast. This research 
highlights the challenges the university faced during the period of the Troubles and how the 
external societal issues that plagued Northern Ireland found their way into the university. 
Taylor (1988) specifically highlights how the conflict eroded the university’s national standing 
and points to the disproportionate increase in internal promotions of Protestants as compared 
to Catholics.  
More recent work done by Lynch, Grummel, & Dympna (2012) has revealed the 
influences of neo-liberal marketization on the higher education in Ireland. They display how 
the “new managerialist” approach to higher education has altered the culture of universities 
and lead to major gender biases in female academic appointments. But the emphasis of this 
research has focused on individual and country-specific universities rather than the knowledge 
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producers within these institutions and the disciplines that they reside in. Thus, there is a lack 
in exploring the “human quality” of the Northern Ireland epistemic community of political 
science.  
AGENTS, STRUCTURES, AND KNOWLEDGE TRANSFORMATION 
This “human” relationship with and development of knowledge has been a philosophical 
problem in political writings since Graeco-Roman times. Plato in Theaetetus was perhaps the 
first to address this issue by adopting a scientific approach to knowledge, resting his ontology 
on epistemological foundations (Found in: P. Stern, 2008). Thematic to this literature is the 
acknowledgement that all social differences have social origins and are thus subject to human 
control (Stehr & Meja, 2005). A wide range of social, economic, and political factors can shape 
the origin, structure, and content of human consciousness. Traditional social science analyses 
have focused on questions such as the relationship between knowledge and ideology 
(Bershady, 1973), how valid and reliable knowledge claims pertaining to the external world 
are based on sense perceptions (See writings in: Greenough, Pritchard, & Williamson, 2009), 
the presuppositions required for the production of knowledge (Turner, 1993), and the use of 
language in constructing knowledge claims (Chomsky, 1985, 1988; Marques & Venturinha, 
2012). In most of these analyses, knowledge, knowing, and the knower are reduced to the 
relationship between ideas and theory or between individual subjects (knowers) and objects 
(the known) (Stehr & Meja, 2005).  
 One of the first explanations is Marx’s sub-and-superstructure scheme. This position 
argues that there is, under certain historical conditions, a predominance of economic realities 
and a determination of the ideological superstructure by socio-economic processes (Marx, 
Engels, & Hobsbawm, 1998). Marx’s conception of the relationship between social structure 
and culture remains a major leitmotif in the relationship between knowledge and its producers, 
though these explanations are often complex, as his positions changed somewhat over time 
(Coser, 1977). Simply put, though, Marx asserts that knowledge can be traced to the life 
conditions and the historical situations of those who uphold and produce it. This is true whether 
the knowledge produced is considered revolutionary or conservative. For Marx:  
the existence of revolutionary ideas in a particular age presupposes the existence 
of a revolutionary class. The ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas 
of the ruling class. When people speak of ideas that revolutionize society, they 
do but express the fact that within the old society the elements of a new one 
have been created, and that the dissolution of the old ideas keeps even pace with 




Academics (whom Marx refers to as ideologists) and the political representatives of a class 
need not share in all the material characteristics of that class. What they share and express is 
the overall cast of mind of that class.  
 Conversely there are the contributions of the German Sociologist, Karl Mannheim. 
Mannheim asked where the existential bases of cognitive products were located, what the 
correlation between these cognitive products and existential bases were, and under what 
conditions or at what point such correlations could be observed. This scholarship highlighted 
that knowledge in the social and political world is connected to being (seinsverbunden) rather 
than class. Knowledge can therefore vary according to an individual’s social location 
(Mannheim, 1930; Meja & Stehr, 1990). There is a distinction between “static” and “dynamic” 
thinking that recognizes the social characteristics of knowledge and adapts to them. Knowledge 
in the present is characterized by a competition between three alternative interpretations of 
existence.15 This hermeneutic problem is based on the relationship between the whole 
(structure) and its parts (agents). Mannheim suggests that the differences between art, the 
natural sciences, and philosophy regarding “truth claims” are that science, unlike art, always 
tries to prove or disprove a theory. Art can coexist with more than one world view and 
philosophy falls somewhere in between the two extremes (Longhurst, 1988). Mannheim’s 
work suggests the “danger of relativism”, where a historical process yields a cultural product. 
Scholars like Longhurst (1988) have argued that if thought is relative to a single historical 
period, it may be unavailable to another historical period (pp. 7-9). But if knowledge and ideas 
are bound to a specific location within social structures and historical processes, there is a 
“universal relativism”. If this is so and if all truth is relative and all thought existentially 
determined, how can anyone’s thoughts claim immunity from this (Coser & Merton, 1975)?  
 These debates go on ad infinitum (See: Morgan, 2016). Yet a consensus has developed 
that knowledge can become functionalized with increased social conflict, differences in group 
values, attitudes, and modes of thinking about other groups. These differences often developed 
to the point where the orientations that groups previously had in common become increasingly 
overshadowed by incompatible differences (R. K. Merton, 1957, pp. 367-369). Therefore, not 
“only do groups develop different universes of discourse, but the existence of any one universe 
challenges the validity and legitimacy of the other” (Stehr & Meja, 2005, p. 10). This sparked 
new interests in understanding the variety and forms of contested knowledge that science has 
                                                 
15 These include “the knower”, “the known”, and “the to be known”, which were based on psychology, logic, and 
ontology.   
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made available (See: Shapin, 1995). Science, in its various disciplines, has become the chief 
source of knowledge in society. As the availability of knowledge continues to increase, it 
drastically widens the possibilities of social action and therefore suggests that the investments 
in, production, distribution, and reproduction of knowledge have greater social implications 
(Stehr, 2005; Stehr & Meja, 2005). This increases the need for investigating knowledge, its 
creators, and the social contexts and events they exist within.  
 The problematization of the societal role of knowledge will be thematic in this 
discourse on Northern Ireland. Norbert Elias (1987) investigated the social role of the carriers 
of knowledge, such as intellectuals, professionals, and cultural elites, and the civilizational 
transformation in forms of knowledge. Such research focused on the consumption of 
knowledge, conceptualizing knowledge as something like a dependent variable. Yet over last 
several decades the emphasis of research has shifted almost entirely to the production of 
knowledge (For example see work by: Gibbons, 1994; Latour, Woolgar, & Salk, 1986; M. 
Lynch, 2005; Stehr & Grundmann, 2011). The claims here being that the societal orientation 
of science will assure what kind of knowledge we have in science and what social processes 
are responsible for the inner structure of knowledge and its conceptual apparatus.   
 The transformation of modern societies into knowledge societies has given experts an 
increased impact and influence on economic, technological, and public policy issues (Stehr & 
Grundmann, 2011). This transformation has caused science, and scientists, to have an 
increasingly co-determinate role in setting the political agenda (Stehr & Meja, 2005). Science 
is often responsible for discovering the problems that a society must address, or solutions to 
them. This has developed into a field of political activity that Stehr (2005) has called 
“knowledge politics”. It calls on researchers to present new questions on the social role of 
knowledge and knowledge carriers in the field of politics. This has resulted in an array of 
research focusing on policy issues such as biotechnology (Stehr, 2004), climate change and the 
environment (Grundmann, 2007; Sarewitz, 2004), and new “converging technologies” (Fuller, 
2009), as well as a host of other topics.  
 Yet the development of these knowledge societies and knowledge politics have 
occurred alongside great social changes. The advent of various peace agreement and accords 
following the Cold War in places such as Northern Ireland, Bosnia, and South Africa are among 
some of these. Northern Ireland is just one example of a society plagued by acute social conflict 
coupled with abundant social disorganization and reorganization. As mentioned previously, 
research by Merton (1972; 1957) noted that during such times of polarization and conflict in a 
society, contending claims of truths also become polarized. In this way knowledge, and the 
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products of knowledge, become functionalized, interpreted, and funnelled through various 
social movements in terms of their presumed social, economic, political, and psychological 
sources and functions (R. Merton, 1972).  
With the advent of large social changes one comes upon the contemporary relevance of 
longstanding problems concerning knowledge and knowledge carriers, namely, patterned 
differentials among social groups and strata in access to certain types of knowledge. This is 
what some have termed “insider doctrines” (Anderson & Herr, 1999; Griffith, 1998; R. Merton, 
1972). Social movements, particularly within knowledge communities, both during and 
following social conflicts, are often formed based on ascribed status. Inclusion in these 
movements is based on who you are rather than what you are. This involves public affirmations 
of pride in an individual’s ascribed status and solidarity with collectivities that have long been 
socially and culturally downgraded (See: R. Merton, 1968; R. Merton, 1972; Michael Polanyi, 
1959, 1964, 1973).  
In extreme forms, knowledge groups can exert epistemological claims that they have 
monopolistic access to a field or type of knowledge. The weaker more empirical forms of these 
claims assert that some groups possess a privileged access to knowledge, with other groups 
having the ability to obtain that knowledge for themselves but at greater risks and costs (R. 
Merton, 1972, pp. 10-11). Marx (1936) first highlighted this noting that after a capitalist society 
reached its pinnacle of development, the location of one class of individuals would enable it to 
achieve an understanding of society exempt from false consciousness (See: Lukács, 1971, pp. 
47-81, 181-209), while Weber’s (1922) notion of Wertbeziehung suggested that differing social 
locations affect how problems are selected for investigation (pp. 146–214). These knowledge 
doctrines can crudely be vernacularized into “you got to be one to understand one” or “you got 
to be one to understand what’s worth understanding”.  
Early studies of the epistemological doctrines of “insiderism” were linked to forms of 
ethnocentrism. Here insiderism “views things where one’s own group is the center of 
everything and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it” and, going further, where “a 
group nourishes its own pride and vanity . . .” (Sumner, 1940, p. 13). Caplow (1964) spoke of 
the tendency of members of an organization to upwardly distort or overestimate its prestige 
and value. This is what he called “aggrandizement effect” (ibid.). Lasswell (1935) similarly 
spoke of the tendency of any social formation to bellicosely glorify and extoll their status and 
collectivity. This is important to the study of Northern Ireland’s epistemic community since 
this research shows that these tendencies are exacerbated under extreme situations (such as the 
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outbreak of conflict or peace), as scientists have often allowed their status as nationals to 
dominate their position as scientists (R. Merton, 1972).  
This all simply suggests that the epistemological claims of an insider group to have 
monopolistic or privileged access to social truth develop under certain social and historical 
conditions. Under these conditions the social groups and/or strata that are seen to be “on the 
rise” develop a revolutionary élan. They often do so with ambitions for larger shares of 
influence, power, and control over their social and political domain, finding various 
expressions, among them claims to a unique access to knowledge (R. Merton, 1968, 1972; R. 
K. Merton, 1957).  
The explorations into the relationship between power, knowledge, and politics have 
been inspired by the thinking of Foucault (1970; 1979; 1987) and his contemporaries. His 
research discovered that the growth of the state, the development of the disciplines of 
administrative and civil services, and the rise of professionals intrinsically linked to state 
projects, plans, and practices often conduct the conduct of subjects (Foucault, Rabinow, & 
Rose, 2003, pp. vi-xxxii). This work brought into question the “knowledge of life and the 
government of life” (Foucault et al., 2003, p. xxii). Foucault stresses that to analyse the routes 
that link knowledge to practices of normalization or government is not to reduce the truth to a 
mere effect of such practices. Rather, this research suggests that truth is often a mere 
legitimation or functional support for power. Knowledge is governed by rules, and rule-makers, 
that exist on various hierarchal planes and rest along various epistemological boundaries. An 
individual’s position on this plane often determines what can be said truthfully at any given 
time, the criteria of evidence for establishing the truth, forms of proof, and the very objects of 
which they speak. This is even found in the knowledge of the positive sciences which takes 
humans in their various states of reality as its object (Foucault et al., 2003).16 In any case, once 
an institutionalized network of scholars is born they develop their own distinct set of 
boundaries, rewards, and careers.  
BOUNDARIES AND OBJECTS 
Northern Ireland as a region and a subject is familiar with boundaries. From a disciplinary 
standpoint, Northern Ireland exists within a subdiscipline of political science that is conducted 
by an extremely diverse group of actors. These actors consist of researchers from different 
disciplines, amateurs, politicians, and professionals making the discipline ever more 
                                                 
16 See the chapter “Questions of Method”.  
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heterogeneous. Despite this heterogeneity the discipline requires cooperation. Cooperation 
enable individuals to create common understandings, to ensure reliability across domains, and 
to gather information that retains its integrity across time, space, and local contingencies. This 
creates the inevitable tension between those with divergent viewpoints and their need to 
collaborate and develop generalizable findings.  
 There seems to be a myth surrounding academia that it is characterized by a collective 
consensus. But examining the actual work organization of scientific enterprises, there is no 
such consensus (See: M. Kerr, 2006; John McGarry & O’Leary, 2007; B. O'Leary, 2005; 
Taylor, 2009a). Disciplines like political science, much like the politics they study, are often 
marked by and develop alongside great internal conflict.17 What researchers have shown in 
examining disciplines such as biology and zoology is that scientific work neither loses its 
internal diversity nor is consequently retarded by lack of consensus (See for example: Hughes, 
1971; Latour & Woolgar, 1986; J. M. Ruane & Cerulo, 2008). Consensus is not necessary for 
cooperation and the successful conduct of scientific research.  
 This fundamental sociological finding which holds true in the life and health sciences 
also applies to the Northern Ireland epistemic community and the discipline in which is it 
situated. Yet unlike in other disciplines, political scientists are focusing on and, often, located 
within specific areas of conflict. This presents unique problems in trying to ensure integrity of 
information in the presence of diversity and, at times, controversy. One way of describing this 
is to say that the actors trying to solve and understand various socio-political problems often 
come from different social worlds. Irrespective of these differences actors are able to establish 
a mutual modus operandi (Star & Griesemer, 1989). As an example, Marxist political historians 
looking to understand and explain the relationship between Republicanism and Socialism in 
Irish politics operate within a different paradigm and pursue a different set of tasks than the 
political comparativist aiming to put Northern Ireland’s peace process in a more global context 
with that of other peace accords.  
 In a discipline and subject where these differing worlds intersect, difficulties are 
inevitable. This is because the creation of new scientific knowledge depends on communication 
as well as on creating new findings. Yet because the subjects and methods of inquiry often 
mean different things in different worlds, actors are regularly faced with the task of reconciling 
these meanings if they wish to cooperate or come together. This reconciliation requires 
                                                 
17 For an excellent example of this in the British context see Grant’s (2010) accounts of the conflicts and diversity 
of thought in the formation and evolution of Political Studies Association.  
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substantial labour on everyone's part. Therefore, political scientists and other actors 
contributing to the development of literature and research in the discipline must find the need 
to translate, negotiate, debate, triangulate, and simplify to work together in and across various 
institutional settings.  
TRANSLATION PROBLEMS 
The problem of translation as described by Latour (1981, 1986), Callon (1988, 2005), and Law 
(1999; 1989; 1986) is central to this reconciliation. In order to create scientific authority, 
researchers gradually enlist participants (or to borrow Latour’s (1986, 2012) word, “allies”) 
from a range of locations. These allies reinterpret the researchers’ concerns to fit their own 
programmatic goals and then establish themselves as gatekeepers to particular avenues of 
knowledge within a discipline (in Law’s [(2005)] terms, as “obligatory points of passage”). 
The authority they derive may emanate from either substantive or methodological claims. 
Akrich, Callon, and Latour (1986, 2012) notably labelled this process interessement, to indicate 
the translation of the concerns of the non-scientist into those of the scientist.  
 The Northern Ireland epistemic community is an ideal example of this. The members 
of this community not only from come from more than one social world but from different 
disciplinary and methodical backgrounds as well. The empirical chapters of this research show, 
as an example, that members of this community come from Protestant and Catholic 
backgrounds from inside and outside Northern Ireland. They consist of political scientists, 
historians, sociologists, anthropologists, and geographers, some of whom were active members 
of dissident groups during the Troubles. Others are members of the political class, straddling 
the boundaries of the political and academic. Thus, this is not just a case of interessement from 
non-scientists to scientists but between political scientists who not only come from various 
methodological, academic, and political backgrounds but who are trying to conduct translations 
while simultaneously, at times, inhabiting different worlds (i.e. the political, the personal, and 
the academic). In this process, each translator must maintain the integrity of his own research 
while looking to ensure the interests of the other audiences to retain them as allies. And all this 
is ideally done in such a way as to increase the centrality and importance of their work. Yet at 
times this process fails to come about. What has been described as the n-way nature of the 
interessement (or one could say, the challenge intersecting social worlds pose to the coherence 
of translations) cannot be understood from a single viewpoint (Akrich et al., 1988). It requires 
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a more holistic analysis of the sort Everett Hughes’ (1971) described in his analysis of the 
ecology of institutions:  
In some measure an institution chooses its environment. This is one of the 
functions of the institution as enterprise. Someone inside the institution acts as 
an entrepreneur . . . one of the things the enterprising element must do is choose 
within the possible limits the environment to which the institution will react, 
that is, in many cases, the sources of its funds, the sources of its clientele 
(whether they be clients who will buy shoes, education or medicine), and the 
sources of its personnel of various grades and kinds (Found in:Star & 
Griesemer, 1989, p. 389).  
 
 An advantage of such an analysis is that it does not presuppose an epistemological 
primacy for any one viewpoint; the viewpoints of the consociationalists are not inherently 
better or worse than that of its critics, for instance. Latour (1986) reminds us that important 
question concern the flow of concepts through the network of participating actors and the social 
and intellectual worlds they occupy. The holistic viewpoint is therefore anti-reductionist in that 
the unit of analysis is the whole enterprise. 
 The boundary object concept as it is used here differs from the Callon, Latour, and Law 
model of translations and interessement in a few distinct ways. First, their model is a kind of 
“funneling” – reframing or mediating the concerns of several actors into a narrower passage 
point. The narrative in Callon, Latour, and Law’s case is predominately told from the point of 
view of one passage point – usually the manager, entrepreneur, or scientist. The analysis 
proposed here still contains what one could call a scientific bias, in that the stories of the 
academics constituting Northern Ireland’s epistemic community are those who reside within 
various political science departments across the U.K. and Ireland and are members of the 
Political Science Association of Ireland. But it is a many-to-many mapping, where several 
obligatory points of passage are negotiated with several kinds of allies – both pro and anti-
consociationalists alike, for example.  
 The coherence of sets of translations depends on the extent to which academic efforts 
from multiple worlds can coexist, whatever the nature of the processes or individuals that 
produce them. Translation here is indeterminate, in a way analogous to Quine’s philosophical 
dictum about language.18 There is an indefinite number of ways in which academics from each 
cooperating social world may make their own work an obligatory point of passage for the whole 
                                                 
18According to Quine, the acquisition of language is a process of conditioning the performance of verbal 
behaviour. Words for concrete or abstract objects may be learned by a process of reinforcement and extinction, 
whereby the meaning of words may become more clearly understood (See: Grant, 2010).  
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network of participants. Because of this there is an indeterminate number of coherent sets of 
translations. The problem for actors in a community, including researchers, is to (temporarily) 
reduce their local uncertainty without risking a loss of cooperation from allies. Once the 
process has established an obligatory point of passage, the job then becomes to defend it against 
other translations threatening to displace it. My interest in this problem of coherence and 
cooperation in political science is shaped by trying to understand the historical developments 
of the Northern Ireland epistemic community.  
CONCEPTUALIZING THE CONCEPT 
A boundary object is an analytic concept. A scientific object or set of objects that inhabits 
several intersecting social worlds. It satisfies the informational requirements of these worlds 
and the actors in them, ultimately bringing them together (Latour, 2005). A boundary object is 
therefore plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the constraints of the various parties 
employing them, yet it is robust enough to maintain a common identity across multiple 
spectrums (social, political, intellectual). This object is weak in structure when in collective 
use, but then takes on a strong structure in individual use. The object(s) can be abstract or 
concrete and can, and often do, have different meanings in different social worlds, but their 
structure is common enough to more than one world to make them recognizable – that is, a 
means of translation (Leigh Star, 2010; Star, 1989). Understanding the creation and 
management of a boundary object is a key process in developing and maintaining its coherence 
across intersecting social worlds (Leigh Star, 2010). On this point, it is now important to focus 
on the architecture of the boundary object concept. 
 To begin with, there is the aspect of interpretive flexibility, which exists with any 
object. Star & Griesemer (1989) noted that a map could point the way to a campground for one 
group, while this same map may follow a series of geological sites of importance for scientists. 
Maps may resemble each other, overlap, and even seem indistinguishable to an outsider’s eye 
(Star & Griesemer, 1989). Their difference therefore depends on the use and interpretation of 
the object. This aspect of boundary objects is hardly new in philosophy or history, as 
interpretive flexibility has been one cornerstone behind much of the “constructivist” approach 
in the sociology of science (Leigh Star, 2010).  
 The two other aspects of our employment of boundary object that need clarification are 
(1) its material/organizational structure and (2) the question of scale/granularity. Recall that a 
boundary object is a sort of arrangement that allows different groups to work together without 
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(necessarily having a) consensus. The forms this may take are not arbitrary, though. They are 
essentially organic infrastructures that have arisen out of what has been referred to as 
“information needs” (See: Golinski, 1998, 2005; Schmidt, 2012) and later revised to 
“information and work requirements” (See both: Star, 1989; Star & Griesemer, 1989). These 
needs are perceived locally and by the groups who wish to cooperate. “Work” is also a word 
that stretches to include cooperation around serious “work/play endeavours”. These can include 
conferences, research retreats, entertainment, and conversations in the pub (here I borrow from 
research by Becker [(1986)] who noted that the work–play relationship is a continuum). 
Nevertheless, what is important is how practices, structure, and language emerge from 
gathering and doing things together (Bowker & Star, 1999; Leigh Star, 2010). 
 The words “boundary” and “object” need some fleshing out as well. Often, a boundary 
implies something like edge or border, as in the edge of a cliff or the border of a state. Here, 
however, it simply means something that occupies a shared space. Such a common object(s) 
forms the boundaries between groups through flexibility and shared structure – “they are the 
stuff of action” (Bowker & Star, 1999; Leigh Star, 2010; Star, 1989; Star & Griesemer, 1989).  
 The term object is used in a social scientific and pragmatist sense, as well as in the 
material sense. An object is something people act towards and with (Leigh Star, 2010, p. 603). 
Its materiality derives from action, not necessarily from a sense of prefabricated stuff or 
“thing”-ness. For this research, consociational and/or power sharing theory acts as a powerful 
object in political science, especially concerning Northern Ireland. Although a theory is 
embodied, discussed, printed, and named, it is not the same thing as, say, a constitution (like 
GFA, etc.). This is indeed a boundary object, but only when it is used between groups in the 
ways described above.19 The important point is that a boundary object is simultaneously 
temporal, based in action, subject to reflection, and local, tailoring and distributed throughout 
all of these dimensions (Bowker & Star, 1999; Leigh Star, 2010). They are thus 
multidimensional. 
 In the original formulation of the boundary objects concept Star & Griesemer (1989) 
suggested four traits that an object might adopt, based on forms of action and cooperation. In 
this employment of the boundary objects concept these analytical traits should be briefly 
fleshed out. In doing this, though, these distinctions are not meant to be exclusive to any 
boundary object but, depending on the type of action and cooperation, the nature and form of 
                                                 
19 Bowker & Star (1999) go to great pains to discuss and outline what they term the “four-dimensional” and often 
complex meanings of both boundary and object (see Chapter 9 specifically).  
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the object can and often will adopt multiple traits. This keeps with the multidimensional nature 
of boundary objects.  
 The first distinction that is made is that of “repositories”. Repositories are classified as 
ordered “piles” of objects that are often indexed in a standardized fashion (Star & Griesemer, 
1989). This standardization is established to deal with problems of heterogeneity caused by 
differences in unit of analysis (ibid.). Examples of repositories used in this research will be an 
association and a journal, as they have the advantage of being modular. This means that various 
actors from different worlds can use, borrow from, or contribute to the “pile” for their own 
purposes without having to directly negotiate differences in purpose. This develops out of the 
need in science for an assembly of things that allows for a heterogeneity of ideas (internally) 
while maintaining cooperation across boundaries. The heuristic advantage of a repository is 
therefore encapsulation of internal units.20 The instance-based work and information needs – 
ontology – of the repository are well suited for conducting private research (individually or 
collaboratively) and controlling the nature of commentary or debate. This is not initially a 
formalized sort of work process looking to drop away particulars but instead an iterative one 
that preserves particulars (Star & Griesemer, 1989). 
 The “ideal type” is the next trait. This is an object such as a process (i.e. peace process) 
or a diagram of sorts that does not in fact accurately describe the details of any one locality or 
thing. Ideal types are abstracted from all domains and may be fairly vague (Bowker & Star, 
1999). However, an idea type is adaptable to a local site precisely because it is vague; it serves 
as a means of communicating and cooperating symbolically – in application to Northern 
Ireland the term “a good enough road map for all parties” comes to mind. The example of an 
ideal type in this research I am proposing is the evolving and ongoing notion of the Northern 
Ireland peace process. This is a concept that in fact described no specimen, which incorporates 
both concrete and theoretical material, and which serves as a means of communicating across 
multiple disciplines. The utility of this distinction is that ideal types arise with differences in 
degree of abstraction and, because of this, result in the deletion of local contingencies from the 
common object and has the advantage of adaptability (Star, 1989; Star & Griesemer, 1989).  
 “Coincident boundaries” are the third trait here and are identified as common items that 
have the same boundaries but different internal contents. They arise in the presence of different 
means of aggregating data and when work is distributed over a large-scale geographic area 
                                                 
20 For example, Star (Quine, 2013) notes that the pages of a book are bound by covers or electronic conventions; 
the limits of a Web site by the initial URL.  
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(Briers & Chua, 2001; Star & Griesemer, 1989). The result is that work in different locations 
and with different perspectives can be conducted independently while cooperating parties share 
a common referent (ibid.). The advantage is the resolution of different goals. Here I assume 
that the coincident boundary is the framework of the Agreement. The Agreement was created 
by the politicians and professional policymakers. Its framework resembles similar road maps 
to peace in other areas like Bosnia and Macedonia (J. McEvoy, 2015), for example, and sets 
up institutional rules for promoting cooperation. Yet the theoretical frameworks of these 
agreements were created by academics and fall under the tent of consociationalism. 
 Lastly we have “standardized forms”. This trait is devised as a method of common 
communication across dispersed work groups. This is useful for our applications to Northern 
Ireland because the research is conducted at distributed locations and by a variety of different 
people, rendering standard methods essential. The results of this type of boundary object are 
what Latour (1981) called “immutable mobiles” – objects that can be transported over a long 
distance and convey unchanging information (p. 7–13). The advantage of this is that local 
uncertainties are often deleted, and the people who inhabit more than one social world – 
marginal people21 – face comparable situations. The distinguishable trait here is whether 
similar strategies exist among those creating or managing a joint object across social world 
boundaries. In political science, researchers often stake out territory, either in a literal or 
conceptual sense, to claim as their own and establish themselves as experts in. If a state of war 
does not prevail, then institutionalized negotiations manage ordinary affairs when different 
social worlds share the same territory. These negotiations often include a degree of conflict 
and are constantly challenged and refined (Leigh Star, 2010). Everett Hughes (1971) described 
such overlaps and termed the organizations that manage collisions in space sovereignty as 
“inter-tribal centers”. Similarly, Gerson’s (1984) early analysis of resources and commitments 
provided a general model of sovereignties based on commitments of time, money, skill, and 
sentiment. Here the central cooperative task of social worlds, which share the same space but 
different perspectives, is the “translation” of each other’s perspectives. 
                                                 
21 Traditionally, the concept of marginality has referred to a person who has membership in more than one social 
world, such as a person whose mother is white and father is black (2010). Park’s (1928) classic work on the 
“marginal man” discusses the tensions imposed by such multiple membership, problems of identity, and loyalty. 
Marginality is a critical concept for understanding the ways in which the boundaries of social worlds are 
constructed and the kinds of navigation and articulation which individuals with multiple memberships must 
undertake. I argue in this study that the strategies employed by marginal people to manage their identities – 
activist, academic, personal affiliations, etc. – provide a provocative source of metaphors for understanding 
objects with multiple memberships. 
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So in saying all of this let’s just take a moment to spell out exactly what the boundary 
objects of this research are. These objects, like the community they bind, exist on multiple 
planes. On the macro level, it is obvious that region of Northern Ireland itself is a boundary 
object for the epistemic community. It is the location and subject by which all political, social, 
and cultural analysis focuses on in a variety of different ways. Though a location, this object is 
mobile in the sense that it can be studied by a sociologist, anthropologist, or political scientist. 
It is also an area that almost all the academics are attached to in one way or another. This 
connection is by biography, birth, marriage or combinations of all three.  
Zooming this in more the peace process leading up to and, subsequently, the Good 
Friday Agreement (GFA) are also boundary objects that exist within the region of Northern 
Ireland. The ongoing peace process that follows GFA also fits within this. All three events and 
documents act points and products (in the case of GFA) of analysis whereby academics can, 
safely, come together and agree as well as, more importantly, disagree with one another in 
ways that weren’t possible before around the study, analysis, and understanding of events in 
Northern Ireland creating objective frameworks and whereby knowledge could be understood, 
developed, and refuted by academics in the community in ways that weren’t possible during 
the Troubles. 
 The final micro (one could say) object for the Northern Ireland epistemic community 
is consociationalism. In many ways, this micro object is the centre piece of this epistemic 
community and responsible for its emergence in the context of the peace process. 
Consociationalism has been the main theoretical framework used by Northern Ireland political 
scientists to understand, analyse, and debate the ongoing peace process in the region as well as 
the consititutional merits of GFA. Since its (re)application to Northern Ireland by O’Leary and 
McGarry consocationalism has been a central staple in the Northern Ireland political science 
diet, one which has been responsible for an almost endless litany of publications and debates. 
It arose out of “information needs” given scholars frustration with existing paradigms that the 
conflict in the region was one without a solution and has resulted in a level of interpretive 
flexibility with scholars at it often takes on different forms and understandings depending on 
the context which it is applied. Consociationalism, thus, allows a many-to-many mapping by 
scholars, dissidents, and practitioners in a variety of disciplines and locations as it offers 
multiple obligatory points of passage that can be negotiated with a variety of allies and 
adversaries – both pro and anti-consociationalists alike. 
SUMMARIZING 
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Recall that here we are interested in that sort of multidimensional translation that includes 
scientific objects. We are interested in the kinds of translations scientists perform to craft 
objects containing elements which are different in different worlds – objects marginal to those 
worlds, or what we call boundary objects. In conducting research, people coming together from 
different social worlds frequently have the experience of addressing an object that has a 
different meaning for each of them. The actors from these social worlds have partial authority 
over the resources represented by that object, and mismatches caused by the overlap become 
problems for negotiation. Here I must note that the situation of marginal people who reflexively 
face problems of identity and membership is not like the objects with multiple memberships, 
as such objects do not change themselves reflexively or voluntarily manage membership 
problems. While these objects have some of the same properties as marginal people, there are 
crucial differences that I should mention.  
 For example, for an individual, managing multiple memberships is a volatile, elusive, 
and confusing process, as navigating more than one world is a non-trivial mapping exercise. 
People resolve problems of marginality in a variety of ways: by passing on one side or another, 
denying one side, oscillating between worlds, or by forming a new social world composed of 
others like themselves (Star, 1989; Star & Griesemer, 1989). However, researchers negotiate 
the management of these objects – including construction of them – only when their work 
coincides. The objects thus come to form a common boundary between worlds by inhabiting 
them both simultaneously. Scientists manage boundary objects via a set of strategies only 
loosely comparable to those practiced by marginal people.  
 Intersections place demands on representations, and on the integrity of information 
arising from and being used in more than one world (Callon & Law, 1997; Leigh Star, 2010; 
Star, 1989; Star & Griesemer, 1989). Because more than one world or set of concerns is using 
and making the representation, it must satisfy more than one set of concerns. When participants 
in intersecting worlds create representations together, their different commitments and 
perceptions are resolved into those representations – in the sense that a fuzzy image is resolved 
by a microscope (Akkerman & Bakker, 2011). This resolution does not mean consensus but, 
instead, the representations encompass at every stage traces of these multiple positions, 
translations, and ongoing conflicts. For this research, the boundary object is the means of 
satisfying and mediating these conflicting sets of concerns.  
WRAPPING IT UP 
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Next we set out to employ my methodological framework explaining how an epistemic 
community emerges. In doing this, recall that Marx  (Marx, 2005, p. 103) noted that:  
men make their own history [and knowledge] but they do not make it just as 
they please; they don’t make it under circumstances always chosen by 
themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and 
transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a 
nightmare on the brain.  
 










It is easy to get hung up on the question of methodology. In the social sciences, particularly 
political science, the method issue is one on which countless books and arguments, and 
arguments about those arguments, have been written.22 This is particularly true of qualitative 
methods, a category which this research falls into. One of the aims of this dissertation is to 
show that the issue of method need not be so painful. At its very core, method is nothing more 
than a tool, which acts to “keep us erect while we navigate a terrain that moves and shifts as 
we attempt to pass through it” (Burawoy, 2009, p. 19). In choosing this tool, one must proceed 
with caution, as the signs along the way read, “Danger, trouble ahead!” 
 In order to account for the potential pitfalls and dangers associated with this endeavour, 
the primary aim of this chapter is three-fold:  
1.) It outlines the respective tools utilized in this study. The tool employed to “keep us 
erect” on this path is a reflective one. It uses interviews in a way that allows respondents 
to give their own account – tell a story – of the various stages of their professional and 
personal development, as a means of extracting the general from the unique; or rather, 
using the “micro” to account for the “macro” (Burawoy, 2009).  
2.) It will display the utility of this technique. This method is both phenomenologically 
rich in data, as well as corroborated by existing literature from various fields of the 
social sciences.   
3.) To address the potential, or perhaps inevitable, limitations of adopting such an approach 
and the criticisms that accompany them.  
We now begin with a discussion about the first aspect of our methodological tool, abstracting.  
                                                 
22 For a few examples, see: (Bennett & Elman, 2006; Goertz & Mahoney, 2012; Michael Polanyi, 1958; Popper, 
1963; Schram & Caterino, 2006). 
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ABSTRACTING 
Let us begin with reflecting on a comedian who once remarked, in jest of course, that he had a 
“life-sized map of the world”. Such a statement sounds ridiculous. Yet ironically, this anecdote 
reflects the desire, and barrier, of the political scientist. The comedian, because of scope, time, 
and lack of materials, is prevented from owning a “life-sized” world map. The social scientist, 
because of the expanse of history and limited (or in some cases, lack of) information, cannot 
understand everything about any given epoch or incident. To understand it all would require 
the recapitulation of every detail, discussion of every nuance, full explanations of human 
psychology and sociology—and to do all this in real time. It would be to tell a story that would 
literally never end. The historian, John Lewis Gaddis (2002), put it this way: 
To try to represent everything that's in a landscape would be as absurd as to 
attempt to recount everything that happened, whether at Waterloo or anywhere 
else. Such a map, like such an account, would have to become what it 
represented. . . (p.32) 
 
 Thus, it is safe to say that such a prospect is impossible. Fortunately, this totality of 
information is not a necessity. In political science, one does not need to reproduce events to 
understand or gain insights into them; one only must be able to represent them. We are very 
much like historians - who have always been, in this sense, abstractionists; concern for the 
literal representation of reality is not theirs (Gaddis, 2002, p. 17). 
 In this attempt to understand how epistemic communities emerge and how they have 
developed over time, we are faced with various challenges: one of which is to determine how 
one selects and measures the variables in question. As in social science research, the selection 
and measurements of variables can be infinitely divisible, we are left with no choice but to 
attempt to sketch what we cannot precisely delineate; to generalize, to abstract. In creating 
these abstractions, we should be free to combine a variety of interdisciplinary techniques: 
including those of the biologist, sociologist, psychologist, and anthropologist (See: McGraw, 
1996; Schatz, 2009; Yin, 2003). Indeed, Gaddis (2002) argues that because scientists have 
discovered that “what exists in the present has not always done so in the past, they have “begun 
to derive structures from [past] processes” and in doing so have “brought history into science” 
(p. 39). 
 This brings into question purely reductionist approaches adopted in social science as a 
means of making sense of human societies: many of which have run into major problems given 
the complexities involved in human relations and the political, religious, and economic 
interactions between them (Gaddis, 2002; Shapiro, 2002; A. Wendt, 1992; A. E. Wendt, 1987). 
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After all, societies are not “complicated” in the way a nuclear reactor is complicated, can be 
broken into its constituent parts and understood; rather, they are highly “complex”: involving 
interdependent variables that interact, often in irregular ways, over any given period.  
 This complexity which exists in the political/social realm suggests that a more 
ecological, rather than reductionist, lens is more appropriate when considering the “how” and 
“why” of individual interactions and the various ways these develop over time, often becoming 
systems – or dare I say, communities? – whose nature cannot be defined through the mere 
calculation of their parts. Yet the complexity involved in this process of coming together leaves 
us to grapple with the inevitable issues of causation and contingency. To properly sketch out 
and control for this complexity, one must employ dynamic methods for organizing knowledge, 
which rely on the micro rather than the macro. It is here where the use of narrative storylines, 
the tool of choice for this research, brings a force and utility.  
 From a theoretical standpoint, narrative accounts and research offer a wide range of 
diversity, depth and scope in their theoretical mapping. Within an individual – micro – narrative 
can be found Hobbesians, Marxists, Weberians, or even Foucaultians, to the extent that these 
representations converge and bring one closer to the realities which they seek to account. 
Through the employment of narrative, a respondent is free to describe, evoke, quantify, qualify, 
and even reify if these techniques serve to improve the fit which we aim to achieve through 
their account, or re-account. It has long been acknowledged that at the convergence of a 
plurality of paradigms, we can both test the boundaries of theory as well as attain a closer fit 
between reality and representation (Burawoy, 2009; Forester, 1999; Elliot George Mishler, 
1986, 1999a; Whewell & Butts, 1968).  
In saying this, we recognize that narrative research is an encompassing term that covers 
an ever-widening and diversifying range of approaches; because of this, specificity is needed 
(Some notable examples are: Andrews, Squire, & Tamboukou, 2008; Elliot George Mishler, 
1986, 1999b; M. Patterson & Monroe, 1998). The narrative approach employed here is a sub-
genre that uses life-stories, defined by specific assumptions and methodological procedures.  
Two of these assumptions are particularly important and worth mentioning briefly. The 
first is that an interview is a dialogic process (Elliot George Mishler, 1986). This means that 
when we speak of interviews, we are talking about an intricate sequence of exchanges: through 
which the interviewer and interviewee negotiate some degree of agreement on what will be 
talked about and how the material will be approached. In this case, respondents’ accounts of 
their life experiences are situated in that context and can be seen as co-produced (Elliot George 
Mishler, 1999b). In this co-production, the interviewer acts as intervener into the life of the 
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interviewee, facilitating movements with “the participants through their space and time” 
(Burawoy, 2009, p. 13). This position of “interviewer as intervener” permits one to explore 
how a respondent’s story might be influenced by their location during the interview, given the 
social relationship established during its course. In doing this, we look to overcome a principal 
problem long recognized in survey research: that too much is often inferred from answers taken 
at face value to questions of suspicious value, as answers can vary depending on the way that 
the question is framed.  
 The next assumption is that narratives, as well as other discourse genres, are social acts. 
As Langellier has noted, through speaking, we perform our identity by making various 
“moves” along the landscape of social relationships (Found in: Brockmeier & Carbaugh, 2001). 
This pragmatic view of language underscores what we as social actors are doing in our selection 
and organization of discourse, to tell stories in ways that fit the occasion and are appropriate 
for our specific intentions, audiences, and context. Both of these assumptions of narratives as 
dialogue and performance place it within the social field and constitute the methodological 
framework of this dissertation, which Mishler (1999b) has termed “narrative as praxis”. 
NARRATIVE AS PRAXIS 
The development of the “narrative as praxis” framework reflects the growing expansion of 
narrative studies in the last thirty years within the social sciences. Freeman (1994) called this 
expansion a virtual “narrative mania”; while others, far from positivists in their own domains, 
have criticized this. Several scholars have noted that this “narrative mania” has resulted in the 
emergence of an “interview society” within the social sciences, which is particularly obsessed 
with confessions and personal tales; which they perceive as reflecting the West’s valorisation 
of individual agency, so much so that critical analyses of macro-structural features of society 
have fallen by the wayside, deflecting attention from important issues such as power and 
coercion (See: Atkinson & Delamont, 2006; Atkinson & Silverman, 1997; Denzin, 2001). In 
addition, and in light of the sheer breadth of studies which have fallen into this “narrative 
mania”, attempts to create a canonical definition of what “narrative” means are quite difficult; 
as are efforts to standardize the ways in which we analyse such accounts (Riessman, 2013).  
 In acknowledging these criticisms and difficulties, we must assert that our purpose here 
is not to attempt to police or rein in the boundaries of this umbrella term, as any efforts to do 
so would be misguided and useless. Quite the contrary: this research takes the position that one 
of the exciting and useful things about performing narrative research lies in the multiplicity of 
approaches and perspectives which encompass it. This is not to deny the potential handicaps 
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of such a multitude of approaches; but like all handicaps, it can be dealt with in two ways: by 
containing it or turning it to our advantage (Burawoy, 1998). Through a containment approach, 
we can look to control participation with subjects by interrogation via intermediaries. Instead 
of engaging in the “messiness” of our subjects’ personal narratives, we seek to insulate 
ourselves from participants, standardize the way we collect their information, place brackets 
around external conditions (such as the political, social, and institutional environment), and go 
through great efforts to make sure our sample is representative. This is common practice in the 
positivist approach to survey research. Here though, we prefer the latter strategy.   
 To properly embrace the “messiness” and complexity of narratives offered by this 
strategy, we must thematize the world under study. To do so, we must root ourselves in a set 
of assumptions that guide our dialogue with participants. Michael Polanyi (1958) first 
elaborated on this in his rejection of positivist notions of objectivity based on sense data, in 
favour of a commitment to the “rationality of  theory”: described often as cognitive maps, or 
dare we say abstractions, through which we apprehend the world (Found in: Burawoy, 1998, 
p. 5).  Thus, through what Burawoy often referred to as “dwelling in theory” (See: Burawoy, 
1991, 1998, 2009; Burawoy & Skocpol, 1982), we form the basis of our reflexive model of 
science: which embraces engagement with the mess as the way towards understanding. This 
reflexive approach to narratives is a means of extracting the general from the unique; that is, 
we will use the micro to connect to the macro, and in so doing, connect the present to the past. 
Furthermore, by employing the “narrative as praxis” framework, we operate under the 
assumptions that personal stories are socially situated actions, life performances, and fusions 
of both form and context: that allow us to thematize patterns from the micro and connect them 
to the macro. Before adding more nuance to these assumptions, let us take a moment to discuss 
what we mean by our employment of the term “praxis”.  
 By using the term “praxis”, we employ a Marxist vocabulary that, in our understanding, 
refers to the dialectic interplay between our dual positions as subjects – actively making and 
transforming the world – which then become the “objective” conditions to which we must 
respond as we adapt, make, remake, and transform ourselves and these conditions (Elliot 
George Mishler, 1999b). This concept is relevant to our narrative research because it elevates 
the status of narratives to purposeful and contextually situated human action, therefore 
countering poststructuralist views of a disembodied discourse or “grand narrative” that speaks 
through individuals (See for example: Kraus, 2006; Søndergaard, 2002). We also recognise 
that individuals are not cultural zombies who mindlessly act out the cultural/social scripts in 
the stories of our lives; but rather, we adapt to, resist and selectively appropriate cultural and 
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social rules that present themselves at various stages in our development. Such logic is useful, 
as it extends to arguments made by Schiffrin (1994) regarding the “reflexivity of coherence 
assessments”. This assumes that coherence does not depend simply on predetermined verbal 
forms and meaning, but on how individuals work together within certain social and cultural 
frameworks of interpretation: bringing about achievements in our joint production, and 
understanding of stories through our dialogue with each other.                                            
With regards to the first assumption of this section, that narratives are socially situated 
actions, we draw on Mishler (1986, 1999b; 2006), who referred to narrative life stories as 
“speech events” – a dialogic process, whereby the meaning of questions and answers are 
negotiated throughout the context of the interview. Emphasis on the “socially situated” nature 
of narrative accounts directs attention to the interviewee’s location within an ongoing stream 
and evolution of social interaction, and how these unfold throughout the context of the 
interview. It acknowledges that one must attend not only to the story being told, but that story’s 
placement within the sequential order of events which unfold throughout the storying process: 
what we refer to as turning points. Here, negotiation of meaning is mediated not by the 
interviewer per se, but through the interviewee’s reflexive engagement and struggle within 
their own personal accounts, and how they make sense of them. 
The next assumption of the “narrative as praxis” framework is that narratives are in fact 
identity performances. Individuals express, exhibit and make claims for both who they are and 
who they would like themselves to be through the stories they tell. In other words, we perform 
our identities! Richard Bauman (1986) made reference to this when noting that oral 
performances are rooted in form, meaning and function in culturally defined scenes and events. 
Other scholars have remarked that the full meaning of narrative is performative rather than 
semantic (See essays in: Brockmeier & Carbaugh, 2001). Thus, by taking this performative 
approach to narratives, we recognize the uniqueness of each individual’s performance and the 
multiplicity, fragmentary, often contradictory, and inherently unfinished nature of their 
narrative identity. Identity is an unstable performative struggle; a notion we will return to 
momentarily.  
This instability and multiplicity – terrain constantly shifting beneath our feet – forces 
us to focus our attention on the rhetorical strategies which individuals employ to speak their 
identities. This requires an analysis that allows us to account for the different ways in which 
stories may be organized and put together by directing participants to contextualize their 
performative process, and having them reflect on the ways they have navigated various identity 
negotiations and conflicts encountered. Simply put, we need a means of studying the details 
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that illuminate how participants in the Northern Ireland epistemic community collectively co-
produce the world around them.  
This need is satisfied within the “narrative as praxis” framework through its final 
assumption that narratives are fusions of form and content. Here, we reflect for a moment on 
Hayden White (1990), who viewed the role of historians as retelling individual and collective 
stories in a narrative, “the truth of which would reside in the correspondence of the story told 
to the story lived by real people in the past” (p.X). He explains that narratives are not simply 
forms of discourse which can be filled with various contents; but have a content which exists 
prior to any given actualization of it; “content of the form” (H. V. White, 1990).  
In order to discover this “content of the form” as regards my early analogy about life-
sized maps, we must emphasize the structure through which these narratives are constructed 
and analysed. This is how we “fuse form to content”: focusing on specific events and incidents 
at various points in these academic’s paths. We ask for specific cases, events, and interactions 
– personally and professionally – which Northern Ireland academics found fascinating, 
engaging, challenging and intriguing: both in their studies on Northern Ireland, as well as their 
interactions in academia in the British Isles before, during and following the peace process. 
Through first-hand accounts, we learn not only about the difficulties, obstacles, challenges, 
openings, promises, and opportunities which participants were presented with; but also how 
they were able, or unable, to navigate them, as well as how they built relationships, managed 
trust and suspicion, and learned as they went along: inquiring sometimes by themselves, at 
others facilitating inquiry by others with whom they collaborated.  
Through the “narrative as praxis” framework, we have a way of organizing and 
approaching the complexity, multitude and messiness of narrative accounts, by elevating the 
status of these to their rightful place. In utilizing this tool, we neither valorise individual agency 
to the extent that extra-local forces are ignored, nor diminish this agency to the extent that we 
reduce participant narratives to being storied by these forces. By recognizing the dialogic, 
social and performative nature of personal narratives, we cannot only thematize commonalities 
between a multitude of accounts, but also fuse their form with content; and in so doing, are 
able to abstract – identify – and use the micro to connect with the macro. That is, we can then 
generalise.      
 With this use of narratives this research places itself under the methodological umbrella 
of ethnography. Though it is different in the sense that conventional ethnographic studies 
confine themselves to the claims and behaviours of individuals within the features of the 
everyday worlds they examine them in. To do this anthropologist traditionally use interviews 
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and participant observation (Kuhn, 1962; Popper, 1963; Lakatos, 1978; Burawoy, 1998, 2003). 
There is much utility in both approaches; however, my interest was to extend beyond the limits 
of traditional ethnography. This “extension” was inspired by the Manchester School of social 
anthropology23 and Michael Burawoy (2008) who insisted that instead of simply collecting 
data about what participants ought to do they looked to gather data and tell stories about what 
individuals were actually doing! This is a story. The use of narratives story telling allowed me 
as an interviewer to extent myself into the everyday experience of Northern Ireland academics, 
gathering rich accounts of the real events, struggles, and dramas that took place over space and 
time. The use of this storytelling technique follows an efficient self-generating schema in that 
these narratives are detailed in their texture, they are fixated in a relevant context, and they 
close problems of Gestalt – all stories and events have a beginning, middle, and an end with a 
natural flow (Bauer, 1996).24  The next section deals with identity.  
   
IDENTITY 
The notion of identity and, more specifically, identity formation has been mentioned much 
here. This is because identity formation is a secondary concern in this study. More precisely, 
we are interested in how my participants’ identity - not only as academics, but Irish in a British 
context, and/or British in an Irish context (with or without certain political leanings) - were 
shaped, achieved, and mediated over time; in other words, the trajectories of identity formation. 
As an example, scholars such as Professor Brendan O’Leary narrative displays how 
experiences of living in Nigeria during its civil war, being the only Irish born catholic in a 
protestant school, first being warned of being labelled “Irish” in terms of his research interest, 
and finally being called the “green Machiavelli” in regards to his analysis of Northern Ireland 
display a trajectory in his professional and personal story. In attempting this, we recognize the 
enormous amount of research already on this concept of “identity” within social science 
literature.25 For the sake of time and space, we do not wish to review or nuance this literature 
                                                 
23 Specifically see the work of Kingsley Garbett (1970) and Max Gluckman, both of whom are leading figures 
and contributors to this discipline as well as more recent reviews of this work by Andrew Abbott (2007).  
24 For more fleshing of these details and the utility and pitfalls of this method see the writings from the LSE 
methodology institute on interviewing techniques, particularly those regarding storytelling. I particularly found 
the essays by Martin Bauer (1987,1996) to be very useful.   
25 Some notable works on identity literature relevant to Northern Ireland are:  (Cairns & Mercer, 1984; Graham, 
1998; Hewstone, Cairns, Voci, Hamberger, & Niens, 2006; McGlynn *, Niens, Cairns, & Hewstone, 2004; Tajfel, 
2010) 
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in any detail; but think it useful to briefly discuss how this concept will act as scaffolding to 
our methodological approach.   
        When dealing with a topic as slippery as identity formation, complexities will 
inevitably emerge, quickly. One of the problems is that professional identity formation and 
development does not take place in a linear fashion. For example, the erratic career trajectories 
of our participants were often marked by shifts in interests and focus – in terms of research as 
well as social, political and institutional participation and activism – which seem unrelated and 
difficult to connect at times. For example, Lord Professor Paul Bew’s participation as an 
activist and protester with the Workers Party in Northern Ireland to being a special advisor to 
UUP leader David Trimble and, then, Life Peer in the House of Lords.  Another issue is the 
degree to which participants’ work identities will appear as only one of a series of separate and 
sovereign axes of self-definition. These complexities direct us to a concept of identity that 
rejects the singular notion of an all-encompassing IDENTITY (Elliot George Mishler, 1999b). 
Instead it recognizes the plurality of sub-identities which, metaphorically speaking, sing 
together, sometimes surprisingly, as a collective choir: which constitute “the self” who give 
space, at various times and durations, for baritone and soprano solos.       
Such is this multiplicity and complexity, we consider that Mishler (1999b)’s concept of 
identity, which states that it should be seen as a dynamic organization of sub-identities that 
might conflict with or align with one another, is appropriate. The desire here in utilizing this 
concept is to focus our attention on the process – the how – of identity formation; rather than 
an individual’s identity at times: the what. In having a process-oriented focus, we will still see 
what individuals’ identities are at particular moments in time; but more than this, how they 
came to “be” in particular circumstances, and how they navigate the boundaries of this “being”. 
Again, we stress the importance of this model in mapping the formation and achievement of 
professional and other sub-identities of British and Irish academics by looking at life-course 
disjunctions, discontinuities and transitions; and thematizing them.  
We must also acknowledge the social and group aspect of identity, and the role it will 
play in this process and framework. The social aspect of identity should be understood as that 
part of the individual’s self-concept which derives from their knowledge of their membership 
in a particular social group(s), together with the significance attached (Tajfel, 2010, p. 2). This 
understanding fits within our conceptualization of identity and affords us further opportunity 
to thematize how individuals form groups, behave in and towards specific groups; as well as 
how they modulate and define the boundaries of their personal identities within and outside 
these settings.  
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We thus fit our methodological model within the individual and group identity 
frameworks. This framework is used to map and thematize the trajectories and critical junctures 
in the lives of members of the Northern Ireland epistemic community. It affords us the ability 
not just to identify the how of the Northern Ireland epistemic community – how it emerged, 
has developed and changed over the years – but to abstract and locate the exact episteme26 of 
this community. That is, it will display where the ideas of this community are and have been 
located as well as how such ideas bind them together or (potentially) keep them apart. This is 
made possible not by suppressing – what positivists often refer to as controlling for – the 
variability among participants in how they achieve and perform their identities, but by retaining 
and respecting these differences, and addressing them within a comparative framework.  
 In closing this section I would be remise if I did not speak of my own identity for a 
moment and the challenges and possibilities this afforded me. From the onset, I had to contend 
with the fact that I was very much an outsider to this academic community. For one I am an 
American with no Irish or Northern Irish connection whatsoever. As mentioned before this 
lack of biological or biographical connection was somewhat puzzling to the academics I 
interviewed. I am, however, from the South-Eastern U.S. – a place accustomed to troubles, 
issues of segregation, and a lack of willingness to face up to the longstanding impacts of these 
issues and how they have (and often not) been addressed. Though the differences in these two 
areas are stark I do feel this background gave me a basis for which to observe and listen to my 
respondents. But a major challenge I had to contend with was the reality that the individuals 
that I was interviewing had far more sensitivity to, familiarity with, and knowledge of the 
subject matter and cultural nuances in question. For example, I could hardly challenge Brendan 
O’Leary on consociationalism nor Anthony McIntyre on the impacts or reality of the IRA 
armed struggle. 
My status as an outsider became apparent to myself in the many stumbling’s of this 
research. At one point my lack of sensitivity to language and issues cost me an interview and 
greatly offended a prominent Professor in the discipline. After he informed me I could go “fuck 
myself” I realised my lack of sensitivity as well as the complications of the interviews to come. 
Yet in the end it was my outsider status and my position of (one could say) weakness that really 
displayed the strengths of the narrative method employed. This is because storytelling is a 
competence that is (relatively) independent of education, language, or cultural competence 
                                                 
26 This is the historical a priori which grounds knowledge and its discourses, and therefore represents the condition 
of their possibility within particular epochs (Foucault, 1973b). 
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(Schuetze, 1977). As an interviewer one simply guides the retelling of events that can be 
rendered either in general or indexical terms. Indexical stories were specifically useful because 
they allowed the interviewees references to be grounded to concrete events in specific places 
and times.  
In this research, the Northern Ireland academics narrations were rich in indexical 
statements, grounded in personal experiences which were, by virtue, detailed in focus and 
attention. This was important in helping me get out of my own way in the interview process. I 
quickly discovered once the participants began talking and narrating their stories these stories 
had a sequential logic to them. This sequence forces (often unbeknownst to the narrator) to 
give a structure, context, and personal evaluation and reflection of the outcome as well as the 
underlying motivations and the participants own symbolic system for orienting these stories in 
the context of my research (Lamnek, 1989). The utility of this method is thus that actors begin 
to tell on themselves in the telling of their stories and it is through this that I could use these 
micro events and happenings in the lives of individuals to point to greater macro trends and 
developments within the Northern Ireland epistemic community.     
THE HOW OF THIS METHOD 
Until now, we have discussed the intellectual scaffolding and framework which make up our 
methodological model. It should be clear that the method adopted centres on the gathering, 
telling, and interpretation of individual stories. This path of storytelling is travelled to make 
sense of the puzzle: How and why do epistemic communities emerge? In this section, we 
therefore want to look at more practical aspects: such as how participants are selected, from 
where, the types of questions employed, and how.  
We wish, first, to reassert that our aim is to learn through the friction of actual 
practitioners’ struggles and experiences. As in any field of practice we would like to explore – 
post-conflict mediation, policing, political strategy, or community building – we begin by 
identifying our selection criteria for interviewees. Here, we look for academics who by both 
reputation and role, have been deeply immersed in various problems, research, debates, and 
institutions concerning the Northern Ireland conflict and peace process. More specifically, 
because we are looking at the emergence of the epistemic community within the U.K. and 
Ireland, we focus on academics emerging from within British-Irish academia; in other words, 
British and Irish academics. Though not all the academics interviewed come from the United 
Kingdom and/or Ireland. Several of the scholars interviewed were born in Germany, South 
Africa, and North America, yet even these individuals have some Anglo-Irish roots. The only 
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exception to this is Stefan Wolff, a German academic at University of Birmingham. All 
participants did their PhD’s and started their careers in British or Irish universities. Many of 
their origins are traced to Queens University Belfast. Several of the scholars interviewed 
currently reside outside of the U.K. and Ireland. In these cases, interviews were conducted via 
Skype. All other interviews were conducted face to face. This was perhaps the most difficult 
aspect of the process – arranging, scheduling, travelling to, and coordinating the interviews.   
The practitioners (as we shall call them), we identify for this research are not only kind 
enough to offer us their time, but willing to speak about their own practice(s) and involvement 
in research and research institutions within the British Isles: discussing what they’ve tried, what 
they might have done differently, what they’ve found surprising, how they adapted, changes 
they have seen in the academy, and so on. Scholar’s biographical information, professional 
background, and university affiliation is placed within footnotes. This was done to maintain 
the flow of the main text while also giving readers the necessary background and biography to 
give context and make sense of “the messiness” of these scholars’ personal narratives. These 
scholars were identified, over in total 50, based on their publication and research contributions 
to the subject of Northern Ireland as well as their membership and participation (both current 
and past) in the Political Studies Association of Ireland (PSAI). We also relied greatly on 
snowballing in identifying participants. Once participants engaged in their personal reflections 
the interview often prompted them to say, “oh, you must talk to… he or she would be really 
useful”. Of these 50 individuals, 34 participants within the British-Irish academy were willing 
to participate (See Appendix 1). Only five women agreed to participate. Though they were 
clearly the minority within the community and the discipline.  
Also, of all the academics approached female academics were the demographic which 
pushed back the most. They were the most apprehensive to participate in the research. 
Interestingly, this was based on their questions concerning their affiliation with the Northern 
Ireland community as well as the political science discipline. They also showed the most 
thoroughness in terms of editing texts, omitting information, and (carefully) choosing their 
words. This was not the case with all female participants but it was a theme. Yet the lack of 
female academics’ narratives and their reluctance to participate did prove to complicate this 
research and sheds light on their position and lack of representation within the discipline.  
 Once contacted, these experienced practitioners are asked if they can speak about two 
or three specific cases regarding their involvement within British-Irish academia, based on a 
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series of questions which we have developed.27 These questions are administered a week prior 
to the interviews, giving the participants ample time to reflect and develop their stories. 
Interviewee were explained that the questions administered were not strict guidelines but, 
instead, were meant to act signposts to help them with the narrating of their lives (See Appendix 
2 for a list of questions).  
We do not merely ask these participants for success stories. Instead, we ask for cases 
that the practitioner themselves finds fascinating, engaging, intriguing and/or challenging - 
because these stories teach us about the difficulties and obstacles, challenges, openings, 
promises and opportunities of their actual work; as well as how they define themselves, and 
the boundaries of their relationships with others. In conducting these interviews, the role of the 
interviewer is to allow respondents to freely articulate narrative accounts of such instances: 
prompted and at times interrupted by being asked to specify “how?” rather than “why?” Copies 
and files of these interview transcripts can and will be made available upon request.   
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has been concerned with the sometimes overly complicated issue of method. It 
has outlined the tool to be utilized, as painlessly as possible, in addressing the central question 
of this research: How does an epistemic community emerge? The tool employed to “keep us 
erect” on this path will be a reflective one, which uses interviews in a way that allows 
respondents to give their own account – tell a story – of the various stages of their professional 
and personal development as a means of extracting the general from the unique; using the 
“micro” to account for the “macro” (Burawoy, 2009).  
In outlining this interview method, the chapter has also displayed the utility of 
employing such a technique: which is not only phenomenologically rich in data, but can be 
corroborated by existing literature from various fields in the social sciences. In doing so, it has 
addressed the limitations and criticisms of adopting such an approach. Let us now commence 
on the substantive part of this dissertation, and test the utility of this chosen method, as well as 
the theoretical framework adopted to make sense of this puzzle.  
 
                                                 
27 See Annex for the list of questions.  
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CHAPTER 3  
 




The previous chapters of this research have been aimed at setting up the context and intellectual 
scaffolding of this research. Up to this point it has been focused on laying out what the question 
is, why that question is important, the literature that supports its importance, and the theory and 
method that will be to answer and explain – how an epistemic community emerges. Now we 
get into the meat of this subject. That is, this is the point where we delve into the interviews 
and take, in stages, the various points, events, and times that show the development and 
evolution of the Northern Ireland epistemic community.  
And to this point, it is important to note our basic premise is that scientific communities 
matter. Scholars have long noted that the enduring, growing importance of scientific journals, 
research centers, university departments, peer reviews and conferences all point to the growing 
influence of science and expansion of the “knowledge-driven economy” (See for example: 
Chomsky, 1997; Drucker, 1993; C. Kerr, 1995, 2001; Washburn, 2005). 20 years into what 
management expert Peter Drucker termed the post-capitalist knowledge society, knowledge 
institutions and carriers have become the central wealth creators of the developed world 
(Drucker, 1993, p. 8). Knowledge has thus become one of the most important factors of 
production and valuable assets to corporations and nation states.  
 Along with the enhanced utility and value of knowledge has come the inevitable 
increase in the profile and value of knowledge carriers and communities: bringing into question 
their ethics, practices, relationships and origins. When asking questions such as “how and why 
does an epistemic community emerge”, a special emphasis is therefore placed on the how. By 
focusing on the how, we are looking to uncover not only the when of a community – the time 
it emerged – but what conditions were needed for a community to emerge, why it failed to 
emerge previously, how that community develops, operates, and adapts to specific settings 
once it is established, and how it changes alongside its environments. In looking at these 
differing facets, we must not dwell much on the notion of episteme or community; but look to 
the ic in epistemic.  
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Scientific communities often develop around a perceived problem (the - ic) – and look 
for solution(s) to that problem. Staying with the notion of ic, attention is drawn to persistent 
problems with treatments but not necessarily solutions; there is an emphasis on process. For 
example, in treating the alcoholic, the diabetic, or any other patient with a chronic disease, 
medical practitioners place emphasis on various treatment processes that address the 
symptoms, though permanent solutions (which address root causes and conditions) or 
preventions have yet to be discovered and continue to be debated (Brown, 1995). Similar 
claims can be made about other disciplines and communities that look at things such as 
environmental change (Toke, 1999) and business regulation (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000), to 
name but a few.   
The same is true for practitioners and researchers into systemic socio-political 
problems, such as conflict. This has been the concern of much of the literature concerning both 
democratization and Northern Ireland: both, indeed, involve processes through which 
protracted conflict can be ended and political stability maintained. Here, the point of 
agreement, which researchers come together on, is the recognition of a problem; the best 
solution exists through the application of some form of democratic process. Unlike medical 
scientists, however, political scientists are not charged with and often do not develop solutions 
to socio-political problems. This is the role of politicians. This is not to say that political 
scientists are not consulted with about such problems, but the resolution of conflict is ultimately 
seen as a responsibility of the state and its officials. In this sense, political science looks to 
understand and critique socio-political behaviour and policy; as well as inform and (attempt 
to) predict future state strategy. Yet such has been the expansion of the “knowledge economy” 
and elevation of knowledge carriers and creators, the lines between academia are becoming 
ever more porous.  
This chapter investigates and explains the seeming lack of relationship between 
political science in the U.K. and Ireland, and the events taking place in Northern Ireland; the 
chicken and egg’s apparent divorce from one another. It is dedicated to exploring the what, 
why, and how of this disconnect, bringing into focus the lack of community and scholarship in 
relation to the Northern Ireland issue in the British and Irish political science academies. When 
considering “how and why an epistemic community emerges”, it is necessary to understand the 
conditions which make scholarship and community around a subject possible, as well as those 
which do the opposite.  
CONTEXT – DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE U.K. 
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We must begin here by stating the obvious; the outbreak of violence in Northern Ireland in the 
late 1960s created a significant level of difficulty concerning any social science research in the 
area. This issue of research silence has been addressed, briefly, by Schubotz (2005), who noted 
that “the everyday military presence of the British army, curfews and paramilitary threats, the 
absence of democratic means of participation, the threat of falling victim to shootings or 
bombings” might have contributed (p. 6). Such was its deep socio-religious segregation, social 
research in Northern Ireland had been sensitive long before the outbreak of violence (ibid). 
Social researchers, whether from the U.K. or Ireland, had always had to position themselves 
within the sectarian “us-versus-them” divide and found themselves positioned there by others, 
not least those they researched (Tonge, 2015). Professor’s Brendan O’Leary28 and Jonathan 
Tonge29 recalled that political scientists at the time of the Troubles were conscious of being 
labelled “Irish” – a term that indicated an automatic affiliation with republicanism – in terms 
of research on Northern Ireland. Professors John Doyle30 and John Coakley31 note that in the 
Republic of Ireland, academics went to great pains to avoid research or making claims which 
might have seen them depicted as sympathizers with Sinn Féin or any other fractious groups.  
In a practical sense, the Troubles made contacting people “from the other side” highly 
precarious; a state of affairs which applied to researchers and respondents. This may also have 
contributed to many feeling unable to engage in empirical research (Nagle & Clancy, 2012; 
                                                 
28 Brendan O’Leary is perhaps the discipline’s most prominent scholar, and one of Consociational Theory’s most 
ardent advocates. A Republic of Ireland native, born in Cork, O’Leary moved to Carrickfergus – a town 11 miles 
outside Belfast, on the north shore of Belfast Lough – after spending a considerable portion of his childhood in 
Nigeria during its civil war, with his father a scientist for the United Nations initiative there. O’Leary went to the 
prominent Roman Catholic grammar school, St MacNissi’s College, in Carnolough, County Antrim (also known 
as Garron Tower), along with his colleague John McGarry; and was the first from this school to attend Oxford: 
where he studied Philosophy, Politics, and Economics. In 1981, he began his PhD at the London School of 
Economics, under the supervision of Professor Tom Nossiter. 
29 Jonathan Tonge is Professor of Politics at Liverpool University and has written well over a hundred publications 
on the Northern Ireland peace process and elections (See: Liverpool, 2016). Tonge is a British native from 
Liverpool, raised in the working class Irish Catholic area of Merseyside; he attended Catholic primary school in 
Southport, on the Lancashire/Merseyside border. In 1994, Tonge began his PhD at London Southbank University 
under the supervision of the famous gay activist, historian, and sociologist, Jeffery Weeks; his dissertation was 
on anti-poll tax movement. 
30 Professor John Doyle was born in County Wexford in the Republic of Ireland, is the Director of the Institute 
for International Conflict Resolution and Reconstruction, and Executive Dean of Dublin City University (DCU)’s 
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences. Doyle was previously Head of the School of Law and Government; 
and before this, was founding co-Director of the Centre for International Studies at DCU. He currently acts as 
Editor of Irish Studies in International Affairs. He did his PhD at Queens University under the supervision of 
Liam O’Dowd.   
31 John Coakley is a native of the Republic of Ireland and Emeritus Professor of Politics at University College 
Dublin (UCD) and Queens University Belfast. He is former Head of the School of Politics and International 
Relations (2008-09) at UCD and former Director of the UCD Institute of British-Irish Studies (1999-2005, 2006-
08). One of the discipline’s most eminent political scientists, Coakley acted as Secretary- General of the 
International Political Science Association (1994-2000), and was the former President and founding member of 
the Political Studies Association of Ireland (1988-90). 
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Schubotz, 2005). Conditions were unfavourable for any form of critical social research, but 
particularly problematic for political science projects: especially qualitative ones, which could 
have put participants at risk if identified. Since Northern Ireland is a very small and closely-
knit society, the risk of identification would have been relatively high.  
The difficulties with research can certainly be seen in British publications: from 1969 
until 1995, prominent journals such as The British Journal of Political Science (BJPS) only 
produced two articles on Northern Ireland.32 Aside from the odd piece of anomalous research, 
such as Richard Rose (1971)’s Governing Without Consensus: An Irish Perspective; or Paul 
Bew and Henry Patterson (1985)’s The British State & The Ulster Crisis, Northern Ireland 
seemed to be terra incognita to political scientists in the U.K. and Ireland, even though it was 
referred to as the one of the most researched conflicts in history prior to the peace process 
(Whyte, 1990). Before the latter commenced, the topic in fact received the scantest mentions 
in standard works on British history; while the handful of special studies produced over the 50 
years prior to the outbreak of The Troubles only looked at the literary theory of the 
Constitution: the institution set up in 1920 and the principles governing their operation (See: 
C. O'Leary, 1972).  
Of course, there are anomalies to this pattern. Scholars such as Frank Wright’s (1973) 
ground breaking analysis of the structure and historical continuity of Protestant political 
ideology is a case in point. Wright was mentioned often, and favourably, by most the scholars 
interviewed. Wright and Adrain Guelke (both of whom were at Queens University Belfast) are 
often credited with pioneering the comparative approach towards Northern Ireland. Scholars 
pointed out that Wright was one of the few who looked at Northern Ireland not as a unique and 
anomalous social and political problem, but sought to find parallels with other divided societies 
forged by history on the frontiers between different cultures and societies (Jay, 1993). Yet all 
the academics interviewed noted that such analyses, especially within the U.K. and Ireland, 
were the exception rather than the rule during this time.  
Thus, when talking to scholars about what Brendan O’Leary called “the absence of 
community” in the pre-peace process political science academy, academics such as Professor 
Richard English33 noted that “we all felt that the political scientists in most of Britain and 
                                                 
32 These articles were James Russell (1977)’s Replication of Instability: Political Socialization in Northern 
Ireland; and Arend Lijphart (1975b)’s Northern Ireland Problem – Cases, Theories, & Solutions. Although they 
did not adopt any of the sectarian stances found in NLR, they were submitted by academics and universities from 
outside the U.K. and Ireland. 
33 Professor Richard English is Wardlaw Professor of Politics at the School of International Relations and Director 
of the Handa Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at the University of St Andrews. 
He is a Belfast native and son of the Methodist scholar, preacher, author, evangelist, church statesman and 
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Ireland had grotesquely neglected the subject” (English, 2015, p. 2). Moreover, Lord Professor 
Paul Bew34, Professor of Irish Politics at Queens University since 1991, reflected that during 
the early 1970s, when he was a PhD student and aspiring academic studying in Cambridge:  
Nobody had a developed interest in Northern Ireland anywhere [in the U.K.] 
really at that time.  It was all… I mean when I was a student [at Cambridge], 
there were actually these old hands at Cambridge… Mansergh was there – 
Martin Mansergh – and his father, Nicholas, was a Master at my college and 
every [year], he did teach a course of lectures [on Ireland] and all, my supervisor 
and he published the Penguin History of Modern Ireland but it didn’t really 
address the Northern Issue.” 
 
Bew goes on to highlight that:  
“There was a kind of [minor] interest by academics in the U.K. in the [Republic 
of] Ireland [at that time]… In later decades this developed further but it took a 
long time, you know.  We really did not… just the first few years of the Troubles 
[went on] with no impact (Bew, 2015).  
 
All academics interviewed acknowledged that collectively, the discipline had neglected 
the subject; and that there was nothing like a community of scholars within the U.K. or Ireland 
during that time. There was, though, strong consensus over exactly why political scientists had 
neglected the conflict; with many acknowledging Schubotz (2005)’s findings, and noting that 
several academics received death threats from dissident groups based on opinions they had 
openly expressed (either in print or during talks). Brendan O’Leary, Richard English, Rupert 
                                                 
broadcaster, Donald English. English attended Oxford and did his PhD in History at Keele University in 1986 
under the supervision of the prominent English historian, Charles Townshend. English worked at Queen’s 
University between 1989 and 2011, and is author of several books related to Northern Ireland, including the 
award-winning Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA (2003); and Irish Freedom: The History of Nationalism 
in Ireland (2007). 
34 Lord Professor Paul Bew is a Belfast native and perhaps the most prominent political historian and academic 
on Northern Ireland in the U.K.. Lord Professor Bew did his BA and PhD at Pembroke College, Cambridge under 
the supervision of Edward Nolan. He has been an academic at Queens University, Belfast since 1979. He 
participated in the People's Democracy marches in 1969 and along with his colleague Professor Henry Patterson, 
was briefly a member of the Workers' Association and the Workers' Party of Ireland: a Republican Organization 
which advocated the Two Nation Theory of Northern Ireland. During the peace process, Bew served as an adviser 
to David Trimble. His contributions to the Good Friday Agreement were acknowledged with an appointment to 
the House of Lords as a life peer in February 2007; currently, he acts as Chairman of the Committee on Standards 
in Public Life, an advisory non-departmental public body of the U.K. Government. 
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Taylor35, Henry Patterson36, Pete Shirlow37 and others pointed to this; the murder of Edgar 
Graham38 and Eric Davy39; as well as the shootings of Adrian Guelke40 and Bernadette Devlin 
McAiskey41. Reflecting on this, Jonathan Tonge explained the very real sense which academics 
experienced: he received death threats and was harassed well into the period of the peace 
process by various dissident groups, who objected to opinions he expressed in news 
publications, as well as magazines such as Fortnight (Tonge, 2015). Richard English, an 
academic at Queens from 1989 to 2011, recalls that many scholars forget:  
How ominous it all seemed, studying it when people were getting shot. So you’d 
find those people would be, I remember seeing people at conferences when I’d 
be talking to someone who was there [in Belfast], and there’d be some people 
across the room slightly out the side of their head, you know, they didn’t know, 
I didn’t know really what they thought, he’s an IRA man. Who’s that bloke? Is 
he here too, it was just a conference? But it struck me that there was a way, once 
everyone thought well, the IRA is not going to kill you, or loyalists aren’t going 
to kill you, it became easier to discuss it (English, 2015). 
 
Lord Professor Bew was one of the few who deviated from this position: arguing that 
even though lack of engagement from political scientists persisted well into the 1980s, this was 
                                                 
35 Professor Rupert Taylor is a Devon-born British native who attended the London School of Economics and did 
his PhD in Sociology at the University of Kent in 1986. Taylor’s doctoral dissertation highlighted the problems 
confronting Queen’s University Belfast in seeking to maintain a liberal position in a deeply divided society, and 
helped initiate reform of sectarian employment practices in higher education in Northern Ireland. In 1984, his 
research findings were reported in the British and Irish media, and stimulated a Fair Employment Agency enquiry 
which resulted in new employment equity guidelines (Taylor, 2015). Taylor is currently Professor of Political 
Studies and former Head of the Department of Political Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand, 
Johannesburg, where he has resided since 1987; he has remained one of Consociationalism’s most ardent critics.  
36 Henry Patterson is a Belfast native from the working-class Protestant area of Bangor. Patterson did his PhD and 
BA at Queens University in the late 1960s and, together with Lord Professor Paul Bew, was a member of the 
Worker’s Party in Ireland. He is currently Professor of Politics at University of Ulster.  
37 Professor Pete Shirlow is currently the Director and Blair Chair at the University of Liverpool’s Institute of 
Irish Studies. Shirlow was born and raised in a working-class Protestant family in East Belfast, but attended a 
Quaker grammar school. He did his BA at Queens University Belfast, and his PhD in Economic Geography at the 
University of Liverpool. Shirlow returned to Queens in 1993 as a Professor of Politics, and was Deputy Director 
of Queens Institute for Conflict Transformation and Social Justice (2013-2015). His research has been focused 
largely on political violence, post-conflict transformation, policing and the community in Northern Ireland; he has 
published more than 80 pieces of work, including the recently acclaimed monograph, The End of Ulster 
Loyalism? (2012).  
38 Edgar Graham was an Ulster Unionist assembly member and Law Lecturer at Queens University Belfast, shot 
dead by two IRA gunmen on December 7, 1983.  
39 Eric Davey was a scholar and political activist, shot in his car in County Derry in 1989.  
40 Adrian Guelke is a South African native and Emeritus Professor of Comparative Politics at Queen's University 
Belfast. He did his PhD at London School of Economics: his research focused mainly on the comparative study 
of ethnic conflict, particularly the cases of Northern Ireland, South Africa and Kashmir. A longstanding expert on 
Northern Ireland, he survived an assassination attempt by Ulster Defence Association (UDA) members at his 
home in Belfast in 1991. The incident occurred following a leaked false police report, which described Guelke as 
an academic known to be involved in the IRA. The attempt failed because the gun used by the would-be assassin 
jammed. The UDA later realized that the claims regarding Guelke were false (Guelke, 2004).   
41 Bernadette Devlin (as she is commonly known as) is an Irish socialist and republican political activist, who was 
shot multiple times along with her husband by Ulster Freedom Fighters in her home on 16 January 1981. 
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not due to any meta-socio-structural issues or restraints, such as censorship from the British or 
Irish state(s) or threats from dissidents. Bew recalled that in relation to his own work on 
Northern Ireland at the time – when he would have been one of the few academics writing on 
the subject – and his activism within organizations like the Workers’ Party42, the British “state 
couldn’t care less” (Bew, 2015). This was echoed by other scholars involved in similar 
activities, such as Professor Paul Arthur43 (who gave political education courses to active 
members of the UDF in the 1980s) and Henry Patterson (who was involved in the Workers’ 
Party with Bew). Although Bew did acknowledge the physical threats posed by the conflict, in 
his experience, the lack of research and community owed more to academics in Northern 
Ireland and the U.K. taking no interest; they were more concerned with mainland British issues, 
such as class and party politics. “Academics had interest in what the problem was, for example, 
with why the Labour Party rose or the Liberals fall or, you know, big structural questions of 
change in mainstream, mainland British politics” (Bew, 2015). Taking a Hegelian stance, he 
noted that regarding academic research, “the owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the 
falling of the dusk” (ibid).  Mockingly, he recalled:  
That is what’s remarkable in academics… is how long it takes for a paradigm 
to change in terms of what they think is important to teach.  So the fact that 
bombs are going off, they can go off for ten years and nobody thinks – ‘Shit, 
we should have a course on that’… but after 20 years, the penny kind of drops. 
That's the way it works with academic life (Bew, 2015). 
 
Professor Paul Arthur reflected an almost identical sentiment, recalling that “during the 
70s, 80s there have would have been almost zero interest in the U.K. or Ireland, for that matter, 
[on the Northern conflict] other than the odd book written by people like Richard Rose, who is 
an American, outside of that… no interest whatsoever” (Arthur, 2015). He goes on:   
I mean I remember expressing my disgust on the day that the IRA planted the 
Brighton bomb44, I got a call from a very senior academic in a British institution 
                                                 
42 The Workers’ Party was first known as Official Sinn Féin, and is a Marxist political party in Ireland. It 
originated out of Sinn Féin (founded in 1905) and the Irish Republican Army (IRA), as the split took place with 
the Provisionals within the republican movement at the onset of The Troubles in 1969–70. It rebranded itself as 
Sinn Féin, the Workers' Party in 1977; and then the Workers' Party in 1982, but it has been consistently associated 
with the Official Irish Republican Army, and was an open advocate of the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War.  
43 Paul Arthur is a preeminent Northern Ireland scholar and practitioner in international conflict resolution. Arthur 
describes himself as a “child of The Troubles”, born into a Catholic/nationalist working class family in Derry’s 
Bogside. He was educated at Queen’s University Belfast (BA & MSc), and did his D.Litt at National University 
of Ireland (NUI) Maynouth. Arthur is an Emeritus Professor of Politics, Emeritus Director of the Graduate 
Program in Peace and Conflict Studies, and INCORE (International Conflict Research Institute) Honorary 
Associate at University of Ulster, where he has worked since the 1980s.  
44 An IRA bombing took place at the Brighton Hotel in 1984. It was intended to assassinate Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher and members of her Cabinet; and while Thatcher escaped unharmed, resulted in five deaths, 
including two high profile members of the Conservative Party, and 31 people being injured.  
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and said – ‘I guess we’re going to have to pay attention’, he was a political 
scientist, very senior, had a senior job at Oxford saying ‘we’re going to have to 
pay attention to Northern Ireland’ (ibid).  
 
Academics in Ireland, such as Professor John Doyle, reflected that “it wasn’t that there 
was so much a resistance or reluctance to [studying Northern Ireland] but just a sense you don’t 
need expertise [on it]. You don’t need to do research…” However, Professor Doyle reflected 
that beyond a sense of institutionalized arrogance around the subject of Northern Ireland – 
individuals didn’t feel that it warranted empirical research “because we know about this stuff 
[already]” (Doyle 2015) – there were certain restraints which caused academics to shy away 
from the subject. On this, Doyle points to several examples, reflecting:   
So the average student at UCD in the 1980s could talk very intelligently about 
the entire division of the South African Liberation Movement but would repeat 
tabloid rubbish about Northern Ireland. Because they had no capacity to engage 
this issue… mostly because of censorship [name omitted], for example, refused 
to take part in RTE’s personal question time, because it was known the audience 
was [being] vetted by the [British] special branch.  
[And] that is a sense of how close it was! How difficult it was! Dennis O’Hearn 
who was in Queen's for a number of years in the sociology department when I 
was there. I didn’t realize when Dennis told me that New Left Review never 
publish an article in Northern Ireland. 
The entire academy of Ireland… concerning the conflict, they just totally 
refused to [engage]. I mean, look at people on the progressive side of U.K. 
politics, Hobsbawm himself, you know, the man's an immense intellectual, and 
Mary Calderon in LSE took a very Metropolitan/Imperial view of the Northern 
Ireland conflict. So, Calderon/Hobsbawm didn’t think that it was English 
nationalism – a British nationalism, at least – that wasn’t considered writing on 
the North. As if nationalism only existed in Celtic fringes…so it’s the Scottish 
nationalist, Wales’s nationalist and Irish nationalist who are primordial and 
backward and missing the class dimension to politics. But they knew that British 
politics was above all of that…that’s a classic Imperialist view.  
And they used their influence in the more progressive end of the academy to 
sort of silence the debate on Northern Ireland. And then the impact of censorship 
and the conflicts together, you can't separate the two. [This] meant it also wasn’t 
a wise career choice for young academics.  
What you had is two combinations. You had everyone thinks they know about 
Northern Ireland so if you were a head of department going…you’re looking to 
pick up a new hire, you wouldn’t pick an expert on Northern Ireland because 
everyone in the department already thinks they can teach it even though nobody 
was. 
So it wasn’t that there was so much a resistance or reluctance to it but just a 
sense you don’t need expertise. You don’t need to do research. You don’t need 
evidence because we know this stuff. 
I used to do a trick with students at UCD… I used to test them out of the blue, 
asking – ‘which is further away Kerry or Belfast?’ And they almost uniformly 
thought Belfast was further away. Because you [would] go on holidays to Kerry, 
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but none of them had been North of Dundalk… In fact, most of them hadn’t 
been North of Drogheda.  
I did a survey at one stage, taking the population from Galway to Dublin and 
sort of making a rough route of that… and if you lived North to that then you’d 
probably end up crossing the border just to have convenience at some stage. But 
if you're living South of the Galway-Dublin line, you got to choose to cross the 
border and a majority of people South of that line will never cross the border. I 
did the survey… [it] was like in the early '80s and the number people who ever 
crossed the border was miniscule. 
So we had censorship, non-traveling, the psychological impacts of pretending 
the violence is further away than it actually is. So for Americans like 90 miles 
to a warzone is like commuting distance!  
But it got magnified, the impacts of censorship and the conflict itself forced 
people to push it [away]. And that’s why they didn’t want to address it (Doyle, 
2015).   
 
           Thus neglect of the subject owed to a combination of dismissal by many within the 
political science academy, censorship and monitoring of the media, and academics’ fear of 
being perceived as sympathizing with or aligning their views with dissident groups. Other, 
rather more redundant themes emerged too. For example, Professor Richard English noted that 
Northern Ireland “seemed for a long time a problem without a solution, partly because there 
was a hint of it being dangerous, the stuff that was happening” (English, 2015). Certainly, this 
was the dominant point argued by scholars at the time (For example, see: Lijphart, 1975b; R. 
Rose, 1971; R. Rose, 1976b; Whyte, 1990). In Britain, per English and others, there was a 
sense of Ireland being “mystifyingly inexplicable and violent and wanting to separate from it 
because it didn’t fit [in with] patterns of British politics” (English, 2015). He went on: “When 
people wrote – brilliant scholars like David Miller writing about national identity based in 
Oxford, Northern Ireland seemed to cut against the model, which you were describing if you 
worked in Britain for example [at the time]” (ibid). The situation was similar in Ireland, because 
for “people talking about the development of state democratic politics in the Republic of 
Ireland, the North was a problem for that [model]. So conveniently it was ignored” (English, 









Table 3: Pre-Peace Process Publications in the U.K. & Ireland45 
 
This highlights that following the outbreak of the Troubles in October of 1968 
throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s articles on the subject in British and Irish political science 
journals were scarce. This is especially apparent in the 1970’s and early part of the 1980’s 
when the Troubles were particularly troublesome. This period included major political events 
such as the infamous Battle of the Bogside in 1969, the later deployment of British troops to 
the region, the events of Bloody Sunday in 1972, the hunger strikes of 1981, and the attempted 
assassination of Margaret Thatcher with the Brighton Bombings of 1984, to name only a few. 
To further contextual the lack of publications from the U.K. and Ireland during this time 
scholars have noted that from 1969 to 1987 some 5,000 serious publications appeared on 
Northern Ireland from places such as the U.S., Canada, and Western Europe (B. O'Leary, 
1989a; Wright, 1988). Yet despite the litany of political developments and controversies 
emanating from the region there was a lack of analyses within the U.K. and Irelands leading 
political science journals until the latter part of the 1980’s when the current peace process 
began.   
           Brendan O’Leary recalled that “the bulk of British academy, if they thought about 
Northern Ireland at all, coded it as a residual, primarily religious, conflict to be accounted for 
                                                 
45 The figures in this table are derived from bibliometric data found on Reuters, Web of Science database. The 
search criteria were limited to peer reviewed journal articles in major British and Irish political science journals, 
other countries were excluded. Book publications were also excluded from this search. Publications were 
identified with its engagement about Northern Ireland, the Troubles, IRA, terrorism, peace process, and political 
violence. It is also of note to reiterate the point that despite the previous peace processes of the 1970’s and 1980’s 
(both of which involved the British and Irish governments) that sparse research was conducted during this time.  
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by the bigotry of Ulster Protestants, which they saw as very like that of Scottish Protestants, 
and partly triggered by what they saw as the vehement Catholicism of the Irish” (pp. 8 & 9). 
O’Leary’s view highlights controversies which emerged in a leading journal of the British left, 
the New Left Review (NLR), also referred to by Doyle. A scathing 1995 article noted that 
between November 1970 and October 1994 (immediately following the IRA ceasefire), the 
NLR had not published any articles which engaged with Britain’s problem in Northern Ireland 
(S. Porter & O'Hearn, 1995). Prior to the 1994 ceasefire, the only article to be published in 
NLR remotely touching on the issue was Peter Gibbon’s (1969) analysis of religion and class 
in Ireland: which described the political situation through what the 1995 authors depicted as a 
typical British classist/imperialistic view.46
  
Academics writing on Northern Ireland since the late 1970s and early 1980s, like Bew, 
Arthur and Patterson made similar references: referring to the British academy’s tendency to 
class issues in the North as both “residual” and “provincial”, not warranting any real attention 
or explanation. Michael Cox47 notes that Northern Ireland was, for a long time, “the ugly 
duckling of regional conflicts [in the British academy]… occasionally mentioned in passing, 
but not much…” (Cox, 1998, p. 326); while Tonge records that for a long time, Irish studies 
were generally seen as the “redheaded stepchild of British political science” (2015). 
Attempting to put this into historical perspective, Bew reflects that:  
The academics don't – I mentioned before, academics like the first 10 years of 
the Troubles in – they think that they have to write. The bombs went off and 
about 800 people were dead, but did they – no. And then it becomes another… 
there are two seminars a week when it's over.  That's academics! It's – Hegel is 
right, ‘the owl of Minerva is always there post-festum’. 
With Northern Ireland this has to do with the fact that they had a set of concerns, 
which they had developed in post-war England. In Churchill's reign, actually in 
parallel in 1937-38, he said. ‘The youth of today does not understand how 
important Ireland was in the United Kingdom.’ But Churchill is actually 
annoyed about this partly because Churchill's career has got a lot of Gamma 
Alpha before.  Now, he's held big offices.  They've done some really good things 
but also in the Home Office during the war, the First World War, he'd done 
some good things — and also people thought some crappy things. 
And the one thing he absolutely takes over is the policy in 1921-22 towards 
Ireland, and he gets it right – right, from the British point of view.  He gets the 
                                                 
46 It should be noted that NLR published a short scanner piece on the IRA split in 1970 (See: Gibbon, 1970); and 
in the same year, reprinted an interview with the Chief of Staff of the Official IRA (Goulding, 1970).  
47 Michael Cox is Emeritus Professor of International Relations at LSE and Director of LSE IDEAS. Cox did his 
PhD at the University of Reading and is a former Professor of Politics at Queen's University Belfast (1972–1995). 
He is also a former Chair at LSE’s Department of International Relations and helped establish the Cold War 
Studies Centre at LSE in 2004.   
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deal done with Ireland and these states come out [of it].  And that's the one thing 
we're lucky to have. It's not Gamma Alpha. It's not gated…boom it worked. 
He’s got it bared in his mind; ‘this is what we're going to do,’ boom, and it 
worked. And so Churchill kind of then felt by 1937 when he was in the 
wilderness. ‘I did this big thing alone but nobody gives a damn about it 
anymore’. They've just gone off the topic… and you could see when he writes 
about Parnell, it's not just saying we should remember but what he's saying is 
the youth of today have no sense of importance about what happened in Ireland. 
The youth that Churchill was writing about in 1937 were the people of today or 
the sort of people who were Professors in Cambridge when I got there. And to 
them Ireland is this off-a-quaint-place which you might have gone to on your 
holidays, if you're unlucky… You know, and stuff like that. And aside from one 
or two people because there are quite a lot of Anglo-Irish people in Cambridge, 
Mansergh for example had family connections with, but basically that was [it] 
– it was off the mainstream.  What Churchill was writing about was the 
emergence of the working class, the emergence of the labor movement, the Tory 
vote in the suburbs, the Tory working man [and] these were the issues of the 
day but that's it (Bew, 2015, pp. 8-9). 
 
Thus, the attitude amongst academics – as well as the public – towards Northern Ireland 
was that it was yesterday’s news, and a subject which the discipline had simply moved on from. 
The historical longevity of the dispute, coupled with the depth of the divide between the two 
communities, also seemed to suggest that the conflict would persist indefinitely. This was 
certainly the dominant view among academics, even as the settlement of other regional disputes 
began in the early 1990s; scholars did not express optimism regarding Northern Ireland (For 
instance see: O'Malley, 1993). Indeed, Guelke (1994) noted that while real peace might be 
possible in the Middle East and South Africa, it was probably impossible in Ulster. The general 
consensus was that unrest would continue until either exhaustion overcame the protagonists, 
or “demographic, economic and wider political changes which are not programmed with a view 
to peace” changed “the nature of the questions people ask about Northern Ireland” (English, 
1997).   
Certainly, the impact of censorship and monitoring of the media – by both state and 
paramilitaries – would have greatly exacerbated individual inclinations against conducting 
research, as well as reinforcing existing attitudes towards the conflict. Irrespective of the views 
of Bew and others that the state “couldn’t have cared less” in relation to research, it has long 
been acknowledged that in Northern Ireland, routine public relations were dedicated to 
promoting the view that the conflict was caused either by deep and irreconcilable divisions 
between Irish Nationalists and Ulster Unionists, or simply by “terrorism”. In either case, the 
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situation was often framed via what former IRA member and scholar Anthony McIntyre48 
described many times as the “internal conflict model”; namely, that the conflict had nothing to 
do with the relationship between Britain and Ireland, but was between internal fractious groups, 
with Britain a neutral arbiter (McIntyre, 2015).  
In any case, a number of official attempts were made to impose tight controls on media 
and social practice in both the U.K. and Ireland (See:Miller, 1993; Miller, 1995). This was 
done both through the law and routine government intimidation of the media, as referenced in 
Doyle’s account. In the former case, the number and severity of powers available to 
circumscribe the media had steadily increased in relation to Northern Ireland from the 1970s 
onwards. In the U.K., this included the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), the Emergency 
Provisions Act (EPA), the Official Secrets Act (OSA), and the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act (PCEA), all passed and/or tightened following the increase of violence in the 1970s (O 
Maohiin, 1989). In 1976 in Ireland, under Section 31 of the Broadcasting Authority Act (BAA) 
of 1960, the state issued strict orders that Raidió Teilifís Éireann (RTÉ) not broadcast, “any 
matter that could be calculated to promote the aims or activities of any organization which 
engages in, promotes, encourages or advocates the attaining of any particular objectives by 
violent means” (Miller, 1995). In the U.K., the 1989 revision of the PTA allowed the police to 
demand access to any journalistic material should they believe it likely to have “substantial 
value” in a terrorist investigation. In the same year, OSA further narrowed the sphere of debate 
by making it illegal for anyone associated with intelligence or security matters to speak or be 
reported in the media. Brendan O’Leary recalled that:  
There is a fertile engagement with the history of Ireland in the past. Economic 
history, cultural history, all that is taking place, but if anything the atmosphere 
is Cold War-ish with anybody who appears to be sympathetic to Northern 
Nationalists gets coded as an IRA supporter and dangerous, and doesn’t have a 
good career. It was a chilling atmosphere as a result of censorship, that was a 
revert censorship of Republicans. 
For instance, there was a broadcast in that. Take, Connor Cruise O’Brien, like 
a major intellectual, was in transition from being a left wing Irish Nationalist to 
being a right-wing Unionist and he ended up in the same political party as 
Robert McCartney – the United Kingdom Unionist Party. [Connor Cruise 
O’Brien] helped and advised in the Republic of Ireland to implement a very 
vigorous censorship program (O’Leary, 2015).    
                                                 
48 Anthony McIntyre is a former Provisional Irish Republican Army combatant. McIntyre was imprisoned for 
murder for 18 years in Long Kesh (Maze) Prison in Northern Ireland. Following his release from prison in 1996, 
he completed a PhD in Political Science at Queens University Belfast under the supervision of Paul Bew. Since 
completion of his dissertation, McIntyre has worked as a journalist, historian, researcher, and activist: remaining 
consistently and ardently critical of Gerry Adams, Sinn Féin, the Good Friday Agreement and Northern Ireland 
Peace Process. His most prominent work is a collection of his journalism and criticism entitled Good Friday: The 
Death of Irish Republicanism (2008).  
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The “Cold War-ish” nature of academia around Northern Ireland is reminiscent of that 
of the 1940s and 1950s at American universities under McCarthyism: whereby groups and 
individuals were reluctant and urged not to express left-wing views, as they might be seen as 
anti-state and pro-communist (Schrecker, 1986). John Regan (2013) has called attention to 
similar developments in Ireland: noting that the advent of the Provisional IRA and rapid 
collapse of Northern Ireland’s political institutions led some to fear the stability of the Irish 
state; and thus forced many academics to adopt and adhere to historical meta-narratives better 
suited to the times. These new narratives had a modi-operandi of focusing on Irish state 
institutions and relocating the origins of the state from “the un-mandated republican violence 
of 1916 to the civil war of 1922-23 fought by a democratic state against a public tyranny” 
(Regan, 2013, p. 3).  
Following the outbreak of violence, the dominant view in Ireland thus became that 
history had a sort of agency which could translate into political action and, potentially, political 
violence. Prominent intellectuals of the time such as Connor Cruise O’Brien – mentioned by 
O’Leary – blamed the outbreak of The Troubles on the hero worship of individuals such as 
Patrick Henry Pearse, brought on by the Jubilee commemorations of the Easter Rising in 1966 
(O'Brien, 1972, p. 150). Reflecting the temper of the time in 1976, O’Brien, then a Cabinet 
minister, attempted to introduce legislation into the Dáil that would “punish teachers who lead 
classes in IRA ballads and history teachers who glorify the Irish revolutionary heroes” (Taken 
from: Regan, 2013, p. 5).   
Though not as pronounced as in Ireland, censorship was also reflected in the U.K. by 
grant bodies such as the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), the largest funding 
body for social science research in the U.K..49 In the 1970s, it issued strict guidelines which 
determined that it would not fund research projects in Northern Ireland which focused on issues 
around the conflict. Thus one of the most important social problems in the U.K. was excluded 
from funding by a major government research body (Schubotz, 2005, p. 3). Although the ESRC 
                                                 
49 The ESRC was initially founded in 1965 as the Social Science Research Council (SSRC). However, following 
Thatcher’s election in 1979 – and her reservations about the value of research in the social sciences and the extent 
to which it should be publicly funded – it was decided that while the Council should remain, its remit should be 
expanded beyond the social sciences (hence, the addition of ‘Economic’ to its title). The ESRC was established 
to ensure that more “empirical” research geared towards issues addressing “public concern” was conducted 
(SSRC/ESRC: the first forty years, 2011).  
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ban was lifted in 1980, the first funded project which dealt directly with the political conflict 
in Northern Ireland was not awarded until 1984.50  
We must also take into consideration that even though the ESRC relaxed its funding 
restrictions in 1980, Margaret Thatcher’s administration began to implement drastic changes 
and funding cuts aimed at universities. From about the mid-1980s onwards, Thatcher’s 
government began to behave as though education were an ailing, near-bankrupt industry. Its 
policy became to challenge, even denigrate, the views of “insiders”, demand value for money, 
impose performance management, root out endemic “failure”, and insist on what it viewed as 
customer satisfaction in relation to students (Wilby, 2013). Thus even after the ESRC 
restrictions were lifted, they had already had knock-on effects on academic institutions’ 
engagement with Northern Ireland. Moreover, the new policies imposed on universities and 
university professors would have created an environment of risk aversion to examining what 
was widely regarded as a politically unpopular and unsolvable conflict. Ulster University 
Professor of Politics, Arthur Aughey51, noted that the general climate within Northern Ireland 
during the time of The Troubles created a culture of “paranocracy”: what he described as 
extreme paranoia about providing or revealing any information, or being “too honest” in 
interviews. In an example of this:  
I mean myself and a colleague were contracted by a European Research 
Program [in the early 1980’s] which was centered in Mannheim in Germany, 
and what they were looking at and what they were attempting to survey was 
what they called in their Germanic fashion, “Middle level elites”, to gain ideas 
about their political parties, their social background, their legist attitudes, their 
political attitudes, their ideological dispositions, attitudes on the economy and 
so on.  
That was a framework which would apply with the degree of credibility to let's 
say the Socialist Party in Germany or the Labor Party, the Conservative Party 
in GB, but sort of applying it to a small regional parties like the Ulster Unionist 
Party, the SDLP there were certain difficulties that sort of questionnaire that is 
required of them because the idea of a middle level elite didn’t really seem to 
apply in the same organizational way. But anyway we were charged with going 
along to the various party conferences making ourselves known as academics, 
                                                 
50 This project was awarded to Queens University Belfast and looked at youth culture in Northern Ireland and its 
relationship to sectarianism. It examined the role of Protestant working class youth culture in transmitting loyalist 
ethnic and political identity (See:Willis, 1984) However, it is important to note that it was conducted by a 
sociologist, rather than political scientists.   
51 Arthur Aughey is a Belfast native from a Protestant family and Professor of Politics at University of Ulster. 
Aughey did his undergraduate degree in History and Politics at Queen’s University Belfast; and graduate and 
doctoral research (the latter on British Conservatism) at the University of Hull, under the supervision of Philip 
Norton. He has published widely on Northern Irish politics, British Conservatism and constitutional change in the 
U.K., with one of his best known publications being The Politics of Northern Ireland: Beyond the Belfast 
Agreement (2005).  
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explaining the research program, distributing the questionnaires and you know 
waiting their completion.  
Here, the completion rate was about one or two percent. People I thought were 
relevant didn’t want to provide any information or give its people [because] the 
use of which they weren't certain about or had no control over. So it was – in 
the end it was completely a waste of time (Aughey, 2015). 
These claims are highlighted by several early studies which bring home the sensitivity 
which research concerning Northern Ireland’s political, social and economic discrimination 
involved. For example, a report produced by the Fermanagh Civil Rights Association in 1969, 
concerning discrimination against Catholics in Fermanagh Council and focusing on the 
housing and employment situation showed that although the County's population was almost 
evenly made up of Catholics and Protestants, only 32 of the Council’s 370 employees were 
Catholic (Smyth & Darby, 2001). A larger research project undertaken in 1973 showed that 
Protestants were over-represented at all levels in the Northern Ireland Civil Service; 
particularly at senior level, where over 80% were Protestant and less than 20% were Catholic. 
Furthermore, a two-year study was conducted by the Guildhall Group in Londonderry to 
investigate inner city population migration in 1994, just following the IRA ceasefire: revealing 
that sectarian divides were increasing, with large numbers of Protestants leaving the 
predominantly Catholic city side of Londonderry and settling in the largely Protestant 
Waterside, or leaving the city altogether (Found in: M. Smyth, 1995).  
What is significant here is not the consistent findings of segregation and discrimination 
– though we can certainly deduce that with such a preponderance of discrimination within the 
public sector, it would inevitably have filtered into other aspects of the labor force, such as 
higher education – but that particularly with regards to meetings of the Guildhall Group, 
research and meetings had to take place secretly: because some of the researchers held positions 
in their communities which could have been compromised had it become known that they were 
meeting with the “enemy”; while the findings of the other reports went largely unaddressed by 
British government until the peace process began (M. Smyth & Darby, 2001).  
The effect of such laws, as well as fear of intimidation and/or incrimination, was that a 
culture of self-censorship developed: whereby individuals and institutions became risk averse 
in addressing or taking on the subject. Rupert Taylor speaks to this: noting that when he began 
his PhD at the University of Canterbury in the early 1980s, he was dumbfounded by “the 
aversion and the lack of interest in the problem that was going around [Queens] University” in 
Belfast. Taylor goes on to recall that because of this aversion, he decided to alter his “PhD 
[topic] to look at the way in which the university (Queens) interacted with the Troubles” 
(Taylor, 2015). However, upon investigating this material, he discovered that the topic was 
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“quite controversial”; as the dominant view was that [anything on Northern Ireland] wasn’t 
going to be a topic that would get you appointed to a mainstream British, American or European 
university because it would be seen to maybe too controversial or too political” (Taylor, 2015). 
Indeed, several academics attempted to prevent his research: “Roy Wallis, who was the 
Professor of Sociology at Queen’s at the time, called up my supervisor, who he knew from 
their Oxford days together way back when, and said that what I was doing was not a legitimate 
subject for enquiry”; there were “several academics at Queen’s and people who thought that I 
shouldn’t be doing this” (Taylor, 2015) and urged him to stop.  
In further highlighting the environment of the time, Taylor points to one chapter of his 
dissertation – which looked at the way Queen’s University interacted with The Troubles – on 
the academic labor market. When doing his research, he ran into other barriers because “the 
university position was that they didn’t keep figures on the numbers of Catholics and 
Protestants, but through analysing Senate meetings and talking to key informants, I was able 
to get the figures…” (Taylor, 2015) The official stance of the university was that it was non-
sectarian and non-discriminatory with regards to Catholics, who were highly discriminated 
against in other sectors of the labor market; however, Taylor’s research soon revealed that “this 
university, Queen’s, was not as non-sectarian as it portrayed, because out of 110 professors, 
only 10 were Catholic” (Taylor, 2015). During his research, he found it surprising how 
“difficult it [was] to maintain genuine relationships with Catholics and Protestants, but it was 
also the case in terms of the academic staff at the time” (ibid).  
Richard English noted similar experiences when discussing his time at Queen’s. He 
described the general environment there when he began his academic position in 1989 as 
“fractious. Fractious. Everything in Queen’s is fractious. And it’s a university that I love, but 
obviously, it reflects the society in which it found itself” (English, 2015). He noted that 
scholars, both inside and outside the university, had to be conscious that “people will be 
listening to hear, [for example] people say the North or Northern Ireland, but they’re saying 
Ulster or the six counties or they’re saying Derry or Londonderry. There was a kind of social 
sophistication of watching who was who – partly, not to give offense, partly self-protection” 
(English, 2015). Moreover: 
Any lecture you gave, you knew somebody in the audience, quite a few people 
in the audience, would have lost someone to The Troubles. A number of people 
in the audience would have killed someone in The Troubles. Some people in 
the audience would have definitely done time in jail. Some people in the 
audience would be about to do time in jail. One of my first students was lifted 
early on in one of the master’s classes I was teaching and subsequently did time 
in jail for paramilitary activity. So it was close to the material. And so someone 
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like Paul, for example, my colleague Paul Bew I worked with for a very long 
time, was always conscious that any conversation you had had a kind of 
explosive capacity. So nothing was neutral (Ibid). 
 
Expanding on this a bit further, he explained that academics had to monitor themselves:  
Because the cost of people letting arguments explode was so great, that certain 
kinds of courtesy or distancing were necessary. You found it grouped around 
certain departments, more likely that the sociology department, this is a 
generalization, but it’s an element of it, more likely the Sociology department 
would tend towards more Republican orientation, the History department 
towards more Unionist. That’s a big simplification, but not entirely without 
some grounding. And that then replicated itself in terms of graduate students, 
for example. Generally speaking, there was a kind of professional courtesy, 
which obtained, which was admirable and necessary. Sometimes it would 
bubble over in review essays, sometimes it would bubble over in arguments at 
a book launch, sharp edged questions at a seminar or lecture. But generally 
speaking what I would find is that people would, in Queens as in Northern 
Ireland society more broadly, would try to avoid punches having to be landed 
because they knew the consequences of starting a fight, whether it would 
escalate quite quickly (Ibid). 
 
Also at this time, as Brendan O’Leary alluded to, scholars in Northern Ireland would 
have felt very exposed to the “moral” and “normative” malaise of the issues surrounding the 
conflict; and universities often did not speak out on their behalf. For example, when Professor 
Adrian Guelke was shot at Queen’s, “his vice chancellor did not protect him, did not [come out 
and] say, ‘this is a scholar. Of course, he’s not a South African Spy and of course, he’s not a 
Republican. He’s a professor’” (O’Leary, 2015). O’Leary noted that because scholars couldn’t 
expect to get “that elementary protection of what one would expect from an institution… or 
even the [acknowledgement that] you’re not in favour of your staff being shot”, that many were 
reluctant to tackle the issues in ways that others outside Northern Ireland might have been 
willing to.  
However, this was not limited to Queen’s University or Northern Ireland alone. Several 
of the scholars from Northern Ireland noted that upon leaving and studying at mainland U.K. 
universities – including Oxford and Cambridge, as well as others – during the 1970s, 1980s, 
and even well into the 1990s, they remained very aware of the stigma attached to the Irish 
issue. One scholar from Belfast, who requested to remain anonymous, recalled that they were 
doing their graduate work at a prestigious British university when the IRA ceasefire broke 
down in 1984; and they became acutely aware that they were “the only Irish person in the 
college”. During this period, they spent a lot of time trying to explain what the issues were to 
both British professors and students; “not to justify why anything would happen”, but to supply 
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additional context, because the issues weren’t covered in England in the same way as in 
Northern Ireland. However, in doing this, they noted a great deal of prejudice with regards to 
the subject (Anonymous, 2015).  
O’Leary made similar references: when he began his PhD at the LSE in 1981, “I 
proposed to study British policy in Northern Ireland and its impact on Great Britain. My 
argument was that there had been very little research on it”. However, after a lengthy meeting 
with his supervisor, he was told, amongst other things, that “you’re very bright, but don’t get 
labeled as Irish. Prove that you’re a general political scientist and then the world’s your oyster. 
Do something general, do something comparative. Come back to Ireland when you’ve already 
established yourself” (O’Leary, 2015). O’Leary “thought [seriously] about that and I decided, 
yes. All right, I’ll follow the advice. I’ll stay interested in Irish matters; I’ll keep reading” (Ibid), 
but decided to change focus. Thus, to both avoid the label as well as meet his supervisor’s 
criteria, his PhD was on: “Why did India have no communist revolution whereas China did?” 
– a popular and well received topic given the Cold War context (O’Leary, 2015).  
Paul Arthur, in a telling example of the environment of the time, reflected that:  
So I’m there at Queen’s doing research and getting involved – I was involved 
in direct action, then comes time to get a job and I couldn’t get a job anywhere, 
and eventually I got a job in ah – I was the only Catholic employed in a 
Protestant school in high school in Belfast, 1972-1974, teaching politics. It was 
very very dodgy. The atmosphere inside the school was very good, but walking 
into school every morning, on the big gable wall, there was a sign, which says… 
there was a Scotch whisky called Haid, and the slogan was – Don’t be vague, 
drink Haid. 
And this slogan says don’t be a vaig spelt v-a-i-g, shoot a Taig, and you know 
what a Taig is… 
And as the only Taig boy in there, of course, it wasn’t the most comfortable 
[environment]. I remember, I was living in a very Protestant area, I was living 
in the seaside resort, which was overwhelmingly Protestant. Uh and it was not 
a good time, my wife travelled to teach in a Catholic school in the next town 
and she used to get abused on the bus. They assumed I was Protestant because 
my name was such … it was a neutral name, and I was teaching in a Protestant 
school, and when I was teaching in that school, this formed me hugely, because 
I had to be able to adapt to the circumstances, and I think I learned qualities of 
empathy, of putting yourself in another person’s shoes, in order to survive, you 
had to understand the way they thought. Um, and when I first went there it was 
– of course, the boys, they want to know your background, [and it was a while] 
before they discovered I was a Catholic…  
[But following that I] walked into my classroom one morning and someone 
[got] a knife and scored with the knife on my desk: Arthur is a Taig. And then 
it began with photographs of me at civil rights demonstrations etc. But it was a 
wonderful education for me, so I promised – when the headmaster appointed 
said to me, he said ‘I am taking a huge risk appointing a Catholic – will you 
promise you will stay for two years?’ and I said ‘I will’. And I stayed for exactly 
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two years, but it was getting too mean and I resigned before – I had another job, 
and I knew my book was coming out, and I knew it was going to get publicity, 
so I knew it was going to get quite difficult. So I stayed the two years and on 
the back of the book coming out I got a job in the Ulster Polytechnic [what 
became University of Ulster]. I was now into third level education and it was 
not involved in politics at all… 
But you have to remember the university environment [was no better] at that 
time… It wasn’t good at all. It wasn’t good. 
The tension on the ground was very very bad, and for example during the hunger 
strikes, trying to teach classes was very very difficult, the Republicans were 
very assertive and the lawyers were very sullen and I had most of my classes in 
the afternoon [with these people and one student] who was a Senior member of 
the UDA- he was very open about it. And so there was a real tension there was 
quite uncomfortable…” (Arthur, 2015) 
 
Arthur drew attention to the tensions and divisions not just existing in terms of the external 
environment surrounding universities, or between differing departments within them; there 
were open and obvious ideological fissures between academics within political science 
departments. Throughout the interview, he frequently stated how often he had disagreed with 
and felt at odds with ideological perspectives within the Northern Irish political science 
academy: which, he argued, very much reflected the society it existed within. When asked 
about his personal experience on this, he commented:  
Well there were probably – the common feature was hostility; each side was 
very hostile towards the other. I have – there’s a handbook of modern Irish 
history, I have got a chapter in it beginning with the early years. At the very end 
we were asked to sum up the state of play and I was quite open in my 
disagreements with Bew and Patterson and Aughey who was also in our 
department. And our department wasn’t helped by the fact that, not only did 
Bew and Patterson have their jobs there, but despised me. So I was very much 
isolated, and I moved out of the Jordanstown campus [at University of Ulster] 
and moved to teaching politics in Derry because that’s where we had established 
our Peace Studies – our Master’s in Peace Studies and that was 1987. I was still 
based in Jordanstown but I moved eventually to Derry. 
So there was no question that I – you had animosity at the level of political 
debate in Northern Ireland (Arthur, 2015). 
 
These accounts are reinforced by research by Whyte (1990) and Rose (1971; 1976): 
who highlighted that elements of censorship, both individual and structural, have existed since 
Northern Ireland’s creation. It has also been acknowledged that Northern Ireland was a 
fundamentally unjust society, in which Catholics and Irish Nationalists were openly 
discriminated against; while ruling Unionist governments regarded Northern Ireland as a state 
founded for Protestants and run by Protestants. “Catholics [at all levels of society] were 
discriminated against because they were perceived as disloyal nationalists/republicans” (John 
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McGarry & O'Leary, 1995, p. 205). Of course, this discrimination was not entirely one-sided: 
Protestants/Unionists were also discriminated against in Catholic/Nationalist-dominated areas 
of society (R. Rose, 1971). Nevertheless, one of the main areas of discrimination was in the 
employment sector, reflected in the higher education system: where the vast majority of 
professors within Northern Irish universities – not just Queen’s – were Protestants (Schubotz, 
2005; Taylor, 1988).  
With such social and political variables at play, it is surely understandable that research 
scrutinizing sectarian division and conflict, as well as ways of addressing such inequalities, 
would have avoided: as it would have likely been met by severe opposition from the 
government in Northern Ireland; and unease from both Westminster and within the universities 
themselves. 
We should also note that until Northern Ireland’s civil rights movement began in the 
mid-1960s, there was little in the way of organized opposition to, or national awareness of, the 
way in which Northern Ireland was run. Before the outbreak of open civil unrest, the general 
consensus was that it was best left to be dealt with by the local government (Regan, 2013). 
Then following the start of The Troubles, when Northern Ireland was governed via direct rule 
from London, little criticism was openly voiced about the way its affairs were now being run: 
because any disapproval could have been “weaponized” by political republicanism and 
nationalism, and in turn undermined the morale of the British troops and Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (John McGarry & O'Leary, 1995; Schubotz, 2005; Whyte, 1990).  
BRINGING IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
A larger international dimension should also be considered. Without exception, all scholars 
interviewed noted that to understand the British and Irish academies’ attitude towards Northern 
Ireland, we also have to appreciate the context within which the conflict was taking place: 
namely, the Cold War. Although The Troubles may have dragged on for nearly 30 years, 
resulting in over 3,500 deaths, Northern Ireland did not compare – at least through the prism 
of fatalities – to the American experience in Vietnam, that of the USSR in Afghanistan, Israel 
in the Middle East, the various liberation movements in Latin America, or even the subsequent 
massacre in Rwanda and genocide in Bosnia. Indeed, in 1997, the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) compiled a report on behalf of the Carnegie Endowment for 
Peace, which ranked and categorized “major conflicts” over the previous 20 years. In that 
study, remarkably, Northern Ireland was not even mentioned (SIPRI, 1997).  
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Not only the size of the conflict, but also its nature rendered it as less interesting to the 
political science community. Professors John Doyle, Brendan O’Leary, Richard English, John 
McGarry, Jim Hughes52, and Jonathan Tonge all highlighted that although the subjects of 
“identity” and “ethnicity” are taken seriously in the discipline today, it has not always been so; 
and to most scholars, The Troubles always looked like a very narrow, parochial affair, with 
nothing to do with the international system or politics. O’Leary provides an interesting account 
of this time:  
I mean it’s difficult for you to recall, but in the late 1980s before the Soviet 
Union collapses, before Germany is unified, LSE professors around at a dinner 
table. It’s Gordon Smith’s inaugural lecture and I’m the one guest who isn’t a 
German specialist were talking about what’s happening in Germany in early 
’88. Gorbachev made it clear that there isn’t going to any kind of military 
intervention in his tenure. 
Late or early ’89—I may have the date wrong—I am the only person in the room 
who thinks that German unification is going to happen very soon. And I’m 
condemned for it. I’m accused of projecting my wishes for Ireland and to 
Germany, whereas in fact, my analysis would be Germany’s homogenous, 
Ireland isn’t, which is why unification would be extraordinarily difficult in 
Ireland, but not in Germany.  
I didn’t say this, but they would be saying. ‘Wir sind ein Volk,’ very, very 
quickly. This was shocking. All the German professors—good Germans, post-
basic law Germans didn’t want anything to do with nationalism—Two systems, 
two states. Even if the Soviets go, ‘We’ll have two separate systems’. The 
Western specialists devoutly wanted them to be true. And here is this rude Irish 
man suggesting, ‘It doesn’t matter. What you want, it will be a unified Germany, 
right?’ 
So, that was probably quite well known and I got it right. And the LSE 
community came out to be an example. It’s a very good example of how a 
genuine community — because I don’t think there was a Northern Ireland 
epistemic community, certainly not at that time. 
There was a community of scholarship in Germany. It was absolutely convinced 
that German unification was going off the horizon. It took somebody who 
wasn’t in that culture to see what was blinding the obvious. At least, it seemed 
to be blinding the obvious to me. If I had been wrong, maybe I would have 
revised my opinion, but it seemed to me, obvious that German unification will 
take place. 
                                                 
52 Jim Hughes is a Northern Ireland native from the Republican area of Anderstown, Belfast; Professor of 
Comparative Politics, Convenor of the MSc in Conflict Studies, and Director of the Conflict Research Group at 
LSE. He took his BA in Political Science and Ancient History at Queen's University, Belfast, in 1982; and his 
PhD at LSE (1982-7) in Soviet History. He has authored, co-authored and edited seven books: which include a 
critique of international conditionality and intervention during EU enlargement, The Myth of Conditionality 
(Palgrave, 2004); and the EU's developing conflict resolution capacity, EU Conflict Management (Routledge, 
2010). Hughes has published more than 40 articles and chapters, including analyses of the EU's role in Northern 
Ireland and Kosovo. He joined LSE as a Lecturer in 1994 and was promoted successively to Senior Lecturer 




So the scholarship of political science except where was focused on post-
colonial countries, was not deeply interested in questions of nationality, 
ethnicity, and religion – with the exception of the small numbers of people like 
Richard Rose, like Ian McAllister, Anthony Noonan and others, [these 
questions had] influenced many of them. 
There was a small literature interested in the new nationalisms that developed 
in the West. Not violent, but the democratic nationalisms of Flanders, of 
Scotland, of Wales, of Catalonia, and so on. That was there in the background, 
but it certainly wasn’t mainstream (O’Leary, 2015). 
 
This context is important because the Provisional IRA did not begin life in 1970 as a 
fully formed nationalist guerrilla organization, but as a fledgling, poorly equipped group, 
whose first task was to defend the besieged Catholics of the North against the perceived threat 
posed by the Protestant majority (Cox, 1997). Those who created the Provos also regarded their 
job as rebuilding a movement which, in their view, had moved too far to the left in the 1960s 
and thus become too involved in normal politics. This apolitical (almost anti-political) stance 
was well captured in an article published in the republican newspaper, An Phoblacht, which 
asserted that the primary concern of the movement was not with politics, but rather with the 
preservation of the purity of republican principles (Found in: M. L. R. Smith, 1995, p. 108).  
Moreover, there was no need for republicans to look outside Ireland for inspiration or 
guidance, as with other national revolutionaries of the time. In 1971, for example, when leading 
republican militants were asked what inspiration Irish revolutionaries drew from struggles in 
other parts of the world, they replied “in Ireland… we have no need of your Che Guevaras and 
your Ho Chi Minhs. We have Wolfe Tone, Robert Emmett, O’Donovan Rossa, Cathal Brugha 
and many others” (Quote found in: Halliday, 1996, pp. 123-124). This reflects the literal 
interpretation of the meaning of Sinn Féin ('ourselves alone'), reinforced in part by oddly 
optimistic assumptions which Provos held about the possibilities of victory over the U.K.. One 
of the republicans flown to London in 1972 to negotiate what he and others (including the 
young Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness) hoped would be a British declaration of intent 
to leave Ireland, expressed this optimism: “If we could continue to inflict high British casualties 
and step up the sabotage campaign, it would be difficult for them to bear the strain and drain 
on their economy, and no government could be prepared to continue indefinitely in such a 
situation” (Macstiofáin, 1975, p. 261).  
Given this mentality, it was not necessary to look to external support and validation 
from other like-minded revolutionaries. Also, even though some in the IRA may have regarded 
Che Guevara as an effective militant and even applauded the Vietnamese for their guerrilla 
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tactics, for the staid (often, religiously devout) leaders of the Provisional IRA, these other 
movements in distant lands seemed irrelevant (Cox, 1997, 1998).  
With these variables at play, many scholars noted that Northern Ireland, in the context 
of the Cold War, was viewed as simply a “regional” or “local” rather than an international 
conflict. Given this, the subject lacked an element of prestige and international significance 
within the political science sphere; and such was what seemed to be the “ourselves alone” 
mentality of the republican movement, the close affection and connection many within it had 
with the U.S., and the almost banal attitude they had regarding the USSR, it seemed a conflict 
without comparison, at a time other national liberation movements were aligning within the 
global bi-polar paradigm.  
Moreover, while the conflict was something of a human tragedy, in global terms, little 
seemed to be at stake. The region had no major assets, such as oil; was located on the edge of 
Western Europe, within an icon of Western democratic longevity and stability, the U.K.; it 
produced no refugees; and the superpowers took little interest in it. As Professor Michael Kerr53 
noted, “you have to think of it in this context… this is the United Kingdom, it’s Northern 
Ireland, the strategic backwater that is Northern Ireland, the small teeny, little three quarters of 
the province of Ireland that is so significant” (Kerr, 2015). Even though events such as “Bloody 
Sunday” and the “Hunger Strikes” attracted a great deal of international and media attention, 
especially in the U.S., and were a source of embarrassment to the British government:  
Was that pressure on the U.K. government intense enough for it to really change 
course? It influenced or it definitely pressured the U.K. government at certain 
points into taking actions and reacting. For [example], it wouldn’t have entered 
Northern Ireland in the first place in ‘69 with the British Army if it could have 
avoided it. I don’t think [international pressure] was strong enough, no.  
Jimmy Carter’s presidency, they talked about it, they didn’t do anything. 
Reagan, there was a little pressure here, maybe, ‘Margaret, do you really 
think…?’ It wasn’t until Bill Clinton’s time, until after the Cold War…where 
you saw an American president that was actually willing to consider election 
pledges that he’d made that he was willing to follow up and actually act on them 
(Kerr, 2015). 
 
                                                 
53 Michael Kerr is a Belfast native from a middle class, Protestant family, raised in what he described as the “leafy 
suburbs” of Belfast. Kerr attended the prestigious grammar school, Campbell College, before moving to Essex 
University, where he conducted his undergraduate studies in Politics. His graduate and PhD work was performed 
at LSE under the supervision of Brendan O’Leary; he performed a comparative analysis of the power-sharing 
agreements in Northern Ireland and Lebanon. He also acted as a staffer and assistant to David Trimble and the 
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) during his time at LSE. He is now Professor of Conflict Studies, Director of the 
Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, and the Centre for the Study of Divided Societies, at Kings College, London. 
  
 101 
In fact, the conflict has often been treated almost as a success of the British government: 
in terms of how well it was managed and what little impact it had on the world outside. Thus 
it was perceived as an “internal” or at most “Anglo/Irish” affair (B. O'Leary & McGarry, 1993, 
1996, 2005). The proficiency with which it was managed coincided with the prevailing “self-
help” paradigm of the Cold War: whereby conflicts inside nations, particularly those existing 
within the respective Western and Eastern blocs, were expected to be dealt with internally. 
Professors O’Leary, John McGarry54, English, and Tonge concur that because of the way in 
which Northern Ireland was perceived both at home and abroad, comparing it to other major 
conflicts of the time was particularly difficult.  
TYING IT TOGETHER 
In attempting to link these accounts to this research’s theoretical explanation, it is important to 
remind ourselves of a common myth surrounding science and scientific cooperation: namely, 
that there is a natural consensus amongst scholars; and through this, knowledge is created (Star 
& Griesemer, 1989). If anything, the opposite is true. Science and its development have been 
marked by various conflicts and controversies. This is how most scientific theories are 
developed and honed: by arguing about them. Consensus is not necessary for cooperation, nor 
is it detrimental to the development of theory or empirical research. This is what the boundary 
object concept is about: the ability to discover some kernel which individuals can come 
together around, open a forum where they can discuss (and disagree on) issues openly with 
each other, and sustain these interactions once they have begun.  
 The interim period of the 1970s and 1980s was marked by stark consensus concerning 
Northern Ireland amongst political scientists in the U.K. and Ireland: specifically, that it was a 
(minor) conflict without a solution. The few scholars in the locale researching the conflict at 
the time arrived at this conclusion; and given the social as well as structural barriers which 
                                                 
54 John McGarry is a Belfast native who grew up in Ballymena and attended the Catholic grammar school, St 
MacNissi’s College, in Carnolough, County Antrim (also known as Garron Tower), with his contemporary, 
Brendan O’Leary. McGarry attended Trinity College, Dublin (1979) for his undergraduate studies; and did his 
PhD on Nationalism in Scotland and Wales at the University of Western Ontario (1987). He has published 
extensively on power sharing in Northern Ireland, many of his pieces co-authored with O’Leary. His work has 
had an important public policy dimension and impact. McGarry and O’Leary’s Policing Northern Ireland: 
Proposals for a New Start (1999) significantly influenced the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern 
Ireland. McGarry has appeared as an expert witness before the International Relations Committee of the U.S. 
Congress; participated in briefings of the UN Security Council; and worked with several governments around the 
world. In 2008-9, McGarry served for 15 months as “Senior Advisor on Power-Sharing” to the United Nations 
(Standby Team, Mediation Support Unit), the first person appointed to this position. He is currently the lead 




existed, challenging this consensus was problematic. That said, these barriers were not imposed 
by the academics themselves; all scholars interviewed indicated that everyone would have liked 
to have seen matters resolved. Instead, they noted structural barriers: such as overt censorship 
in the Irish and British media; and in the case of the U.K., restrictions on funding bodies such 
as the ESRC.  
All this was undoubtedly compounded by continued outbreaks of violence in a country 
which is geographically small, and within communities which are extremely tight knit. This 
alone made qualitative research difficult - because individuals, including researchers, were 
fearful that their identities and hence, their safety might be compromised: either by dissident 
groups or state police agencies. Yet this was not limited to qualitative projects; as Tonge points 
out, “during this time the main survey research firms wouldn't touch [Northern Ireland]. You 
had to use local ones. And they – you go in and ask them questions. Who do you – which party 
would you support? Asked them questions about attitudes towards political violence, ask them 
questions about attitudes towards policing. Paramilitaries would wonder who the hell you are” 
(Tonge, 2015).  
Other interviewees highlight the shootings of various academics at Queen’s University, 
Belfast; as well as prejudice towards to the subject within the greater discipline and desire to 
avoid “being labeled Irish” (O’Leary, 2015), given the culture of “paranocracy” (Aughey, 
2015) surrounding the whole issue. The minority opinion of Lord Paul Bew, Paul Arthur and 
Henry Patterson pointed more towards to the general tendency of academics to be slow on the 
uptake in terms of recognizing the necessity and importance of taking up a subject – “the owl 
of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk” (Bew, 2015) - which adds some 
nuance to this picture; however, it is surely more likely that the owl of Minerva spreading its 
wings at dusk had more to do with the conditions of the day than some natural preference for 
nocturnal flight.      
These points are important because under the boundary object framework, the creation 
of new scientific knowledge is centred on communication and new findings. Objects and 
methods mean different things in different worlds; thus, if they are to cooperate, scholars must 
find ways of reconciling these meanings. This laborious effort is contingent upon the ability to 
translate, negotiate, debate, triangulate and simplify to “work” together (Leigh Star, 2010; Star, 
1989; Star & Griesemer, 1989). Translation is key to this, because gaining authority in a 
respective discipline requires the ability to enlist “allies” who can re-interpret concerns to fit 
their own programmatic goals, and then establish themselves as gatekeepers: an obligatory 
point of passage (Laws, 1987). This process of interessement allows gatekeepers from different 
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cultural and intellectual worlds to develop multiple translations of meaning simultaneously, 
while maintaining the interests and integrity of other translations, but increasing the centrality 
and importance of the individual argument (Akkerman & Bakker, 2011; Leigh Star, 2010; Star 
& Griesemer, 1989).   
However, for interessement to occur, the individual argument or point of inquiry must 
be important; the meaning must be meaningful. All learning and knowledge creation therefore 
involves the development of boundaries. The boundary of a specific domain, discipline, or 
community is constitutive of relevant episteme and epistemology. In this sense, a boundary 
acts as a socio-cultural distinction which can lead to continuity or discontinuity in action or 
interaction (Akkerman & Bakker, 2011). Simply, a boundary defines what is meaningful, as 
well as what belongs within a discipline. Given the general view of the British academy that 
the conflict was a “provincial” (O’Leary, 2015) “sink of sectarian violence” (Patterson, 2015); 
as well as it being seen, internationally, as the “ugly duckling of regional conflicts” (Cox, 1998) 
– and according to SPIRI (1997), not even a “major conflict” - a boundary has been established 
in the case of Northern Ireland.  
Coupled with the “fractious” (English, 2015) and “hostile” university environment in 
Northern Ireland, divided along the same ideological lines and susceptible to the same sectarian 
forms of discrimination as other sections of society, this suggests that bridging such boundaries 
was improbable. Translations, challenges or solutions to existing paradigms, and general 
engagement with the subject material, all could have compromised academics’ reputations or 
personal safety; and clearly made the gathering of “allies” extremely difficult. Further, such 
was the “lack of community” and the “Cold War-ish” (O’Leary, 2015) atmosphere surrounding 
the subject material, on top of lack of prestige and funding, there was a lack of engagement 
with one another at conferences, collaborative research projects, and the like. Star (2010) notes 
that the relationship between information needs and work is usually mediated and facilitated 
within various repositories: which can serve the function of facilitating and moderating the 
commentary of debates, and conducting private research (either individually or collectively). 
They serve a bridging function which allows for heterogeneity of translation without 
confrontation, and act as knowledge infrastructure.  
This infrastructure – visible and invisible – is important, because artefacts (both 
physical and theoretical) and organizational arrangements are the sine qua non of membership 
in a community of practice (Leigh Star, 2010; Lykke & Braidotti, 1996). Strangers and 
outsiders to a discipline often encounter this as a target object to be learned about; thus, new 
participants acquire a naturalized familiarity with its objects as they become members (Leigh 
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Star, 2010). This knowledge infrastructure links them with various conventions of practice 
which are both shaped by and shapes the conventions of a community of practice. For example, 
most social scientists utilizing statistics learn how to use SPSS for analysis purposes; its 
limitations are inherited by the version in use, then by advances in methodologies, modelling 
and software. Yet this infrastructure does not grow de novo but wrestles with the inertia of the 
existing base of knowledge, often inheriting strengths and limitations from this base.  
In the case of “how an epistemic community emerges”, the development of such 
infrastructure and hence, the emergence of a community, becomes visible when new bases of 
knowledge begin to emerge and challenge existing paradigms. In the case of Northern Ireland, 
the “lack of community” and knowledge infrastructure around the subject is visible in terms of 
both the limited research and number of scholars focused on subject in the U.K. and Ireland; 
as well as the somewhat parochial and localized view of the conflict itself.  
The invisible – or perhaps, taken for granted – quality of working infrastructure 
becomes visible only when it breaks down; in other words, when a bridge washes out or there 
is a power blackout. However, in such cases, back-up mechanisms or procedures further 
highlight the now-visible infrastructure. In Northern Ireland, the lack of community and 
knowledge infrastructure becomes visible not when it breaks down, but when one seeks to 
utilize it. In this respect, it amounts to the difference between driving on a major motorway or 
a gravelled country road. The former is wide, roomy, and well-travelled, with much investment 
in its upkeep, many different avenues to enter and from, and one is sure to be surrounded by 
fellow motorists. In contrast, the latter receives little, if any, upkeep or attention; is largely 
unknown, not connected to any mainstream routes, and the driver is likely to travel alone.  
During this period, then, Northern Ireland was the road less travelled in both British 
and Irish political science communities. This chapter then largely dealt with the lack of 
community and research around the study of Northern Ireland. It focused on local, national, 
and international context to which the Northern Ireland “problem” was viewed (or rather not 
viewed) during Cold war period in British and Irish academia. This was a time where both 
locally and internationally academics saw Northern Ireland either not an issue worth exploring 
or simply a conflict without a solution. Though some scholars like Lord Paul Bew assert this 
paradigm and lack of engagement from the community stemmed from some Hegelian 
disposition of academics being like “the owl of Minerva” who “spreads its wings only with the 
falling of the dusk”. Yet this chapter has explained that the lack of community and research on 
Northern Ireland in British and Irish political science had more to do with the political, 
economic, social issues on the ground during the Troubles rather than a preference for 
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nocturnal flight. Because of these conditions there was a lack of knowledge infrastructure and 
objects of which academic could gather around and travel down collectively. Thus, research 
on the subject was seen as an eccentricity of which a only a few academic no-mads decided to 
engage with. However, leading up to and following the end of Cold war this all began to 
change. The next chapter displays this and how a subject developed by the epistemic 



















The last chapter highlighted the long-time lack of academic community around the study of 
Northern Ireland. Recall that it laid out the context and barriers that existed concerning research 
engagement on Northern Ireland from British academics. Specifically, it talked about the 
(potentially) dangerous and hostile – physical, social, and professional – environment that 
academics faced during the time of the Troubles. This environment was complimented by a 
lack of knowledge infrastructure as well as entrenched paradigms that saw the conflict in 
Northern Ireland as one without a solution. All of this made the studying of Northern Ireland 
an eccentricity and showed a lack of objects, ideas, scholars as well as any sense of an epistemic 
community being possible. Our next aim then is to display the points at which this community 
did begin to emerge. This chapter therefore outlines how and when this community ultimately 
emerged: locating its emergence in relative time and space, along with the conditions and 
(boundary) objects which made this possible.   
In doing this we will also display the internal struggles and conflicts which in many 
ways defined and developed this discipline and the academics that study it. We not only 
develop an understanding of the community that emerged, but to look at the various boundaries 
and objects which have come to define and unite it. This will shed light on our research puzzle 
– how an epistemic community emerges – as well as test the explanatory power of our 
employment of the boundary object concept.       
THE EMERGENCE OF A COMMUNITY 
There is little consensus amongst academics as to exactly “when” this community of scholars 
came about. As we noted, communities of practice and knowledge infrastructure do not 
develop de novo, but wrestle with the inertia of the existing knowledge base in any discipline. 
In this respect, there is some degree of consensus as to how the development of the community 
happened. More senior scholars, such as Henry Patterson, Lord Paul Bew, and Paul Arthur, all 
of whom bring different perspectives and come from different backgrounds in terms of politics 
and religion, have all noted and been credited with working on and around the conflict as early 
as the late 1970s and early 1980s. Both Patterson and Bew are from middle class, Protestant 
backgrounds; both admitted to a more “orange”55 interpretation of the conflict, and did a lot of 
                                                 
55 In Northern Ireland, interpretations regarding the conflict are typically distinguished along a “green” and 
“orange” spectrum. Green interpretations are typically associated with republicanism, while orange interpretations 
are associated with unionism.    
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work with the Workers Party56, which afforded them various avenues of research (Patterson, 
2015). Arthur, a Catholic from a working-class family in Derry’s infamous Bogside57, referred 
to his publication of Government and Politics of Northern Ireland in 1980, which led to his 
giving political education classes to members of the Ulster Defense Association (UDA). 
However, both Arthur and Patterson noted that this type of work was “totally unique” and 
“unheard of at the time” (Arthur, 2015). Patterson commented that despite an almost complete 
lack of interest from academics in the Republic of Ireland during this time, there was much 
more of an interest from within the U.K., particularly Northern Ireland. Almost all interviewees 
acknowledged that engagement came mainly from historians, rather than political scientists.  
In attempting to contextualize this, and reflect on the formation of a community, John 
Coakley noted the relative infancy of political science as a coherent discipline across Europe 
(Coakley, 2015). For instance, the French Political Science Association (l'Association 
Française de Science Politique) was not established until 1949, the German Political Science 
Association (Deutsche Vereinigung für Politische Wissenschaft) until 1951, the British 
Political Science Association – originally named the Political Studies Association (PSA) – until 
1950, and the Irish Political Studies Association (PSAI) until 1982. This contrasts with the 
U.S.: where the American Political Science Association (APSA) was founded in 1903, and 
helped political science become a firmly established, embedded discipline within American 
academia, epistemologically and methodologically, before the 1920s (Jewett, 2012).  
Most senior academics interviewed, many of whom are highly regarded political 
scientists in this field, did not consider themselves political scientists: but described themselves 
as “political historians”, all having written their PhDs in history departments. Similarly, several 
female academics interviewed, such as Dr. Katy Hayward58 at Queens University Belfast, Dr. 
                                                 
56 The Workers' Party was originally known as Official Sinn Féin and is a Marxist political party in Ireland. 
Originating out of Sinn Féin and the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Workers’ Party split with Provisionals 
within the republican movement at the onset of the Troubles in 1969–70. The Officials' founders were Cathal 
Goulding and Tomás Mac Giolla. The party name was changed to Sinn Féin, the Workers' Party in 1977; then to 
the Workers' Party in 1982. Throughout its history, the party has been closely associated with the Official Irish 
Republican Army. 
57The Bogside is a historically Catholic neighborhood outside the city walls of Derry/Londonderry. In 1969, local 
Catholics in the area became engulfed in a fierce three-day battle against the RUC and local Protestants – known 
as the Battle of the Bogside - which is generally seen as a key starting point of The Troubles.  
58 Katy Hayward is an English born academic (from Newbury, near Reading) and Senior Lecturer in the School 
of Sociology, Social Policy, and Social Work at Queens University Belfast. Hayward attended University of 
Ulster, Magee College in Derry (BA) and did her PhD on Northern Ireland at University College Dublin (UCD) 
under the supervision of Tom Garvin in 1999. 
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Maria Power59 at University of Liverpool, and Dr. Sandra Buchannan60 of the Donegal 
Education and Training Board's Adult Education Service, identified themselves as political 
sociologists or historians. Professor Michael Cox noted that even today, in both the U.K. and 
Ireland, political science does not exist as a discipline in the same way as it does in the U.S. 
Professors Brendan O’Leary, John McGarry, Pete Shirlow, and Jonathan Tonge made similar 
references to this: “One must realize that many within the British and Irish, for that matter, 
academy, don’t class themselves as political scientists… look at LSE… It’s the London School 
of Economics and Political Science but where is the political science department at LSE?” 
(O’Leary, 2015) Moreover, it is the “politics department at Liverpool” (Tonge, 2015); while at 
Queen’s University Belfast, it is the “school of politics, international studies, and philosophy” 
(Shirlow, 2015).  
Speaking more specifically on this point, Paul Mitchell61, Associate Professor of 
Political Science at LSE, a self-identified “pure” political scientist and one of the few Northern 
Ireland experts that almost exclusively utilizes quantitative research methods, noted that:  
There was quite a lot of, I'll put it politely, there was [always] quite a lot of 
scepticism about political science [at Queens and in Irish academia]. 
Historically, for example, the Department [at Queens] had been labelled 'The 
Department of Political Science' but they changed it to 'The Department of 
Politics' I think it's called. It's now called something else because it's a school 
of something now. 
There weren't very many people who would have considered themselves to have 
been trained in political science and who saw themselves mainly as political 
scientists. There was always a strong political theory group in the department. 
In a U.K. context a political theory group would absolutely be regarded as 
political scientists as well. Some of them were that way but others were post-
                                                 
59 Maria Power is Lecturer of Religion and Peacebuilding in the Irish Studies Institute at University of Liverpool. 
Power is the daughter of Irish parents raised in the heavily populated Irish community in North London; and took 
her undergraduate, postgraduate and doctoral studies at Royal Holloway University under the famed historical 
Professor John Turner – the biographer of Lord David Lloyd-George - in Irish History.  
60 Sandra Buchannan is a native of Ireland, who grew up and still lives on the Inishowen Peninsula in County 
Donegal. Buchannan is the only academic interviewed who comes from a mixed marriage background – her 
mother is Protestant and her father Catholic – which she described as a “very political household”. She did her 
undergraduate studies in History at UCD, where she began engaging on Northern Ireland in class with Jennifer 
Todd; and her PhD at University of Ulster, MaGee Campus under Professor Paul Arthur on cross-border 
education. Buchannan continues to work in this field with the Donegal Educational and Training Board’s Adult 
Education Service, and is author of Transforming Conflict Through Social and Economic Development: Practice 
and Policy Lessons from Northern Ireland and the Border Counties (2014). 
61 Paul Mitchell is an English native with a Scottish father and Northern Irish mother. Mitchell was born in the 
Middle England town of Corby – known for its’ largely Scottish and Northern Irish demographics - and raised in 
Scotland. Mitchell attended Manchester University (undergraduate), LSE (Master’s), the European University 
Institute (PhD), and the University of Michigan ICPSR Summer Program in Quantitative Methods. He joined the 
faculty of Queens University Belfast in 1992 and remained there until 2000, when he became a lecturer at LSE.   
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modernists of various types that have debates about whether facts exist and 
things like that whereas, to me, that wasn't really what political science is mainly 
about. 
If we leave the theory and philosophers aside and move to the more empirical 
part of social science study, the Department was undoubtedly dominated by 
people whose disciplinary predispositions were really of an historical nature. 
That would be especially true in the cases of the people who were actually 
studying Ireland (Mitchell, 2015). 
Mitchell went on to explain that:  
Don't get me wrong, they are good historians in many cases. There was Paul 
Bew, Margaret O'Callaghan, Richard English and a number of others, Graham 
Walker, etc. I never had any personal objection to any of these people or to their 
craft as historians but my objection was that they should be in the History 
Department. 
There is no reciprocity in the sense that it would be inconceivable to imagine 
that the Department of History, in its hiring process, would hire, you can always 
have one or two exceptions, but the Department of History would not decide en 
masse to hire non-historians. They'd be hiring people with PhDs in History 
predominantly, and that's what they do. It's partly why they're strong. 
Under the guise of pluralism, I have always felt that some of the Political 
Science Departments in Ireland have failed to protect and promote their 
professional discipline. That's because, of course, they are not political scientists 
in the first place. That was always going to be a reason why I would be looking 
to leave at some point because I want to be in a Department where political 
science is the default thing to do (Mitchell, 2015). 
The problem identified at the time, but which continues, and is not specific to the study 
of Northern Ireland, but political science generally, lies in separating it from the strong 
traditions of historicism, philosophy, and sociological methodologies which have long 
dominated Irish and U.K. political research traditions.   
Both Coakley and others pointed to the foundation of the Political Science Association 
of Ireland (PSAI) in 1982 and its journal Irish Political Studies (IPS) (established in 1986), of 
which he was a founding member, as indications that a community of scholars was beginning 
to emerge as a more distinct political science cohort in the early-to-mid 1980s. O’Leary, 
Arthur, Shirlow, Rupert Taylor, Eamonn O’Kane62, and Tonge pointed to the work of Coakley 
                                                 
62 Eamon O’Kane is a Senior Lecturer in Politics and War Studies in the School of Social, Historical, and Political 
Studies at University of Wolverhampton. O’Kane is a London native with Irish roots. His mother is from the West 
of Ireland and father from Northern Ireland. He studied at University of Hull (undergraduate), Queens University 
Belfast (Masters), and University of Wolverhampton (PhD). His doctoral dissertation was on Anglo-Irish 
relations, written under the supervision of Northern Ireland historian, Christopher Norton. He has collaborated 
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and Michael Laver in developing the PSAI and how it had contributed to the discipline; 
however, O’Leary noted that its main success was “producing a decent journal of high-caliber, 
differentiating Irish political studies from Irish historical studies” (O’Leary, 2015). Before the 
journal’s publication, there was little in the way of distinguishing the differences, at least 
methodologically, between political science and historical analysis of Irish political research. 
The PSAI journal allowed political science, and its practitioners, to begin to distinguish 
themselves and Irish political studies as a specific and legitimate discipline.   
Certainly, in terms of articles from IPS in 1986, 1987 and 1988, several pieces focus 
solely on political topics in Northern Ireland: an analysis of the religious values of the 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) (C. Smyth, 1986); the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 
(Arthur, 1987); and the Scottish Orange Order’s reaction to the Anglo-Irish Agreement 
(Gallagher, 1988), all of which adopted more of a political science approach. Arthur, who was 
integral in establishing the journal and wrote the foreword to the first publication, noted that 
the subject, and the journal for that matter, was not in the mainstream of British or Irish political 
science. Moreover, in the late 1980s, the time of PSAI’s initial development, research on 
Northern Ireland was still limited to individual “clusters” of people, rather than anything like 
a “community”; and it still held a strong tradition of historicism (Arthur, 2015). Arthur 
reflected that several academics, notably Aughey, declined initially to contribute to PSAI 
because of its Irish-centric focus, its orientation towards more political science research 
methods, and their personal interest in mainstream British political research (Arthur, 2015).  
Others noted that the “clusters” of academics working on Northern Ireland – both in the 
U.K. and Ireland –were composed of “people from Northern Ireland or for some people 
[originally] from outside” the U.K. and Ireland (Patterson, 2015). English reflected that “when 
I was in Oxford in the mid-80s, studying Ireland [in general] was an eccentricity”; and not until 
the 1990s was there mainstreaming of the study of Ireland in mainstay British institutions such 
as Oxford and Cambridge (English, 2015). This was echoed by O’Leary and Bew, who both 
did their PhDs at these institutions. Patterson pointed out that Coakley – another founder of the 
PSAI and IPS, acknowledged as the “backbone” of its initial operation (Arthur & Lover, 1986) 
– had no real interest in issues concerning Northern Ireland. Instead, he wanted IPS to deliver 
research on Southern Irish political scholarship, much in the same way as mainland British 
                                                 
with scholars such as Paul Dixon on publications like Britain, Ireland and Northern Ireland since 1980; and The 
Totality of Relationships (2007), and is currently co-convener of PSA’s Irish Politics Group (along with Professor 
Alan Greer), whose constitution was established in 2010.  
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politics was covered in academic journals such as Political Studies and British Journal of 
Political Science. Patterson also noted that Coakley did not study Northern Ireland until much 
later (Patterson, 2015); Coakley himself commented that he had never wished to distinguish 
himself as an expert on Northern Ireland.  
That said, according to Coakley and Arthur, the founding of the PSAI and launch of its 
journal were important developments in the beginnings of a community of academics regarding 
Northern Ireland. Almost all interviewees agreed that from its outset, it was obvious that 
research on Northern Ireland would be a part of PSAI’s research agenda and a central topic at 
its conferences.    
Now, academics reflected on developments around the peace process which began 
taking shape during the early to mid-1980s, resulting in the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. 
O’Leary and Aughey noted this was the point when real research became possible; their interest 
now began to be provoked. O’Leary’s “first real research experience as opposed to simply 
reading materials and a sense of doing interviews and field research came after Anglo/Irish 
Agreement of ’85” (O’Leary, 2015). Thus he applied for a grant made available through “the 
Nuffield foundation… to interview people who’ve been involved in the making of the 
agreement [and] what were their objectives” (O’Leary, 2015); and was able to apply political 
science methods by using Graham Allison (1971)’s “rational actors” model in cases of decision 
making. Aughey concurred that the Anglo-Irish Agreement gave him “the incentive… 
academic incentive or an intellectual incentive as well as the props of publishing, and you can 
see here was an opportunity” [to understand] “the nature of unionist politics then and what the 
options, what options were open [to them]” (Aughey, 2015). He also now had the chance to 
write and publish the book which linked this process to mainland British politics: Under Siege: 
Ulster Unionism and the Anglo-Irish Agreement (1989). 
Yet Bew, Patterson, McIntyre, and even O’Leary highlighted that the failure of this 
agreement to bring an end to political violence simply reinforced the existing narrative that 
Northern Ireland was “a sink of sectarian violence” (Patterson, 2015). O’Leary explained how 
different the Anglo-Irish Agreement and abortive 1970s peace process was compared with 
what finally resulted in the 1990s; because the breakdown of the Sunningdale Agreement 
meant political failure (O’Leary, 2015). McIntyre and Arthur also noted that none of the 
previous processes had “delivered Sinn Féin” (McIntyre, 2015).  
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However, O’Leary and others reflected that while there was still no real community of 
scholars on Northern Ireland at the time of the Anglo/Irish Agreement, especially in terms of 
conferences and suchlike, they could see developments on the horizon which pointed to its 
emergence. The appearance of publications such as IPS, as well as scholarly contributions to 
Fortnight63 magazine greatly assisted in this.   
Of particular importance during this period were the personal contributions made by 
O’Leary and McGarry in terms of their (re)engagement with consociational theory. Even 
scholars who were quite critical of the pair and their application of the theory, of which there 
are many, noted their vital contribution to the discipline. Both Bew and Patterson, for example, 
credited O’Leary for:  
More generally, believing you got the minutiae, the details, some of the things 
that Brendan wrote about consociation, some… which I would accept but the 
general idea, that he promoted the idea, he kept it alive for a long time when 
other people like myself went through periods of not believing it. I think it's 
enormously to his credit (Bew, 2015). 
Arthur, another critic of the pair, nonetheless noted that the consociational model 
contributed to the “coming together” of the discipline and the study of Northern Ireland 
(Arthur, 2015). Tonge, Mitchell, English, Doyle, Naill O’Dochartaigh64, and Shirlow all 
pointed to the importance and influence of O’Leary and McGarry in bringing what one called 
“a forensic political science analysis” to a subject hitherto dominated by historians (Tonge, 
2015). Academics who began or finished their PhDs at various points in the 1990s all 
referenced O’Leary and McGarry’s work – such as The Future of Northern Ireland (1990) and 
Explaining Northern Ireland (1995) - as major influences on their research; while others, such 
                                                 
63 Fortnight was a monthly political and cultural magazine published in Belfast. It was founded in 1970, with the 
aim of providing analysis and criticism of politics, culture, and the arts from those both inside and outside Northern 
Ireland. Fortnight was read and contributed to by politicians, academics, and journalists from across the political 
and cultural spectrum. These included notable political figures such as David Trimble - ex-leader of the Ulster 
Unionist Party – and Mary Robinson, former President of Ireland (1990-1997). It stopped publication in 2012 
following a large decline in readership and subscriptions, which some scholars equated with the success of the 
peace process (Shirlow, 2015).  
64 Naill O’Dochartaigh is a Galway native who was a member of the Irish Labour Party. He did his studies 
(undergraduate and Master’s) at National University Ireland (NUI), Galway. O’Dochartaigh took his PhD at 
Queens University Belfast under Bew’s supervision, and looked at the escalation of conflict in Northern Ireland 
in the early 1970s: which was later turned into From Civil Rights to Armalites (1997). He is Senior Lecturer in 
the Department of Political Science and Sociology at NUI, Galway.   
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as Dr. Brendan O’Duffy65 and Dr. Etain Tannam66, who took their PhDs at LSE during the 
early 1990s, noted that O’Leary’s methodological approach had brought them there. O’Duffy 
commented that:    
[I came] to LSE because I mean O’Leary was at LSE at that time. So I came 
basically at that point – I think if you’re serious you’re sort of applying to 
institution matters. But the PhD the supervisor matters more. So I had begun in 
doing some research part of my Master’s and I came across work by O’Leary… 
But I happened to be persuaded because he was trying also to do – he was 
basically approaching the Northern Ireland subject from a more comparative 
perspective, more so than compared to a lot of his contemporaries. So the initial 
stuff I read was kind of engaging in consociational theory. To me it was 
satisfying and seemed more appealing than some of the narrower or even 
broader social science approach that I may have been tempted to do. [For 
example,] I had a place at Nuffield College at Oxford and maybe I would have 
gone to a really completely different direction if I were down there. Because 
there wasn’t anyone with that kind of expertise in that area and they were almost 
certainly encouraging me to kind of continue with my current quantitative large 
and macro approach. So O’Leary’s works appealed. So I thought that makes 
sense for what he was describing during that period of the post Anglo/Irish 
Agreement and the beginning – we now kind of see it as the beginning of the 
framework of the consociational plus settlement (O’Duffy, 2015).   
O’Leary acknowledged that “I think McGarry and I not only applied consociational theory [to 
Northern Ireland], I think we partially developed it. And I don’t want to say that we [started] 
major intellectual revolution, but we did help transform the conversation on Northern Ireland” 
(O’Leary, 2015). McGarry felt that the claims that he and O’Leary “kept power sharing alive” 
or brought it to life were overstated, noting that “it was Brussels, it was the politicians realizing 
that this was a way to get it done, to satisfy both parties involved” (McGarry, 2015). He did 
explain, however, that following his first publication on Northern Ireland, The Anglo-Irish 
Agreement and The Prospects for Power Sharing in Northern Ireland (1988), he was contacted 
                                                 
65 Brendan O’Duffy is an American native of Irish descent from Rochester, Minnesota. O’Duffy studied Sociology 
and History at Boston College (undergraduate), a Master’s in Political Sociology at McGill (Montreal), and a PhD 
in Government at LSE under the supervision of Brendan O’Leary: a historical institutionalist analysis of the causes 
and dynamics of political violence in Ireland. He is Senior Lecturer in the School of Politics and International 
Relations at Queen Mary, University of London; and author of British-Irish Relations and Northern Ireland: From 
Violent Politics to Conflict Regulation (2007).  
66 Etain Tannam is an Irish native raised in what she referred to as a “moderate nationalist” household, with family 
connections (on her mother’s side) to Northern Ireland. Tannam received her BA in Economics and Political 
Science from Trinity College Dublin, her MA in West European Politics from University of Essex, and her PhD 
from LSE. The latter was supervised by O’Leary, and looked at EU policy in relation to Northern Ireland. Tannam 
is Associate Professor and Course Coordinator of International Peace Studies at Trinity College, Dublin’s Irish 
School of Ecumenics.  
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by O’Leary, whom he had gone to primary school with - who stated that, according to 
O’Leary’s account, “I really agree with what you’re saying here” (O’Leary, 2015).  
Thanks to this interaction, they worked together on and released The Future of Northern 
Ireland (1990a) (McGarry, 2015). According to McGarry, their work on this brought together 
“about 12 people who were engaged in different ways of finding…finding a way out of the 
Northern Ireland conflict” (John McGarry, 2015). Not only was this the first work to challenge 
the dominant view of Northern Ireland as a conflict without solution, but it brought together a 
collaboration of scholars: “Paul Bew and Henry Patterson were involved in that and I believe 
Anthony Kenny67 who was at Oxford, people from Dublin such as Anthony Coughlan68”. 
Though these academics had different views on possible solutions and varying historical 
interpretations regarding its origin, they began to interact more closely, and “a lot of us wrote 
various articles for this magazine called Fortnight, which was very important in the 1990s” 
(McGarry, 2015).   
McGarry and O’Leary reflected that through publications such as Fortnight, as well as 
conferences, these scholars began “commenting on each other’s work or refuting each other’s 
work” (McGarry, 2015).  In looking to highlight the elevation in interest in Northern Ireland – 
from both academics and politicians – he went on to discuss one specific experience:  
I remember going to conference in around 1990, that was on South Africa and 
the Middle East, and Northern Ireland and it took place in Boston, it was 
organized by Paudrich O’Mally, who was at the University of Massachusetts in 
Boston. At this conference was Peter Robinson, first minister and another 
prominent member of the DUP, they were representing the Unionist cause and 
we had Mark Durkin from the SDLP, so I mean that was ground breaking. 
Mandela was being released for instance in South Africa.  So right there and 
then, there was a… there was a network of scholars involving in the United 
States, Northern Ireland, from Canada, Ireland, and Scotland, a few from 
England (McGarry, 2015). 
                                                 
67 Sir Anthony John Patrick Kenny is a prominent English philosopher and former Roman Catholic priest.  
68 Anthony Coughlan is an academic, Secretary of the National Platform for EU Research and Information 
Centre, and a retired Senior Lecturer Emeritus in Social Policy at Trinity College, Dublin. A native of Cork, 
Coughlan began lecturing at Trinity College, Dublin; and in the 1960s, was heavily involved in the Wolfe Tone 
Society, which campaigned for civil rights in Northern Ireland and supported the Northern Ireland Civil Rights 
Association (NICRA) (CAIN, 2015). 
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O’Leary confirmed that Fortnight and his publications on Northern Ireland helped link him 
with other scholars, such as Paul Mitchell and Geoffrey Evans69, in the early 1990s; and 
develop parallel theories around consociationalism:   
I think the work that I did with Geoff Evans and Paul Mitchell on electoral 
behaviour overtime was important. I would claim it immodestly, but I think 
correctly. And [we were] the first to publish on the growth of the Northern 
Nationalist in Fortnight magazine way back in early 1991 or so, what the long-
run implications of that transformations are—with Mitchell and Evans. Also, 
we make a nice contribution to showing how high the theory of Shepsle and 
Rabushka, which implies that you can’t have a democracy amid deep ethnic 
divisions because you will perpetually have a lot of flanking. You’ll have civil 
war and a lot of flanking. Our efforts to try and show how that might not be true, 
if you get to development of tribune parties, I think that’s a contribution to the 
discipline (O’Leary, 2015).  
Many interviewees, including Mitchell, noted the importance of publications such as 
Fortnight and the contribution which O’Leary and McGarry’s theoretical application brought 
to the study of Northern Ireland in the early 1990s. Dr. Paul Dixon70, one of O’Leary and 
consociationalists’ most ardent critics, referred to the publication as a “lifeline” to scholars in 
the U.K.; it allowed to them to stay connected to developments in the North, as it was not 
covered very well in British or Irish media (Dixon, 2015). Although it was not an academic 
publication, Fortnight allowed scholars and journalists to refute and review one another’s work 
in a way which wasn’t possible in other outlets.  
Moreover, we can also identify evidence of a rise in discussions on consocationalism 
and Northern Ireland. In April 1988, for example, O’Leary presented at the Institute of 
Advanced Legal Studies, University of London on The limits of Coercive Consociationalism; 
and was invited to speak on various British policy practices and limits in Northern Ireland in 
March and April 1989 at the Joint Convention of the British International Studies Association 
and International Studies Association in London, as well as the European Consortium for 
                                                 
69 Professor Geoffrey Evans is a political scientist and Official Fellow in Politics at Nuffield College, Oxford. 
Evans specializes in elections, is long-standing editor of the journal, Electoral Studies, and has extensively 
published on British, Scottish, and Northern Ireland elections, together with individuals such as Paul Mitchell and 
Brendan O’Leary (For example, Paul Mitchell, Evans, & O'Leary, 2009).  
70 Paul Dixon is a native Londoner from Southfields, with an Irish Catholic family; and was educated at a Roman 
Catholic primary school. Dixon attended Manchester University (BA), where he studied Politics and Modern 
History (1986); and did his PhD at Bradford University (1993) under Tom Gallagher, where his dissertation 
focused on the Labour Party and Northern Ireland. Dixon is now Professor of Politics at in the Department of 
Economics, Politics, and History at Kingston University, London; an active member and contributor to the 
Political Science Association, Ireland and its journal; and a regular participant at PSAI conferences. Dixon has 
published pieces on Northern Ireland and its peace process which critique consocationalism and its supporters 
(For a listing see: Kingston, 2014). 
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Political Research in Paris. Then, following the release of their book in 1990, O’Leary and 
McGarry gave a series of public lectures throughout Ireland, the U.K., Europe, and North 
America: talking about and debating their explanations and proposed solutions (See: 
Pennsylvania, 2013).  
Moreover, the book’s publication presaged multiple reviews and refutations of their 
work (See: Guelke, 1991; H. Patterson, 1993). O’Leary began to correspond regularly with 
established academics such as Richard Rose71, John Darby72, and Jonathan (John) Whyte73; 
“there [was] such a demand for matchers so I would be invited to many, many places in London 
and around the region to give a talk on Northern Ireland, to explain it…” (B. O'Leary, 2015). 
During this time, there was an increase in conferences, general discourse and in student 
appetite for Northern Ireland, both in the U.K. and Ireland, to which professors began to 
respond. The rise of discourse on consociationalism coincided with several other variables 
which increased academics’ general interest. Mitchell, then at Queens University Belfast, and 
Tonge, then at Liverpool, both pointed towards high student turnout and the development of 
class modules dedicated to Northern Ireland, which compared it with other conflicts of the 
time. Many interviewees also highlighted the foundation of various research institutes - such 
as University of Liverpool’s Institute of Irish Studies in 1988, and Ulster University’s 
International Conflict Research Institute (INCORE)74 in 1993 - as benchmarks in bringing the 
                                                 
71 Richard Rose is an American-born political scientist and pioneering scholar on Northern Ireland and 
comparative politics. He is Director of the Centre for the Study of Public Policy and Emeritus Professor of Politics 
at the University of Strathclyde, Scotland. Rose was a student at Johns Hopkins University (BA), and wrote 
his PhD at the University of Oxford. Though his research on Northern Ireland was highly influential in the 1970s 
and 1980s, he has largely abandoned the subject and currently focuses on EU enlargement, democratization, 
elections and voting, and policy transfer. Rose was Professor of Politics at the University of Strathclyde from 
1966 to 2005; and Lecturer in Government at the University of Manchester, from 1961 to 1966 (CSPP, 2016).  
72 John Darby was distinguished scholar on Northern Ireland. Darby was born in Belfast, attended Queen’s 
University Belfast (BA) and began his teaching history in Belfast in the 1970s; however, following the outbreak 
of The Troubles, he began researching and publishing for the Northern Ireland Community Relations 
Commission. His first book, Conflict in Northern Ireland: The Development of a Polarized Community (1976) 
was one of the early influential contributions to understanding the conflict. Darby was appointed Lecturer in 
Social Administration at the University of Ulster at Coleraine, and helped establish INCORE. In 1999, Darby was 
appointed Professor of Comparative Ethnic Studies at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the 
University of Notre Dame, where he remained until 2011 (Dunn, 2012).    
73 John Whyte was an Irish historian and political scientist who wrote extensively on Northern Ireland as well as 
other divided societies. Whyte was Professor of Empirical Politics at University College, Dublin (UCD) from 
1962 to 1966: when he moved to teach Irish Politics at Queen’s University Belfast, and remained there until 1982. 
Whyte returned to UCD in 1984, where he chaired the Politics Department and wrote his seminal treatise 
Interpreting Northern Ireland (1990).  
74 INCORE was established in 1993 and is a joint project of the United Nations University and the University of 
Ulster. INCORE’s remit is to look at the causes and consequences of conflict in Northern Ireland and 
internationally, as well as promote conflict resolution management strategies. INCORE is located within the 
Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Ulster  and co-ordinates varied peace and conflict-related activity 
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study of Northern Ireland, as well as other Irish political and social topics, to the mainstream 
of British academia.  
In trying to explain the “why”, English and Tannam also noted the changes taking place 
in the late 1980s/early 1990s, which brought Irish studies and Northern Ireland to the forefront. 
Pointing to the beginnings of the peace process, with Peter Brooke’s75 famous statement in 
1990 that the British government had no “selfish economic or strategic interest” in Northern 
Ireland and would accept the unification of Ireland by consent, followed by the Downing Street 
Declaration in 1993, and the rise of the Celtic Tiger, many noted that Ireland had started to 
become “doubly ‘cool’ because it was moving toward peace and because the economy seemed 
to be doing well” (English, 2015). Tannam provided further context: highlighting the major 
shifts taking place in Europe, with the implementation of the Single European Act:  
The Single European Act in 1987 that was – well, it did create a European 
market. It was one of the most – I would say the most fundamental acts in EU 
history. It was – it changed decision-making procedures in the European Union 
to increase majority voting so, in other words, it was more easy to pass through 
common policies without having national vetoes and it was extended to different 
aspects to economics to create a single market so that there would be no quality 
barriers to importing goods into the EU. And Thatcher signed up to it which was 
surprising and that was because the financial services sector in London was set 
to gain from it and it really did contribute to their success with even more 
success.  But their side payment made to Spain and Portugal was that regional 
policy being formed because those regions were poor, so was Ireland, so Ireland 
would get and Northern Ireland, subject to which region was the poorest, would 
get large sums of money – most of EU regional policy money. In fact, all of it 
was to be concentrated on a small number of poor regions including Ireland, 
Northern Ireland and Scotland… It became a symbol of a post-nationalist world 
where ethnic conflict should not matter as much because they cooperated 
according to economics and EU logic rather than nationalist logic. So that 
became extremely fashionable [to study] (Tannam, 2015).        
Tannam noted also that around this time, because of the Single European Act and the 
investment that came along with it, the EU began to play a more prominent role in the 
relationship between Northern Ireland, Ireland, and the U.K.; and this got the attention of the 
academic community. She recalled that while on her PhD in around 1990 or 1991: 
I remember my first conference paper, which I was terrified about giving, and 
was – I can't remember…  I think it was on regional policy – it was my first 
publication – was on regional administrative cooperation between Northern 
                                                 
across the University. It incorporates a number of disciplines and has been a starting point for many scholars in  
the Northern Ireland epistemic community.  
75 Peter Brooke was a Conservative MP and Secretary of State of Northern Ireland from 1989 until 1992.  
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Ireland and the Republic of Ireland and how the EU was improving it, and there 
was this huge interest. I remember loads of established academics coming up to 
me afterwards to get my card and, of course, I hadn't got a card so just my 
number, and it was absolutely overwhelming. And then somebody from…I 
can’t remember, but they knew O'Leary asked if, would I submit the paper to 
Governance, the American journal that was just starting that now is established, 
and it got published. Just like that (Tannam, 2015). 
Doyle, Arthur, and Mitchell all highlighted the research money being made available 
to the subject at this time: both because of the buoyancy of the Irish economy, and an infusion 
of EU funds.76 All interviewees agreed on the importance of this: “I mean no one was getting 
rich off of studying Northern Ireland…” but that it’s “easier to study something when there is 
interest in it and money made available than not” (Anonymous, 2015).  
Tannam, English, and Arthur concurred that involvement from the EU and its regional 
policy raised the profile of the Northern Ireland conflict from a regional to international one. 
American involvement following the election of Bill Clinton also meant that Northern Ireland 
started being viewed as more internationally relevant. Historically, the U.S.-U.K. “special 
relationship” and Cold War context usually trumped any American desire to intervene in 
Northern Ireland and reflected the doctrine of “non-interference” in the internal affairs of 
nations (T. J. White, 2013). The first real break with this came after Clinton’s election and the 
end of the Cold War.  
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, unification of Germany in 1990 and demise of the 
Soviet Union in 1991 marked a major shift in international politics and academia. Following 
the Cold War, there was an explosion of interest intellectually and academically in the notion 
and study of nationalism and ethnic conflict, a subject which had not been taken that seriously 
before. Mitchell noted that before the Cold War ended, sub-disciplines within political science, 
such as “peace studies” or “conflict studies”, simply did not exist (Mitchell, 2015). The end of 
the Cold War also led academia to shift from major conflicts between nations to the study of 
civil wars, including Northern Ireland. “The end of the Cold War means that almost every 
single war in the world right now is a civil war…” (Mitchell, 2015): which greatly increased 
the ability of political scientists to make comparisons and apply theories such as 
consociationalism, furthering both the theory and the discipline.  
                                                 
76 For instance, from 1988 – following the Single European Act – to 1993 the EU invested €795 million into 
various community initiatives and organizations: including the International Fund for Ireland, as well as research 
into various regional and community policy initiatives (See: McCaffery, 2013).   
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O’Leary echoed this, pointing out that “as a result of the breakdown of the Soviet 
Union, the breakdown of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, etc… There’s a whole set of 
unemployed Sovietologists and Yugoslav specialists” (O’Leary, 2015) who needed new 
material to work with. The study of ethnic conflict and civil war seemed to be an increasingly 
propitious area. O’Leary and McGarry were at the forefront of attempting to normalize both 
the study of Northern Ireland and comparative politics by emphasizing its primarily 
ethnic/national character and comparing that with other conflicts (O’Leary, 2015). McGarry, 
O’Leary, Arthur, English, Bew and a host of others highlighted that this rise in popularity and 
profile can be understood in the level of interest amongst academics and its media profile. 
Many recalled that from the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, they made regular 
appearances on television, radio, and wrote regular pieces for publications such as The 
Guardian, The Telegraph, The Times, and other Irish, British, and international publications. 
In a specific example, O’Leary recalled that:  
You can’t tell from the web, but if I have been—I suppose from ’87 to 2001, I 
would have had at least one appearance a week on radio or television and quite 
a few op-ed so I was actively in the media. I was a regular on the BBC world 
service. As I got older with higher academic status, I was a regular on the Today 
Program, Northern Radio, the 10 o’clock radio news on Radio 4. I did BBC 2, 
Channel 4. When I was in ’95 or ’96, the Guardian publishes celebrity Dons and 
I’m in the first 10-celebrity Dons (O’Leary, 2015). 
The rise in popularity was also because Northern Ireland is a relatively easy case study 
for somebody who speaks English and does not want the difficulties of learning, for example, 
Uzbek or Ukrainian. Individuals eager to research the conflict could do fieldwork relatively 
easily, as it is located inside Western Europe. Perhaps most importantly, scholars moving into 
the field focused on a new, “interesting question to answer, that is – why does it appear that 
this ethnic conflict might be capable of resolution compared to other?” (O’Leary, 2015) 
However, despite this paradigm shift from Northern Ireland as a conflict without a solution and 
a subject to avoid to “fashionable” (Tannam, 2015) and even “sexy” (Kerr, 2015), with peace 
now seen as a possibility, there was hardly consensus amongst academics as to how this 
“interesting question” could be answered.  
In fact, the division that had come to define Northern Ireland was reflected and 
embedded within the academic debates that developed throughout the 1990s and 2000s. 
Certainly, O’Leary and McGarry both talked about their experience in beginning to publish 
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and discuss their work on consociationalism, and how their ideas were met with fierce criticism 
from many within the academic community. McGarry recalled that:   
Even though we were all engaged in trying to improve things in Northern 
Ireland, thinking of a way of resolving this conflict, we genuinely believed that 
the approach taken by the outside or some of the other sides… and it’s…well 
sometimes those debates could be quite vitriolic. I can remember one academic 
who is English, I believe… writing, I won’t mention names because I don’t want 
to restart a debate, but accused O’Leary and me of supporting ethnic cleansing 
because we supported power sharing. And I don’t know how you get from 
supporting power sharing to supporting ethnic cleansing but his thinking was 
that both the fall the reification of groups that comes and once you started 
thinking in terms of groups, you’re down a slippery slope to the Holocaust 
(McGarry, 2015).  
O’Leary was a little more reluctant to discuss the level of “vitriol” surrounding 
criticisms of his work or the debates which took place; but did explain that while he was at 
LSE and began appearing regularly on the media, it evoked different reactions from his fellows. 
He reflected that people he would have regarded as authentic scholars “would genuinely praise 
me for being clear, lucid, detached and obviously, not British… giving a perspective that was 
not the mainstream British one” (O’Leary, 2015). However, other individuals, like a former 
“Director of LSE at one point. This is second hand so I don’t know if he said it for certain. [but 
allegedly said] ‘We even have a very good Sinn Féin (SF) professor’” (O’Leary, 2015). 
O’Leary was not and had never been a member of Sinn Féin or a supporter of any dissident 
group; but because he and McGarry took a “greener” perspective than many mainstream British 
interpretations, they received a lot of abuse. He recalled another example where: 
Kevin McNamara, then Shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 
accompanied by Christopher McCrudden77, see a presentation that I gave in 
London at the Advanced Institute of Equal Studies. I don’t recall whether it was 
in ’87 or ’88. I think it’s probably ’87.  
And Kevin asked was I subsequently… willing to advise. I wasn’t sure at that 
time and I talked with Chris then I decided. So I became part of a small 
community, a real community face-to-face interaction, not the more abstract 
notion. And we drafted policy papers for future Labour government… I was the 
principal drafter of a document that’s trying to gloss over two difficult positions. 
The Labour party had committed itself to Irish unification by consent. So the 
question is, ‘What did that consent mean?’ and another question is, ‘What did 
you do in the interim if you were a Labour government?’  
                                                 
77 Christopher McCrudden is Professor of Human Rights and Equality Law at Queen’s University Belfast; and 
William W Cook Global Law Professor at the University of Michigan Law School. Until 2011, he was Professor 
of Human Rights Law at the University of Oxford, and a Fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford.  
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So, what McCrudden and I really cared about was the radical reform of Northern 
Ireland so that we were intent on radical peace reform, formative administration 
of justice, equal funding for education, a vigorous affirmative action program 
for fair employment, and devolved government. 
But we also were asked to think about what else we could do if there was no 
support for a devolved government. And that’s when I had the mission basically 
to think through how joint sovereignty over Northern Ireland might work. And 
although people have denied this, I know it to be true that Neil Kinnock78 
approved these papers before the 1992 election, which Labour was expected to 
win, but didn’t… 
Shortly afterwards, the paper that I had, being the lead drafter—I wasn’t alone. 
Others were involved but I don’t think anybody would deny I was the lead 
drafter. It’s leaked. So in response to this sensible decision is made, that the 
Institute of Public Policy Research (IPPR) will ask for a version of the document 
to be published as a short book I co-author, Northern Ireland Sharing Authority 
(1993). 
And that gets very significant media attention. It may have been the most useful 
thing I ever did on Northern Ireland, not because it was implemented. It wasn’t, 
but for two separate long run reasons: One, it made Unionists generally anxious 
that if there were a Labour government, there were people crazy enough to go 
ahead with joint sovereignty. So it might make more sense for them to negotiate 
a power-sharing arrangement within the UK with cross-border institutions 
rather than something worse happening. 
Peter Hain, Mo Mowlam, Claire Short, Jimmy Marshall, Roger Stott, and a 
whole range of Labour MPs were a sounding board for both the document and 
the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) text as it developed.  
Two of them, Hain and Mowlam went on to be Secretaries of State. I don’t know 
what direct influence that document had. I mean, it had a significant influence 
on Mo. Peter Hain, I don’t know what long-run impact it had. But there was a 
view, a theory among the unionists that there was a serious possibility of joint 
authority might be considered by British government.  
That needed the acceptance of something like what happened in the framework 
documents in the ’95 and the ’98 agreements, much easier for them to accept 
influence by consociational thinking, but also a fresh institutional design 
(O’Leary, 2015). 
Both because of his work with the Labour party, as well as the consocational framework 
he was advocating, O’Leary “took a fair share of abuse” from many of his colleagues (O’Leary, 
                                                 
78 Neil Kinnock is a British Labour Party politician and was Leader of the Labour Party and Leader of the 
Opposition from 1983 until 1992, making him the longest-serving Leader of the Opposition in British political 
history. 
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2015). He recalled “Ruth Dudley Edwards79—known as Ruth ‘Deadly’ Edwards to her friends, 
called me the ‘Green Machiavelli’ in the Sunday Times” (O’Leary, 2015) for his academic and 
political contributions. McGarry recalled that he and O’Leary were once referred to as 
“academic carnivores” for the positions they were defending and their critique of existing 
paradigms (For example, see references in: Cochrane, 1997, pp. 60-62). Many of these debates 
took place at various conferences and across different publications: to the extent that a book 
was written about the debates themselves: 
Rupert Taylor in particular who was – and is an English person who I think did 
a pretty solid contribution when I think about it and he also edited the book on 
consociational thinking and he brought together a lot of these different 
perspectives – it’s called Consociational Theory (2009) and it involves the 
debates between these different perspectives, some of which were pretty heated 
(McGarry, 2015).   
Moreover, individuals like “Robin Wilson80, for example, who writes in this volume as 
well as a former editor of Fortnight and a person with very good intentions, and good ideas. 
But he just didn’t agree with anything we said at all.  He just said it was sectarian; it was 
ethnocentric, segregationists, etc etc…” (McGarry, 2015). However, in retelling these 
accounts, both scholars recognized that they gave criticism just as much as they received it; 
their “reaction wasn’t the New Testament reaction to turn the other cheek, but to take on 
criticism and to respond to it… and we did so – we gave as good as we got” (McGarry, 2015). 
Taylor, Shirlow, Arthur, Dixon, and others, all noted the sometimes-intense nature of 
these disagreements, the often-combative nature of the pair, and how in many ways they came 
to define the discipline. Nevertheless, Taylor recognizes O’Leary and McGarry’s approach to 
consociational theory as probably having “the biggest influence on developing, academically 
in political science, the study of Northern Ireland”; but “identified [himself] as being a critic 
of consociational theory and in favour of a more transformative agenda” (Taylor, 2015). 
Despite his disagreements with O’Leary, McGarry, and consociationalism generally, the 
framework did give scholars a “foundation” which they could build on; while the notion of 
“power-sharing” created a debate that “actually left the academy…in the Belfast Agreement”. 
                                                 
79 Ruth Dudley Edwards is a writer, journalist, and media broadcaster in the UK and Ireland. She is also a 
columnist and regular contributor in the conservative-leaning Sunday Independent (Ireland).   
80 Robin Wilson is an independent political scientist who did his PhD at Queen’s University Belfast and was 
former editor of Fortnight Publications (1986-1995) and Director of Democratic Dialogue (1995-2006). Wilson 
has written extensively against consociationalism: including The Northern Ireland experience of conflict and 
agreement: a model for export? (2010). 
 123 
These ideas influenced political figures at Stormont and in the British Labour Party (Taylor, 
2015).  
Bew, though, disputed this: arguing that the influence of consociationalism, O’Leary, 
McGarry, and other academics was greatly overstated. He argued that while O’Leary and 
McGarry played an important role in the theoretical debate surrounding Northern Ireland, their 
influence within and on the politics around the conflict was miniscule. “I was the only one in 
the game… there was no other academic in the game...” “scholars like Brendan O’Leary…  I 
think Brendan is a great scholar, a great man. And he is in the game, for example, on the Kurds 
[In Iraq], right? But is he in the game – on Ireland? No” (Bew, 2015). Bew went on to explain 
that O’Leary could have been involved but for a clash of personalities with Mo Mowlam81 and 
her team: “Mo and Mo's people didn't like Brendan… [so…] end of story [he was out]” (Bew, 
2015).  
According to Bew’s account, he was the only academic who was, in a practical sense, 
involved in the negotiations and talks around the peace process and the Agreement of 1998. 
He and other interviewees, such as McIntyre, Patterson, Arthur, and Aughey, all noted the 
tendency for scholars at the time of the peace process and following the Agreement in 1998 – 
and even today – to “overstate” and/or “exaggerate” their role and influence in the events taking 
place. Bew’s credibility here does seem valid given his role as an advisor to David Trimble 
during the peace process, and the fact that this later made him a lifetime peer in the House of 
Lords. Yet similar claims were made by Arthur, O’Leary, Shirlow, and Kerr: who all, in one 
way or another, noted the utility and uniqueness of their respective roles in either shaping ideas 
around the peace process or with the political figures involved. For example, Arthur recalled 
that:  
When the ceasefires were in 1994, the most fascinating three days of my life 
was in chairing a meeting for the combined Loyalist Military Command, as they 
had to work out what they wanted to do. It was three intense days. The UDA, 
the UVF, the Progressive Unionist Party, Ulster Democratic Unionist Party all 
in the hotel and they broke up into four separate groups after the session, and 
they discussed the way to move forward, at the very end of it, I was called in, 
and 6 questions were put to me, and they said to me: on the basis of how you 
answer these 6 questions, we will be able to decide how we will be able to move 
                                                 
81 Marjorie (Mo) Mowlam was a Labour Party politician and MP for Redcar from 1987 to 2001 and served in 
the Cabinet as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Mowlam's time as Northern Ireland Secretary oversaw the 
signing of the historic Good Friday Peace Agreement in 1998. 
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on. So that was both fascinating and very scary. So that’s part of… so at the end 
of it I began to get involved in exercises (Arthur, 2015).  
He went on to point out that: 
From the 90s, from 1990 onwards, and I’ve written about this, I was one of the 
few people who had approached, and established enough rapport with people 
like Peter Robinson, for example, and the whole point of trying to… has to be 
transparent, it becomes transparent – absolute trust, and they found that what 
we said amongst ourselves was confidential. 
So my career was, to a large extent, as a practitioner, as much about being an 
academic and in that respect, I was unlike, virtually everyone else that you’ve 
spoken to, with the exception of Antony McIntyre who clearly was in the IRA 
and who became very close to David Trimble, but hadn’t really been involved 
in a way that I would have been involved in these sort of things. So that was my 
trajectory, if you like (Arthur, 2015).         
In seeking to explain such differing accounts, Aughey made an interesting point, albeit 
indirectly, about the concept of “fantasy echos”: noting that when individuals, even scholars, 
look at the past and their role in it, they often conjure up wondrous images when trying to 
understand their relationship to it (Aughey, 2015). He explained that the echoes coming from 
the past are real, “but how we understand them were fantastic, there's something real about it… 
there's a real echo there, but it's a sort of a fantastic interpretation” (Aughey, 2015). Yet even 
if some of these interpretations are indeed fantastic, the desire of academics to attach 
themselves to the subject of Northern Ireland and promote themselves as having an influence 
in the political process marked a dramatic, almost unrecognisable shift given what had gone 
before.    
Irrespective of the influence which consociationalism and O’Leary and McGarry had 
on political figures in Northern Ireland, it undoubtedly influenced scholarship. Looking at the 
literature on the peace process from its initiation in the early 1990s until the signing of the 
Agreement, the intellectual schisms between academics who adopted different approaches and 
perspectives and their mixed, and sometimes hostile, responses to the proposed power sharing 
agreements – which would later comprise the Good Friday Agreement – are very apparent. 
This is commonly described as Northern Ireland’s “meta conflict”: the intellectual debate about 
the nature of the conflict and the appropriate prescriptions to tackle it (John McGarry & 
O'Leary, 1995). As an example of the hostile positions taken, a majority of interviewees 
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pointed specifically to the debates between Dixon, O’Leary, and McGarry in Irish Political 
Studies (See: Paul Dixon, 1996; John McGarry & O'Leary, 1996).82  
The anti-consociationalism, implicit or overt, camp was not limited to a dispute 
between two or three individuals, but formed a staple of the Northern Ireland political diet 
throughout the 1990s. Its framework was not only condemned by academics; but by Irish 
republicans, unionists, and political parties: who represented, or so they insisted, the “middle 
ground” between the two ethno-national blocs (e.g. members of the Alliance, Democratic Left, 
and the Women’s Coalition) (See for example: J. McGarry & O'Leary, 2006). The framework 
was opposed by think tanks, who accused O’Leary and McGarry of developing an “uncritical 
acceptance of the primacy and permanency of ethnicity” (Taylor, 1994); and conveying a 
“rather bleak view of humanity” (Wilford, 1992b).  
Several scholars maintained that consociation would not resolve the conflict but instead 
would “institutionalize” divisions, casting them in “marble” (Rooney, 1998); that its basic 
principles were incompatible with democratic stability; and therefore, a consociational 
democracy in Northern Ireland would be “impermanent”, “dysfunctional”, “unworkable” and 
a “macabre” parody of “real democracy” (McCartney, 2000). And as O’Leary and McGarry 
noted, Dixon went so far as to claim that consociationalists – especially O’Leary – were 
“segregationists”, whose message could be “condoning . . . ethnic cleansing” (Paul Dixon, 
1996; P. Dixon, 1998). The level of disagreement and potential for the subject to arouse 
controversy was so profound that when several of those involved in these debates and in this 
community were approached to be interviewed for this research, they either outright refused to 
participate or declined to allow any of the material discussed in interviews be used.83   
When pressed on “why” these debates were so heated and “what” the science was 
behind disagreements which seemed more personal than empirical, several responses were 
provided. Patterson – who was pointedly critical of O’Leary and McGarry in the interview – 
simply claimed, “There was nothing scientific about it all…it’s mostly ideological” (Patterson, 
2015). This was echoed by several interviewees: who highlighted that most of those who were 
actively engaging with the debates were either from Northern Ireland or had spent a significant 
amount of time there. Even McGarry noted, “where you stand is dependent on where you sit, 
                                                 
82 Other such debates can be found in: (Paul Dixon, 1997a; Gilligan & Tonge, 1997; McGovern, 1997, 2000). 
83 It is also noteworthy that they requested that their names not be used or unofficial comments regarding them be 
referred to anywhere within this thesis.  
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and that explains, I think, much about Northern Ireland scholarship and about academic 
scholarship anywhere, that perspective is sort of determined by your sociology” (McGarry,  
2015). Taylor and Arthur made similar references to this, but pointed out that such prejudices 
had existed previously, in “academic debates at Queen’s in the 1970s and early 1980s where 
people’s reading of the conflict would often create situations where colleagues wouldn’t talk 
to each other or would even fight with each other because they disagreed about how they should 
understand it from either a Marxist, non-Marxist, Nationalist or Unionist point of view” 
(Taylor, 2015).  
Certainly, individuals’ personal biographies matter; most of those interviewed were 
quite open about their backgrounds and locations within the various communities of Northern 
Ireland. Patterson, English, Aughey, Shirlow, Aaron Edwards84, and Kerr all noted in one way 
or another that their respective unionist backgrounds shaped and influenced their views and 
opinions on Northern Ireland. Kerr, a self-identified unionist from a middle-class Protestant 
background in Belfast, noted his engagement in unionist politics, working for David Trimble 
and the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) in the early 2000s; while Shirlow remarked that his 
background and upbringing in a Protestant, working class area in Belfast afforded him the 
opportunity and interest in conducting research with various Loyalist groups and organizations. 
English spoke at some length about this:  
To engage with a subject, you have to realize that your own history and 
background plays a part. I’m sure that people who disagree with my work would 
say that I have not done well enough in accounting for this. I’m reminded, for 
example, with the book on the IRA which I published in 2003, that was a book 
which was deliberately written about people who aren’t my relatives in the sense 
and so far, as I have a connection with them. My mother was a Belfast 
Protestant. Relatives of mine were in the police. So insofar as the IRA were 
involved in my personal family life, it would have been possibly to try and kill 
my cousin, rather than because I was a supporter. And it seemed to me that 
writing books about people who are not your relatives and trying to do it 
empathetically, and I did my best in that book to be as empathetic as I could 
towards the group which I disagreed with, seemed to me to be useful. Put 
another way, if there were more empathetic books on the shelf about unionism 
written by republicans, we’d be in a better place. If there were more empathetic 
books written about republicans by people who were not from that tradition, 
                                                 
84 Aaron Edwards is a Senior Lecturer in Defense and International Affairs at the Royal Military Academy 
Sandhurst. Edwards was born and raised in the Northern Belfast area of Rathcoole. Edwards was born in 1980 
(making him one of the younger academics interviewed) and grew up in what he described as a “working class 
Protestant” background and a largely military family (Edwards, 2015). He attended Sandhurst Military Academy, 
serving in the British Military, as well as University of Ulster, Curran Campus (BA). His graduate work (MA & 
PhD) was conducted at Queens University Belfast under the supervision of Richard English, where he wrote on 
the Northern Ireland Labour Party.    
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we’d also be in a better place. I tried to do what I could there. Having said that, 
it’s clear that my politics are, broadly speaking, I think that the shift the 
republicans have made towards recognizing the consent principle of unionists 
is a good one. So in that sense I’m a unionist. I’m not a unionist in the sense of 
being a capital ‘U’ unionist, but a republican would recognize that my politics 
are not a matter of modern nationalism. And I’m sure in the ways that all of us 
reflect and refract our political views there are elements of that (English, 2015). 
Kerr and Shirlow made similar comments – that they are also unionists without a capital ‘U’ - 
and this in some ways influenced what they had looked to research. Conversely, Tonge openly 
acknowledged that he held more republican – with a small ‘r’ – views, but these are not 
reflected in his scholarship (Tonge, 2015). Tonge also noted that the number of scholars with 
more republican-leaning views is minimal in both the U.K. and Ireland. Indeed, none of 
Coakley, O Dochartaigh, Tannam, Dawn Walsh85, or Doyle indicated or referred to holding 
any republican-leaning views; nor would this be apparent in their work. The only notable, and 
obvious, exception to this was McIntyre, a former IRA member who does not hold an academic 
position at present. Dixon, however, pointed to what he saw as the domination of the 
republican/nationalist view in academia: through consociationalist thinkers such as O’Leary, 
McGarry, and their followers (Dixon, 2015).  
In any case, these accounts do not indicate that the prejudice and sectarianism which 
exists around the politics of Northern Ireland is also apparent in the political science academy. 
For example, Bew and Patterson supervised Anthony McIntyre: with whom they had 
developed a relationship while he was in prison. McIntyre recalls that:  
I’m a former member of the IRA, and I served eighteen years in prison for IRA 
activity. I did a first class honors degree, in international politics in prison. Local 
politics, general politics… then I won out the PhD. I acquired the grant, got the 
grant from…an institution in Northern Ireland. And I spoke with Henry 
Patterson, an academic and friend whom I had been in contact with while I was 
in prison. And, we came up with the title “A Social Analysis of Modern Irish 
Republicanism”. I did understand republicanism, because I’d been a member of 
the IRA and in a way, sort of knew about it but also because I wanted to more 
about it. And basically that’s how I got interested in it…through being in it. 
                                                 
85 Dawn Walsh is an Irish-born academic at the University of Birmingham. Walsh attended Trinity College Dublin 
(BA & MA) in Political Science from 2003 to 2007, and wrote her PhD at Dublin City University under the 
supervision of John Doyle. She defended her thesis in Politics and International Relations at DCU in April 2014; 
O’Leary was the external examiner. Walsh is currently an Irish Research Council-Marie Curie Elevate post-
doctoral fellow at Birmingham. She collaborates on her research at the University of Birmingham with Prof Stefan 
Wolff; and at DCU, with Dr John Doyle. This is largely focused on complex power-sharing institutions in post-
conflict societies: including Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Macedonia, Moldova and Burundi. 
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Now I didn’t study under Henry Patterson, I just went to him with the idea. He 
and I discussed the idea; I wanted to do a PhD in an area that could be 
researched. And I wanted to sort of kind of explain the Provisionals, and an idea 
about Provisionals. But, not a response, not a judicial Republican response to 
British State strategy, or sorry, not to the presence of British, but a response to 
how the British did behave while they were here. And therefore, if that was the 
cause of the Provisionals, then you can predict that the British would not leave, 
to bring the Provisionals to an end, they would really have to modify their 
behavior, which is what they did in the Good Friday Agreement. 
So, he and I discussed this, and then I applied to Queens, and Queens appointed 
Paul Bew as a supervisor. So Henry didn’t have an input as such. 
So Paul was my supervisor. But I had been in touch with both Paul and Henry 
in and out of prison, and I’m grateful to them…  
But as I’d focus on [my PhD topic], I began to write an awful lot about an awful 
little. Which was a whole lot about a few years, but it was all about the 
Provisionals and a better understanding of them. I didn’t want to make the 
classic mistake of academics… staring away and scratching their ass. 
So, I had a chance to tread along, effects period, and what was the formative 
years of the Provos. Now Paul was laissez faire in that he was always there. But 
he didn’t interfere, he didn’t come down with a heavy hand, saying “I want you 
to do this, or maybe you should do that. Or take it this direction.” 
He allowed me to take it in the direction that I wanted. Make it on my own, 
make it on the ordering. And he was quite fair… 
But I mean, I could’ve met him for a drink, or a chat, or we discussed politics, 
and that… But he would ask me how it was going on. You know, I could’ve 
been sitting at home, scratching my balls. And doing that. Nevertheless, but he 
knew I wasn’t screwing around with him, and I delivered this massive book at 
the end of it all… 
And I mean the analysis [I gave] was different, my background’s obviously 
different [from theirs], but my attitude is obviously different. I mean, I was still 
a member of the IRA when I was doing this PhD…” (McIntyre, 2015) 
Irrespective of his background, his differing political views and disdain for the peace process, 
which Bew was playing an active role in, McIntyre continued: 
I mean Bew and Patterson were somewhat on the outside, because they had all 
the, they’re kind of gauging this relationship with me, where we were 
challenging their views, and making criticisms… And…And, I mean Paul Bew 
once wrote about two years ago, in the Irish Independent, that I was his own 
personal introduction to the peace process, because at the time when everybody 
was suspicious, I was busily saying the leadership are selling out. And he was 
saying, well that, you know… the argument that the war was over. 
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But I hadn’t introduced him to the peace process, because I had never been 
involved in the peace process.  
But what I persuaded him, he had said this, which I don’t take credit for it, but 
he has argued in public that, I… [for example], when people were saying about 
myself and Ed Maloney they were just anti-peace process journalists, blah blah 
blah, that Gerry Adams had sold out….he had said, well, ironically enough, it 
was myself who had persuaded him, that the peace process as genuine. [He 
stood up for me.] Not that I agreed with [the peace process], I just believed, [it 
was] genuine. It was genuine bollocks, but genuine nonetheless… (McIntyre, 
2015) 
Many academics followed the examples of Bew and Patterson and engaged with, at a 
supervisorial and professional standpoint, individuals whom they held dramatically different 
political and intellectual views from. We should also remember that both Patterson and Bew, 
despite unionist backgrounds and views, were also previously involved with the Workers party, 
a Marxist political organization with historical ties to Official Sinn Féin in the Republic of 
Ireland; and actively participated in the civil rights marches and peace demonstrations during 
the 1960s. Similarly, O’Leary and Arthur, academics identified on the “green” end of the 
spectrum, related that they too had supervised and collaborated with a number of scholars with 
whom they significantly differed. “You must be conscious of your own prejudices” (Arthur, 
2015).  
O’Leary was Kerr’s supervisor when he interrupted his PhD to work for David Trimble 
and the UUP. Kerr noted that he knew O’Leary held very different political views, but was 
supportive of his academic and professional development; he had immense respect for 
O’Leary’s scholastic ability and his application of consocationalism (Kerr, 2015). Arthur 
echoed similar sentiments regarding his educational work and engagement with leaders and 
members of the UDF. When considering how someone manages their personal views alongside 
their intellectual pursuits and research, English reflected that “I’ve tried as far as possible to let 
the evidence take you, even if it doesn’t take you in places you’d like it to take you, to go with 
the evidence” (English, 2015).  
Elaborating on this, as well as the nature of the debates between O’Leary, McGarry, 
and Dixon during the 1990s, Tonge commented:  
Dixon had an insurmountable argument that consociational rules were so lax 
now that any form of power sharing was being labeled as consociation. I mean, 
he had a point but I think he missed the big picture. Well, most of Ljipharts 
models, most of them are already there in Northern Ireland. So, you know, it 
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was dancing on the head of a pin. But I think that with academics getting 
ridiculously wound up about their own positions, it’s normal. 
Academics have a crazy determination to prove they’re right and [generally 
have a] lack of receptiveness to other arguments.  
I was there at the PSAI conference when there was the historic handshake 
between O’Leary and Dixon. That's how they kissed and made up. But, they 
had a friendly chat in the bar. And this is normal [in academia].  
I mean, you know, it's nonsense because there was no need.  
I mean, I would disagree politically with a lot of the people I work with. I mean, 
you know, people I've worked with, Jim McCauley from a loyalist background 
which would not be my background, Tom Hennessy of where there is very much 
unionist sympathy in his writings. Whereas I would be instinctively sympathetic 
towards republicanism. 
And I think I have done a good job not reflecting that in my scholarship. I'm 
trying to do. The one thing I'm trying to do is really challenge my own 
prejudice… (Tonge, 2015) 
Not all interviewees were convinced of the ability, or necessity, of academics to 
challenge their own prejudices. Mitchell and Dixon openly acknowledged that their 
background and political affiliations greatly shaped their views, but argued that this was not 
necessarily a bad thing. In any case, these views and backgrounds do vary. For example, 
Mitchell mentioned growing up in a “Catholic” background in a sectarian area of Scotland, but 
that:  
I'm always a bit sceptical if anyone self-consciously claims that they're 
normatively neutral. I think that's a tough claim and almost a philosophical 
question, which is hard to answer. I'm not sure it's connected with statistics. 
I think that I've never been a partisan in the conflict. There are some advantages 
in having some detachment from it. Even though you can read family histories 
and things like that, I did not grow up there [in Northern Ireland]. That makes 
an enormous difference to how you internally see the world. 
I don't see the world in sectarian terms. I've observed sectarianism, of course, 
but I've never been that way, I don't think. I've certainly never, at least 
consciously in any of my academic writings, been motivated to try and 
contribute to a victory by one side or the other. I think that would be a bad 
analysis of the conflict. 
I very much subscribe to the McGarry/O'Leary line that the whole thing 
historically is a clash of two nation-building failures that has left a small strange 
place, which then became the localised conflict zone. I think both sides have 
valid points of view. I always thought that. Therefore, it's for others to judge 
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whether I have been or not but I've tried to be fair. I've been interested in conflict 
resolution, not in helping one side or the other win (Mitchell, 2015). 
This was also reflected by McGarry and O’Leary: who both noted that having left 
Northern Ireland and taken position in universities outside of it helped them achieve an 
objective distance in analyzing the situation. While accepting that their reading and analysis 
were sometimes “greener” than many within mainstream British academia, they do not see 
themselves as nationalist or sympathetic to dissident republicans; but, irrespective of this, 
nationalist concerns and perspectives must be included in debates and solutions on Northern 
Ireland. Dixon – who was born in London, raised Catholic, educated in the U.K. and, like 
O’Leary, is a Labour party supporter – argues, however:   
I think we construct our realities. The problem is that when you look at quite a 
few of – I don't think we stand outside the world that we’re studying. So, you 
know, of course I see my background, my experiences, as shaping the way that 
I would write. Now, a lot of academics don't want to admit that because they 
like the rhetorical power of being able to say, ‘Look, I’m an objective academic. 
I’m not a member of a political party. I am apolitical. I am giving you the 
objective view of this’, but I think that is an untenable position to hold because 
everyone does have their politics. It’s just some people try to conceal that and it 
gives them rhetorical weight whereas others are more open about it (Dixon, 
2015).  
However, these disputes around consocationalism and scientific objectivity, which led 
up to the Belfast Agreement and beyond, are not unique to Northern Ireland or political science 
generally. Certainly in other disciplines, such as International Relations, we can note the 
sometimes heated, passionate debates which took place between (neo) realists and 
constructivists throughout the 1980s: some which seemed particularly pointed between 
prominent realist scholars such as Kenneth Waltz, and constructivists like Richard Ashley (For 
instance see debates in: Keohane, 1986). Also, as one put it, “academics are notorious bickerers 
and can lapse into self-indulgent defense of their work and its ‘value’”. But “hopefully, at times 
they can challenge views and readings that they find difficult without falling into hapless folly” 
(Shirlow, 2013). 
  Moreover, a majority considered the debates, vitriolic or not, as healthy, necessary, and, 
again, normal. O’Kane commented that regardless of the rhetoric around them, “I don’t ever 
think they were particularly problematic and I remain of that view. I think they’d been very, 
very healthy because this is what an academic discipline is about” (O’Kane, 2015). He 
acknowledged that at times, the discussion became more personal than necessary, but:  
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It was ever thus; I mean academics we tend to have strong opinions or many 
academics tend to have strong opinions. We tend to perhaps take things a little 
bit too far. We might not be as subtle as we should be. Generally, I remember, 
and also there’s obvious, and I don’t want to stereotype here, but I think it was 
helpful and healthy; there’s also been a backdrop of alcohol and conversations.  
In any case, this helps create a sense of community:  
[The] good thing about conferences [is] some of the best debates you have at 
the bar after the panels. That’s always been a very strong element of those 
working in Irish politics. I don’t mean that in the context of we’re all a load of 
drunks, but I do think that generally even given the differences that existed 
within, and continue to exist within the academic community, there has been a 
willingness to engage socially to an extent. I’m not saying we’re all bosom 
buddies, people aren’t, but generally I never felt it was problematic. I never felt 
that the divisions between people because of perceptions about the conflict were 
spilling over to create a poisonous atmosphere within those who are working on 
this. 
Don’t get me wrong. There is some enmity between people, but I don’t think 
political scientists are exceptional there. If you look at any large institution 
office politics and discipline politics are in play you’re never going to get a 
bunch of people who are of strong opinion, who are intelligent, informed and 
articulate and very often confutative, because they believe strongly in this stuff. 
You’re never going to get harmony and agreement. Indeed, academically nor 
should we, because otherwise it would be a pointless discipline to be involved 
in (O’Kane, 2016). 
Moreover, because of the theoretical framework which O’Leary and McGarry 
developed, referred to as “top class” (Anonymous, 2015), “robust” (O Dochartaigh, 2015), and 
“sophisticated” (Taylor, 2015), an objective point of reference could now be worked around 
and debated safely, without these becoming overtly personal. Taylor recalled that debates 
around consociationalism were always, for the most part, “very collegial”; scholars often 
“agreed personally but disagreed academically [or theoretically]” (Taylor, 2015). He and others 
reiterated that everyone had a shared interest and desire for the violence to come to an end, but 
simply differed as to how this could or should come about. Consocationalism thus “provided a 
context in which you could come and make your own argument. It provided a context around 
a key set of arguments laid down by Lijphart” (Taylor, 2015). Speaking to this more directly, 
O’Leary highlighted that in terms of his research and writing and the normative arguments 
which it spurred:  
I don’t think a political science that completely divorces the empirical and the 
normative would have much longevity. Explanation and prescription are linked. 
They’re not automatically linked. You can explain how something works, but 
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not approve of it. You may even explain how something works and then think 
about how you stop it. So, political science has both of those characteristics, the 
empirical, the normative, and I think it always will have (O’Leary, 2015). 
O’Leary and McGarry also noted the need to account for or being aware of one’s own bias; the 
comparative methodology which they utilized helped hugely to account for this:  
I became a comparative political scientist. I have a comparative formation. I’ve 
been comparing all my life. I grew up in multiple environments and I believe 
that comparisons extremely helpful for checking your prejudices, for checking 
your intuitions, checking your priers. And a political science that is informed 
by comparative thinking is the only kind of political science that’s worthwhile 
(O’Leary, 2015). 
Other scholars agreed that O’Leary and McGarry’s comparative model helped move 
the discipline along substantially. Mitchell believes that because of this method and the end of 
the Cold War, the discipline “has evolved quite a lot” (Mitchell, 2015). Before the end of the 
Cold War, by contrast, “with a couple of rare exceptions or a couple of early scholars but there 
wasn't really a profession of peace studies in quite the same way”; “I don't want to overly 
generalise but at least in Ireland [and the UK] I don't think it was a big study. The study of 
politics was historians studying politics essentially” (Mitchell, 2015). Most interviewees 
acknowledged that the growth in this area was not specific to Ireland, but across the board in 
terms of conflict studies. However, one of the most “oversubscribed degrees at the LSE right 
now is the one that I teach on, which is effectively, comparative conflict analysis. We didn't 
[even] have a Master’s degree in conflict analysis back in the 1980s” (Mitchell, 2015). All 
participants concurred that Northern Ireland and consociationalism now form a central part of 
this conflict analysis.  
Yet there remain dissenting opinions about the benefits and influence of consociational 
foundation on political science on Northern Ireland. Dixon regards consocationalism as “a 
complete disaster” (Dixon, 2015), because “science [doesn’t] progress, by this endless 
reproduction of a paradigm that was really written in the 60s and 70s and continues to just 
morph into different forms, different labels for all the various variations of it” (Dixon, 2015). 
McIntrye posits that the debates around consocationalism simply reinforce the existing 
“internal conflict model” paradigm which has long dominated political and academic 
explanations for the Northern Ireland conflict. Similar points were made by Patterson and Bew: 
who argue that the discipline has become stale, and simply replicates theoretical claims by 
using a comparative method that “doesn’t tell us anything new” (Patterson, 2015) about 
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Northern Ireland. This is a point which academics inside and outside the community have been 
expressing for some time: going so far as to term the scholarship around Northern Ireland as 
stuck in a form of “intellectual internment” (See: Edwards, 2007; M. L. R. Smith, 1999).   
Apart from the contribution, and controversy, which consociationalism played in the 
formation of the academic community around Northern Ireland, all agreed that the signing of 
the Good Friday Agreement (the Agreement) in 1998 contributed significantly to the 
development of the discipline and enhancement of the political science community. Tonge, 
Kerr, and John Bew86, son of Paul Bew, all noted the importance of the Agreement to the 
discipline and its “expansion” of the Northern Ireland academic community: it opened new 
avenues and possibilities for research which had not been possible beforehand. Tonge 
explained that the Agreement:  
Opened up a lot of new possibilities. I mean, there, there were so many angles 
on how you study Northern Ireland created by that deal. Firstly, there's the, the 
comparative devolved concept, devolution in the UK, because you then have 
Northern Ireland with localized power shared with other local political 
institutions. So, you can do important comparisons, which is something that has 
been done under Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland around devolved power 
and the English question… So, you've got the devolution comparative aspect. 
Then, you've got the peace process comparative aspect. Then, you've got the 
intellectual questions about consociation versus integration. So, you’ve got a 
whole range of issues as well as issues such as, you know, management of 
political violence. You've got political parties in a post-conflict politic. You've 
got so many different angles to tackle all of that once you get to the Good Friday 
Agreement (Tonge, 2015). 
 Seasoned academics like Shirlow or English; as well as younger contemporaries, such 
as Edwards, Kerr, Buchannan, or Andrew Mumford87, all of whom entered the academy over 
the last 10 to 15 years, acknowledged that their research was largely made possible by the new 
avenues and opportunities opened up by the Agreement. Specifically, Kerr noted that the 
Agreement made his PhD and work with the UUP possible, as it allowed him to make 
comparisons with other countries in a way which hadn’t been utilized before. Reflecting on 
                                                 
86 John Bew is the son of Lord Professor Paul Bew and Reader in History and Foreign Policy at the War Studies 
Department at King’s College London. Bew is a Belfast native and completed his education at Pembroke College, 
Cambridge: doing a BA in History, an MPhil in Historical Studies, and completed his PhD in 2006 on nineteenth 
century Belfast. Bew was the youngest holder of the Henry A. Kissinger Chair in Foreign Policy at the John W. 
Kluge Center at the US Library of Congress (2013-14); and is co-author, along with Martin Frampton, of Talking 
to Terrorists: Making Peace in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country (2009).  
87 Andrew Mumford is an English native from North Yorkshire. Mumford attended Sheffield University (BA), 
where he studied History; and did his PhD at Warwick University under the supervision of Caroline Kennedy, 
focusing on the history of terrorism. He is currently Associate Professor in Politics and International Relations at 
The University of Nottingham.     
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this, he recalled that “the Belfast Agreement had just happened so that was a ripe opportunity 
to do some research on that”; and because of his interest in O’Leary’s consocationalism and 
his comparative methodology, he contacted him: stating that he wanted to do something on the 
Agreement. “Brendan said, ‘Yes, why don’t you make a comparative. Good idea,’ and I said, 
‘Yes, okay.’ I fired back straight away because I’d just done it the week before, ‘What about 
Lebanon?’ and he said, ‘Oh, Lebanon, no one’s done that before,’ so that was it” (Kerr, 2015). 
Joanne McEvoy88, Buchannan, and O’Kane had similar experiences with their PhDs: the 
financial and intellectual opportunities available from 1998 made researching the subject much 
easier and more lucrative in terms of potential career opportunities.  
 There was thus a “buzz” around the study of Northern Ireland during this time. Arthur 
highlighted that “on the day that the Agreement was signed, I sat on the television all day just 
doing a rolling commentary on it, and I was very very positive about everything” (Arthur, 
2015). O’Leary, McGarry, Tonge, and Bew recalled that they appeared regularly in the media 
and received numerous invitations to speak at conferences and on panels looking to “explain” 
the success of the process and the various stages of it. Tonge observed that events put on by 
the PSAI were often oversubscribed and had scholars from various disciplines and across the 
globe; whereas beforehand, they had been “fairly drab” affairs, with a small cohort of 
academics, mainly from Northern Ireland (Tonge, 2015). Meanwhile, political science 
organizations such as the PSA and its journal, Political Studies, began covering the topic in a 
way which hadn’t been done before.89 “We thought the whole world was looking at Northern 
Ireland at the time” (Arthur, 2015).  
 Following the Agreement, there was an influx of money into British and Irish 
universities: aimed at looking at the peace process and lessons which could be learned from it. 
Many interviewees highlighted that this money was made available to academics and 
universities because of the EU’s Peace and Reconciliation Fund and Irish Department of 
Foreign Affairs Reconciliation Fund, both of which received massive budget increases 
                                                 
88 Joanne McEvoy is from Newcastle, Northern Ireland, an area she described as very mixed and middle class. 
McEvoy attended Queens University, Belfast for her BA and PhD. Her research was supervised by Rick Wilford 
and looked at the Northern Ireland power-sharing executive. McEvoy did her post-doctoral work on power sharing 
with Brendan O’Leary at the University of Pennsylvania in 2007/2008; after which, she co-edited Power-Sharing 
in Deeply Divided Places (2013) with O’Leary; and more recently, published Power-Sharing Executives: 
Governing in Bosnia, Macedonia, and Northern Ireland (2015). She is Senior Lecturer in Politics and 
International Relations in The School of Social Science at the University of Aberdeen.    
89 To put this into perspective, Political Studies produced only six articles on Northern Ireland from 1970 to 1994 
(For example: Bruce, 1987; Laver, 1976; Mac Iver, 1987; McAllister, 1983; B. O'Leary, 1989b; H. Patterson, 
1976); but it has published some 25 articles on the subject since 1998.  
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following the Agreement (Trade, 2015 ). Arthur recalled that following the Agreement, many 
academics were approached by these agencies - because organizations such as Department of 
Foreign Affairs in Ireland simply did not have enough staff to properly utilize the resources 
now available to them (Arthur, 2015). Coakley and Tonge noted that these agencies were 
greatly responsible for a proliferation of research institutes throughout the U.K. and Ireland 
following the Agreement, to study the “Northern Ireland laboratory” (Tonge, 2015). Examples 
included the Centre for the Study of Ethnic Conflict (Est.1998) at Queens University Belfast; 
the Institute for British Irish Studies (Est. 1999) at University College Dublin; and the 
Transitional Justice Institute (Est. 2003) at the University of Ulster.  
 The Agreement and infusion of funds and international attention which followed placed 
the study of Northern Ireland within the “peace industry”. One scholar, who asked to remain 
anonymous, commented that when he came onto the academic scene in 1999:  
The British and Irish governments, and the European Union, and Atlantic 
philanthropies lavished academia in Northern Ireland with money. And 
[because of the Agreement] created huge civil society, which could be 
interviewed and re-interviewed, and re-interviewed... [Because of this] you had 
multiple research projects… of which I’ve benefitted from, but virtually every 
other academic I know at Queen’s and UU [and others] benefited from. Which 
were all looking at Northern Ireland (Anonymous 2, 2015). 
 Buchannan, the only interviewee who works outside academia, reflected that funding 
from the EU through its PEACE I and PEACE II programs was what made her PhD research 
possible in 2002; that during this time, there was a huge appetite for “anything related to 
Northern Ireland”, and many of these projects were funded by and through such initiatives 
(Buchannan, 2015).90 Moreover, local community councils and other Northern Ireland civil 
society organizations were also now able to seek out academics, universities, and research 
institutes in order to conduct studies on a variety of issues, such as shared space, interface areas, 
and building good relations (For example see list in: Community Relations Council, 2015). 
Tonge, who admitted “ashamedly” to being a part of the peace industry which developed, said 
that he did not think this was necessarily a bad thing - because:  
                                                 
90 PEACE I funding for Northern Ireland was made available from 1994 to 1999, and through this stream alone, 
dispersed some €400 million on various projects; while PEACE II, which focused on developing the Northern 
Ireland Community Support Framework, lasted from 2000 to 2006 and distributed €425 million. Between 1994 
and 2006, the EU funded over €3 billion worth of programs and initiatives aimed at peace building, reconciliation, 
transitional justice, and community building in Northern Ireland (McCaffery, 2013).   
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Northern Ireland [became] this great sectarian laboratory that was testing 
around for which is the better approach [to conflict management] consociational 
management of division or integration that's trying to eradicate division. And 
that has helped academics [and academia]. I think the academic community in 
that sense flourished. You probably got more people working on Northern 
Ireland now in academia than was ever the case. You’ve more academics with 
funding to study in Northern Ireland than ever before, and it used to be called 
the most over-researched conflict in…well, it's now the most over-researched 
partial conflict or it's the most over-researched analysis of sectarianism that, that 
you would get (Tonge, 2015). 
In the words of Kerr:   
[Because of the Agreement] I think [Northern Ireland] became very much in 
vogue because here is a conflict that couldn’t possibly be fixed, it was beyond 
everybody’s understanding. It was just intractable and yet, with a new set of 
circumstances and a lot of will, a lot of growing up and a lot of advances in 
Anglo-Irish relations, here we had a peace process that we’re predicting it’s 
going to collapse and Trimble is going to fall, it’s never going to work.  
Yet it begins to walk on its own two feet. Okay, it’s still got stabilisers and 
stanchions on either side of it. Then people start to think, “Wow. If that can 
work in Northern Ireland, if you take that set of variables, what is there in the 
Northern Ireland case that might be replicated elsewhere, or if it can’t be. 





EXPLAINING WHAT HAPPEN WITH THEORY 
As knowledge communities do not develop de novo, but rather crawl (sometimes quickly, 
sometimes slowly) out of the primordial ooze of the inertia of existing knowledge, the ability 
to identify specific dates or the “when” of knowledge communities is problematic. This is 
compounded in Northern Ireland’s case, because this sub-discipline and scholars in political 
science are often at odds on where their work lies. Many interviewees refuted the idea of the 
“scientific” nature of political research in Northern Ireland over the last few decades; Bew, 
Patterson, and Arthur regard the debates as based more on ideology than epistemology. It is 
certainly telling that none of English, Arthur, Lord Bew, Patterson, Aughey, John Bew, 
McGrattan or Edwards identify themselves or their scholarship particularly within the field of 
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political science; but rather, assert that they were/are historians residing in politics departments. 
Similarly, female academics like Buchannan, Power and Hayward identified themselves and 
their work as existing more within sociology, anthropology, and theology rather than political 
science; Hayward, indeed, is in the Sociology Department at Queens University Belfast. 
 This issue is not limited to the study of Northern Ireland; it reflects the heterogeneous, 
interdisciplinary struggle of political science in the U.K. and Ireland. The discipline of political 
science is still in its relative infancy in Ireland and the U.K., and has often had a difficult time 
distinguishing itself from counterparts with deep roots in the British and Irish academy, such 
as history and philosophy. Some interviewees even questioned whether it truly exists as a 
discipline in the U.K. at all. Mitchell, O’Leary and Tonge – none of whom regard themselves 
as political scientists, but who have adopted political science methodologies for studying 
Northern Ireland – all noted that the U.K. has very few institutions with political science 
departments; they are often labelled simply “Politics”. Mitchell pointed to the proclivity of 
politics departments at Queens and elsewhere as having been weighted more towards historians 
and political theorists. This is especially true in Ireland: where Mitchell and Coakley note that 
the discipline has long been dominated by historians as well as philosophers. Ironically, even 
O’Leary pointed out that iconic institutions for political science like LSE did not, and still do 
not, have a clearly identifiable political science department.  
In this respect, the study of Northern Ireland lacked the capacity to be properly 
translated, as it sat on the nexus of history, sociology, philosophy and political science. The 
success of translation centers on the ability of scholars to reconcile meanings between 
disciplines and develop new findings (Star & Griesemer, 1989). The aim is to enlist “allies” 
from various locations and disciplines to create authority over a specific subject area, then to 
reinterpret this in a way that fits the individuals’ goals or aims. However, uncertainties around 
a particular discipline and its epistemological relevance have been shown to challenge the 
authority of knowledge in various scientific domains, making the recruitment of allies 
problematic (Shackley & Wynne, 1996).  
This level of uncertainty around Northern Ireland was apparent through the failure of 
previous peace processes in the 1970s and 1980s, confirming to many that it was a “sinkhole 
of sectarianism” (Patterson, 2015); but also because paradigms which might have been 
employed to explain the situation, such as nationalism and ethnic conflict, were not taken 
seriously (O’Leary, 2015; Mitchell, 2015). This is certainly confirmed in the literature on 
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nationalism, for example: which prior to the collapse of the USSR, was mainly seen as a rare 
phenomenon to be studied by a handful of scholars in sociology, anthropology, and history 
(See: Hutchinson & Smith, 2002; A. D. Smith, 1998).  
 Yet paradoxically, this uncertainty is helpful in identifying the “when” and “how” of 
the emergence of a knowledge community: one could say, the various stages emerging out of 
the ooze. In this respect, scholars pointed to the establishment of PSAI and its journal, IPS, as 
a significant development in the academy, as its purpose was to distinguish Irish political 
studies from history and other disciplines. The creation of the PSAI and IPS marked a level of 
modularity regarding the study of Irish politics generally and Northern Ireland specifically, as 
it created a forum – both through the sponsoring of conferences and publications in the journal 
– where the “clusters” of scholars working on the subject, from a range of disciplines, could 
come together, share and refute each other’s work. It indicates ontologically that the 
development and appetite for information needs were emerging enough that scholars sought to 
begin controlling the nature of commentary and debate. In this sense, they had the feature of 
repositories: in that they looked to create specific databases or “piles” of research (Star & 
Griesemer, 1989), which others could borrow from; and expressed the emergent need or desire 
to conduct research in these specific areas. It was also a way in which the community could 
begin to identify and locate other members.  
However, gaining allies who could participate and contribute to these organizations was 
problematic. As Arthur highlighted, initially, several of the already few academics working on 
Northern Ireland declined to join or contribute. In terms of empirical research, Aughey did not 
contribute to IPS until 1996; Lord Bew only contributed one article, in 1988; while Patterson 
has only provided two articles, one in 2008 and again in 2012 (See: Aughey, 1996; P. Bew, 
1988; H. Patterson, 2008, 2012). In addition, following the organization’s establishment, 
academics working on Northern Ireland still weren’t in the “mainstream” of British political 
science, and continued to be viewed as an “eccentricity” (English, 2015).    
Yet not long after the establishment of the IPS in 1987 came McGarry and O’Leary’s 
engagement with Consociational Theory. As we have noted, many interviewees argue that 
O’Leary and McGarry’s contribution brought a “forensic” (Tonge, 2015) political science 
approach to the study of Northern Ireland. O’Leary acknowledged that he and McGarry “not 
only applied consociational theory [to Northern Ireland], I think we partially developed it”; and 
because of this they “transformed the conversation on Northern Ireland” (O’Leary, 2015).  
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The individual contributions of these scholars to the theory and its application to 
Northern Ireland can be traced back to McGarry’s publication of The Anglo-Irish Agreement 
and the Prospects of Power Sharing in Northern Ireland (1988); and O’Leary’s The Limits of 
Coercive Consocationalism in Northern Ireland (1989), which brought the two academics’ 
attention to one another. They henceforth began their working relationship on developing their 
theory and its application. From that time, McGarry recalled that they began collaborating with 
Lord Bew, Arthur, Patterson and others on various projects: which led to the book The Future 
of Northern Ireland (1990), a collection of essays which debated the merits and plausibility of 
consociationalism in Northern Ireland, and challenged prevailing paradigms on the conflict. 
 The rise of McGarry and O’Leary’s application of consocationalism coincided with a 
variety of other factors which also challenged existing intellectual paradigms, as well as raised 
the profile of Northern Ireland. Tanname, English and others pointed to the changing economic 
conditions in the Republic of Ireland during the early 1990s, the Single European Act in 1987, 
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, all of which 
raised the profile of Northern Ireland: it was no longer viewed as a local conflict within the 
U.K., but a regional conflict taking place in the context of and alongside the outbreak of various 
other ethnic conflicts.  
Major international political change was also underway in terms of how nation states 
could deal with civil wars and ethnic conflicts; before the end of the Cold War, these states had 
largely been left to deal with these issues internally (P. C. Stern & Druckman, 2000). This 
meant that most conflicts being studied were now civil wars; thus there was a large increase in 
interest in and study of ethnic conflict. O’Leary and McGarry were at the center of efforts to 
normalize the study of Northern Ireland by using comparative methodologies which 
emphasized the ethnic/national character of the conflict and how it, and potential solutions to 
it, compared with other conflicts.   
Another vital development was, of course, the peace process. Although there is no 
general agreement among scholars on its exact start date, they credit its development with 
greatly assisting the study of Northern Ireland and development of its knowledge community. 
Some people regard the process as dating back to 11 January 1988 when John Hume, then 
leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), had a meeting with Gerry Adams, 
then President of Sinn Féin (SF). This was the first of a series of discussions which took place 
between the two men between 1988 and 1993, and eventually led to the Hume/Adams initiative 
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based on a document (the Hume / Adams Document) agreed by the two leaders. Elements of 
this document were to find their way into the Downing Street Declaration, made jointly by the 
British and Irish governments in 1993 (CAIN, 2006).  
Others cite the announcement of the IRA ceasefire on 31 August 1994 as the end of one 
part of the process and the beginning of another. Nonetheless, interviewees concur that a 
combination of the peace process; buoyancy of the Irish economy; and extra-national 
developments, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union and greater influence of the EU made 
the study of Ireland and Northern Ireland “doubly cool” (English, 2015), while also raising 
“interesting questions” as to how the issue of ethnic conflict could be addressed.  
Interviewees pointed almost unanimously to pieces by McGarry and O’Leary, such as 
Northern Ireland: Sharing Authority (1993) and Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images 
(1995) as setting the stage for the discussions and debates around the conflict, and solutions to 
it. This resulted in an increase in the study, significance, and intellectual relevance of Northern 
Ireland to the British and Irish political science academy. There was a proliferation in research, 
attendance and presentations looking to “explain” Northern Ireland at conferences and in the 
media: with O’Leary, Arthur, and others regularly appearing on and publishing in various 
outlets.     
  Conceptually, several traits, or boundaries, need to be detailed here. The first is the 
context in which these events took place: the peace process of the 1990s. In this respect, the 
“vagueness” and uncertainty of the process, debates on what “peace” might look like and how 
it might be achieved, allowed a level of adaptability around the study of Northern Ireland which 
had not existed beforehand. As we have seen, prior to the peace process, Northern Ireland was 
largely regarded as a conflict without any possible solution. Many subscribed to sectarian 
interpretations of historical events. Such was the general climate during this time, engagement 
was potentially dangerous to scholars, both professionally – painting them as dissident 
sympathizers, and leaving them unable to have their work published or promoted, because the 
subject wasn’t viewed as mainstream or relevant in British/Irish academia – and physically: 
several academics in the field were murdered. Thus the notion and idea of a “process” 
symbolically communicated developments and events which adopted (potential) theoretical 
and concrete explanations which scholars, irrespective of methodological training or 
disciplinary affiliation, could communicate and debate.  
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In this respect, the peace process acted as a diagram which did not describe the details 
of any one thing but – with the application of consocational theory and comparative 
methodology – allowed for the deletion of local contingencies from the common object, 
Northern Ireland. It accompanied the rise of a distinct community which, while it hosted very 
different visions as to what the solutions might look like, was offering clear alternatives to 
existing assumptions.  
 Thanks to both the peace process and McGarry and O’Leary’s application of 
consociational theory, an objective “framework” or “foundation” was established which 
academics could review, debate, and refute. That said, many debates became heated and at 
times seemed more personal than empirical, with anti-consocaitionalism a “staple of the 
political diet of Northern Ireland” (O’Leary, 2015); McGarry and O’Leary took on a series of 
challenges inside and outside the academic community. O Dochartaigh (2015) noted that much 
of this was because McGarry and O’Leary had moved the center of the debate from a strictly 
unionist interpretation to inclusion and acknowledgement of nationalist discourse and 
concerns.  
However, this does not suggest that the debates on Northern Ireland were simply drawn 
along sectarian lines. Certainly, when reviewing the interviewees’ narratives, it was apparent 
that where they stood and the issues they researched were informed by their personal 
sociologies: with several acknowledging the little “u” and “r” of their alignment with unionist 
and republican perspectives. However, O’Leary, Bew, Patterson, Kerr, Tonge, McIntyre and 
others displayed the ability to engage with those who adopted alternative interpretations and 
political alignments in both collaborative research and supervision.  
Not all were convinced of the ability or necessity of academics to divorce themselves, 
either partially or entirely, from their personal history and bias; but that this did not handicap 
the debates. O’Leary and others highlighted the importance of making normative arguments 
and taking such positions in political science, because “explanations and prescriptions are 
linked”, as one can “explain how something works but not approve of it” (O’Leary, 2015). 
Others considered that, however heated and occasionally vitriolic, the debates never got out of 
hand and were, in many ways, “healthy”; such arguments were par for the course for any 
academic discipline, let alone Irish politics.  
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  In this way, consociational theory and the application of comparative methods allowed 
for common communication to begin taking place across dispersed academic groups with 
varying and often conflicting interpretations of what prescriptions and explanations should be 
utilized. The standardization of the comparative method used to explain and apply 
consocationalism to Northern Ireland and other conflicts had Latour (1981)’s trait of 
“immutable mobility”: meaning that its ideas and information could be transported and 
translated between and across various disciplines. In this sense, the debates not only had the 
boundary object quality which scholars could gather around, but also a boundary crossing 
quality which, in the context of the peace process, opened various new avenues for 
interpretation and investigation on Northern Ireland, across disciplines. Debates around 
consociationalism were housed within political science, but included and utilized scholarship, 
researchers, and methods from history, philosophy and sociology. This reflects not just the 
heterogeneity of the discipline around the study of ethno/national conflict, but the utility of the 
theory and method to translate these concerns and findings across a variety of disciplines and 
actors.  
 Star (2010) has noted that the utility and robustness of a boundary object is often tested 
by the way in which it is managed in the negotiation of translations across various social worlds 
or disciplines. As academics are somewhat tribal - they often stake out territories which they 
claim as their own, and establish themselves as experts within these domains - the outbreak of 
conflict and disagreement within and across disciplines is inevitable: as often, these tribal 
leaders fear dethronement. Thus the functionality of a boundary object is to reduce local, or 
tribal, uncertainty enough to avoid a state of all-out war, and manage these various tribal 
boundaries when there is territorial overlap in a way that maintain allies as well as expands the 
existing base of knowledge (Star & Griesemer, 1989).  
Both the peace process and McGarry and O’Leary’s application of consocational theory 
served this purpose, as it allowed these scholars to establish themselves as experts on the 
application of the theory and use of comparative methods; but also allowed them to include 
and navigate, sometime tenuously, the tendency towards tribal conflicts which many had 
always defined the study of Northern Ireland by, as well as garner “allies” from other 
disciplines and even those from differing tribal camps who proposed different paradigms and 
solutions. This is perhaps best reflected by Taylor and McGarry, who noted that precisely 
because of the disagreements around consociationalism, they were able to collaborate with 
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various counterparts from differing disciplines, and utilize different methods in order to expand 
the knowledge base. As an example, they cited Consociational Theory: McGarry and O'Leary 
and the Northern Ireland Conflict (2009), where these debates were explained and expanded 
upon by various pro- and anti-consocationalists. Thus, the framework acted within what 
Hughes (1971) referred to as an “inter-tribal center”, which could manage and house various 
territorial collisions, as well as allow them a sovereignty.    
 Also, despite the contention between and around consocationalist explanations of 
Northern Ireland, the accounts point to the emergence of various work/play relationships 
around this scholarship. Many interviewed noted that although individuals would disagree 
intellectually with one another on what the solutions might look like, these disagreements were 
not personal: everyone wanted to see the situation improve. So much so that after conferences 
put on by organizations such as PSAI, and research centers such as INCORE and the Institute 
of Irish Studies, many debates continued into “the pub”, where those involved gained greater 
understanding of each other’s backgrounds and intellectual positions (Dixon, 2015).  
This is significant in terms of the development of a knowledge infrastructure and 
structures. Star & Greisemer (1989)’s boundary object emerged out of the historical and 
institutional developments of natural history research museums: which marked a new stage in 
the professionalization of natural history work, as well as the changing relationship between 
biologists, zoologists, and scientific researchers. They noted that these institutions developed 
largely out of displays of wealth and popular cultural developments, which provoked interest 
in viewing such displays and created increased demand for these museums. As these 
institutions were established by wealthy collectors who contributed substantially to their 
funding and operation, an increase in demand for scientific cooperation emerged out of 
individuals “doing things together” (Star & Griesemer, 1989).  
 This is very much like the “buzz” around Northern Ireland: whose status rose from 
“local”, “provincial” conflict to a regional one thanks to the collapse of the USSR and EU 
involvement. It went on to enjoy international attention and financial backing through various 
initiatives from the EU, U.K. and Ireland; as well as various Atlantic philanthropists, given the 
subsequent involvement of the U.S. in the peace process. This process followed the same 
popular cultural trend described by Star & Griesemer (1989): it mainstreamed the study of 
ethno/national conflict and civil war in British and Irish academia, and placed Northern Ireland 
within the context of greater post-Cold War peace building and democratization strategies: 
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transforming it into a “cool” and “sexy” subject. Not only did this generate huge demand for 
new research around this area, with large sums of money made available to community 
councils and research institutes through new funding opportunities, but it also greatly increased 
student appetite and coverage of events such as the ongoing peace process in various media 
outlets.  
There was also a rise in the status of academics who studied Northern Ireland: with 
O’Leary making the list of “celebrity dons” in The Guardian, and Lord Bew becoming an 
advisor to David Trimble during the peace process and following the Agreement. This “buzz”, 
as well as the “new and interesting questions” and inferences to be derived from comparing 
this ethnic conflict and its potential for peace to that of other conflicts led in many ways to the 
professionalization of the study of ethnic conflict, which placed Northern Ireland and the 
academics working on it at the very center of these questions. Such professionalization creates 
the need for both method-standardization as well as boundary objects as a way of 
accommodating and housing multiple identities and disciplines in a many-room political 
mansion.  
Of course, the signing of the Agreement in 1998 exponentially increased the “buzz” 
around Northern Ireland, as there was a shift towards deriving and understanding “lessons 
learned” from the peace process; and how both the process and its end result could be applied 
successfully to other arenas of conflict. Following the Agreement, there was a proliferation of 
research institutes in the U.K. and Ireland, which sought to investigate new avenues for 
research in what Tonge (2015) referred to as the “great sectarian laboratory”.  
Additionally, Kerr, Buchannan, McEvoy and O’Kane all noted that because of the 
Agreement, the funding and research opportunities which followed from it, their PhD research 
and professional prospects were made possible and greatly enhanced respectively. Moreover, 
the Agreement furthered the discipline of political science as it relates to Northern Ireland, 
through the exploration of devolution, policing, shared space, reconciliation, as well as the 
ongoing intellectual and normative consociation versus integration paradigms.  
In this chapter, we have discussed the slow and often painful developments which made 
up the emergence of the Northern Ireland epistemic community. These events and variables 
included the thawing and then ending of the Cold War, developments within Irish academia 
(IPS), and the re-introduction and application of consocationalism to the Northern Ireland 
problem. These all challenged existing paradigms as well as introduced new thought, energy, 
and interest in the study of Northern Ireland. This was all complimented by the further neo-
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liberalization of academia and the infusion of international funding for the study of ethnic 
conflict all of which transformed the study of Northern Ireland. This all culminated in GFA in 
1998, making the region and the (theoretical) model for peace an international success. The 
significance of these developments, and how both these and the academic community further 

















As laid out in the previous chapter the intellectual and political environment in Northern Ireland 
began to change greatly with ending of the Cold War, the application and debates around 
consocationalism re-introduced by O’Leary and McGarry, and the commencement of the peace 
process and signing of the Agreement in 1998. As one academic noted this all exponentially 
increased the academic “buzz” and research around Northern Ireland. Recall that initially this 
“buzz” centered on “new and interesting questions” (O’Leary, 2015) and inferences which 
could be derived from comparing the Northern Ireland conflict and its potential for peace to 
that of other ethnic conflicts. The theoretical framework developed by McGarry and O’Leary 
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and the rise of comparative methods within political science greatly assisted in establishing an 
intellectual platform: through which academics began reviewing, refuting, and debating the 
emerging literature on Northern Ireland in a wholly new way. By the time the Agreement was 
signed, an academic community had developed begun to expand. Interviewees acknowledge 
the proliferation of literature and research institutes, which sought to apply and compare 
Northern Ireland to other ongoing and resolved ethnic conflicts.  
Tonge (2015), of course, noted that thanks to the Agreement, Northern Ireland became 
this “great sectarian laboratory”, with new funding and research opportunities available for 
issues such as devolution, policing, shared space, and reconciliation. In the wake of the 
Agreement, that there was a major spike in interest because:   
It opened up a lot of new possibilities. I mean, there were so many angles to 
how you study Northern Ireland, created by that deal. Firstly, there’s the 
comparative devolved context, devolution in the U.K., because you then have 
Northern Ireland with localized power sharing.  
With local political institutions, where you’ve not had for 25 years. So you can 
do important comparisons, which is something of an underdog in Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland. Plus the English question of course.  
Okay, so you’ve got the devolution comparative aspect, then you’ve got the 
peace process comparative aspect, then you’ve got the intellectual questions 
about consociation versus integration, so you’ve got a whole range of, and then 
you’ve got issues such as the management of political violence, you’ve got 
political parties in a post-conflict polity.  
You’ve got so many different angles to tackle Northern Ireland, once you get to 
the Good Friday Agreement, you’ve got for the historians as well, the 
comparison, Good Friday Agreement versus Sunningdale in fact (Tonge, 2015).   
 
Thus this chapter looks at how this community and the object(s) which bound it together 
evolved in the post-Agreement environment, and the implications of this for both the discipline 
and individuals. 
POST-GOOD FRIDAY AND THE EVOLUTION OF A DISCIPLINE 
The importance of the Agreement and its impact on the Northern Ireland academic community 
was acknowledged by most scholars interviewed: all of whom noted that the Agreement laid 
the foundation for future analysis on Northern Ireland. Yet irrespective of the euphoria 
inaugurated by the Agreement, there was skepticism amongst academics around a political 
environment and peace settlement which many described as uncertain. O’Kane recalled that:  
To an extent there was euphoria and I shared that, but maybe it’s traditional of 
cynical academics and also maybe it goes back to the point I was making a 
moment ago about my [and others] inability to predict things [in the region]. I 
remember thinking at the time and saying to several people in conversation, in 
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fact at academic conferences and elsewhere that I thought to an extent that [the 
Agreement] was the “easy part”. I use easy there in huge inverted commas, I’m 
not saying it was easy, but it was almost easier I thought to get the Good Friday 
Agreement than to actually get stable, devolved government to Northern Ireland 
(O’Kane, 2015). 
 
Dixon, Patterson, English, Coakley and O’Duffy, amongst others, all noted this uncertainty of 
the initial years of the post-Agreement era, and the difficulties which the phases of 
implementation faced. For example, Kerr, who worked for David Trimble, recalled that the 
political environment was still extremely cynical with regards to “selling” various aspects of 
the Agreement:  
I mean I would have been an Ulster Unionist, a yes voter [for devolved 
government] and was keen to sign up and promote the yes agenda. Little did I 
know, I thought I’d be joining up with the hordes of David Trimble supporters 
that were out there fighting for power sharing and for the Agreement but there 
was very, very few of them.  
I started working for him and his staff in Westminster, writing speeches and 
showing people round the House of Commons. Then a couple of years later I 
was over fighting the 2001 general election with him as his gopher and 
attendant. Then four years later again, I’d been there working with him for two 
years’ full time with a break from academia and then he lost the 2005 election.  
I got involved in practicing what I was preaching but of course whenever I 
began, and right through that period, the (Ulster Unionist Party) UUP was split. 
I was working in an office full of people and MPs, 10 MPs, 50% of them were 
against the Agreement and would like to burn David Trimble at the stake.  
The other 50%, well 20% of them were ardent supporters like me and 
unequivocally in favor of the theory and practice of power sharing and engaging 
with not just the SDLP but going the whole hog with Sinn Féin. The other 30%, 
well they could have gone either way. Some hedged their bets.  
[In 1999] I joined a group of people that were very sceptical and I don’t really 
think my view changed a great deal during that time. [Some think] it ended in a 
failure. It ended in a success because the peace was consolidated, but it ended 
in electoral failure so that all those around me were, “There he is, he’s the Sinn 
Féin wing of the UUP.”  
You imagine knocking on somebody’s door and saying, “We should go into 
government with Sinn Féin,” [this was] a couple of months after they’ve done 
the biggest bank robbery in Northern Ireland history and murdered somebody 
outside a bar in Belfast, slit his throat and stabbed him in the chest and then 
cleaned the place up. Yes, I mean that doesn’t work in Unionist areas. It doesn’t 
work in some other areas as well (Kerr, 2015).   
 
O’Kane reflected that he and others were “sceptical even as late as 2005, 2006 [when] 
you get the St Andrews deal, even that the St Andrews deal would then pan out to devolved 
government [was fairly circumspect]” (O’Kane, 2015). Well into the 2000s, there was “still the 
looming threat of a reversion back to sectarian violence” (Tonge, 2015).  
 149 
There was nothing especially unique about the skepticism regarding the longevity or 
impact of the Agreement: it reflected a level of “traditional or academic naysaying” (O’Kane, 
2015). All interviewees acknowledged that the Good Friday Agreement was a wonderful 
achievement and supported it in principle; but saw it as the beginning, not the end of something. 
This uncertainty and skepticism still obtains today: “All you have to do is turn on the TV or 
read the news in Belfast to realise the fragility of the whole thing” (Anonymous 1, 2015). 
Indeed, various U.K. and international interventions into Northern Irish affairs have sought to 
resolve executive impasses and political uncertainty: resulting in the Stormont House 
Agreement in December 2014, the Hillsborough Agreement in 2010, and the St Andrews 
Agreement in 2006 (See: Birrell & Gormley-Heenan, 2015).  Interestingly, Lord Bew remarked 
on multiple occasions that when he was advising Trimble and others on the framework of the 
Agreement, they “never intended [it] to bring about peace” (Bew, 2015); but instead hoped it 
would help bring political parties together and put a halt to political violence and killings.  
Lord Bew, O’Leary, McGarry, and even Dixon commented that regardless of the 
difficulties which the post-Agreement peace process has faced, they were all confident “in the 
overall trajectory of the process” (O’Leary, 2015). Lord Bew spoke in depth about his 
involvement with Trimble and the British Government during this period: noting that even 
though there were various periods of uncertainty and confusion regarding how each strand of 
the Agreement would be implemented, most were certain the process would continue 
nonetheless. He recalled:  
 [It was] a gamble [I made] that turned out to be right. And that was the biggest 
gamble for me, you see, because I did understand the British government. I did 
understand the local Unionists. At least I understood what UUP was, and I did 
understand Dublin and what Dublin wanted out of this. 
The biggest gamble I made probably believe was reading the Provos. And in 
that case, people like Sean O’Callaghan and Anthony McIntyre in particular 
were very good guides. Maloney, and they would say – whatever he says, 
Maloney has his critics but Maloney knew an awful lot about them, more than 
any one human being. 
I got it when it was going to be a deal and what the shape of it was. The one 
thing that I got wrong was I thought that – I mean for example, I got the 
North/South thing quick and the broad constitutional structure. If you look at – 
I would say now if you look at the articles I wrote from time the Framework 
Document went through, I got it. And I was the only person writing at that time 
saying this is a sham, but the one thing that I got wrong was the actual – and I 
was stupid – slightly stupid there because people like Maurice Hayes who did 
understand this strand one damage and better than me.  He did convey it to me 
in the weeks before the end. 
I thought that it might be possible still to have a strand one closer to the actual 
Framework Document, which would have avoided the [chaos] where you had 
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decentralized local structure but decentralized power structure and committee 
chairmanships which would have avoided a lot of the problems that would have 
been there about calling people Minister of Education [for example]. That's 
what it really meant – it would've been, but avoided all the problems then by 
being in government and having guns or whatever. 
My personal view is strand one of the Framework Document is actually better 
than what's negotiated in the point of view of the English leadership.  What they 
actually negotiated by returning to a cabinet government raised all these 
difficult issues in terms of well, once these guys have decommissioned, then 
they were in government without guns and legal – and Paisley, you see, was 
right about this. Paisley said in 1994 if I didn't know right – he said that they 
would be able to [in] the reading of the Downing Street Declaration was they'd 
be able to enter talks without giving up their guns, which turned out to be 
completely true. 
The Downing Street Declaration called for a permanent renunciation of 
violence, says the Irish prime minister and the Irish Parliament on the day by 
the handing over of weapons. This does – this is a process that was not 
completed for another, was it 11 years, by everybody's account now. 
And it's what killed Trimble; it was… that it was dragged out for so long.  But 
I got that at the [time] you know, that was sort of the process of them hanging 
on to guns for so long and combined with the fact that they had these titles of 
minister of this and minister of that was too much for mainstream Unionism to 
bear. Had you had a system of chairmanships, I think it might have been easier 
to do, and certainly that's what strand one of the Framework Document talks 
about. 
So, that was [what]… I kind of assumed that's what they might go for with the 
negotiation but they didn't. But it's all… it doesn't matter now because we're 
exactly in the position we would be anyway, whatever it was about.  But strand 
two I got and strand two – and East-West I got [and we knew it was going to 
happen] (Bew, 2015). 
 
  McGarry and O’Leary highlighted that intellectually, the signing of the Agreement and 
uncertainty of the ongoing peace process opened up various battlegrounds. An overwhelming 
majority of interviewees noted that the major battles continued to occur between pro and anti-
consocationalists long after the Agreement had been signed. McGarry, for example, regarded 
the Agreement and its implementation, though rocky at times, was “a vindication of 
consociation theory”; “there were academics that promised that consociationalism would end 
in disaster” (McGarry, 2015). As it had not, they began applying the theory to a host of other 
conflict areas. Dixon, who argues that the Agreement is not consociational, asserts that 
although the peace process has been largely successful, the application of consociational theory 
to Northern Ireland and other conflicts has been “disastrous” for the discipline of political 
science, because:  
 What [has] happened is that you’ve got [people like] Lijphart, powerful, 
prominent name, then you’ve got McGarry and O’Leary and then you’ve got 
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their acolytes. So what happens is that you’ve got plenty of PhD students who 
are doing PhDs on consociationalism and who are developing multiple 
definitions of what consociationalism is but if you’re a PhD student working for 
someone who’s a consociationalist, are you really going to turn around and say, 
“Actually, this doesn't make much sense to me”? I just find it stultifying because 
surely that’s not how science progresses, by this endless reproduction of a 
paradigm that was really written in the ‘60s and ‘70s and continues to just morph 
into different forms, different labels for all the various variations of it (Dixon, 
2015). 
 
Yet interviewees, pro- and anti-consocationalist, overwhelmingly disagreed with 
Dixon’s view; and instead credited the theory and O’Leary and McGarry’s work as a major 
contribution to the discipline and community. That said, many also took note of the “endless 
reproduction of research” following the Agreement which has either sought to (re)explain the 
various consociational elements of it and the peace process, and/or rehash the seemingly 
endless debates between pro- and anti-consociationalists and about the historical roots of the 
conflict. 
Yet academics who entered the field following the Agreement, such as McEvoy, Kerr, 
Hayward, Mumford, and Walsh, all highlighted that these debates as well as the new, ongoing 
literature focusing on Northern Ireland and its consociational elements has more to do with it 
being a process constantly in flux. The consensus and utility of this process is that it can be 
studied using comparative methods and from a variety of disciplines and perspectives; it is 
more than a mere replication of literature, but an expansion of the boundaries of the discipline. 
Regarding his research, which focuses on British military history, Mumford noted that:  
I am someone who takes a close interest in Northern Ireland so I can build the 
bigger picture of British responses to violence and what have this and other 
thematic elements that have emerged like negotiations and like torture. That has 
very much been my way into a lot of this [recent] Northern Irish research – 
focusing on themes rather than the conflict specifically.  
From a generalist perspective I think its transition from a focus of conflict 
studies to a focus of peace studies is largely reflected in what I see going around 
the conferences [and literature] that is focusing on Northern Ireland now. I 
would see a shift in the way Northern Ireland is being used as a comparative 
tool. It is very much now what can we learn from Good Friday? What can we 
learn from the devolution process that was put in place? What can we learn from 
utilising [various] party actors in peace making processes? Rather than looking 
at specific military operations or looking at IRA bombing tactics and that sort 
of thing.  
I think that is to be welcomed because there are huge controversies to whether 
the British military operations in Northern Ireland could ever be deemed 
successful, for example. I think perhaps Good Friday had more success in terms 
of its objectives being reached than the British military’s. If I look at the big 
journals for example the leading political studies journals in the area. Northern 
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Ireland reaches a prominence in these journals predominantly when peace 
making had been discussed. The peace process is being discussed and 
consociationalism is being discussed and the sociological element is being 
discussed [and they will continue to be discussed (Mumford, 2015). 
 
Kerr and McEvoy considered that much of what has been written in the last 15 years 
and, indeed, what is currently being produced (including their own work) is not focused solely 
on Northern Ireland, but looks to place and compare the (success of) the peace process within 
a wider context and framework of other ethnonational conflict scenarios and peace processes 
(For example see: M. Kerr, 2006, 2013; J. McEvoy, 2015). In similar vein, Walsh pointed out 
that:  
…What I'm trying to do [with my own work] is expand two cases which I think 
have similarities and I can bring my [Northern Ireland] expertise to them. The 
obvious one is Bosnia. But you’ve also got Cyprus, you've got Macedonia and 
Moldova. My postdoc is looking at projects that have a power sharing element 
and a territorial self-government element. I think they are the key parts of the 
institution in Northern Ireland (Walsh, 2015). 
 
O’Leary, McGarry, Tonge, English, and Taylor, the latter a critic of consocationalism, 
contested that much of what is being written is about the “intricate complexities of the 
relationships between cultures and institutions” (O’Leary, 2015). These debates are equivalent 
to “chicken or egg” arguments in terms of what comes first and “will likely be debated forever” 
(Taylor, 2015).  
Shirlow and Hughes consider that the controversy around consociationalism and the 
debates which developed post-Agreement were simply reflections of the ideological divides 
which had always defined the discipline. Shirlow highlighted that controversy and ideology 
are actually what brings academics together, arguing that scholars “always love being together, 
because they actually love the argument [maybe] more than the academic experience. 
Academics like an argument” (Shirlow, 2015). Mitchell agreed that there is nothing special 
about academics holding onto or failing to change their intellectual or ideological positions, 
and that:  
I don't know if there has been an evolution [in my views about Northern Ireland] 
in the sense that many may mean it. I suspect this is quite true of quite a lot of 
academics as well. There are some academics that radically change the subject 
matter that they're studying every five years. Genuine polymaths who pick on 
one thing and do the best they can with it for five years and then think, ‘Fine, 
I'm done with that. I'll now go on and do something completely different.’ Even 
within political science I mean, not necessarily across disciplines because that 
would be tougher in professional terms. 
 153 
I suspect that a lot of us, in different ways, work away at the same problem for 
many decades. I probably haven't reflected enough on this as to why that would 
be the case but I know of lots of people who started out with an initial problem 
and have never satisfactorily answered it. They keep coming at it [and debating 
it] in different ways (Mitchell, 2015). 
  
Indeed, at conferences held by organizations such as PSAI, “the usual suspects” could 
frequently be found, often (re)-engaging in debates on consocationalism; but these arguments 
often seemed seeped in personal and ideological positions which many described as “vitriolic” 
at times. Yet the interviewees overwhelmingly concurred that generally, scholars got along 
with one another and could cooperate on a professional level. One academic credited this 
largely to the Agreement, noting that it “[provided] a foundation that they could kind of 
reconcile themselves to and then build off of intellectually” (Anonymous 1, 2015). Others 
argued that as the peace process began to stabilize and conditions on the ground improved, “the 
debates have become politer as the conflict itself has become politer” (Taylor, 2015).    
Moreover, the debates between pro- and anti-consociationalists are only one part of the 
scholarship which has developed. Tonge and Hayward noted that these debates were largely 
focused between a handful of scholars (Tonge, 2015; Hayward, 2015), but the discipline and 
community has expanded beyond that. Mitchell, Power, and others who asked to remain 
anonymous mentioned that many new opportunities in the “great sectarian laboratory” (Tonge, 
2015) had emerged. Following the Agreement, “opportunities for research opened up for 
academics in ways that never existed before” pointing to the different sub-sections of political 
science such as “terrorism, policing, reconciliation, issues of identity, education, etc etc…” 
(Power, 2015)  
Power recalled that when she arrived at University of Liverpool’s Institute for Irish 
Studies in 2003, there was a major interest and demand in “the research I was doing [which 
was] all about religion and peace, religion and conflict and how you can bridge the gap between 
the two. And [from this] I became very interested in evangelicals at that point because they 
have mass influence in Northern Ireland politics” (Power, 2015). Power has gone on to publish 
multiple books and articles (See: Power, 2005; Power, 2007).  
Similarly, Cathal McCall91 noted when he arrived at Queens University Belfast in 2003, 
he was brought into its Institute of European studies, later incorporated into the politics 
                                                 
91 Cathal McCall is a Northern Ireland academic from the border town of Dungannon, and Reader in Politics and 
International Studies at Queens University Belfast. He studied at the University of Manchester (BA) and 
Edinburgh (MA), and wrote his PhD at Strathclyde: where he was examined by Paul Arthur. McCall was Senior 
Fellow at the ISCTSJ at Queen’s (2012-14); his research interest has largely looked at the relationship between 
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department, because of his research on borders, European integration, and identity politics in 
Northern Ireland (McCall, 1999, 2014; McCall & Wilson, 2010); while an anonymous scholar 
related that their position at INCORE was a “peace process job”, as it “was funded ultimately 
by, and through the European Union, and the Northern Ireland office, and it was as part of a 
research project to look at comparative approaches to peace processes” (Anonymous 2, 2015).  
 In explaining the development of such opportunities and the expansion of the 
community of academics and their research on Northern Ireland, interviewees pointed to 
several variables. Some noted sardonically that it could be attributed to:    
 A huge range of factors. Among them, it comes from a feeling that everyone 
from a conflict-affected society has the idea that their conflict is the most 
interesting one in the world. They also feel that their grievances are bigger than 
others, hence the phrase that my friend Feargal Cochran uses, which is ‘People 
in Northern Ireland think that they are MOPEs – The Most Oppressed People 
Ever’.   
But it also comes down to the physicality of Northern Ireland. It’s a very small 
place, with just two universities. People are reticent to leave it.  
The concentration around South Belfast, for example, of academics, and coffee 
shops, is remarkable, so it’s insularity within Northern Ireland, not just on the 
Northern Ireland basis but generally. But also, a political economy grew up, that 
reinforced that interest in Northern Ireland.  
The British and Irish governments, and the European Union, and Atlantic 
philanthropies lavished academia in Northern Ireland with money. And [the 
Agreement] created a huge civil society, which could be interviewed and re-
interviewed, and re-interviewed to death. [It was also one] that could come to 
the same workshops and same seminars.  
[Take for example], that you have multiple research projects over the past 20 
years, of which I’ve benefitted from, but virtually every other academic I know 
at Queen’s and UU benefited from, which were all looking at Northern Ireland. 
All of those research projects needed money [which] was all funded by the 
[British or Irish] governments, the European Union, or these other 
philanthropies. They all relied on research and somehow the fiction that this 
research would aid community relations for the peace process, or some political 
good, in a normative way.   
And it really did create this political economy, in which you had the same 
people, the usual suspects, seeing each other twice or three times a week, at 
different workshops, seminars, and conferences in Belfast (Anonymous 2, 
2015).  
 
English reflected that: 
Things evolved in three main ways over my professional career. One is the 
number of people studying Northern Ireland has grown hugely [since the 
Agreement]. So if you look at something like the Conference of Irish Historians 
in Britain, which was set up in the 1970’s and which I first went to in the late 
                                                 
border reconfiguration and conflict transformation within and beyond the EU, focusing largely on Northern 
Ireland. 
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80’s, was quite a small-scale operation. Now it’s much bigger because there are 
far more people studying Irish things in Britain, and similarly in the Republic. 
There are also variables such as since the Agreement things have become less 
bloodstained; there’s been a growth. 
The second thing that’s happened in terms of change has been that because 
rather than being seen as something which is depressing, which you’d rather not 
happen, the Northern Ireland conflict seemed to be something where you can 
almost export lessons, which is why turning towards peace has been an 
internationalization of it. So that’s been something where people are happier to 
say I studied the Northern Ireland conflict, because they can say how do we 
look at conflict resolution? Which is a nicer thing to say than how do we explain 
why three people have been murdered yesterday. It, also, became more 
international, when people say how do conflicts end? They say Northern Ireland 
seems to have ended, let’s look at that. And because it was in the English 
language, it also made it easier to study than some other conflicts for many 
people.  
And the third thing was that 9/11 made a big difference, and the American 
academic life became much more interested in terrorism than it had been 
beforehand. So you found that there were people who were studying this in the 
U.S. And that had a big knock on effect in the academic community over here. 
Why? Because journals were more interested and staff publishers’ thought they 
could sell more things through invitations to go and lecture [on things such as 
terrorism and conflict resolution]. So it used to be the case before 9/11, my 
invitations to America tended to be to go and talk to audiences interested in 
Ireland about Irish things. After 9/11 that still happened, but it was also the case 
people would say, can you come and give a lecture on how terrorism ends? Can 
you come and give a lecture on the dynamics of counter-terrorism?  
The Irish thing might be an example of it, but they weren’t really interested in 
Ireland. They were interested in how terrorism ends because of the thing that 
had happened in September 11, 2001 and in Belfast in 1998. So all of those 
things made a big difference.  
So my experience was that it was those things coming together that made this a 
more auspicious place to study things. And therefore the number of conferences, 
which were interested in people studying these things, has grown which has also 
increased the amount of enthusiasm there was for supervisors saying this is a 
good thing to study.  
Another experience quite often I find is that there are people from the U.S., 
[students and academics] who aren’t interested in Ireland at all that are 
interested in why certain rebel groups become powerful and certain ones don’t. 
Or being told to read your book about the IRA the same way they’d be told to 
read someone else’s book about Hamas. This is a case study of some terrorist 
phenomenon, whereas it [before] would have been much more of a cult - 
terrorism studies in America was a bit of a pagan religion until 9/11, and then it 
became a mainstream religion. This did make a big difference in the study of 
Northern Ireland and it made a big difference to funding. Suddenly there was 
much more funding in the study of this thing in the wake of 9/11. So all those 
things made a difference, and I think because I’ve, in the long period I’ve been 
studying these things, it’s become more recognizable to people who don’t have 
a particular interest in Ireland, that there’s something happening in Northern 
 156 
Ireland that was kind of world historical, whereas I think it was previously seen 
more as an eccentricity (English, 2015).  
 
Mitchell, O’Leary, Arthur, Aughey and others all agreed that the success of the 
Agreement prompted intellectual engagement with the subject and affiliation with it: “Victory 
has a thousand fathers” (Aughey, 2015). Beyond this, the Agreement changed the conversation 
around Northern Ireland, because it placed it within a wider international field; while within 
British academia:   
What the Agreement did was awakened the British Academy, I suppose, or the 
British academic kind of core, to the idea that Northern Ireland was part of the 
U.K. and that if you have a journal, say, British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations, you couldn't understand British politics and say 
Northern Ireland was a place apart anymore. This was particularly so after 1998 
with devolution because everywhere was different, we were seeing Scotland 
and Wales and London devolved as well and that had been the case pre-1998 
where we [in Northern Ireland] were always just [seen as] the ones that were 
different. So the constitutional reform that took place in '98 changed the way 
that people wrote about Northern Ireland because the landscape became 
different and it was how we stood in relation to everything else, not how we 
stood apart anymore. 
So, you know, the phases of the Good Friday Agreement really opened people's 
eyes to that. [People began to ask], hold on.  There's the east/west access here.  
What does the British/Irish Council actually mean?  What does a joint 
ministerial council actually look like?  What…. so we started to look a little bit 
more at the structures that had been put in place in the Agreement as opposed 
to the bigger question of what is the constitutional options for Northern Ireland.  
Once that had been settled with the Agreement then the focus went on to all of 
these other things and that became more mainstream in UK politics because it 
had relevance for U.K. politics, the broader readership of the journals and so 
could say, but, yeah, it's Northern Ireland that's different.  No, it's not.  It's the 
same as in devolution applies here, here, here and here, and how is London 
going to handle that when it comes to welfare reform or whatever else 
(Anonymous 1, 2015). 
 
The expansion of the scholarship on Northern Ireland following the Agreement is 
therefore not only due to its success, but to several other factors too. These include the 
internationalization of conflict studies, comparisons and inquiries on what events in Northern 
Ireland could inform scholars and policymakers about other conflict areas, as well as Northern 
Ireland being brought into the fold of mainland British politics.   
 However, this also took place within the context of a changing university environment, 
where the influences of and need for money as well as new demand for academics to publish 
placed new pressure and had a significant impact on researchers. Participants have had varying 
experiences. For example, Tonge referred to Northern Ireland as a “honey pot” in terms of its 
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funding opportunities: noting somewhat sarcastically that after the Agreement, it seemed like 
“you needed Northern Ireland on an ESRC or Leverhulme grant application if you wanted it to 
be successful” (Tonge, 2015) which he acknowledges he benefited greatly from.92 Various 
governments and philanthropies “lavished academia in Northern Ireland with money” 
(Anonymous 2, 2015): resulting in what many referred to as the growth of the Northern Ireland 
“peace industry” (Bew, Patterson, Arthur, McIntyre, Tonge, 2015). This “industry” was 
alluded to when scholars noted the replication of research which sought to (re)explain various 
aspects of Northern Ireland’s peace process and its consociational elements. In this respect, the 
“community of scholars” around Northern Ireland appear to have been somewhat opportunistic 
in terms of their research and ideas; the influence of money has had a narrowing effect on the 
scholarship being produced.  
McIntyre was quite critical of all academic work on the peace process generally and 
consocationalism in particular: arguing, pace Dixon, that “it [the peace process] can mean 
everything to everybody. That it can be what you want [to get] out of it… And then it is widely 
touted, as a model for what was seemingly a problem beyond resolution, has suddenly been 
resolved. Therefore, we will talk it up, put bells on it, and try and sell it to the rest of the world. 
Just becomes a nice word for industry”, which looks to export Northern Ireland’s “internal 
conflict model” (McIntyre, 2015) around the world. McGrattan and Patterson similarly referred 
to the “transitional justice”, “terrorism”, and “peace process industry”, all of which have 
developed out of the Agreement: noting that there has been a widespread “marketization” of 
research and academia not just in terms of Northern Ireland, but also universities generally, 
leading to a narrowing of work produced. Another participant lamented that:   
For a long time, we have been in essentially neo-liberal universities. Northern 
Ireland was somewhat odd in that it has been lavished by this money, so it is 
Keynesian neo-liberalism, in the sense it has been funded by outsiders.  
But often there were competitions for these grants, in the neo-liberal way of 
sharing resources. And with REF and RAE before that it creates a target driven 
society, it creates a political economy. People who are after targets, they’re 
encouraged to go after targets by the institution, because linked to that is career 
progression, promotion, esteem, etc. We’re also encouraged to have links with 
civil society, to be able to demonstrate impact. 
Impact obviously must be socially responsible, it has to be politically in keeping 
with the time, and that is pro-peace process, by virtue. There is no accident that 
the projects that were funded were those that generally said the peace process is 
a good thing. 
                                                 
92 Tonge has received over £200,000 in research grants from the ESRC as well as Leverhulme since 2006; and 
been awarded grants from the British government and American Political Science Association for his work on 
Northern Ireland (See: U. o. Liverpool, 2016 ).  
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…And I think that’s something that we can see throughout academia, on these 
islands, but it was brought into sharper relief in Northern Ireland because there 
was (a) an on-going peace process, and (b) there was the money to tell nice 
things about that on-going peace process (Anonymous 2, 2015).  
 
This scholar went on to highlight that: 
 
I don’t think I have avoided it. In fact, I have been the recipient of external 
funding, to look at the peace process, and so I am implicated with others, in that. 
I hope I have been true to my own intellectual scepticism, and have not merely 
been the handmaiden of policy.  
But ultimately, is it too much to say that large parts of academia, including 
myself, at certain times, have been bought. I don’t think it is (ibid). 
  
However, others regarded these claims as over-stated: “I don't think anybody is going 
to make their fortune out of working on the Northern Ireland conflict, you know, because no 
matter what book you sell it's going to sell way less than a general textbook on British politics, 
for example, so I don't think anybody is going into it thinking, you know, I'll make my fortune 
here” (Anonymous 1, 2015). O’Duffy reflected that while working with O’Leary and applying 
for research grants, when they did receive funding, “it was never large”. “I remember for [this 
one particular project he was working on] O’Leary complaining about a lot of good reviews 
for his grant applications with ESRC or whatever its equivalent was then. Good reviews but 
high failure rates” (O’Duffy, 2015).  
Others reflected favorably on REF93: claiming it has had positive effects on academia 
in the U.K., as it has introduced more “objectivity” in assessing academic contributions and 
                                                 
93 In the U.K., the origins of work on research evaluation and assessing the impact of research on the economy 
and society can be traced back to the late 1970s/early 1980s and the Thatcher administration. There was significant 
debate and interest amongst scientists regarding the issue of ‘science and society’ (H. Rose & Rose, 1969), and 
the social responsibility of the scientist (Nelkin, 1979). Pioneering work by radical scholars like Bernal (1939) 
and others (See: Werskey, 1971) raised skepticism as to whether science was being used for the full benefit of 
humanity. The 1970s also oversaw a succession of economic crises, resulting in severe public expenditure cuts: 
increasing the pressure to ensure that the scarce funds available for research were spent as wisely as possible 
(Martin, 2011).  
During this time, most decisions in academia were made within universities and on the basis of peer review alone. 
Partly because of the limitations of this, it was argued that the decision-making process needed to be opened up, 
providing a more public form of accountability (Martin, 2011). For that to be achieved, data on the inputs to and 
outputs from research were required. These early efforts encountered opposition from academics, who were 
concerned about politicians and bureaucrats encroaching on their terrain and challenging the authority of peer 
review as the primary decision-making mechanism (for promotion and academic assessment) in universities 
(Martin, 2011). Under political and economic pressure, funding bodies such as UK research councils began to 
adopt more systematic approaches to research evaluation; and over time, these became more extensive.  
For example, in 1986, the University Grants Committee (UGC) recognized that a more selective approach was 
required to fund British university research, and launched the Research Selectivity Exercise (Martin, 2011). 
Initially, this process was comparatively simple: panels carried out a peer review assessment of short submissions 
from each university department (or research unit) and that department’s best five publications. However, 
criticism from academics forced UGC and its successor, the University Funding Council (UFC) to make the 
approach in the 1989 Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) more rigorous and labor intensive in terms of 
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how the promotion process takes place within universities (Mitchell, 2015). Young scholars 
such as John Bew spoke very positively:  
I’m a hundred percent grateful [for the REF]. I’m very productive, I write a lot. 
I mean that’s the one thing I’m very good at. So, in that sense, I’m a beneficiary 
to the REF. I’m also for very lucky that I had a two-year post doc in Cambridge 
and then a two-year teaching job, which was not teaching intensive [so I could 
publish]. So, I have benefited personally from the REF because I had a very 
lucky start to my academic career where I had two, almost four years where I 
can really get ahead… I mean, that’s where I [did] my first book. So like it's 
been personally by complete luck, pretty useful for me. I think my parents [who 
are both academics] are going to make [a difference here as they] probably 
stressed the importance of publications. I also think what the hell is the point in 
doing it? Unless you’re publishing stuff and closely into public debate but that’s 
a personal thing, you know (J. Bew, 2015).         
 
Shirlow related that he too has never had an issue getting his work published, but that he has 
noticed:  
“The marketization [of academia and the REF have] …. what you would find is 
some people may be cut corners to get published, because they are under so 
much pressure. They are maybe not doing as much collecting enough 
information or data to really produce good work, maybe as well. 
They are getting published, but there is a long tale now in journals. You have 
got to realise, when I was at university there were nowhere near the number of 
journals. The Internet has changed all of this. 
I have a journal sometimes now, I come across something that somebody has 
written and I have never heard of the journal. It is like journal [of whatever], 
volume two and volume three and volume four. So it is different from my 
generation, we had to start off in a very, very tight range of journals. 
You are told to publish in at least third level journals, and that has gotten much 
more difficult, because there is much more competition because that is what the 
REF has done.  
So you are seeing a lot of younger staff that are publishing in journals. "What is 
that journal, I have never heard of that?" So all these things like impact factors, 
citations, all of that is increasingly accretion. 
My generation was the first one, which was put under the RAE/REF and it put 
a lot of pressure on us and now with the introduction of new things like three-
year contracts etc. I think it is probably not a very pleasant place to be [for new 
                                                 
preparing each unit’s submission and carrying out the assessment (Martin, 2011). The pattern was to be repeated 
over each successive RAE, with criticisms of the previous exercise resulting in ever more refinements being 
introduced to the next one (Martin and Whitley, 2010).  
The pressures to perform well in the RAE increased, so universities and their departments came to put growing 
levels of effort into preparing for the next exercise. While early RAEs brought significant benefits in terms of 
greater attention to published research and a more strategic approach by universities and departments, these began 
to diminish. After intensive debates on the cost and benefits of administering the RAE, the UK Treasury proposed 
that perhaps this peer review-based assessment could be replaced simply by metrics such as the funding received 
from research councils and other funding bodies (HM Treasury, 2006). However, this led to fierce opposition 
from academics, loath to see the disappearance of peer review from the process. Instead, HEFCE and the other 
funding councils decided to replace the RAE with the Research Excellence Framework (REF), a combination of 
the previous peer-review-based exercise with some form of impact assessment. 
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scholars], which may encourage you to go more for volume as opposed to going 
for [quality], you need four pieces of [top quality] work. I don't think any of the 
young people would risk going for four pieces of work. I think they would 
probably try to get as many pieces of work done as possible. 
I also know from some journals up in the North that rejection rates have risen 
and that is probably not a very healthy terrain for people to be in as well… [I 
mean] I have published about 100 things, I have had two papers rejected, I have 
been very, very lucky” (Shirlow, 2015).  
 
The pressure on academics to publish and its effect on quality was certainly a theme 
throughout the narratives. An anonymous participant highlighted that because of things like 
the REF, scholars tended to think more “strategically” about what and where they published; 
elements such as “impact” have influenced academia:    
The requirement of academics to publish a lot more than they did.  So in the 
olden days during the conflict somebody like, you know, Cornelius O'Leary, 
who was the head of the department [at Queens University Belfast], could work 
his entire life on his one big book, or John White, right.  You know, they 
published one thing, but they still were the world’s experts on it, right. They 
just talked about it a lot. They didn't actually have to commit anything to paper 
because they didn't have a head of school saying get it out 'cause we need it! So 
there is a… that spike that you see you will see in relation to a lot of other sub-
disciplines as well that you might have noticed beforehand simply because the 
research exercise, which started in 1998, or 96 (Anonymous 1, 2015).  
 
As a result, academics no longer had the:  
Opportunity now to write the big opus on a piece of work. For example, the 
opportunity to do what a John White did or Cornelius O'Leary did and work for 
years on your big, big book is lost. [Today] most universities will not afford you 
that luxury to sit down and really think about the bigger picture and how all of 
the different pieces [fit] together.  So what tends to happen now is everybody 
does their bit and if you put all the bits together it makes up the whole whereas 
in the past a scholar would have had the opportunity to sit down and look at the 
whole by themselves. So what has happened has been we’ve become much 
more [specialized] experts in sub-parts of individual areas (Anonymous 1, 
2015).  
 
Moreover, as noted above, the development of the RAE/REF has resulted in a 
proliferation of academic journals as well as a growth in undesirable practices such as the 
replication of research in different guises in different journals (Elton, 2000; Martin, 2011). 
Pressure to publish has restricted and disadvantaged “long term” research, as academics now 
felt required to be “research active” and publish widely. Failure to do so could result in financial 
penalties; with research in interdisciplinary fields particularly hindered, as it became more 
difficult to establish new research fields (Elton, 2000; Martin, 2011; NAPAG, 1996).  
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 English, John Bew, Kerr, Power, O’Duffy, and Hayward all largely echoed similar 
statements. Often, the research and research centres which emerged following the Agreement 
were not nearly as well funded as some may have suggested; continue to have wide research 
agendas (not solely focused on Northern Ireland); and the impact and implementation of “neo-
liberal” policies on universities had existed long before the peace process began. In fact:    
One is there was a kind of Northern Ireland Troubles mania [in the 1980’s]. So 
during the period when [bombings and such] were happening in English cities, 
there was a sense that if you pumped money into Northern Ireland it might make 
it less awful. So motorways being built, community centers being built, Queens 
was better funded than an equivalent university would be in England during the 
80’s in terms of library, provisional jobs or whatever, because there was a sense 
that you put money into the society in the hope of assuaging some of the 
difficulties. Whether that worked or not is another question, but that’s what 
happened. So there was money pumped in it that way.  
[Next]A lot of the institutions that are set up when you look close [at them] 
there’s not as much money in them as you’d like. And with a lot of them there’s 
a good reason for that, because they’re not that great. But what should happen 
in academic life is that there’s less reinvention all the time. People tend to say, 
let’s merge these departments together, let’s set up a new institute, or let’s 
rebrand this. Quite often it seems to me that just concentrating on people doing 
as well as they can on the work that they do with the institutions that exist would 
make more sense. Part of that is the dynamic that if someone wants to be the 
vice chancellor of Queens, if they turn up and say, here’s my vision of a 
restructured place that will be blah blah blah, it’s more likely they’ll get the job 
than if they turn up and say look, the structures we have may be imperfect but 
what we need is to raise morale and give people more autonomy and let them 
do as good work as they can. But that’s just not the dynamic of appointment to 
jobs (English, 2015).  
 
It is important to note here that the experience and accounts of academics in Ireland was very 
different to that of academics in the U.K. and Northern Ireland. For example, Ó Dochartiagh 
pointed out that:  
First of all, we were [and are] under far less pressure here, in terms of rigid 
agendas and regulation. So until very recent years, I felt I had immensely more 
freedom than colleagues in the U.K., and maybe in other institutions like UCD 
and TCD in terms of research and publishing. I always felt we were encouraged 
to do certain things, we were pushed in certain directions, but it wasn't ever very 
rigid (Ó Dochartiagh, 2015). 
 
Similarly, Tannam noted that even at institutions like Trinity College Dublin (TCD), 
there was not the same pressure to publish or bring in money as at U.K. universities. When she 
returned to Ireland in 1995 from the LSE:  
I was shocked when I came back here because there was nothing of that 
[publishing] culture [in Ireland]. And it's changed now, but it's still wouldn't be 
anything like the UK, and at the Irish School of Ecumenics (ISE) at Trinity it 
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would be even less so it is kind of part of a different tradition and it’s changing 
as well now, but, I mean, there's no research rating in Ireland.  There's no 
ranking system. It's beginning to be done, but when I came back to Ireland in 
'95 and there wasn’t really - there was substantial pressure on people to be active 
in research so it was quite different. 
 
 
She went on to state that:  
 
There was [some pressure] in one way that if you wanted to be a good 
department, like political science here [at Trinity], then you did need – and UCD 
– you needed to be active, but there wasn't any financial penalty, which in the 
U.K. there was, so I think that was a different kind of thing and you wouldn't be 
judged cause there's league table. [In fact], when Michael Marsh, and here it 
was very contentious amongst academics, created lead table of individual 
academics and how much they published and how much they were being cited 
under Google Scholar. They did that about seven years ago and it's, you know 
I’m not actually not great naming people but there was huge trouble about it, 
where they identified the top academics in Ireland per Google Scholar and other 
citations, but there is nothing governmentally driven like that. So it's not like, 
it's still not like the U.K. and it was most definitely wasn’t in 95 (Tanname, 
2015). 
 
Coakely and Doyle both concurred that although their academic environment has begun 
to move towards a more U.K.-oriented system, pressure on academics in terms of research, 
attracting funding and publications has been much less in Ireland. That said, a “new 
managerialist” form of education has taken effect in Irish academia, and been accused of 
importing Anglo-American neo-liberal policies (Dunne, 2013; K. Lynch et al., 2012). Thus in 
Ireland too, academia has moved towards a focus on outputs over inputs; and begun to use 
narrowly defined arguments of “efficiency”, “value for money”, and “relevance”, turning Irish 
higher education into a commodity (K. Lynch et al., 2012). 
Speaking more about the publishing culture which has developed around Northern 
Ireland, English noted that:  
In terms of the publishing and it being a fashionable area, that didn’t use to be 
the case. So it used to be the case that people used to say, don’t write on 
Northern Ireland, it’s a horrible subject. Whereas now people say it’s a quite 
jazzy subject [though less so now]. I think that’s caught on. Partly it’s self-
reinforcing in that if people who have studied it then become successful, if 
people who studied it become professors at the university level, people around 
it who are following them, you tend to get a replication. And so I think that that 
means that this is a self-fulfilling quality, just as if there were certain trends in 
a certain kind of, there was a kind of series of waves of Foucaultian scholarship 
not long ago in the social sciences. It went on but there was a way in which it 
all self-replicated for a while, so departments with professors who were 
Foucault scholars tended to appoint other Foucault scholars, and then they 
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appointed the grandchildren of Foucault scholars and it went on. And then these 
tides and pendulums shift. In terms of Northern Ireland, you’re right. If you look 
at mainstream politics journals, mainstream history journals, there’s far more 
on Northern Ireland than there used to be. How many of the articles are great is 
another question. Some of them are very, very good, some of them if they 
weren’t written on Northern Ireland, would they get published? Possibly not 
now. But then you could argue that the pendulum just swung another way. It 
used to be the case where things were too harsh, and now they’re too generous 
(English, 2015). 
 
English’s account echoes the concerns of Dixon, McIntyre and others regarding a 
favorable replication and representation of consociationalist paradigms. Academics such as 
O’Leary have supervised, examined, or assisted several of those interviewed in this research: 
including O’Duffy, Kerr, and Tannam. They also wrote their PhDs and have published 
favourably on some aspect of consociationalism; and in turn, have supervised multiple PhD 
students interested in consocationalism and/or comparative case studies of conflict regulation 
(See: M. Kerr, 2006; O'Duffy, 2007; Tannam, 1998). Others, such as Mitchell, Walsh, 
McEvoy, Taylor (a critic of consociationalism) and Ó Dochartaigh have all published and/or 
collaborated with O’Leary and McGarry, as well as cited the influence and impact of their 
research on their own work (See: J. McEvoy & O'Leary, 2013; P. Mitchell, O'Leary, & Evans, 
2001; Paul  Mitchell, O'Leary, & Evans, 2005; Taylor, 2009b).  
McEvoy and Walsh both noted the influence of O’Leary on their research and academic 
careers. “I would put my cards on the table and say that there is no point in saying I'm not a 
consociationalist because my work would disagree with the records” (Walsh, 2015).94 Yet that 
said, “I wouldn't see myself as some blinding advocate for consociationalism. I see myself as 
someone who sees this as the kind of solution that has been used and something that should be 
studied by political scientists” (Walsh, 2015). Similarly, other scholars “weren’t cheerleaders 
for Brendan or consociationalism” (Tonge, 2015); but consider that both have contributed 
greatly to political science and provided a very useful framework for analysing and 
understanding Northern Ireland and other conflicts.  
 In any case, it should be noted that O’Leary, the comparative methodology he largely 
utilizes, and concosocationalists generally are not overly represented in the Northern Irish 
academic community. Dixon, McIntyre, Edwards, John Bew, McGrattan, Aughey, Ó 
Dochartaigh, English and others also point towards the influence and contributions of Patterson 
                                                 
94 Moreover, Joanne McEvoy did her Post-Doctoral research at the University of Pennsylvanian (UPenn) under 
O’Leary, and has published on consociationalism with him (J. McEvoy & O'Leary, 2013); while Walsh’s PhD 
thesis was examined by O’Leary, and her current research at the University of Birmingham is supervised by 
Steffan Wolff, a former doctoral student of O’Leary’s.  
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and Lord Bew: in particular, their utilization of historical methods and case studies; 
supervision, references, and publications. The impact of Arthur, Coakely, Todd, and English, 
was also highlighted: particularly by Hayward. After her PhD, “I had a brief post-doc on what 
was then called Programme for Research in Third Level Institutions (PRTLI)95, a three-year 
project that Jennifer [Todd] and John [Coakley] helped me get and were running, that actually 
did expand into other opportunities for me” (Hayward, 2015). Additionally, Hayward and Ó 
Dochartaigh are working on a project which amounts to somewhat of a commemoration of 
Coakley, recognizing his contribution to political science.  
In this respect, the epistemological divide noted in the last chapter between political 
science and historiography is still in existence today. For example, those who spoke favorably 
of and published on consocationalism and O’Leary all identified themselves as political 
scientists and often utilize comparative political science methods; whereas critics of 
consociationalism, O’Leary, and the former’s over-representation within and contribution to 
the discipline align themselves with historical methods: 
I suppose it's a fairly traditional path of an academic development for people in 
these groups, i.e. a supervisee then continues on in his supervisor's traditional 
and supports what that person was saying, albeit for a slightly different 
audience. He's well networked, because his supervisor has linked him in with 
these groups. You just see the way that it perpetuates itself (Hayward, 2015). 
 
 Scholars acknowledge that the Northern Irish academic community is not a single one; 
but rather, a series of communities linked together. One interviewee commented that when 
talking about the Northern Ireland “political science academy”, we should think about the 
different individuals who make it up. When thinking about “the political history of Northern 
Ireland, I would say Henry Patterson and Paul Bew. For that sort of broad, general overview 
[of the conflict] John Tonge. For paramilitaries and things like Republicanism, Loyalism and 
so on, John Tonge, Jim McCauley, Pete Shirlow.  For the British-Irish connection, Kevin Bean 
and Eamonn O’Kane… I can tell you of all of them [and where they fit] if you give me list of 
names I could put [their] sub-discipline beside them all and say oh, Kevin does this and so-
and-so does this and so-and-so that. But when you put it altogether that makes up the Northern 
Ireland political academy” (Anonymous, 2015). Similarly, Power reflected that:  
There is a community of scholars and they seem to just gather around Northern 
Ireland. And, there is a sort of ethnic scheme that unites this community [in that] 
                                                 
95 PRTLI is an Irish government programme that provides financial support for institutional strategies, 
programmes and infrastructure to ensure the formulation and implementation of research strategies in the 
humanities, science, technology and social sciences. 
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they are mainly from Northern Ireland or the South and are white, mainly 
middle class, and predominately male… 
But I think there are a series of communities within this so, Historians are one 
community. And I think you’ve got to have your battle claws to establish 
yourself there, it’s tough. 
And you have people that are obsessed with terror. Like, seriously, religious 
about the study of dissidents. Right, you’ve got them. And they’re interested in 
terror. A lot of them make careers of themselves as kind of terror experts. So 
you see them as a distinct community. And, you’ll see them branching out and 
writing books about other issues to do with terrorism and then kind of 
comparing it to Northern Ireland. 
Then there is the likes of me, who does some kind of community engagements. 
So research at the grassroots level, where ordinary people were during The 
Troubles, looking at kind of peace more than conflict.  So, I am interested in the 
process of how peace occurs. So this is a distinct community of scholars that 
work in that kind of field. We all talk to each other. We all know one another. 
Well, ideologically we will be poles apart.   
We’re not in that other group on who is interested in the whole issue of 
consociationalism, for instance. We all think that all spirals and we want, you 
know, we want to try and move the conversation on.  There will be a lot of these 
guys at the political studies Ireland (PSAI) conference, at least a part of it…. 
There is another group of terror-logists – the terrorist group which focus on the 
communities. 
The community relations people, they are people who want to look at how can 
we transform the conflicts? How can we transform the lives of ex-paramilitaries 
or what they call from commands? There’s what we call transitional justice, 
who look at kind of grassroots organizations and looking how the peace process 
can be imbedded.  And then you’ve got, you know, your people that are 
interested in institutions, etc (Power, 2015). 
 
Indeed, participants noted the tendency of individuals to specialize in specific areas of 
expertise; and that the overwhelming majority of academics working on Northern Ireland were 
either from or had some family connection to it. “Many of these people who are researching 
Northern Ireland [today] are from Northern Ireland”; with a good number of these “jolly chaps” 
individuals from “posh”, “middle class”, largely Protestant backgrounds (Shirlow, 2015). 
Hayward, Walsh, Power, and Buchanan all noted, meanwhile, the gender disparity within the 
community: reflecting that the academy was one of “masculine bonding”; and that women 
“have struggled to… It's important to be aware of the significance of gender and how [it plays 
a role]” (Hayward, 2015). Further:  
For example, [in participating in recent conference panels] I hated being the 
person to say, "Are there going to be women on this panel?" When I was a PhD 
student, or a postdoc I remember coming back from the PSA, the Political 
Studies Association conference – God, I don't know when it would have been; 
maybe 2007 or something – just absolutely despairing about the potential for 
me to ever get a job after seeing all the young female PhD students, and then all 
the old male lecturers and professors.  
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I remember talking to Richard English about it, because I just suddenly had this 
revelation that, “Actually, it is really significant; gender is significant” 
(Hayward, 2015).  
 
When discussing gender, many female participants attributed much of intellectual 
combativeness to a form of masculine/macho posturing prevalent within a male-dominated 
community. It is also significant that of the individuals asked to participate in this study, female 
academics (particularly those in senior positions) either outright refused to participate and/or 
speak off the record about their experiences; or asked to be anonymized and/or expressed the 
desire to both edit and omit significant parts of their interview. Existing literature has attempted 
to understand the cultural codes enshrined in senior appointments at universities in the U.K. 
and Ireland: which effectively define the culture of universities and valorise a highly 
competitive, combative intellectual environment (K. Lynch et al., 2012). The Anglo-Irish 
university environment has long been described as one of “homosociability” (with a tendency 
is to select the candidates most like the assessors, ensuring access to power and privilege to 
those who fit in, those of their own kind). This is having a negative impact on the appointment 
of women to senior positions at all levels of education (Dunne, 2013; K. Lynch et al., 2012); 
and indeed, none of the female participants interviewed hold senior academic positions within 
their respective departments. Furthermore, all female participants agreed that because of such 
“macho posturing”, they had somewhat distanced themselves from or did not feel a part of the 
specific Northern Ireland community; and rather, identified themselves with their wider 
disciplinary affiliation (political scientist (Walsh, 2015); political sociologist (Hayward, 2015); 
and ecumenicalist (Power, 2015)). 
 Again though, this distancing is not limited to female academics only, particularly in 
the modern academic environment. Almost every interviewee expressed, sometimes quite 
adamantly, that they either never saw or no longer see themselves as Northern Ireland 
specialists; but had aligned themselves within wider disciplines, or had or were largely moving 
on from the subject area. Both McGarry and O’Leary consider that in many ways, they have 
“moved on from [Northern Ireland]” (McGarry, 2015). As they view the problem as mostly 
having being resolved, they are “more interested in places like Syria, and Yemen, and Iraq and 
Cyprus in particular” (McGarry, 2015): where they can begin to apply their consociational 
framework. O’Leary commented that he is a “comparativist”: before the end of his career, “I 
would have written as much about Kurdistan, as I will have about Northern Ireland” (O’Leary, 
2015). That said, Northern Ireland and its consociational framework continue to be a useful 
foundation for making comparisons in the modern day, because:  
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Civil wars have become a subject matter for international relations —
comparative civil wars, studying insurgence, studying their grievances, 
questioning their grievances, asking what resolves civil wars, now by and large 
the security paradigm that informed a lot of work in the area, it’s the balance of 
forces. 
People make peace when they think they can’t win by war. That kind of grim 
realism has a certain merit to analyzing ethnic conflict, but it’s no good at 
institutions. And it is very interesting to see that literature now interested in why 
do peace agreements emerge? When do they work? Do the content of those 
agreements matter? If so, in what way? 
And you can see a set of results out there that are not resolved. Result number 
one: Power-sharing reduces the likelihood of recurrence of violence. It doesn’t 
guarantee it. What happen again? It reduces the likelihood of violence. 
Result number two: If you have power-sharing arrangements inside your 
democracy, your democracy will perform better against a range of predictable 
indicators than democracies that do not have these power-sharing 
characteristics. So, better democracies, better outputs. 
A third result that we can be fairly confident of: If you have proportional 
representation institutions, combined with some kinds of power-sharing, the 
likelihood of there being ordinary, not organized, but ordinary mass political 
violence, riots and so on is reduced. 
These kinds of general large-end results, I think are pretty robust. They give us 
confidence that power-sharing should be part of the repertoire of applied 
political science, but they don’t tell us what power-sharing is best or if any 
power-sharing resolution is best. What’s the appropriate medicine to be attached 
to particular malady? Those questions require further thinking and detailed 
work (O’Leary, 2015).  
 
In similar vein, Tonge pointed out that:  
I don’t teach dedicated Northern Ireland politics modules any more. I haven’t 
done since about 2006, and that’s because I think there has been a general 
waning of interest in more recent years, okay.  
And so I’ve adapted personally, by making Northern Ireland part of a 
comparative agenda. I teach it as part of (a) a devolution module, and (b) to final 
year students as part of comparative peace processes, so looking at conflicts and 
looking at consociations in Bosnia, Lebanon, Northern Ireland.  
So I don’t think there’s the market [for Northern Ireland] in the last few years 
that there used to be, I sense a slight waning for dedicated Northern Ireland 
modules. I wouldn’t want to teach a full, dedicated Northern Ireland module, in 
a way that I would have done even five years ago (Tonge, 2015). 
 
With regards to the British/Irish labor market, aspiring academics concurred that “when 
you're looking at jobs [today], you don't see jobs in Irish or U.K. universities advertised for 
Northern Ireland specialists. You see jobs advertised for people who are interested in conflict 
resolution or peace study specialists” (Walsh, 2015). In terms of her experience in the academy, 
McEvoy explained:  
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We can talk about the extent to which academics want to be associated with the 
label, ‘Oh, she works on Northern Ireland.’ I had decided or certainly I was of 
the view that even though I’d done my PhD on Northern Ireland, I did not then 
want to continue as someone who solely works on Northern Ireland. I was much 
more an area studies kind of approach.  
I wanted to be more of a political scientist or social scientist being driven by the 
conceptual analytical questions where Northern Ireland happens to be a case of 
something more interesting. So that’s why then when I was at UPENN, and that 
was what the proposal was to do, was to compare Northern Ireland with other 
cases of power sharing, which then turned out to be Bosnia and Macedonia. So 
in that sense that time at UPENN really helped me move on from [Northern 
Ireland]. I hope it’s reflected in that way, that I’m not somebody who works 
solely on Northern Ireland. That I do other things and I’m seeking to do other 
things (McEvoy, 2015).  
 
 Collectively then, scholars expressed a desire to affiliate themselves within wider areas 
of expertise: pointing to both a waning of interest over recent years on Northern Ireland, as 
well as the need to remain relevant and impactful within their own discipline. Shirlow 
elaborated:   
[Previously, there was a big interest in Northern Ireland, it was like a laboratory, 
lots of people did come here and study and you did get these Americans and 
others who came here for six months. Interviewed a few people and then left 
and wrote a book about it. I am not criticising that either but there was a lot of 
people that came here. 
From what I see you don't get that same volume now, that same intensity of 
people (Shirlow, 2015). 
 
This was not just an issue in academia, either: 
 
See journalism is not interested in Northern Ireland anymore either, really. 
There is not much journalism here now. Most of the main papers don't have a 
journalist in Northern Ireland any more. They might have an Irish journalist but 
they don't have a Northern Ireland one. 
Across the board you are not going to build your career studying Northern 
Ireland are you really? In terms of what you would have done. There is no cache 
in it, when there once was (Shirlow, 2015).  
 
This is certainly apparent in the BBC. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, as Northern 
Ireland remained the biggest domestic story, the BBC’s presence and operations in Belfast 
grew steadily. Since the turn of the millennium, its Northern Ireland facility has faced a series 
of cutbacks: with some £19 million  shaved off its budget during the lifespan of the current 
license fee alone, and more cuts on the horizon (Geoghegan, 2016). Moreover, as the sectarian 
conflict is no longer the headline-grabbing story it once was – as the paucity of Northern Irish 
coverage on network news bulletins attests to – the number of BBC journalists has been scaled 
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back: with staff down 22% since 2007, and further job losses likely in the coming years (BBC, 
2015; Geoghegan, 2016).  
Lord Bew stated bluntly that “it’s over and they’re over, though some of them may not 
know it yet”: referring to academics he viewed as “clinging” onto the subject and attempting 
to “milk” the system in terms of funding and research opportunities (Lord Bew, 2015). Bew 
noted that interest in Northern Ireland has waned: “[Tony] Blair gave 40% of his time to this 
issue. [David] Cameron, quite right, he doesn't give 4% of his time” (Lord Bew, 2015). Bew’s 
position is somewhat extreme one in comparison to that of other academics; who hold that 
despite the waning of interest, “it isn’t over” (Tonge, 2015).    
The consensus is not that there has been a wholesale abandonment of the subject by 
academics; but that the subject is being placed within a wider comparative and theoretical 
framework. Kerr, for example, notes that Northern Ireland is “a subject that is not really in a 
singular discipline either so it’s interdisciplinary and comparative”, and that:  
I mean I published a book in 2011 on Northern Ireland but research had started 
a long time ago. I do intend to write a book about the Thatcher years, in the 
future, and the Northern Ireland peace process in future history books.  
I mean those are projects that I will do on top of what my main job is, which is 
the Middle East. I mean I made a conscious choice 10 years ago to go the Middle 
East track. I mean I began teaching on the Middle East in 2001. 
And I mean you have to think strategically about this stuff. Obviously, there is 
personal interest as well. For example, in 2001, I mean I didn’t know the Middle 
East was going to be like it is today but yes, I mean it was. I mean obviously 
Northern Ireland and my PhD was more than just a case study, one of two case 
studies.  
I mean I’m writing about where I’m coming from and I care about it. You can’t 
separate yourself from where you come from, even with the greatest intellectual 
endeavour. Yes, I mean I was aware that this is not a career choice. For me, I 
didn’t see it as a career choice.  
I mean if you put a gun to my head and said, ‘What would you like to do?’ yes, 
I’d like to sit in an office in Central London with archival material around me 
for the next 20 years and write books on Northern Ireland. Well I’m afraid that’s 
just not realistic, because instead of running a course on political Islam at LSE 
or at Kings at Master’s level, I’d get maybe three or four students.  
Teaching [Northern Ireland] comparatively, teaching power sharing 
arrangements in deeply divided societies in Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Bosnia, 
Lebanon, Iraq, then yes, you get 30 students coming and they are like, ‘Wow, 
this is interesting’. Some of them are more interested in Northern Ireland, some 
Lebanon and some Bosnia but looking at it in a comparative framework, yes, I 
still teach Northern Ireland within a Middle Eastern studies department, by 
stealth (Kerr, 2015).  
 
Newer academics such as Edwards and McGrattan noted similar experiences: although 
research and teaching solely focusing on Northern Ireland has waned, the peace process and 
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theoretical debates around it remain relevant for scholars today. Edwards remarked that while 
he was not an advocate of consociationalism or in agreement with much of the literature:  
It has moved on a continuum, so, we’re moving in the conversation from a kind 
of activist agenda (focused solely on Northern Ireland) towards a more 
generalized political science. And I think that there has been a popularization of 
concepts from political science generally in regard to concepts like 
consociationalism, power sharing, you know, institution building, ethnicity and 
ethnic politics and understanding the variables that [go into studying things like] 
political positions, political parties.   
I mean, for example, I wrote a PhD on the Northern Ireland Labour Party [in 
2008], of course I had to look at trade-offs political parties made in order to get 
elected.  Of course I had to look at general things like, you know, my whole 
thesis was looking at the variables of ethnicity in class and how they interacted. 
And accounting for the rise and the fall of the political party.   
So, you know without consociationalism, without its movement in political 
science the pro of those generic concepts from outside, I could not have written 
my PhD in the way that I did. Even though I disagreed with the positions they 
took on the Northern Ireland Labour Party. Of course, I disagree with Brendan 
O’Leary and John McGary [on that]…  
 
He went on to acknowledge: 
 
But consociationalism really made it possible for me [and others] after the Good 
Friday Agreement to conduct our research.  Because it has been seriously 
analyzed and debated.   
You know, when comparing some other deals to Good Friday and looking at 
the analyzed Agreement and looking at these kinds of agreements and looking 
at the idea of institution building, consensus, conflict, cooperation.  I think that 
all of that entirely aided me and assisted me in the writing of my PhD and in 
subsequent research.  I mean I knew how to review articles because of that.   
Looking at this idea of consociationalism versus social transformationalism and 
you know, I kind of have friends and colleagues but I was never a militant or 
ardent activist about any specific paradigm, because, I think that I’m much more 
pragmatic and for me as a historian you’re identified with someone who is 
coming from that position and therefore, not that people wouldn’t engage with 
you, but, they will look seriously at the agenda that you’re trying to push. 
So, in strict academic terms, that anybody who writes about conflict resolution 
or transformation must engage with the debates about consociationalism and 
power sharing absolutely, and no matter what Northern Ireland will always play 
a part in that (Edwards, 2015).   
 
Reflecting on the current and future state of Northern Ireland, Arthur related:  
About 5 years ago I got asked to direct a program called the Mountain of Man 
program, which was bringing American students over, bringing them here to 
London and giving them a grounding in the conflict of Northern Ireland and 
then bringing them over to Northern Ireland, which I’ll do next week, for a few 
days, and meet the players on the ground. And then we go off to the Middle 
East. So we use the experience of the Northern Ireland conflict in the Middle 
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East [as a comparative base]. And I remember when we were trying to sell this 
program, I did scour conferences with a university in the US to gain support and 
one of them summed up [the state of Northern Ireland] beautifully, they said 
‘Y’know for our students, conflict in Northern Ireland is ancient history’. So in 
that sense you could say its redundant [to study it]. But I think that where 
Northern Ireland remains important is as a model of the life cycle of conflict.  
[For example], Johann Galton speaks of the life cycle [of conflicts] being: 
diagnoses, prognoses, and therapy. I describe it as analysis, negotiation and 
implementation. But [maybe] therapy is a much better word. And we’re in the 
therapeutic stage at the moment. But the fact is, we’ve gone through all three, 
which makes it a very interesting case study [and it will remain so for some 




  As the previous chapters explain, knowledge communities do not develop de novo, but 
emerge and evolve from the inertia of existing knowledge. They develop out of a struggle; and 
through that, must cross over established boundaries into new territories. In the case of 
Northern Ireland, the emergence of the academic community took place in the context of a 
heterogeneous political science discipline (which some question the existence of even today), 
dominated by methods of historicism, ideological divides which in many ways reflected those 
of the conflict itself, and a paradigm which viewed it as intractable. Yet with the 
commencement of the peace process and the application of consociationalism, a new paradigm 
was introduced: which allowed scholars to begin reconciling meanings and enlisting “allies” 
(Star & Griesemer, 1989), in order to create and establish a new intellectual authority around 
the subject.  
The utility and resilience of a boundary object resides in its ability to maintain 
communication, interpretation, and (sometimes) utilization between various communities, 
while minimizing uncertainty: particularly in times of strife and insecurity (Kimble, Grenier, 
& Goglio-Primard, 2010). In this respect, participants pointed to several obstacles which had 
faced the discipline since the Agreement. Despite the initial period of euphoria, there was a 
prolonged period of uncertainty and skepticism with regards to implementing the various 
phases. This uncertainty existed not only at intellectual level, but at political and social level: 
Kerr highlighted the difficulties of “selling” the Agreement publicly and politically. McGarry 
and O’Leary noted that this period both opened up new avenues and opportunities, as well as 
reviving existing battlegrounds on cosociationalism. Moreover, these developments took place 
within a university culture which was undergoing and continues to experience drastic 
transformation.  
There were also new challenges over the “endless” replication of existing paradigms 
and research by scholars within the consociationalist camp. This was largely credited to what 
many referred to as the “marketization” of academic research generally, and the “peace process 
industry” which emerged following the Agreement, attributed to the neo-liberal policies 
adopted by British (and subsequently Irish) governments towards higher education.  
That said, the uncertainty during the post-Agreement period was different from that 
pre-peace process, in that scholars were very confident in the “overall trajectory” (O’Leary, 
2015), regardless of the challenges which the process encountered. The signing and 
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implementation of the Agreement was a “vindication” (McGarry, 2015) of consociationalism 
and consociationalists.  
As we have seen, the successful translation of an object rests on the ability of scholars 
not only to reconcile meanings between disciplines, but to also to develop new findings and 
enlist allies to create authority over a subject area (Star & Griesemer, 1989). When 
uncertainties are enough to challenge this authority and question its epistemological relevance, 
the recruitment of allies and expansion of existing paradigms into different social worlds 
becomes problematic (Akkerman & Bakker, 2011; Shackley & Wynne, 1996).  
Yet the consensus amongst interviewees is that during the post-Agreement period, there 
was a massive expansion of research agendas and publications which utilize consociationalism 
and comparative methodologies. Mumford, Kerr, McEvoy and a host of others noted the 
centrality which these now enjoyed in understanding the process taking place in Northern 
Ireland, which had begun being applied to other areas outside the Anglo-Irish sphere. Even 
critics such as Taylor and Edwards acknowledged the centrality and importance of these 
debates in expanding the literature on Northern Ireland and understanding other conflicts and 
peace arrangements around the world.  
More latterly, the application of this paradigm has “moved on” (McGarry, O’Leary, 
2015) from Northern Ireland and begun being applied, comparatively, to a variety of other 
places (such as FYR Macedonia, Lebanon, Bosnia, and Iraq); as well as other subject areas, 
such as terrorism, transitional justice, and mainland British politics. As O’Leary put it, the 
debates around Northern Ireland could and should be placed and understood within wider 
discussions regarding the “intricate complexities of the relationships between cultures and 
institutions” (O’Leary, 2015).   
This indicates an ontological development, whereby the appetite for information needs 
– which hitherto had not existed and then, through the emergence of the peace process, 
developed in Irish studies – had begun to expand into other fields and be applied to other areas 
following the Agreement. Interviewees’ widespread acknowledgement of the “peace process 
industry” and the replication of literature and the application of “the Northern Ireland model” 
to other conflicts points to the mobility and utility of consociationalism, and the authority with 
which its architects had come to command within the wider discipline. This is significant: 
boundary objects have a role in supporting the different forms of coordination found in 
collaborative and multidisciplinary workings. This can sometimes be one of simple information 
transfer; but often, as complexity increases, actors need to establish common meanings which 
can be shared and transferred between varying groups and disciplines (Carlile, 2002; Kimble 
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et al., 2010; Leigh Star, 2010; Star & Griesemer, 1989). Greater informational richness must 
be available to support the process of translation, negotiation and compromise which takes 
place during this transition.  
A boundary object also needs to be flexible enough to allow for what Carlile (2002) 
termed “pragmatic coordination”: processes involving change or transformation. This 
coordination is difficult to achieve, as change can be costly to actors with a stake in the 
established ways of doing things; thus, there is an essentially political nature to these processes, 
as the positions held by actors can become divergent and contradictory (Carlile, 2004).  
 This complexity (and utility) is evident not only in the discourse and research 
concerning Northern Ireland beginning to be situated in wider international frameworks and 
folded into the now expanding field of conflict studies; but also in a changing university 
environment, where new pressures on academics for both funding and publications had 
increased. Interviewees highlighted the impact of neo-liberal education policies on the 
“marketization” of education, as well as the pressure created by the RAE/REF. Although they 
provided mixed interpretations of the effects of such variables (some negative, some positive) 
on scholarship, they collectively acknowledged a narrowing and replication of research and 
ideas.  
However, they also pointed towards the ongoing nature of the process in Northern 
Ireland. In addition, consociationalism and the comparative method used to analyse and apply 
this theory now had a trait of immutable mobility: the ability of an idea and its information to 
be translated and transported across disciplines and fields to a variety of cases (Latour, 1981). 
The replication and (re)application of the consociational paradigm to various conflicts, and the 
centrality with which Northern Ireland has come to play in these analyses demonstrates the 
durability and adaptability of this paradigm: not only in maintaining existing allies in a 
changing, more competitive environment; but in enlisting new allies as the discipline (and its 
disciples) seek to align and establish themselves in wider areas of expertise.  
 With regard to scholars’ claims on the “marketization” of research and potential for 
“opportunism” and competition, the literature concerning boundary objects and their 
development within knowledge fields largely view and explain knowledge creators as 
entrepreneurs and knowledge institutions as enterprises (Star & Griesemer, 1989).  This is 
important in our understanding of the Northern Ireland community; in some ways, actors and 
institutions choose the environment within which they operate. This is one of the functions of 
the institution as an enterprise and actor as an entrepreneur (Hughes, 1971Chpt 6 ; Star & 
Griesemer, 1989). In other words, someone inside the institution acts as an entrepreneur (i.e. 
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the academic looking to attract funding, fulfil external and internal institutional requirements 
and quotas, and maintain relevance within their field); while enterprising actors must choose, 
within the possible limits, the environment to which the institution will react to these 
conditions. In many cases, this concerns how and where they will attract funding, address the 
needs of clientele (students, journals, and research bodies), and the sources which can be drawn 
from to accomplish these goals (Star & Griesemer, 1989).  
Tonge, for example, was “ashamedly… part of the peace process industry”, and had 
“benefited largely” (Tonge, 2015) from the funding culture – albeit, the lucrativeness of this 
was somewhat overstated – which had developed around it. Combined with new pressures to 
attract funding and the utility of Northern Ireland in achieving these goals, and their widespread 
acknowledgement that the student and publication appetite had waned over the years, 
academics are thus largely folding the subject and their expertise into wider and comparative 
discussions on more relevant topics, such as the Middle East (Kerr, 2015). This is also apparent 
the acknowledgement that the community of academics on Northern Ireland is not, in fact, a 
single community any longer; but rather, a series of communities, specializing and focusing on 
their own sub-fields (i.e. terrorism, transitional justice, devolution), dispersed across a variety 
of disciplines (Sociology, Political Science, History, Philosophy).  
Thus in efforts to adapt to the ever-changing “markets” of the university enterprise, 
knowledge entrepreneurs utilized a boundary object(s) (i.e. consociationalism, the Northern 
Ireland Peace Process Model, and comparative methodologies), which has the trait of 
“immutable mobility”; while negating local uncertainties of the often “tribal”96 domains of 
existing scholarship, avoiding epistemological warfare as a means of incorporating new 
“allies” within and across the domain, and expanding its clientele, sources of information and 
opportunities97. Irrespective of this, as Edwards and Arthur referred to, that engagement with 
and understanding of consociationalism (and its debates) and the Northern Ireland process 
remains (and will continue to be) essential reflects both the entrepreneurialism of scholars 
within their respective enterprise, and the robustness of the boundary object.  
This expansion also explains the pervasiveness and continuity of the debates on 
consociationalism, and why the Northern Ireland model has established itself as a central aspect 
in conflict analysis. Marginality has been used to refer to persons with membership in more 
                                                 
96 See the previous chapter’s discussions on tribalism in History, Sociology and Philosophy, which continue to 
exist within the Anglo-Irish Political Science Academies. 
97 Power and others point to various areas of specialization: such as Border Security (Cathal McCall), Terrorism 
(Pete Shirlow & Jonathan Tonge), Transformative Justice & Integration (Rupert Taylor), Community Relations 
(Maria Power), and Social Identity (Katy Hayward).  
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than one social world (for example, historians, sociologists, and philosophers in political 
science) (Star & Griesemer, 1989). Often, these “marginal individuals” experience tension 
regarding multiple memberships in terms of both identity and loyalty (i.e. their ideological and 
biographical identity and adherence – loyalty – towards epistemological doctrines). The 
strategies employed by marginal people to manage their identities is usually to “stake out” 
territories, either literal or conceptual, recruit “allies”, then establish institutionalized ways of 
negotiating and managing intellectual affairs when different social worlds share the same 
territory; that is, the tribal leaders act as boundary brokers (Kimble et al., 2010; Star & 
Griesemer, 1989). In these negotiations between brokers, conflict is inevitable, and paradigms 
are constantly challenged and refined.  
Thus the central cooperative task involves the “translation” of one another’s 
perspectives to existing allies and potentially new ones, while managing conflicts and avoiding 
all-out war. The extent to which this succeeds reflects the robustness of the boundary object, 
its ability to co-exist between and across multiple boundaries and be utilized by a variety of 
marginal individuals. In the case of Northern Ireland, this is apparent in the epistemological 
(and ideological) divides which still exist between historicism and comparative methodologies, 
as well as the criticisms around consocationalism and the ongoing interpretations (debates). 
Yet despite these tensions and conflicts, analyses of the peace process and the Northern Ireland 
model have successfully expanded into wider discussions of conflict management by “allies” 
of initial boundary brokers (i.e. the contemporaries of individuals such as O’Leary), while 
maintaining relationships and collaborations with scholars who oppose such paradigms.  
 In such regard, Walsh, Kerr, O’Duffy, Tanname, and McEvoy all noted the influence 
and impact of O’Leary, McGarry, and comparative methodologies on their work; and how they 
are utilizing these paradigms in a series of other areas, such as Macedonia and Bosnia (J. 
McEvoy, 2015; J. McEvoy & O'Leary, 2013); Lebanon and Syria (M. Kerr, 2006, 2013); Iraq 
and Kurdistan (B. O'Leary, 2009; B. O'Leary et al., 2005); Cyprus (John McGarry & Loizides, 
2015; O'Duffy, 2003); and Sri Lanka (O'Duffy, 2003 ).  
Others, from historical and other disciplines, even when fiercely critical of 
consociationalism (such as John Bew, Power, Taylor, or Edwards) nonetheless acknowledge 
the influence and impact of this paradigm, as well as the need to engage with such debates and 
scholars to develop fundamental and deeper understandings of sociopolitical and historical 
developments taking place in Northern Ireland and more generally.  
Yet irrespective of this, these scholars can still maintain their own intellectual agendas, 
(critical) positions on the discipline, and new sub-areas of focus which they find relevant. This 
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highlights the capacity of the Agreement and peace process to “[provide] a foundation that they 
could kind of reconcile themselves to and then build from intellectually” (Anonymous 1, 2015); 
and “not just pass by each other like ships in the night” (Edwards, 2015). In lieu of which, “the 
debates have become politer” (Taylor, 2015). 
Recall again this research is concerned with how an epistemic community emerges. So 
far it has displayed a lack of community, the (slow) emergence of the epistemic community, 
and how it has developed and responded to a shifting and uncertain academic and political 
environment. This chapter has largely displayed the uncertainty in the initial post-Agreement 
environment as well as the utility and robustness of consociationalism as an analytical tool for 
both uniting the community in sometimes contentious disagreement as well as consensus. 
Through this contention, we have begun to gain insight into the nature of the community as 
well as the epistemic, personal, professional, and political identity struggles and pitfalls 
academics. The next chapter looks to delve further into this looking specifically at how scholars 
define themselves in relation to the community they greatly attached to but see themselves as 
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 178 




The last chapters have largely looked to answer the question of How an epistemic community 
emerges. They focused on explaining how, why, and when this community emerged and 
outline the struggles and events surrounding and explaining these developments. This chapter 
focuses on the individuals in the community itself and how they define themselves personally 
and in relation to the discipline they belong to and its other members. To explain these events 
the notion of insiders and outsiders, and the utility of the boundary object will be of importance.  
It considers the internal dynamics – and tensions – of the epistemic community, and 
elicits further insights into the state of the “community” around this community. Whereas the 
last three chapters have been largely focused on addressing the central question of this thesis – 
how and why an epistemic community emerges – this chapter investigates the boundaries of 
this community, as well as how members determine their (as well as others) position(s) as an 
insider and outsider.   
 As this community has emerged within the context of great political, social, 
institutional, and academic change, there is an inevitable problem of patterned distinctions 
among social groups and strata in access and claims to types of knowledge. In their most potent 
form, these claims are put forward as a matter of epistemological principle: namely, that certain 
individuals have a monopolistic access to particular kinds of knowledge (Foucault, 2001; R. 
Merton, 1972). The empirical argument usually holds that a group or individual may have a 
privileged access to the truth, with others able to obtain it but at greater risk (ibid.).  
THE COMMUNITY THEY’RE ALL IN BUT NOT A PART OF 
As highlighted in the previous chapter, many academics, such as John Bew, made it clear that 
“I don’t want to regard myself as part of an academic community studying Northern Ireland” 
(J. Bew, 2015). Indeed, most interviewees went to great pains in distancing themselves from 
“Northern Ireland specialists”. Hughes reiterated several times that his PhD was in Soviet 
history; his research interests and publications in Soviet politics and following the fall of the 
Soviet Union, issues of ethnic conflict in Eastern Europe; he did not want to be affiliated with 
a community of scholars “dominated by unionists” (Hughes, 2016). Lord Bew claimed that he 
never considered himself part of the Northern Ireland academic community; but was instead a 
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“British historian” (Lord Bew, 2015): a sentiment echoed by Patterson, English, and John Bew, 
among others. Even the standard bearers of the subject, O’Leary and McGarry, plainly stated 
that although they considered their work on Northern Ireland as influential, they had largely 
“moved on” from the discipline and the individuals studying it; and never affiliated themselves 
with the community, but as comparative political scientists (McGarry, 2015; O’Leary, 2015).   
 What is interesting in these accounts is not necessarily the desire of academics to 
separate themselves – voluntarily or involuntarily – from the discipline; or for that matter, cast 
themselves largely as outsiders, who do not subscribe to the same epistemological, ideological 
or biographical predispositions as other members of the Northern Ireland political science 
community. Simultaneously, these scholars went to similar lengths to highlight their unique 
insider perspectives, experiences and insights regarding the conflict and the study of the peace 
process. Take, for example, O’Leary’s account:  
So, unlike some people who have written extensively on Northern Ireland, I 
wasn’t born there. I was born in Cork, in the Irish Republic. Both my parents 
were from that city. But unlike any in Northern Ireland, I experienced ethnic 
conflict at an early age. So my family was in Nigeria at the outbreak of the 
Nigerian civil war. Both my parents behaved very honorably during that civil 
war.  
To take my mother first, on one occasion, a young Hausa man came down a 
dusty road near our bungalow. He was carrying a machete. My sister and I were 
young. I would have been about 8, she could have been about 7, I can’t be 
precise. He asked us where Adolfus, the Ebo cook was, and we knew he was up 
to no good, so we ran into the kitchen screaming, ‘Mommy! Mommy! There 
was a man with a machete who wants to see Adolfus.’ Adolfus, who’s Ebo. 
Plainly we knew from our experience that he was Hausa by background. He 
could have been Fulani, but I think he was Hausa.  
He comes in to the kitchen and he indicates to my mother that she should get 
out of the way. My mother has pushed Adolfus into the pantry and she’s 
standing in front of it. We cower in her skirt and she refuses to give way. My 
mother’s eyesight was very poor, she didn’t have her glasses on, but she was 
adamant that she wasn’t going to make way. 
So after a while, he thought better of it and left. My mother was able to call my 
father. He arrived shortly, at least arrived shortly after that. And my mother 
couldn’t describe the man because her eyesight was very poor. We could picture 
him. We were taken around in Eastland Rivers, to local villagers to identify 
what today would be called an ethnic clan. 
It looked as if everything was going to be unsuccessful. We returned home, but 
my sister spotted him hiding in a ditch. It definitely was him. I don’t forget 
things like that and we weren’t imagining things. So statements were made to 
the police and the police held him overnight, but my father told me later he was 
released because children’s evidence would but be sufficient to convict him.  
The following day, my father took Adolfus to the train which took him to 
Enugu, the Capital of Biafra, which failed to be. My father rescued a whole 
range of Ebo professionals, including those who were have worked on his 
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laboratory. My father was a geo-chemist and he rescued servants, put them on 
the train to Enugu. 
So I had examples in my own life of honorable combat in the midst of ethnic 
conflict (O’Leary, 2015). 
 
O’Leary went on to explain that despite not being from Northern Ireland, he already had some 
unique and direct experiences of sectarianism when moving there:  
So my sister and I had the unusual experience of being cultural Catholics from 
the South being sent to State primary schools, Protestant primary schools, in 
Northern Ireland.  
And I remember the first day; a very kindly Mr. Wilson was taking the register 
and new people who lined up in the queue.  
‘So, young man, who are you and where are you from?’ 
He was taking religious identifications not because there was anything anti-
Catholic about this but he needed to know which Protestant sect people 
belonged to. So that when they did religious instructions, some would be sent 
into different rooms, but others would participate in the class. So I said, in a 
very English voice—exactly bought up with English kids in Nigeria, ‘I’m 
Brendan O’Leary.’ And I turned to my sister and I said, ‘Aren’t you too? I don’t 
know Mary, but I think we’re Roman Catholics.” You could hear the silence in 
the class, I was an alien being.  
So [after that] I had to fight every boy in the school up to my height and a little 
bit beyond before I was in the fact, accepted after that initial encounter, almost 
persecution—difficult to differentiate from the kind of persecution that the new 
boy experiences anywhere, or the new girl. 
But it was plainly emphasized because I had this peculiar combination of a 
Southern name and an English voice. So from the point of view of the locals, I 
sounded like a smug, I sounded English; I was superior, culturally to them in 
my voice, but by name I was a Fenian and a Southern Fenian not even a local 
Fenian which is where I first learned the word Fenian. We were called Fenians. 
Now that seemed to be some kind of ugly insect. I was never quite sure what it 
meant at the time. But to receive political, ethnic or a sectarian abuse in quite 
an early age, yes, it has an impact on you (O’Leary, 2015). 
     
O’Leary’s story continues with his experiences of leaving Northern Ireland to study at 
Oxford, then LSE, taking up a position at the latter, and finally moving to the U.S. to teach 
political science at the University of Pennsylvania (UPenn). He made a point of highlighting 
his roles as an advisor to the Labour Party on Northern Ireland; and the UN on divided societies 
and civil war in Iraq and Kurdistan. Both O’Leary and McGarry consider that their 
geographical distance and “unique” background gave them “intimate local knowledge that only 
an anthropologist can quickly replicate”, coupled with “the advantages of being out of it” 
(O’Leary, 2015). This allowed them to take on “mainstream British” analysis and adopt 
“greener” interpretations of the conflict (O’Leary, 2015; McGarry 2015).  
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 This storyline of a “unique” or “unusual” experience as both “outsider” and “insider” 
is echoed in the narratives of various scholars. Mitchell, for example, stated that “I've observed 
sectarianism”; but was somewhat outside the Northern Ireland community, because he was a 
pure political scientist and not born in the region (Mitchell, 2015). In Hughes’ case, more than 
his research interests made him see himself as both an outsider to the community, but also 
someone with unique insider experience and knowledge:  
I was born in Belfast, in Andersonstown [which] was one of the most violent 
parts of Northern Ireland, during the war, and it was also, pretty much, a 
heartland of support for the provisional IRA. I’m old enough to remember the 
time when there was no war, and there was no provisional IRA, so I was about, 
I was still in primary school when the conflict started, so most of my formative 
years as a teenager, through University, were spent living in West Belfast, in 
Andersonstown, so I experienced the worst of the insurgency, and the worst of 
the counter insurgency (Hughes, 2016).  
 
This experience made Hughes feel an outsider within the greater university 
environment: particularly at Queen’s University Belfast, largely dominated by “unionists and 
unionist positions” (albeit he also felt this was now changing) (Hughes, 2016). His experience 
as an outsider continued on arrival at LSE: where he described a process of being “vetted” by 
his interviewees for his PhD based on his background:  
I wrote a letter, and then I was called for an interview, and now this is something 
which is always kind of interesting, because I mean, I had been travelling back 
and forth to England, partly because of this girl, and so, at that time, the way 
that you have this securitization around Muslims now, that was the case for Irish 
in the ‘70s and ‘80s, right the way through to the Peace Agreement.  
So all the ports, airports, were securitized, if you were coming from Ireland, you 
were stopped, you were searched, and of course, with someone like me, from 
Andersonstown, I got stopped every time, as soon as they put in your address. 
If I was a Protestant from County Down somewhere, of course, you get waved 
through.  
But if they check your address, well, I always got stopped and questioned, 
sometimes held, and delayed, and things like that, so I was running that kind of 
gauntlet, on a regular basis. And so I was called over for the interview, and I 
was interviewed by –omitted- and –omitted- and I knew nothing about the 
politics of Soviet, the study of Soviet politics, in Britain, to me it was just an 
interesting puzzle that I had.  
And I was good at history, and so forth, so I came over, and I talked to –omitted- 
in particular, and –omitted- and they both liked it, liked the idea. Now, I knew 
nothing about them, I knew nothing about LSE, and I knew nothing about Soviet 
studies in Britain, and the reason I’m saying all of that, is because it was even 
more, you think that Northern Ireland is a political minefield, well the study of 
the Soviet Union has a lot to teach ethnic politics in Northern Ireland (laughter).   
Because it was totally politicized, and polarized, ideologically, so you had 
certain universities that were associated with more left wing, or Communist. I 
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mean, in those days, academics would be members of the Communist party, in 
Britain, not in the United States.  
There was an ideological difference in the States too, between what were called 
the social and revisionist historians, and the more totalitarian school. But here, 
it really was ideological, during the Cold War, you had Communist versus 
critics of Communism, and that was, it just completely was like a huge chasm 
in the study of the Soviet Union.  
And I didn’t know anything about this, and LSE of course, was, it turned out, 
for me, was the kind of, it was like the mother lode of anti-Communism in 
England. And now, I was kind of fairly left wing then, and but what I wanted to 
study, was not a left wing driven puzzle, it was actually something that was very 
critical of Stalinism.  
So that’s why –omitted- and –omitted- liked it, and of course Shapiro was still 
alive then, and they were regarded as pathologically anti-Soviet. So they 
accepted me, and I came to do a PhD, but I only found out all of this, obviously 
later. But, what I wanted to say to you was, and this was something that I got, 
then became a pattern, when you go even from that first interview, and I’m sure 
–omitted- and probably –omitted- would not object to me saying it, but they did 
ask me about Northern Ireland, they asked me what my views were, on the 
situation, and that is something that is a regular feature then, thereafter, 
academically.   
So they basically want to make sure, it’s a bit stupid, because anybody with any 
sense of course, is not going to say, ‘Well, I support the IRA’, right, anybody 
with any sense, is going to say, ‘Well, I want a peaceful solution’, blah, blah, 
blah. So, I always tried to give a fairly nuanced, which is what my position was 
actually, fairly nuanced reply to that kind of question.  
If I had wanted to, if I supported the IRA, I would have joined the IRA, it’s as 
simple as that; I didn’t join the IRA, the reason I didn’t join the IRA was not 
because I didn’t agree with all of their aims or objectives, but simply because I 
didn’t like their methods, but you couldn’t really say even that, at that time. 
Because the level of hysterical, anti-Irishness in a way, and anti-IRAness was 
huge.  
You had to take up a fairly nuanced, well you had to say that you did not support 
the IRA, that’s one thing, you had to make that clear, and then, you had some 
latitude to provide some nuance, that you could say this and that (Hughes, 
2016). 
 
Hughes’ experience continues in many ways today. He reiterated that he was unique in 
terms of his experience and analysis of Northern Ireland – being what he described as outside 
the British mainstream – as the community was dominated by unionists and unionist ideas. He 
suggested this was probably the basis of many of the attacks and criticism aimed at O’Leary 
and McGarry, who both challenged dominant unionist paradigms (Hughes, 2016).  
Yet similar narratives were expressed among scholars who might be viewed as 
“unionist leaning”: such as Edwards, who candidly discussed his unionist background, service 
in the British Military, and position within a British military institution – Sandhurst – regarding 
all this as making him, too, an outsider of the discipline and the community:    
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I was born in 1980 in Belfast. The Jubilee Belfast City Hospital which is the old 
maternity wing.  Born 29th of March 1980.  I guess that was in the middle of 
The Troubles in the midst of it. I come from a security forces background. My 
father was in the military and but, we have been quite, well, a working class 
area in North Belfast called Raccoon. And, it’s near this city center right to the 
north.   
And, I guess that my upbringing really screwed me in Northern Irish politics in 
the sense that we have quite, we lived with people who were quite strong views 
and were prepared to kill and die for those views. And, I think that - because 
the area I come from - the people predominantly were semi-skilled or unskilled 
or skilled laborers. So, they’re working very experienced in various industries 
right on the East Trivandum which were, I guess, a product of the kind of post 
war peace evident that came gradually slow in Northern Ireland. Large U.S. 
factories that then set up making everything from cigarettes to components for 
telephones. 
And so, that background solely working class and I suppose Labour oriented 
and the results also from the 1960s involvement of Parliamentarism in that area 
as well as people who joined the army and people who joined the police. So 
predominantly Protestant, predominantly unionist.  But, fiercely working class, 
I suppose, would be the background and the kind of socio economic decision. 
And I lived there all my life until I was 20 years old, and then I left Northern 
Ireland to come here in Sanders. But before I came here I moved to Derry, 
Londonderry and worked for Anchor. I always had interest in history. So, 
Northern Ireland history. Irish history more generally. And, when I went to the 
University in Curran jumbled forward and back a little bit but, just, to sort of 
pigeon picture the higher Rave Theater. And, so, in the late 1990s, I went to 
study at the University of Ulster in Curran and because of my upbringing 
because of politicization that people had gone through and that kind of society 
in that community, I didn’t really want to study Irish politics in any great depth. 
I went to Curran – in the North of Northern Ireland – specifically because they 
offered a broad modern contemporary history course, which is by the 
international history… [but] I think it was unavoidable for me to become 
interested in it. There is a lot of conflict in the 1980s and 1990s [in Northern 
Ireland] and we were more out in the front line of that [where I came from] and 
so assassination was kind of an everyday occurrence. And, violence and public 
disorder was huge absolutely huge, and it wasn’t always directed at the outer 
community – it was directed inside the community. 
So, for example, at the minute I’m writing a book on the Ulster Volunteer Force 
[UVF] and one of the things I’m looking at is social control within communities 
and it’s pretty evident from the community I came from. It was the largest 
housing state in Western Europe at that time, over 10,000 people living in it. It 
was pretty evident that two factions, paramilitary factions, controlled it – the 
UVF and the UDA, so that’s the environment that I grew up in. 
The kind of ordinary people who were not involved but because of the small 
community everyone was connected in one-way or another. So, you can’t avoid 
it and it’s one of the motivating factors is trying to hide and get away from that 
sort of education process and you know, perhaps even leave Northern Ireland. 
But, actually I wasn’t destined for an academic job. I went to a school that was 
well guarded but not a grammar school not a high school, it was a secondary 
school and very rural. And, again it was afflicted by the Troubles and it was 
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predominantly Protestant. I went to that school and after many levels I went to 
one school in Curran. 
And then when I was at Curran in my last year, my undergraduate thesis was on 
the Curran Unionist Party and that was in 2001. And around that time I made 
contact with Richard English at Queen’s and then Richard recruited me into the 
MA program. I moved back to Belfast where my parents are from. And, I should 
say, my father is from Scaldun from Edinburgh my mother is from North 
Belfast. So, I came back home and then I remained there when I did my Masters 
and PhD. 
My PhD was on Northern Ireland Labour Party. So, again, Northern Ireland 
Labour Party had quite a strong following and youth following in North Belfast. 
And that’s why I wanted to study the Northern Ireland Labour Party because I 
knew the people who were out here that were associated with it [and could offer 
original insights].   
So, for example, I came from an area that is fiercely working class and Unionist 
and so I would say, Loyalist, but, there remains a Labour tradition there and so 
I wanted to explore this. So, I looked at the conflict, not just between Protestants 
and Catholics or Unionists and Nationals but also between people who were 
Labour and people who were Loyalist. And, that’s something I’m still, I still 
write about today. 
I suppose that’s really where my upbringing directly influenced all of the 
research that I did subsequently, and, I think that, because of my security forces 
connection it still influences me today, most of the work that I do would be on 
security forces in Northern Ireland – the army and the police… 
In fact, I am the only person who has written about loyalism from that [kind of] 
background. There are other people who study it but not from the point of view 
of close orders and wing people personally… So, for example, people who are 
assisting me with the book at the minute.  I’ve known all my life.  But, yet, they 
become respondents so they become interviewees and they become people who 
feature in one way or another in the book or at least in terms of my research. 
So, I’m unique in that respect because people don’t have that connection. They 
generally don’t have a connection with the communities that they study 
(Edwards, 2015). 
 
Due to this background and his placement within Sandhurst, Edwards sometimes felt 
an outsider in the academic community. He noted, understandably, that “because of the nature 
of my institution”, he would not be invited to certain conferences (not including PSAI), because 
it could put people in an “awkward situation”. He was often on the outside of the academy in 
terms of pressure for publications, looking for grants, or the need to collaborate on research 
(Edwards, 2015). Yet his unique background and connection with the community he grew up 
in afforded him the ability to do original work and develop insights which other academic 
analysis lacked. He spoke, for example, of his work on UVF decommissioning:  
 I see things that are wrong in the community that I come from, and have done 
[original things in academia] over the years since 2002 [because of that]. [for 
example,] I became involved with the Progressive Unionist Party and the UVF, 
working on decommissioning. Okay, so the first problem in disarmament being 
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organization, reintegration, disarmament.  So we worked on that. So I worked 
with them on that. And I suppose you could say I'm [also] an optimist.   
I suppose what led me into working at INCORE at the University of Ulster, and 
I know several other academic colleagues who have started off there but for me 
it was always based on being someone who worked on community relations. 
And we also worked on this decommissioning project, which I've written about 
it several times.   
I've carried that forward into academic work so far as -- and some of the -- a 
couple of journal articles and the chapter I talked about the process with an 
academic involved in that type of work, which is very dangerous, very risky, 
and I think no one else was doing it (emphasis added) …   
So the outcome of that was the UVF decommission in 2008.  So I was involved 
in that process and continued to and offer advice along the way when I'm asked, 
and that’s totally unique (Edwards, 2015). 
    
Edwards’ narrative also reflects that of Shirlow: who was recently appointed Director 
and “Tony Blair Chair” of the Institute for Irish Studies at University of Liverpool; and is 
former Deputy Director of the Institute for Conflict Transformation and Social Justice at 
Queen’s University Belfast (2013-2015). Yet in spite of this, Shirlow noted on multiple 
occasions his feeling and perception of himself as an outsider in relation to the community, as 
well as his “unique insider position” (Shirlow, 2015). Much like Hughes and Edwards, he was 
even an outsider to the community in which he was born:   
 I grew up it was like a working-class Protestant community, there were a couple 
of things in my life which were slightly different than the people I grew up with. 
I went to grammar school and I went to a Quaker grammar school, so I was one 
of the few working class lads who actually went to the grammar school.  
You were in the minority when you went to the grammar school. You were in 
the minority in your community because you came from a community where 
nobody went to grammar school, or very few. 
That was very influential on me, the Quakers’ ideas of liberalism, tolerance, 
respect, that did have an impact upon me. 
In the sense that obviously the conflict was a plague in all houses. That there 
was no settled route to the conflict, that there was no perspective which was 
right. There were these competing ideologies which were being performed 
through violence and the violence was not justified. The violence certainly was 
not permitting any sort of transformation in society. 
So I would have had a very strong sense of that. The Quakers actually taught us 
Irish history, warts and all. So there was that kind of interest why I went to 
university. How many people, irrespective of whether they were Republicans 
or Unionists, they didn't really know Irish history very well, whereas I had been 
taught Irish history. 
I was taught things like Ulster Unionist conferences were in the 1890s when 
they used Irish, or I was told about Catholics who were in the British Army. I 
was told about that sort of really, runny, messy nature of what Irish history was. 
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Whereas everybody else was probably being taught the Irish out of Britain 
history or the God Save the Queen and the Empire history. So that was 
interesting as well. 
My father was actually a peculiar man. He wasn't very sectarian amongst his 
peers, which came from a sort of trade union background. His family had always 
been known as being not sectarian.  
So Shirlow is a very rare name, but when I was young the older men would say 
to me, ‘Which Shirlow are you? Who is your grandfather?’ I would say, ‘Joe 
Shirlow’. They would go, ‘The Communists’? So you were understood as 
different (Shirlow, 2015).  
 
Again paralleling his counterparts, Shirlow went on to discuss how his background and 
education allowed him to be an insider:  
I was employed at Queen’s; my first job was at Manchester as an economic 
geographer. Then I went back to Queen’s as an economic geographer.  
That was 1993 when I went back to Queen’s, then the people I used to serve in 
the bar, the Loyalists, a guy rang me up one day, who is a very senior Loyalist 
and said, ‘Pete you are an academic aren't you?’ I went, ‘Yes.’ He said, ‘Will 
you help us out with the peace process?’ I went, ‘I am an economic geographer, 
I don’t have the slightest idea.’ 
He said, ‘No Pete, you know us, we trust you, you’re different’. So it was 
actually through that I kind of got involved. Then I went along, so '94 we had 
the ceasefires and then after that I was involved behind the scenes talking to 
people, building up trust, talking about different issues, themes, how the peace 
process was, how to move it forward. 
Then I got a phone call one day, ‘Would you go to the prisons and do this over 
a year. Talk to all the different groups in the prisons?’ So I did that, and then 
when I came out I was involved in different schemes and initiatives behind the 
scenes… 
It was actually that phone call, I had no real desire to get engaged with this at 
all. It is a peculiar biography (Shirlow, 2015). 
 
This biography gave him a distinct advantage and insight regarding the conflict: 
It actually helps in a way, because everyone else had their ideas made up and 
their theories. Whereas I was coming out doing stuff on the ground, [so my work 
is reflective of my background and is unique because] it comes from the ground. 
It is from the ground, so there are no preconceived [notions] – I was proved 
right, consociationalism is the model, for example. 
What I actually tried to do is report and record what is actually observed. A little 
bit of theoretical jazzing around it to give it some sort of academic validity. But 
I am not tied to any model or framework or idea. Consociationalism you get 
those people who are like, ‘I must defend consociationalism, I must condemn 
consociation’. Why?...  
[Yet] one of the criticisms that Colin Caldry [and myself] made a few years ago, 
about O'Leary and McGarry's book, Explaining Northern Ireland [and 
consocationalism], they never mentioned class.  
I know Colm, who is a mate of mine, wrote that material in Capital & Class and 
then he repeated it in his book about the sociology of Northern Ireland. Now 
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Colm like me comes from a Protestant working class community. For [people 
like] us we understood class as the motivating factor, not only for violence, but 
also the fact that we were treated differently because we were working class, 
that was a very strong thing. 
The Prods that were working class were treated badly. So whenever you had 
pompous lecturers telling you that there was no discrimination in Northern 
Ireland when you were sitting in a lecture. I could connect with the guy from 
West Belfast, because I knew what discrimination was. I knew the guy in the 
golf club got the job. I knew the son of the Judge that got the job. I knew the 
person whose dad owned the factory, got the last place in the school and paid 
fees to get it. I knew all these things. 
So I wasn't discriminated against because of my religion, but I was certainly 
discriminated against because of my class and whilst at grammar school I had 
been treated differently because I was working class. 
These were very strong things for us. So when you were sitting in the class and 
somebody would say, ‘There was never discrimination in Northern Ireland.’ 
And you are sitting going, ‘You what?’ So I can sympathise. 
The irony of course is the Loyalists are thinking loyalist. Of course they knew 
there was discrimination in Northern Ireland. They actively said there was 
discrimination in Northern Ireland. You look at common sense, you look at the 
UVF publications from the '80s, they say, ‘These people have been 
discriminated against.’ 
Now the desire for constitutional realignment or constitutional change in Ireland 
was wrong. But the fact that they had been discriminated against, we 
understand. 
People like me understand that, you know. So there are things like that. So I 
could bond with somebody from West Belfast then and say, “You hear that silly 
old toff, he says there's no such thing as discrimination. We know what 
discrimination is” (Shirlow, 2015). 
 
Shirlow emphasised his background and experiences several times throughout his 
narrative, reiterating that:    
…You have also got to factor into [this], there are [only a few of] us who are 
academics now [studying Northern Ireland] that come from working class 
backgrounds. And there were almost none from working class backgrounds 30 
and 40 years ago. There is a difference there [in terms of analysis] … If you 
went to Queen's University in the '80s they were all chaps, most of them were 
[posh] chaps [and they didn’t understand or include things like class in their 
research] …  
So I [was and am] different in many respects because I understand the conflict 
would be about class, I didn't understand the conflict would be about religion 
[so I’ve always been different] (Shirlow, 2015). 
 
Yet academics like Edwards and Shirlow, who come from similar backgrounds and 
claim to have insider insights - which both perceive as getting to the “truth of the truth” (R. 
Merton, 1972) - often find their versions of the truth in conflict with one another. For example, 
Edwards noted his contentious disagreements with individuals like Shirlow regarding their 
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interpretations, analysis, and research on the conflict and peace process; but actually questioned 
his legitimacy as an “insider”. When Edwards was asked about Shirlow’s working class, 
Protestant background, connection and work with ex-combatants, he simply stated that “he was 
not like me” (Edwards, 2015). While Shirlow did not make similar comments regarding 
Edwards, he often employed the notion of “we”: underscoring his solidarity with working class 
unionists and unionist communities, and simultaneously depicting his separation from the rest 
of the academy.  
Evidence of conflict and contention between the two is more explicit in academic 
disputes: in which Shirlow is accused of “perpetuating terroristic narratives” (Edwards & 
McGrattan, 2011, p. 358); while Edwards (along with McGrattan)’s research is argued to be 
riddled with “factual inaccuracies, false dichotomies, and tendentious claims” (K. McEvoy & 
Shirlow, 2013, p. 161). This is a continual theme throughout the narratives: interviewees not 
only asserted their claims as outsiders, but also question inherited insider insights, findings 
and/or status of other academics within the community. Yet the elements which constitute an 
“insider” change according to the narrative concerned.  
By way of reminder, Lord Bew asserted that “I was the only one in the game” (Lord 
Bew, 2015) when challenging claims which O’Leary (as well as others) made of being a part 
of the actual political process. Academics view their influence and impact on the peace process 
and politicians involved as another characteristic which makes them an outsider to the 
community of scholars and gives them an insider’s edge and credibility in terms of research 
and analysis: not only on Northern Ireland, but other regions of conflict. This was also 
consistent with other interviewees’ criticisms of “ivory tower” academics: many, in their view, 
of those theorizing on Northern Ireland and conflict resolution. Take, for example, McGarry’s 
experience:    
Unlike many other academics that study Northern Ireland I was never interested 
in academic work that was solely of the theoretical abstract side... the ivory 
tower. Or however you want to put that. I was only interested in Northern 
Ireland so far it could make a difference to policy… and have an effect. So, I 
got involved in minor ways in the debate in Northern Ireland in the policing 
question, I think in a relatively important way but after 1998, I began to get 
involved in the sort of practice of conflict resolution by advising government 
and writing reports for… well public policy reports. 
In 2008, I was appointed as senior advisor on power-sharing to the mediation 
support unit of the United Nations and I was the first person appointed to that 
position. Brendan is the second person appointed to the position. And in that 
capacity, I worked with the UN on a number of different cases mostly on Cyprus 
where I’m still working and – but also in other places like Iraq, Yemen, Kenya 
and different places. And so, I find this hugely interesting and also it’s a two-
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way street, I find no conflict involved, if you’ll excuse the pun there, between 
the academic work and the practical work. The one informs the other. Your 
academic research into these conflicts informs your policy work and your policy 
experience, your work in the field… it informs your academic research. 
So, I find given my type of research that these two go hand-in-hand and they’re 
hugely interesting and fairly unique. I find that’s been a tremendous privilege 
to have been able in the last eight or nine years to be exposed to the real world 
of politics. To be in negotiations and trying to work out compromises between 
different parties and to come up with approaches and the language etc 
institutional to science that both sides can accept.   
And it’s tremendous – nothing more gratifying than to even see one small 
change come about as the result of something you did or said or wrote and… 
I’ve got 12 or 13 books, and written dozens of articles, chapters and things, but 
you know when I see wording in an agreement that is there because I suggested 
it… that that means more to me than all the other stuff. Maybe other academics 
wouldn’t feel that way but I always prefer practical oriented work and it’s 
worked out for me, I would say that, and it's wonderful! I hope to continue doing 
it. 
And my role in the political world actually has increased… it’s made me a better 
academic. 
For example, I will just give you one instance, working on power-sharing theory 
and lot of the debates that goes on is between Liphart on the one-hand and 
Donald Horowitz on the other. They are different views in that, one of them 
says that power-sharing coalitions should be restricted to moderate politicians, 
that’s Horowitz, and Liphart says that coalitions should include everyone, 
regardless, as far as a democratic gain.  So there are radicals, and that’s fine as 
long as they accept constitutional politics, so anyway, that's been a big debate 
in the discipline and over here in Cyprus the last couple of years, I've seen 
Horowitz’ approach being tried and its falling apart and…it made me think, 
WOW! That is what’s wrong with that theory.  
And so I’ve written on this…there is an article coming in it in the International 
Journal of Constitutional Law this year sometimes. And that’s a way in which 
being in the field can inform your theory and since, because I saw that approach 
focus on moderates, it’s pretty plausible that you’d want your coalition limited 
to moderates. They’re more likely to work with each other…But when I see that 
kind of approach falling apart, then I cannot only write on it, I can contribute to 
science here that there are flaws they could think of it, and it allows me say 
something a bit different.  So and that's up to them what they do with those 
ideas…but that informs my writing, my research, and my practice (John 
McGarry, 2015).  
 
Edwards, Shirlow, Patterson, Arthur, Hayward, Doyle, Tonge, Power and others made 
similar comments: namely, that their engagement with local communities (often aided by their 
biographical make-up) as well as politicians greatly assisted their research, separating them 
from the academic herd (so to speak), giving them unique insights and findings. Patterson and 
Lord Bew repeatedly noted their engagement with and activism within the civil rights marches 
of the 1960s and the Workers Party: affording them “unique research opportunities” and 
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insights (Patterson, 2015; Lord Bew, 2015). Bew went on to discuss his work as an advisor to 
Trimble on the peace process, his position as a life peer in the House of Lords, and even his 
current position as chair of the Committee on Standards in Public Life – the body that advises 
the U.K. government on ethical matters; all aspects which not only set him apart from other 
academics on Northern Ireland – “the only one in the game” – but gave him insights into the 
peace process which other academics could not possibly have because “I was there” (P. Bew, 
2015).   
 Most participants made some reference to their engagement in some form of local 
activism and political engagement: either with the peace process, community organizations in 
Northern Ireland, or some form of policy advice at Westminster (i.e. “being there”). These 
statements were often made as a means of both noting their academic and research stature and 
legitimizing their insider status: differentiating them from the other scholars and work on 
Northern Ireland. In other words, in one way or another, this made them “the only one[s] in the 
game”. Edwards detailed his work with unionist communities, explaining:  
I’m what you could call a political academic. I’m not, I wouldn’t be politically 
affiliated, but I think probably motivated in terms of an activist agenda.  But I 
know friends of mine who are much more activists than me.  They would be, 
you know, writing about Ireland.   
…I'm a public servant. So as a public servant, I serve the public, regardless of 
whether they want to be in the United Kingdom or not. So, therefore, I’m 
obligated according to my terms of academia to be – to offer impartial advice, 
to interact with people on the basis of integrity and trust, and I think that it’s fair 
to say that if you would ask people who came from a Republican background 
or Unionist background, they would say that, yes, I am someone, you know, of 
that persuasion because I have to be, and I think as a citizen but also as a civil 
servant. And I would see myself much more as a public servant than any of the 
academics that you talk to.   
And, therefore, I see things that are wrong in the community that I come from, 
and have done over the years since 2002. I became involved with the 
Progressive Unionist Party and the UVF, working on decommissioning. Okay, 
so the first problem in disarmament being organization, reintegration, 
disarmament. So we worked on that.  So I worked with them on that.  And I 
suppose you could say I'm an optimist.  I suppose what led me into working at 
INCORE at the University of Ulster, and I know several other academic 
colleagues who have started off there but for me it was always on the basis of 
being someone who worked on community relations. And we also worked on 
this decommissioning project, which I've written about it several times.   
I’ve carried that forward into academic work so far as I’ve written a couple of 
journal articles and a chapter where I talked about the process with an academic 
involved in that type of work, which is very dangerous, very risky, and I think 
no one else was doing it.  
So someone had to do it, and we got some good people together and we pursued 
that.  So the outcome of that was the UVF decommission in 2008. So I was 
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involved in that process and continued and offer advice along the way when I'm 
asked. And that is simply from the point of that in the United Kingdom there is 
only one rule of law and there is only one government, and there is only one 
government that has the legitimate use of armed force at its disposal, and not as 
an old parliamentary organization in Northern Ireland as part of the U.K. 
So my motivating factor I suppose as being an activist is to take that out of the 
equation, to see how the organization transitions out of violence because it's still 
there. And the fact that, for me, this is a big part of the problem with academia, 
in general, they don’t make the connection.  They are prepared to invest in 
building a better society. So, if we go back to the terms – conditions of the Good 
Friday Agreement – it says something along the lines of decommissioning 
section that people should use it to move things towards a normalization 
process.  And I think that I'm one of those people. I have taken that seriously. 
Now I want to just pause for a moment and talk about the people that are 
prepared to be contrarian in terms of their approach, Polemical. I mean, they'd 
be accused of… that I've read recently would suggest that Henry Patterson, for 
example, is determined to be polemical, even today.  But I don’t think that's the 
case.  I think that they're not prepared to buy into the myth. 
The myth of The Troubles, and that it's simply a conflict. If you ask 
Republicans, a conflict between Republicans and the oppressed Northern Irish 
minority, and the Brits, or, you know, it's something else. And then my – and 
I've had arguments with Republicans that you can't characterize the conflict as 
just being between one group and another, the Brits oppressing the Catholic 
masses, because that's not evidenced by reality.  The reality is that there are 
multiple conflicts. 
So what I'm saying is by introducing complexity into it, then you're going to be 
contrarian, because you're not buying into the myth that has grown up and the 
propaganda and the slogans that have the grown up.  And, quite frankly, it’s 
nonsense because academics need to challenge that and most don’t. And I say 
academics broadly, relevant scholars on Northern Ireland.  I think with scholars 
and historians, there are conventions that you need to adhere to. 
Whereas I'm talking specifically about those people here that kind of are at the 
forefront of policy and academics and where they connect. For the sake of doing 
it because it had to be done because it hadn’t been done before, because of 
originality. Because the fact is that we have one way of looking it and I’m one 
of the few that challenge that (Edwards, 2015).  
 
Shirlow made similar claims in relation to his work on policing reform, community 
work and programs in unionist areas; as did Kerr regarding his work with Trimble, the UUP 
and the peace process; and Buchannan on her work on education and development in border 
counties.  
Scholars connected to the subject as well as the area therefore see their relationship to 
the communities from which they came and their engagement within these as something which 
not only enhances their research and differentiates them from other academics – rendering them 
an outsider in terms of challenging existing paradigms or developing “original” or “unique” 
findings – but also makes them insiders in the sense of holding a specific form of credentialism 
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on the subject. This is centered on early socialization in the culture: which they view as 
providing them with readier, more inherited access to certain kinds of understanding, 
individuals, and phenomena within the area or their location to the political class (R. Merton, 
1972; Naples, 1996). The insider claims of scholars are based, then, on the understanding that 
certain types of knowledge and truth regarding specific group life can only be unearthed by 
those who are directly engaged as members of this group, at least to some degree. 
 Dixon, however, deviated from this; his position as an outsider centred on challenging 
what he saw as mainstream insider doctrines, which he regarded as dominated by republican 
and consociational claims: 
From my perspective, the problem with talking about science is it’s got these 
connotations of objectivity and impartiality. Brendan and John would come 
much more from that school that sees themselves as impartial objective 
observers of social reality. That’s a very powerful rhetorical device. Part of my 
review, I think, of their work was saying, ‘Hang on a minute. Brendan’s an 
advisor to the Labour Party and it just happens that the Labour Party and Irish 
nationalism get a pretty free go here. They’re not particularly criticised. How 
do we relate these things? Is not the fact that you’ve got a position as advisor to 
the Labour Party not likely to constrain what you say about Northern Ireland, 
because, politically, that can be used?’  
By all means let’s debate the strength of arguments, but let’s not pretend that 
some of us or these guys and the consociationalists happen to be somehow 
standing outside of the world. Well, no. You live in this world and you’re 
constructed by it. Is it any surprise? When you look at their work, their argument 
seems to be, ‘Well, pretty much all academics are either unionists or 
nationalists,’ apart from them. That’s the ethnic conflict paradigm. We’re all 
explicable by our ethnicity and you can read off our politics from our ethnicity, 
except for somehow these consociationalists who - yet, when you hear about 
what they will say at sometimes academic conferences or privately, it’s quite 
clear that McGarry and O’Leary, they’re nationalists.  
But it suits them better to say, ‘Oh no, we are political scientists and these are 
impartial accounts,’ because out there in the world people somehow believe that 
academics are more credible or have credibility because they’re impartial and 
neutral. Well, yes I think academics should be listened to, but let’s not be naive 
and think that they don't have a politics. So like when you were reading some 
of the stuff and then you’ve spoken to the academic that’s written that, it’s only 
by understanding where they’re coming from and that their private politics that 
you’ve got from conversations that you can then re-read their work and see, 
‘Oh, actually, now I can see where they’re coming from.’ It seemed to me to be 
that as well.  
I turn up to the Political Studies Association of Ireland and you have a few 
drinks and you go in the pub and you’re arguing with people over politics. All 
of a sudden the whole political science bullshit drops and you really see what 
they really think. But because they want to play this academic game, there’s a 
certain lingo that they use and certain distance that constrains, or they perceive 
as constraining what they’re going to say. I don't want to hear someone telling 
me why republican dissidents are so great in a pub at the PSAI.  
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I want them to write that in a journal article and then I can reply to it. Academics 
who are re-interpreting the history of Northern Ireland, from a particular 
political perspective, but if you don't know where they’re coming from and if 
they’re not explicit about it, you don't get what they’re doing. I think that’s 
deeply misleading. I would rather people were a lot more upfront (Dixon, 2015).    
 
Dixon differentiates himself: arguing that aside from being one of the few scholars not 
from Northern Ireland and without family connections there:  
I’d say I am more upfront than most people, basically, but how do I explain it? 
To me it’s really important for academics to reflect and for their position to 
change. So, the articles on Labour’s Irish policy I wrote over 20 years ago now. 
I was influenced by some unionist arguments at that point that I now reject. I 
think were wrong. Although I’m a supporter of the Labour Party and I’m a 
member of the Labour Party, if the Labour Party is saying something that I think 
is wrong I’ll say something. I’ll say, ‘I think that’s wrong.’ I think it’s the job 
of academics to be honest. As much as they can be honest about what they’re 
saying.  
I suppose the most important thing, what I would say about my book on 
Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland: The Politics of War and Peace (2001), is 
in that book, each chapter, at the beginning, I will present you with different 
perspectives. I will show you how nationalists and unionists, various academics, 
have portrayed a particular episode in Northern Ireland’s history. At the end of 
it I will conclude with what I think, but that means that if you disagree with me, 
you know what a nationalist argument, or a republican argument, or what the 
other arguments are, and you can actually follow those up. I’ve tried to represent 
those arguments as reasonably as I can do. Sure, I’m not objective.  
The words that I choose, the language that I choose, what I cite and choose not 
to cite, what I’m silent about, what I’m open about, that’s going to influence 
what I write, but the principle there is that I am saying, “Look, there are different 
interpretations of this and that part of what we do is a fallible process” (Dixon, 
2015).   
 
However, Dixon noted that his status as an outsider and challenging of what he views as 
mainstream doctrines such as consociationalism has hindered, not enhanced, his position 
within academia:  
The problem is [for me] that because consociationalism is so powerful, you just 
have trouble getting published. I’ve had referees who’ve likened me to Ian 
Paisley and this and that and the other. That’s really how academia works. It’s 
not very edifying. Fortunately, there are colleagues who will publish me. It gets 
easier as you get along, but still it can be very difficult to get published. Some 
journals, Lijphart’s on the editorial board, or McGarry and O’Leary, or the 
editors, they’re connected.  
To me that’s kind of how it operates. They will publish each other’s work and 
they will cite each other [but that excludes me]. I don't want to over-egg it. I do 
get published, but it is sometimes pretty difficult because of my positions. Often 
if it’s an academic journal, if you get one bad referee’s report, and if I’m writing 
about consociation, the chances are they’re going to send it to 
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consociationalists. The chances are they’re going to know who it is. That’s the 
kind of thing that happens, I’m afraid (Dixon, 2015). 
 
In a different vein, McIntyre, with an insider’s experience and background in the realist 
sense – as a former member of the IRA – noted that he often felt an outsider to the community 
because of being an insider; as well as the only scholar who was “pro peace but anti the peace 
process” (McIntyre, 2015). He noted that:     
I’ve always been an outlier in that sense, both by temperament and by political 
persuasion. But they, see what we have in Northern Ireland, academia to some 
extent, is an acquiescence, and the intellectual hegemony of Francis Fukuyama, 
who says that we’re at the end of history. 
Probably most of them may not’ve even heard of Francis Fukuyama. That’s 
neither here nor there. It’s his idea. Which is more or less an evolvement of 
Daniel Bell’s idea in the 1950s, the end of ideology. But in a sense, they, you 
know, it’s a standard they actually believe it. But they, it’s the position that they 
tend to have to hold to. Because they hold on to it for fear of worse. 
The peace process has become battery but, that, you know. It’s, they don’t even 
have to call you an enemy of peace any longer. They just call you an enemy of 
the peace process. 
And I have always said that, and one of my reasons for opposing the peace 
process is that it’s not an indivisible concept. That the peace process carried off 
with the premise of the provisional IRA, the provisional campaigns. 
To strategically use the process beyond the name of peace. So by, my point 
would be, is that, because of the peace process become like Lord of the Flies 
(1963), by William Golding, where, whoever grabs the conch is in a position of 
authority. So everybody has to associate the peace process, and it’s created a 
big regime prison. Therefore, if you dissent from it, you’re immediately a 
bastard.  
So they always just say, ‘he is an enemy of the peace.’ But the… when I said, 
well I had a public record, one for an end to all violence. All Republican 
violence, and have all proportion delivered it. For Republicans, it’s never again 
to use guns to achieve their goals. 
Look at that, I’m still called an enemy of the peace process. But I’m happy to 
be an enemy of the peace process, providing I’m not an enemy of peace. And, 
because there is this fear that they do not worship at the altar of the peace 
process. And somebody else is going to come along with a false god. And it 
may drop all the people away from God and peace process to worship it, then, 
there’s some problems. 
[For example], there’s a recent article by, it appeared on our blog [the Pensive 
Quill], about the (Police Service Northern Ireland) PSNI, and it’s funded for 
publication in academic journal by two senior lecturers at Solon University, it’s 
a top university, Solon. And they basically argue that the PSNI were not what 
the PSNI were claiming to be, and that they have fallen far short this time. 
Why did that article have to go to my blog, and not an academic journal? [It’s 
because] that sort of thinking is not encouraged (McIntyre, 2015). 
 
Such has been McIntyre’s experience as an insider and his push against academic insiders and 
established paradigms, he has become a true outsider:  
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I can’t get work, so that’s how I, that’s how… I don’t think it’s because I’m a 
lazy bastard or I can’t deliver. I think there’s so much time, there’s a 
combination of past record, and prison record. And also, my views. I think that 
people make, I know I’ve been refused work on that basis, I won an interview 
panel one time. To do community research. And they discriminated against me, 
despite me coming first, and other views, on the business of making these 
remarks so controversial. 
And the sad thing is, this comes from a guy who’s gay. He, I mean, he should’ve 
been defend[ing] fucking controversial views, rather than punish others that 
were punishing others. But I don’t even … 
Well I don’t want to be using that as an excuse. I can’t get work in academia. 
I mean there’s an old joke of Belfast, I don’t know if you heard it, it’s what sort 
of something. It’s about a guy, he went in for a job, and, he had a stutter. And 
he went in for a job, in the BBC. And he was having a drink with a guy before, 
and he says, ‘I’m going for a-a-a job’. 
And the man says, ‘what are you trying to get’? 
And he says, “n-n-n-news repor-por-porter’. 
Right. So when the guy got back around [to the pub] he says, “Did you get the 
job”? 
He says, “N-n-n-no, but we fucking Catho-Catholics didn’t have a chance” 
(McIntyre, 2015).  
 
LINKING IT TOGETHER: INSIDERS, OUTSIDERS & BOUNDARIES 
The growth of knowledge hinges on the complex, often turbulent social relations which 
develop between scholars and/or scientists. Individuals have limited experience of the truth in 
any society and must therefore trust others for the remainder of it. This relationship of mutual 
reliance is one of the main functions of any society - but as cleavages exist within groups, this 
process often becomes problematic. This is further complicated within academia, where there 
is a tendency towards a particular form of separatism in the intellectual domain that leads to 
claims to group-based truth: “Insider truths that counter outsider untruths and outsider truths 
that counter insider untruths” (R. Merton, 1972, p. 11). Among the Northern Ireland epistemic 
community, interestingly, this separatism is often used to validate the “outsiderness” of insiders 
and “insiderness” of outsiders. In both cases, these claims are used to elevate and differentiate 
scholars from others within the community, legitimizing them in so doing.  
Lord Bew and his son, John, opened their narratives explicitly stating: “I don’t want to 
regard myself as part of an academic community studying Northern Ireland” (J. Bew, 2015). 
McIntyre proclaimed his status as an “outlier” in the sense of being an “enemy of the peace 
process” (McIntyre, 2015). To a greater or lesser degree, the academics’ narratives 
overwhelmingly display an express desire to place and position themselves as outsiders to the 
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academy to which they belong. Their narratives are reminiscent of the old Groucho Marx line, 
“I refuse to join any club that would have me as a member”.  
Yet dichotomously, this separatism from the Northern Ireland community is based on 
claims of early socialization and experience in the various communities and organizations in 
Northern Ireland. They largely see this affiliation as providing them with readier, more inherent 
access to certain kinds of understanding, individuals, and phenomena within the area: making 
them insiders (R. Merton, 1972; Naples, 1996). Academics often noted their location to and 
relationships with and within the political class, both during and after the Agreement, as a 
means of highlighting their insider status, while simultaneously confirming their positions as 
outsiders (being the only one in the game).  
Moreover, these insider/outsider disputes were not limited to academics from opposing 
camps (i.e. individuals from Republican and Unionist backgrounds). To be sure, as anticipated, 
scholastic separatism based on ideological lines was apparent in individual accounts. For 
example, Hughes’ outsider position and distance from the discipline was largely because he 
regarded it as being “dominated by unionists” (Hughes, 2016). Dixon made similar statements 
on his criticism of consocationalism’s ubiquity within a discipline which he regarded as largely 
dominated by republican interpretations driven by O’Leary and McGarry (Dixon, 2015). These 
accounts largely reinforced narratives from, among others, Patterson (2015): who observed that 
much of the discourse and contention between the community was based on ideological lines. 
English (2015) and Arthur (2015) also noted that in many ways, the Northern Ireland epistemic 
community reflected the society it sought to study, particularly in terms of ideological 
divisions. However, as English and others posited, these ideologies were hardly sectarian; but 
reflected republicanism with a small “r” and unionism with a little “u” (English, 2015).   
Competition existed, with more intensity, between scholars who held claims to “the 
real truth”; we might say, an authentic insider’s perspective on the communities in which they 
originated or their role in the peace process. For example, the cleavages highlighted between 
Shirlow and Edwards were largely along the lines of who was the “true” insider, in the sense 
of having an authentic socialization and background within the working-class unionist society 
which each sought to study. Edwards (2015)’ claims that “[Shirlow] was not like me” indicated 
that he was the “only one in the game” in terms of true access and insights to forms of 
knowledge within this community. Shirlow’s narrative expressed again and again the 
uniqueness of his biographical background; and because of this, his special access to 
communities: because they trusted him. These narratives counter the societal claims famously 
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made by Max Weber, who noted “one need not be Caesar in order to understand Caesar” 
(Quoted in: Michels, 2002, p. li).  
In any case, as we have seen, English (a small “u” unionist) is best known for his work 
on IRA terrorism (English, 2003); while Tonge, who acknowledged small “r” republican 
views, has written on and collaborated with unionist-leaning scholars on the Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP) (Tonge, Braniff, Hennessey, McAuley, & Whiting, 2014), as well as the 
Orange Order (McAuley, Tonge, & Mycock, 2013). This is also true of scholars with no 
connection to Ireland or the U.K.: such as German native, Stefan Wolff, who has written 
extensively on power sharing in Northern Ireland and divided societies generally, and is a 
former student of O’Leary’s (Cordell & Wolff, 2009; Neuheiser & Wolff, 2002; Wolff & 
Yakinthou, 2012). Thus, there is the prospect and acceptance of outsiders achieving creditable 
insights and establishing truth claims in aspects of historical inquiry, as well as understanding 
social and political phenomena within the community.     
It is important to note, though, that scholars’ relationship to or sense of being Caesar 
was not just linked to their biography and background; but also, their position, influence and 
proximity to the political process and political elites around Northern Ireland. Lord Bew’s 
assertions that “I was there” and was the “only one in the game” aimed to legitimize his 
scholarship on the peace process, his critique of the community’s analysis of it, and his ability 
to brand himself as an outsider to that community. Similar sentiments were evoked by Arthur 
in relation to his work with the UVF leaders; Edwards to his work on decommissioning the 
UVF; Shirlow to his work with unionist communities and policing reform; O’Leary and 
McGarry’s work with the Labour party and subsequent work with the UN; Buchannan’s 
position outside academia and work with community organizations on education and 
development in border counties; and Power’s community engagement and work with church 
organizations and clergy.  
The connection between these narratives is the scholarly desire to demarcate 
themselves from the rest of the community as not being an “Ivory Tower” academic. Yet their 
biography, participation in, and (at times) position within local communities and the political 
class afford them direct engagement and thus, privileged access to knowledge not availed to 
others. On the one hand, they see their outsider status and detachment from the “Ivory Tower” 
as allowing them to be freer, practically and theoretically, to survey and analyse conditions 
with less prejudice, granting them greater objectivity and ensuring that they are not tied down 
by habit, piety or (theoretical or epistemological) precedent (Ray, 1991; Simmel & Wolff, 
1950). On the other, they affirm and present themselves as insiders: not so much by implying 
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“I am Caesar”; but that because of their insider position, others “don’t know Caesar the way I 
know Caesar”.    
In these respects, the narratives show the degree of academic tribalism noted by Star 
(2010), who claimed that academics often look for various ways to stake out territories which 
they can claim as their own and establish themselves as experts within. These domains of 
expertise, or “intertribal centers” (Star, 2010), often rest along disciplinary and epistemological 
boundaries, around which the outbreak of conflict and disagreements is inevitable. In each 
specific domain where academics look to stake out their tribal claims, they often encounter 
existing or competing tribal leaders who also claim legitimacy: as underscored by the accounts 
of Shirlow and Edwards. These claims are often based on competing narratives regarding their 
access to certain privileged forms of knowledge.   
In some ways, this draws parallels to the imagery evoked by McIntyre (2015) in his 
reference to the characters in William Golding’s Lord of the Flies (1963), all of whom are in 
competition for the “conch”. He who controls the conch controls the tribe (McIntrye, 2015). 
However, because of the “great sectarian laboratory” (Tonge, 2015) brought about by the peace 
process and signing of the Agreement, the Northern Ireland epistemic community is not a 
single tribe but rather, a series of tribes. It is better to look at the academic landscape of 
Northern Ireland and the conflicts and competition between scholars more in the sense of Game 
of Thrones (GoT) than Lord of the Flies.  
GoT is set in a world divided into seven kingdoms. Competing elites jockey for control 
of the various kingdoms and, ultimately, to rule all of them. These kingdoms border one 
another; the overall land mass is defined by its northern border, divided by a large ice wall 
which demarcates the kingdoms from external threats. Each kingdom, and the rulers within 
them, is in a perpetual state of competition with one another over the boundaries of each 
kingdom and who has legitimacy to the main, dominant throne. Yet amidst this constant 
conflict, they can still collectively come together to defend against external threats from 
“beyond the wall”: would compromise all the kingdoms, ending the game completely. 
Much like Northern Ireland academics, the competing elites in GoT base their claims 
to each respective kingdom on biography (being one of the people), as well as their status as 
an elite and/or their relationship to other elites. These claims are based on the legitimacy of the 
individual either as a “true” insider – being Caesar – or their involvement with political elites 
and the governing process in some respect – being close to Caesar – as a means of de-throning 
the other individual or maintaining their seat on their respective throne. They present their 
experience, research, and findings as unique in the sense of offering alternative interpretations 
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to the “mainstream” academy and departing from the conventional dogma which, many lament, 
clouds the objectivity of scholarship: enabling them to truly understand Caesar. Yet despite 
intra- and inter-tribal conflicts and competing claims to the truth, the scholars all show 
commitment to the process itself; the analysis of which (although contested at times) in fact 
expands the base of knowledge.     
The functionality of a boundary object is measured to the extent that it can reduce local, 
or tribal, uncertainty enough to avoid a state of all-out war, then manage these various tribal 
boundaries when there is territorial overlap in a way that maintains allies and expands the 
existing base of knowledge (Star & Griesemer, 1989). Moreover, as we have noted, Northern 
Ireland’s epistemic community is divided into various concentrations: which focus on 
unionism, republicanism, power-sharing/consociationalism, transitional justice, and 
community relations, among others. Academics, then, define themselves not only through their 
areas of focus, identification with communities, proximity and status to political elites and the 
political process; but also by their disciplinary affiliation (historian, sociologist, political 
scientist, etc.). 
The Game of Thrones in which scholars compete takes place in the realm of looking to 
discover and claim reign over the “truth”. As the internal divisions and polarization of society 
at large stand in the way of realizing this, each respective camp and the individuals within them 
look for confirmation to affirm their status as both an insider and outsider; which in turn, 
validates ideas and information pointing to this truth, while discrediting the ideas and 
information of others. This results in the members of each group scanning, reviewing, and 
gathering data: to find ammunition with which to wage a campaign against the respective 
“other”, legitimizing their position as an insider and outsider, as well as claiming access to the 
truth.  
Though this process may play out in contested, often conflicting ways, scholars must 
maintain interaction and dialogue to keep these debates ongoing; and hence avoid a state of all-
out war while expanding the base of knowledge. Furthermore, due to these conflicts, scholars 
can find, recruit, and maintain allies – individuals they would also regard as true insiders or 
outsiders – with which they can wage their campaign.  
The linking element or boundary which allows these academics to define themselves 
by, as well as the basis for all scholastic analysis, is the peace process. This is the overwhelming 
thread throughout this research: the linking element which both institutionalizes the rivalry 
between differing camps and sub-disciplines and defines the boundaries of such debates as 
“something all scholars can get behind”. 
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In this sense, the only true “outsiders” are those against the peace process - as they look 
to compromise the entirety of the game by not recognizing the legitimacy of the Agreement 
and the political process which has played out since. This would explain why McIntyre, who 
admitted he was an “enemy of the peace process” and the only true insider in the sense of being 
a former active member of the IRA, noted that “I can’t get work” within the academy. 
Conversely, others, even when criticized as “not being Caesar” or “not understanding Caesar”, 
are not barred from the study of the peace process or a place within the political science 
academy. Even if they see themselves as marginalized at times (such as in Dixon’s case), as 
their analysis and views are within the boundaries of this process, no matter their differing 
theoretical and empirical claims, they agree on the relative domain of knowledge.  
Such is the complexity of social differentiation in disciplines dealing with zones of 
conflict, the functional autonomy of science (and individuals within a scientific community) is 
episodically subject to great stress, given individuals’ various backgrounds, ideological, 
epistemological, and theoretical commitments (R. Merton, 1972; Michels, 2002). Yet it is 
precisely this autonomy which enables scholars to transcend these variables in pursuit of truth. 
As Polanyi (2013) notes, academics, more than most, are “people who have learned to respect 
the truth”; and because of this “will feel entitled to uphold the truth against the very society 
which has taught them to respect it. They will indeed demand [and look for] respect for 
themselves on the grounds of their own respect truth, and this will be accepted, even against 
their own inclinations, by those who share these basic convictions” (pp. 61-62).  
Perhaps this explains why John Bew (2015) noted in closing that the only thing left to 
be written about Northern Ireland was “the truth”. The peace process is the object which makes 









This dissertation has sought to understand exactly how and why an epistemic community 
emerges. In doing so, it has focused on the puzzle of knowledge; its custodians, creators and 
carriers, and under what circumstances and how these develop.  
 We have operated on the premise that scientific communities matter. In the “knowledge 
economy”, where information is power, the enduring, growing importance of scientific 
journals, research centres, university departments, peer reviews and conferences all point to 
the growing influence of science and scientists (See for example: Chomsky, 1997; Drucker, 
1993; C. Kerr, 1995, 2001; Washburn, 2005). In Drucker’s post-capitalist knowledge society, 
knowledge institutions and carriers have become the central wealth creators of the developed 
world (Drucker, 1993, p. 8): the modern temples where people go to make sense of the world. 
Knowledge therefore has become an important factor of production; and one of the most 
valuable assets in society today.  
 The enhanced utility of knowledge has increased the profile and value of knowledge 
carriers and communities: bringing into question the ethics, practices, relationships and origins 
of these communities. In looking at how and why an epistemic community emerges; this 
research was particularly interested in how. By focusing on this, we could uncover not only the 
when of this specific community – the time it emerged – but the conditions needed for it to 
emerge; why it failed to do so previously; how that community has developed, operated, and 
adapted to changes in its environments.  
 The aim here is to address several major themes of this dissertation: the first of which 
discusses findings on how and why this epistemic community emerged. Next, we will discuss 
the type of community which academics are a part of and, in many ways, see themselves as 
apart from; as well as what motivates them: the personal, professional and biographical drivers 
behind their research interests and pursuits. The thesis concludes with some personal 
reflections on its limitations, challenges, and the direction which future studies might take. 
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REVIEWING THE THEMES 
In looking at how and why an epistemic community emerges, external, structural 
conditions help explain the failure of the community to emerge previously. These structural 
barriers include: overt censorship in the Republic of Ireland and U.K.: both in the media and, 
in Britain’s case, restrictions on funding bodies such as the ESRC investigating anything 
related to Northern Ireland. The continued outbreaks of violence in an area which is 
geographically small, within communities that are extremely tight knit, made conducting 
research difficult: researchers were fearful that their identities and safety might be 
compromised by dissident groups or state police agencies.  
During The Troubles, the main survey research firms “wouldn't touch [Northern 
Ireland]. You had to use local ones. And they – you go in and ask them questions. Who do you 
– which party would you support? Asked them questions about attitudes towards political 
violence, ask them questions about attitudes towards policing. Paramilitaries would wonder 
who the hell you are” (Tonge, 2015). Then there was the shooting of various academics at 
Queen’s University Belfast, as well as prejudice towards the subject within the greater political 
science discipline, a desire to avoid “being labeled Irish” (O’Leary, 2015), and the culture of 
“paranocracy” (Aughey, 2015) surrounding the subject. 
Internal intellectual barriers were also in place. For example, when the conflict was at 
its worst, from the 1970s through the 1980s, it was marked by stark consensus among political 
scientists in the U.K. and Ireland. One might even argue that this was why The Troubles were 
so troublesome: the consensus (both intellectually and politically) was that it was a conflict 
without a solution. Given the societal and institutional barriers that existed, challenging this 
consensus was problematic (For example: J. P. Darby, 1976; Lijphart, 1975a; R. Rose, 1971, 
1976a; Whyte, 1990). 
The boundary of a specific domain, discipline or community constitutes relevant 
episteme and epistemology. In this sense, a boundary acts as a socio-cultural distinction, which 
can lead to continuity or discontinuity of action or interaction (Akkerman & Bakker, 2011): it 
defines what is meaningful as well as what belongs within a discipline. Given the general view 
held by the British academy that the conflict was a “provincial” (O’Leary, 2015) “sink of 
sectarian violence” (Patterson, 2015); not to mention Northern Ireland being seen, 
internationally, as the “ugly duckling of regional conflicts” (Cox, 1998), and not even a major 
conflict in any case, a boundary was thereby established.  
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The emergence of a community becomes visible when new bases of knowledge begin 
to appear and challenge existing paradigms and boundaries. Northern Ireland’s absence of such 
a community is thereby explained by its lack of knowledge infrastructure around the subject: 
visible in terms of limited research, scholars’ lack of focus on the subject within the U.K. and 
Ireland, the somewhat parochial, localized view of the conflict, and social and institutional 
barriers: which made committing to and conducting research both taboo and problematic. 
 In identifying the development of this knowledge infrastructure, we looked to display 
the struggles (both internal and external) which scholars faced in building these bridges and 
roads, as well as denoting when the emergence of this epistemic community took place. That 
is, we displayed the when of this community – locating its emergence in relative time and space 
– as well as how this community became one, and the conditions and (boundary) objects which 
made this possible.  
 Northern Ireland represents a knowledge community which did not develop de novo, 
but instead crawled out of the primordial ooze of inertia of existing knowledge. This made the 
ability to identify specific dates - the when of this epistemic community - problematic. This 
sub-discipline and the scholars within its greater discipline – political science – were and 
largely remain at odds over where their work lies. Significantly, many interviewees refuted the 
“scientific” nature of political research on Northern Ireland over recent decades: focusing on 
ideology, rather than epistemology. Prominent scholars such as English, Arthur, Lord Bew, 
Patterson, Aughey; as well as relative newcomers such as John Bew, McGrattan, and Edwards, 
did not identify themselves or their scholarship particularly within the field of political science; 
but saw themselves as historians who happen to reside in politics departments. Moreover, 
female academics such as Buchannan, Power, and Hayward highlighted a gender element too: 
they saw themselves and their work as existing more within sociology, anthropology and 
theology than political science.  
 In this respect, the Northern Ireland experience highlights the interdisciplinary 
struggles which heterogeneous disciplines such as political science have undergone in the U.K. 
and Ireland over the last 30 to 40 years. The narratives recounted its relative infancy in both 
Ireland and Britain, and difficulties in distinguishing itself from other disciplines with deep 
roots in the academy, such as history and philosophy. Some continued to question whether it 
truly exists as a discipline in the U.K. at all. This all constitutes a further internal structural 
barrier: for some considerable time, Northern Ireland lacked the allies and objects allowing it 
 204 
to be properly translated by scholars. Instead, study of the conflict sat on the nexus of history, 
sociology, philosophy and political science.  
 This was important in explaining the how, as translation centres on the ability of 
scholars to reconcile meanings between disciplines, develop new findings (Star & Griesemer, 
1989) and enlist “allies” from various locations and disciplines: creating authority over a 
specific subject area and reinterpreting information in a way that fits individual goals and aims. 
The level of uncertainty around Northern Ireland was apparent through the tenacity and 
perpetuation of the conflict, confirming that it was a “sinkhole of sectarianism” (Patterson, 
2015). But this uncertainty also existed because paradigms which might have been used to 
explain it, such as nationalism and ethnic conflict, were not taken seriously (O’Leary, 2015; 
Mitchell, 2015). This is certainly confirmed by the literature on nationalism: which prior to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union was essentially viewed as a phenomenon studied by a handful of 
isolated scholars in sociology, anthropology and history (See: Hutchinson & Smith, 2002; A. 
D. Smith, 1998).  
 Yet paradoxically, this uncertainty helped identify the when and how of the emergence 
of the epistemic community. We identified points of emergence through developments within 
and around the discipline: comprising various stages emerging out of the ooze and developing 
a knowledge infrastructure.  
 The first development was the establishment of the PSAI in 1982, and its journal, IPS, 
in 1984. This was the first real attempt to distinguish Irish political studies from history and 
other disciplines. The creation of the PSAI and IPS marked a level of modularity regarding the 
study of Irish politics generally and Northern Ireland specifically: through the sponsoring of 
conferences and publications in the journal, it created a forum whereby “clusters” of scholars 
working on the subject could come together, share and refute each other’s work.  
This development indicated, at least ontologically, that information needs were 
emerging: scholars could at least look to begin controlling the nature of commentary and 
debate. It showed the need for repositories which could act as specific databases or “piles” of 
research (Star & Griesemer, 1989), which scholars could borrow from. It also enabled the 
community to begin identifying and locating other members. Moreover, certain media 
publications such as Fortnight acted as an unofficial repository, which allowed debates and 
discussion on the subject to take place both before and after the founding of IPS. Yet this was 
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only a beginning; the narratives highlighted that Northern Ireland remained largely outside the 
“mainstream” of British political science, with its researchers considered an “eccentricity” 
(English, 2015).    
 The next major development occurred in 1987, through McGarry and O’Leary’s 
engagement with consociational theory. O’Leary accepts that he and McGarry “not only 
applied consociational theory [to Northern Ireland], I think we partially developed it”; because 
of this, they “transformed the conversation on Northern Ireland” (2015). The individual 
contributions of these scholars to this theory and its application to Northern Ireland can be 
traced back to McGarry’s The Anglo-Irish Agreement and the Prospects of Power Sharing in 
Northern Ireland (1988), and O’Leary’s The Limits of Coercive Consocationalism in Northern 
Ireland (1989): which brought them to the attention to one another. Henceforth, they began 
their working relationship. From this point, collaborative efforts began taking place between 
various academics: leading to the seminal work, The Future of Northern Ireland (1990), a 
collection of essays which began debating the merits and plausibility of consociationalism in 
Northern Ireland, and looked to challenge prevailing paradigms which had so long viewed it 
as an insoluble conflict. 
 This coincided with a variety of other structural factors: including the Single European 
Act of 1987; changing economic conditions in the Republic of Ireland during the early 1990s; 
and major changes in the international order, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. All these had knock-on effects. This once provincial 
conflict was now viewed as a regional one, occurring in the context of various other ethnic 
conflicts which followed the demise of the USSR. Change was also underway in terms of how 
nation states should now deal with civil wars and ethnic conflicts; during the Cold War, these 
states had largely been left to deal with such issues internally (P. C. Stern & Druckman, 2000). 
 This period also marked the beginnings of the peace process. This helps point towards 
the when: albeit, there were several key dates. These range from the 11 January 1988 meeting 
between John Hume and Gerry Adams, to the IRA ceasefire on 31 August 1994. The narratives 
all point to the combination of the peace process, buoyancy of the Irish economy, extra-national 
developments such as the collapse of the Soviet Union and growing influence of the EU as 
helping make the study of Ireland and Northern Ireland “doubly cool”; the latter seemed to be 
moving towards peace, the former was doing increasingly well economically (English, 2015).  
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 There was an uptick in academic pieces produced on Northern Ireland: notably 
McGarry and O’Leary’s Northern Ireland: Sharing Authority (1993); and Explaining Northern 
Ireland: Broken Images (1995), which set the stage for many discussions and debates. There 
was a parallel increase in the study, significance and intellectual relevance of Northern Ireland 
to the British and Irish political science academy: with a proliferation in research, attendance 
and presentations looking to “explain” Northern Ireland at conferences and in the media, with 
O’Leary, Arthur, and others regularly appearing on and publishing in various media outlets. 
The consensus here is that both the peace process and McGarry and O’Leary’s application of 
consociational theory created an objective “framework” or “foundation”, which academics 
could review, debate, and refute. This is how the Northern Ireland epistemic community 
emerged. Yet these explanations of how fail to adequately explain the why. 
In asking why we were especially interested in discovering whether groups of (or 
individual) academics emerge as a response to political events on the ground; or do they, in 
fact, shape them? Here, the question of why becomes a little more complicated. On simple 
observation of Northern Ireland (as well as other areas of protracted conflict), we might argue 
that the emergence of the epistemic community was purely a result of the peace process and 
the signing of the Agreement, a response to events rather than a shaping of them. Yet the peace 
process and 1998 agreement was not Northern Ireland’s first. There had also been a peace 
process in the 1970s, resulting in the Sunningdale Agreement in 1973-4; and the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement was signed in 1985. Both had been the result of British and Irish government 
initiatives, as well as political developments on the ground. Yet why, considering these events, 
did the study of Northern Ireland remain an “eccentricity” (English, 2015) in British and Irish 
political science? 
Events such as the breakdown of the Anglo-Irish Agreement and its failure to bring an 
end to political violence simply reinforced existing paradigms that Northern Ireland was “a 
sink of sectarian violence” (Patterson, 2015). O’Leary explained how different the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement and abortive 1970s peace process was compared with what finally resulted in the 
1990s; the breakdown of Sunningdale meant political failure (O’Leary, 2015). McIntyre and 
Arthur highlighted that the 1990s-peace process was different, because none of its forebears 
had “delivered Sinn Féin” (McIntyre, 2015). Yet in terms of explaining why this community 
could form and flourish, this is not sufficient. O’Leary and Aughey both noted that research 
opportunities had been opened by the Anglo-Irish Agreement; while despite the hopes brought 
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about by the inclusion of Sinn Féin and success of peace processes in South Africa and the 
Middle East during this time, the prevailing view remained that peace in Northern Ireland was 
still highly unlikely, if not impossible (Guelke, 1994; Cox, 1996).  
  In this respect, consociational theory and the application of comparative methods are 
essential in explaining why an epistemic community emerges. These display the ability of 
academics to not just respond to events on the ground, in terms of interpretation, but to act as 
innovators in the sense of utilising theories and methodologies to “change”, “challenge” 
“move” the discourse and paradigms along in relation to Northern Ireland. This allowed 
common communication to take place across dispersed academic groups: which had varying, 
often conflicting, interpretations of what prescriptions and explanations should be utilized. The 
standardization of the methods utilized in applying consocationalism to Northern Ireland and 
other conflicts had Latour (1981)’s trait of “immutable mobility”: its ideas and information 
could be transported and translated between and across various disciplines in ways not availed 
previously. The debates around consocationalism not only acted as a boundary object which 
scholars could gather around; but also, had a boundary crossing quality which, in the context 
of the peace process, opened various new avenues for interpretation and investigation, across 
disciplines in ways that had not existed previously. They incorporated scholarship, researchers 
and methods from history, philosophy and sociology. This reflects not only the heterogeneity 
of the study of ethno/national conflict, but its innovation in translating these concerns and 
findings across a variety of disciplines and actors.  
Here, individual agency was vital. Interviewees overwhelmingly highlighted the 
personal contributions made by O’Leary and McGarry as explaining why the community not 
only emerged but remained. Even those who were quite critical of the pair and their application 
of the theory noted their vital contribution to the discipline and development of the community. 
Lord Bew, Patterson, and Arthur credited both with keeping the theory alive: acknowledging 
the huge contribution of the consociational model. Tonge, Mitchell, English, Doyle, 
O’Dochartaigh, and Shirlow all pointed to the importance and influence of O’Leary and 
McGarry in bringing “a forensic political science analysis” to a subject hitherto dominated by 
historians (Tonge, 2015). They were innovators to the discipline. Academics who began or 
finished their PhDs at various points in the 1990s all referenced O’Leary and McGarry’s work 
– such as The Future of Northern Ireland (1990) and Explaining Northern Ireland (1995) - as 
major influences on their research; while others, such as Brendan O’Duffy and Etain Tannam, 
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who took their doctorates at LSE during the early 1990s, explained that O’Leary’s 
methodological approach had brought them there. 
McGarry and O’Leary acknowledged their contribution: “I don’t want to say that we 
[started] a major intellectual revolution, but we did help transform the conversation on 
Northern Ireland” (O’Leary, 2015). This process began when McGarry published his first piece 
on Northern Ireland, The Anglo-Irish Agreement and The Prospects for Power Sharing in 
Northern Ireland (1988), and was contacted by O’Leary. Their interaction led to the 
publication of The Future of Northern Ireland (1990a), which brought together “about 12 
people who were engaged in different ways of finding a way out of the Northern Ireland 
conflict… Paul Bew and Henry Patterson were involved in that and I believe Anthony Kenny 
who was at Oxford, people from Dublin such as Anthony Coughlan” (McGarry, 2015). 
Although these academics had very different views on the conflict’s origins, they now began 
to interact more closely, and debates around potential solutions began to emerge. 
When the community started to take shape, in many ways, it reflected the society under 
study. Debates quickly became heated and, at times, seemed more personal than empirical: 
with anti-consociationalism becoming a “staple of the political diet of Northern Ireland” 
(O’Leary, 2015); and McGarry and O’Leary taking on a series of challenges from those inside 
and outside the academic community.  
 This was perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of the narratives: specifically, that 
however vitriolic and ideological the debates could sometimes be, they were not drawn along 
or attributable to sectarian lines. Interviewees made clear that where they stood and the issues 
they researched was in many ways informed by their personal sociologies, with several 
acknowledging the little “u” and small “r” of their alignment with unionist and republican 
perspectives. Yet all displayed the capacity to engage with those who adopted alternative 
interpretations and political alignments, in terms of both collaborative research and 
supervision. Even though some were not convinced of the ability or necessity of academics to 
divorce themselves, either partially or entirely, from their personal history and bias, the 
overwhelming evidence is that personal biography did not handicap debate on Northern 
Ireland. Mainstays like O’Leary made clear the importance of normative arguments: 
“Explanations and prescriptions are linked”, as you can “explain how something works but not 
approve of it” (O’Leary, 2015). 
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Certainly, the failure of this community to emerge during The Troubles highlights the 
extent to which actors are able to fully engage their culture in an active manner; if opportunities 
for engagement arrive, they cannot avoid responding to the historical, disciplinary contexts in 
which they find themselves (William T Lynch & Fuhrman, 1991). Both The Troubles and the 
state, cultural and academic sanctions in place during this time clearly affected what academics 
“freely decided” to engage with. This also debunks assumptions that academics can easily 
decide what their interests are and successfully pursue them. If anything, the Northern Ireland 
experience shows that social and historical contradictions hid individuals’ true interests and/or 
subverted their conscious intentions to pursue them. In this respect, Northern Ireland is likely 
to be no different from other areas of long protracted conflict during this time such as South 
Africa, Sri Lanka, or Bosnia where the outbreaks of violence and civil unrest as well as the 
international order created complications for researchers and academics in the regions. This is 
a point that we hope future research and researchers will take up and analyse.    
 Nonetheless, the accounts and controversies that emerged over consociationalism 
reflect what Star (2010) notes: the utility and robustness of a boundary object is often tested by 
how it is managed in the negotiation of translations across various social worlds or disciplines 
at times of uncertainty. As academics are somewhat tribal, in the sense that they often stake 
out territories which they claim as their own and establish themselves as experts within these 
domains, conflict and disagreement within and across disciplines is inevitable: very often, these 
tribal leaders fear dethronement. Thus the functionality of a boundary object is to reduce local 
or tribal uncertainty enough to avoid a state of all-out war; and when there is territorial overlap, 
manage these boundaries in a way that maintain allies and expands the existing knowledge 
base (Star & Griesemer, 1989).  
Both the peace process and McGarry and O’Leary’s application of consociational 
theory served this purpose. It allowed these scholars to establish themselves as experts on the 
application of the theory and use of comparative method; but also to include and navigate, 
sometime tenuously, the tendency towards tribal conflicts, garnering “allies” from other 
disciplines and even those from differing tribal camps, who proposed alternative paradigms 
and solutions. This is perhaps best reflected by Taylor and McGarry: who noted that precisely 
because of the disagreements around consociationalism, they could collaborate with various 
scholars from differing disciplines, via different methods, expanding the knowledge base in so 
doing. Specifically, they pointed towards the publication of Consociational Theory: McGarry 
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and O'Leary and the Northern Ireland Conflict (2009), where the debates were explained and 
expanded upon by various pro and anti-consocationalists. Thus the framework acted in what 
Hughes (1971) refers to as an “inter-tribal centre”, which could manage and house the various 
territorial collisions within a disciplinary space of sovereignty.     
 This is significant in displaying why the why matters as means of explaining how the 
development of a knowledge infrastructure and structures was successful. Star & Greisemer 
(1989)’s utilization of the boundary object concept emerged out of the historical and 
institutional developments of natural history research museums: which marked a new stage in 
the professionalization of natural history, as well as the changing relationship between its 
various scientists and researchers. These institutions developed largely out of displays of 
wealth and developments in popular culture which prompted interest in viewing such displays, 
creating increased demand for these museums. As these institutions were established by 
various wealthy collectors, who contributed substantially to their funding and operation, 
increased demand for scientific cooperation emerged out of individuals “doing things together” 
(Star & Griesemer, 1989).  
 This very much mirrors the “buzz” which scholars of Northern Ireland highlighted: it 
rose in status from “local” and “provincial” conflict to a regional one. It garnered international 
attention and financial backing through various initiatives from the E.U., U.K., and Ireland; to 
say nothing of Atlantic philanthropy, given the subsequent involvement of the U.S. in the peace 
process. This followed the same popular culture trend described by Star & Griesemer (1989): 
it mainstreamed the study of ethno/national conflict and civil war in British and Irish academia, 
while placing Northern Ireland within the context of greater post-Cold War peace building and 
democratization strategies: transforming it into a “cool” and “sexy” subject.  
These developments generated huge demand for new research: with large sums of 
money made available to community councils and research institutes; many more funding 
opportunities; and much greater student appetite and coverage of events such as the peace 
process in various media outlets. This demonstrates that knowledge productions are not 
completely detached from social interests; they are made possible by individual interests - but 
individuals, again, do not always have agency or awareness in creating or identifying what 
these interests are. Knowledge production and communities develop out of a series of struggles; 
part of this involves developing ways of crossing over established boundaries into new 
territories and determining what their interests are. The onset of the peace process and 
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application of consociationalism introduced new paradigms, allowing scholars to begin 
reconciling meanings and enlisting “allies” (Star & Griesemer, 1989): establishing a new 
intellectual authority around the subject and branching into new territories. This made the 
development of such knowledge infrastructures possible.  
 However, even following the Agreement, scholars still faced a series of obstacles. 
Despite the immediate euphoria which followed its signing in 1998, there was a prolonged 
period of uncertainty and scepticism regarding the implementation of its various phases. This 
uncertainty existed at intellectual, political and social level; Kerr reflected on the difficulties 
of “selling” the Agreement publicly and politically. As McGarry and O’Leary noted, this 
period revived existing battlegrounds around cosociationalism, as well as opening new avenues 
and opportunities for research; and took place within a university culture undergoing dramatic 
transformation.  
There were challenges regarding the “endless” replication of existing paradigms and 
research by scholars in the consociationalist camp. This was largely credited to what many 
referred to as the “marketization” of academic research and the “peace process industry” which 
had emerged following the Agreement, attributed to the neo-liberal policies adopted by British 
(and subsequently Irish) governments towards higher education.  
 Evidence of this can be seen in the wide consensus among interviewees: during the 
post-Agreement period, there was a massive expansion of research agendas and publications 
utilizing consociationalism as well as comparative methodologies. Rising academics such as 
Kerr and McEvoy highlighted its centrality in understanding what was taking place in Northern 
Ireland; and it had also begun to be applied to areas outside the Anglo-Irish sphere. Even critics 
accepted the importance of these debates in explaining the why of the expanding literature on 
Northern Ireland; understanding and analysing other conflicts and peace arrangements in, for 
example, FYR Macedonia, Lebanon, Bosnia, and Iraq; as well as other subject areas, such as 
terrorism, transitional justice, and mainland British politics.  
  All of this points to the mobility, utility, and innovation of consociationalism, and the 
authority which its architects had come to command within the wider discipline. Northern 
Ireland’s post-Agreement innovation and utility is therefore evident in its capacity to be placed 
within wider international frameworks and folded into the now expanding field of conflict 
studies in a changing university environment, where new pressures and pushes on academics 
for both funding and publications had increased. It further shows that consociationalism and 
the comparative method had the trait of immutable mobility: the ability of an idea and its 
 212 
information to be translated and transported across disciplines and fields to a variety of cases 
(Latour, 1981). The replication and (re)application of consociationalism to various conflicts 
outside the Northern Irish context, and the centrality which Northern Ireland has come to play 
in these analyses, demonstrates the durability and adaptability of this paradigm: not only in 
maintaining existing allies, but enlisting new ones.  
  It is also important to note scholars’ claims regarding the “marketization” of research, 
potential for “opportunism”, competition amongst and between the community. The literature 
concerning boundary objects and their development within knowledge fields largely views and 
explains knowledge creators as entrepreneurs, and knowledge institutions as enterprises (Star 
& Griesemer, 1989). This is important to our understanding of the why of the Northern Ireland 
community: in some cases, actors and institutions choose the environment in which they 
operate. This is among the functions of the institution as an enterprise and actor as an 
entrepreneur (Hughes, 1971Chpt 6 ; Star & Griesemer, 1989). In other words, someone inside 
the institution acts as an entrepreneur (i.e. the academic looking to attract funding, fulfil 
external and internal institutional requirements and quotas, and maintain relevance within their 
field); while enterprising actors must choose, within the possible limits, the environment to 
which the institution will react. This encompasses how and where it will attract funding, the 
needs of its clientele (students, journals, and research bodies), and the sources it can draw from 
(Star & Griesemer, 1989).  
 Northern Ireland’s epistemic community, though, is not a single, standalone one; but 
rather, a series of communities, each specializing and focusing on its own sub-fields (i.e. 
terrorism, transitional justice, devolution), dispersed across a variety of disciplines (i.e. 
Sociology, Political Science, History, Philosophy). This was explained through actors’ ability 
to adapt to the changing “markets” of the university enterprise. Northern Ireland academics 
therefore act(ed) as knowledge entrepreneurs utilizing a boundary object(s) 
(consociationalism, the Northern Ireland Peace Process Model, and comparative 
methodologies): which had the trait of “immutable mobility”, as well as the capability to negate 
local, “tribal” uncertainties of existing scholarship. This allowed them to avoid epistemological 
warfare, incorporate new “allies” within and across the domain, expand their clientele, sources 
of information and opportunities.  
Regardless, that engagement with and understanding of consociationalism (and its 
debates) and the Northern Ireland process remained (and will continue to remain) essential 
reflects the entrepreneurialism and innovativeness of scholars, and the robustness of the 
boundary object. This helps explain the pervasiveness and continuity of the debates on 
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consociationalism, and why the Northern Ireland model has established itself as a central part 
of conflict analysis.  
 A purely structural understanding of why knowledge communities emerge 
miscalculates the extent to which ideas produced within a society uniformly support the ruling 
class. Marx (1975) posited that “the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas” 
(p.59). In other words, the class which has the ruling material force of society is, at the same 
time, its ruling intellectual force. Yet Northern Ireland shows that ideas produced to support 
one set of interests can also be used to support, and even be opposed to, another set. Our 
analysis reveals that members of its epistemic community are not fully detached from social 
interests and forces, nor is their research completely shaped by these interests. This shows that 
actors often lack agency in creating opportunities within a structure; but once these are created, 
they can exert agency over how these are utilized and navigated. But what kind of community 
is this; and what motivates its members?  
If academics act as entrepreneurs and universities as enterprises, does this mean that 
this community and its members can be reduced to a group(s) of opportunists motivated by 
power, profit and prestige? To this, the answer is a resounding “no”. 
 The narratives overwhelmingly indicate that financial incentives and calculations were 
marginal in research calculations. True, attracting and obtaining funding was an essential part 
of the research process, and a consequence of the neoliberal reforms in higher education, but 
“nobody was getting rich studying Northern Ireland” (Anonymous 1, 2015). Even at the height 
of the peace process, when many claimed the discipline was being “lavished with cash” 
(Anonymous 2, 2015), funding proposals continued to be met with high rates of rejection and, 
even when successful, the rewards were often small in comparison to other scientific 
disciplines.  
This is consistent with empirical findings across all social science domains. As a current 
example, of the £4.8 billion which the U.K. government budgeted for 2016/17 science and 
research funding, only £155 million (3%) was allocated to the entirety of the social sciences 
and humanities (Government, 2016). If this provides evidence of anything, it is the sardonic 
statement that “the reason the infighting in political science is so fierce is that the stakes are so 
small” (Banks, Gruberg, & Kaufman, 1977, p. 511).  
 “Marginality” refers to those with membership of more than one social world (for 
example, historians, sociologists and philosophers in Political Science) (Star & Griesemer, 
1989). Often, these “marginal individuals” experience tension in terms of both identity and 
loyalty (i.e. scholars’ ideological and biographical identity and adherence – loyalty – towards 
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epistemological doctrines). The strategies employed by marginal people to manage their 
identities are usually to “stake out” territories, either literal or conceptual; recruit “allies”; then 
establish institutionalized ways of negotiating and managing intellectual affairs when different 
social worlds share the same territory: in other words, tribal leaders act as boundary brokers 
(Kimble et al., 2010; Star & Griesemer, 1989).  
In these negotiations between brokers, conflict is inevitable, and paradigms are 
constantly challenged and refined. Thus, the central cooperative task of marginal individuals 
is the “translation” of one another’s perspectives to existing allies and potential new ones, while 
managing conflict and avoiding all-out war. The extent to which this is successful reflects the 
robustness of the boundary object, its ability to co-exist between and across multiple 
boundaries, and be utilized by a variety of marginal individuals.  
In the case of Northern Ireland, this is apparent in the epistemological (and ideological) 
divides which still exist between historical approaches and comparative methodologies, as well 
as the criticisms around consocationalism and its ongoing interpretations (debates). Yet despite 
these tensions and conflicts, analysis of the peace process and Northern Ireland model has 
successfully expanded into wider discussions of conflict management by “allies” of initial 
boundary brokers (i.e. the contemporaries of individuals such as O’Leary), while maintaining 
relationships and collaborations with scholars who oppose these paradigms. There is an 
overarching commitment and dedication amongst and between the community’s members to 
understanding and discovering the “truth” of the peace process in Northern Ireland and the 
theories and conditions (consociational or not) which make peace possible (inside and outside 
Northern Ireland).     
 Scholars have limited experience of the “truth” in any society, and must therefore trust 
and enrol the help of others for the remainder of it. This relationship of mutual reliance is a 
main function of any society; but as cleavages exist within groups, this process often becomes 
problematic. This is further complicated in academia: where there is a tendency towards a 
particular form of separatism, which leads to claims of group-based truth: “Insider truths that 
counter outsider untruths and outsider truths that counter insider untruths” (R. Merton, 1972, 
p. 11).  
Yet this research shows that among the Northern Ireland epistemic community, this 
separatism is used to validate the “outsiderness” of insiders and “insiderness” of outsiders. It 
reveals, to a greater or lesser degree, scholars’ desire to position themselves as outsiders to the 
academy to which they belong, to preserve their integrity and proximity with the truth. 
Academics’ affiliation with this community are reminiscent of the old Groucho Marx line: “I 
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refuse to join any club that would have me as a member”. Yet dichotomously, their separatism 
from the Northern Ireland community is itself based on claims of early socialization and 
experience in the various communities and organizations in Northern Ireland. They view this 
affiliation as providing them with readier, more inherent access to certain kinds of 
understanding, individuals, and phenomena: making them insiders (R. Merton, 1972; Naples, 
1996).  
In such regard, interviewees often noted their location to and relationships with and 
within the political class both during and after the Agreement: a means of demonstrating their 
insider status, while simultaneously insisting upon their position as an outsider to the 
community (i.e. “the only one in the game”). Interestingly, these insider/outsider disputes were 
not limited to academics from opposing camps (i.e. individuals from republican and unionist 
backgrounds). Instead, much of this separatism was based on ideological (with a small “i”) 
lines. Hughes (2016)’ outsider’s position and distance from the discipline was largely because 
he regarded it as being “dominated by unionists” (2016). Similar convictions were held by 
Dixon (2015): whose criticisms of consocationalism’s ubiquity linked with what he perceived 
as the domination of republican interpretations driven by O’Leary and McGarry. This lends 
credence to the idea that the Northern Ireland epistemic community largely reflected the society 
it sought to study, particularly in terms of ideological divisions.  
However, that ideological divisions did not inhibit scholastic collaboration, nor did they 
completely shape academic behaviour and dictate research, sheds some light on the nature of 
this community and its members. Scholars’ personal and professional identities were greatly 
mediated through their academic training, engagement with other scholars and within various 
institutions. This vindicates the argument that individuals are not cultural zombies who 
mindlessly act out the cultural/social scripts in the storying of their lives; but adapt to, resist, 
and selectively appropriate various happenings at different stages in their development, 
including how they define themselves in relation to these people and events. This is true of 
both ideology and epistemology. Contemporaries and understudies (what we might call allies) 
of O’Leary and McGarry made it clear that they were not “cheerleaders” (Tonge, 2015) of 
either consociationalism or its founders; but found utility in their comparative model and the 
“truths” brought about by utilising it. Moreover, even major critics recognized the major 
contribution of the pair in “changing the conversation” on Northern Ireland, garnering a deeper 
understanding of the peace process and its application to other areas of conflict.      
 In fact, much more competition existed between scholars who held claims to “the truth” 
in terms of the communities they originated from or their role in the peace process. The 
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cleavages highlighted between Shirlow and Edwards, for example, were largely along the lines 
of who was the “true” insider, in the sense of an authentic socialization and background within 
working class unionist society. Edwards (2015)’ insistence that Shirlow “was not like me” was 
intended to reiterate that he was the “only one in the game” in terms of true access and insights 
to forms of knowledge within this community. Shirlow’s narrative expressed again and again 
the uniqueness of his biographical background; and hence, his special access to communities, 
because they trusted him.  
These narratives counter Max Weber’s famous claim that “one need not be Caesar in 
order to understand Caesar” (Quoted in: Michels, 2002, p. li). Yet they also display the 
acceptance and prospect of outsiders (such as Rose or Wolff) obtaining creditable insights and 
establishing truth claims in historical inquiry, social and political phenomena. Furthermore, 
Lord Bew’s supervision of Anthony McIntyre’s PhD, former IRA member and ardent critic of 
the peace process; and O’Leary’s supervision of UUP member and former Trimble staffer, 
Michael Kerr, are highly indicative of the tolerance and inclusion of wildly differing 
viewpoints and individuals. 
 What we identified as the sense of “being Caesar” was therefore not only linked to 
personal biographies – having come from or having relationships to the communities in 
Northern Ireland – but emanated from participants’ position, influence and proximity to the 
political process and elites. Lord Bew’s assertions that “I was there” and the “only one in the 
game” sought to legitimize his scholarship on the Northern Ireland peace process, critique of 
the community’s analysis of it, and branding of himself as an outsider. Similar sentiments were 
invoked by Arthur in relation to his work with UVF leaders; Edwards to his work on 
decommissioning with the UVF; Shirlow to his work with unionist communities and on 
policing reform; O’Leary and McGarry’s work with the Labour Party and UN; Buchannan’s 
position outside academia and work with community organizations on education and 
development in border counties; and Power’s community engagement and work with church 
organizations and clergy.  
 The link between these narratives is the desire of academics to demarcate themselves 
from the remainder of the community: they do not want to be known as one of those “Ivory 
Tower” academics. Yet paradoxically, their biography, participation in, and (at times) position 
within local communities and the political class affords them direct engagement and thus, 
privileged access to knowledge not availed to others. On the one hand, our interviewees view 
their outsider status and detachment from the “Ivory Tower” as allowing them to be freer, 
practically and theoretically; survey and analyse conditions with less prejudice; and enabling 
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them to have greater levels of objectivity, not tied down by habit, piety or (theoretical or 
epistemological) precedent (Ray, 1991; Simmel & Wolff, 1950). In this sense, academics 
perceive that the further away from the “Ivory Tower” they are, the closer they are to the truth. 
Yet on the other, they affirm and present themselves as insiders: not so much by implying “I 
am Caesar”; but instead, because of their insider position, that others “don’t know Caesar the 
way I know Caesar”.    
 This tribalism reflects a Game of Thrones scenario. Competing academics base their 
claims to each respective “kingdom” on biography (i.e. being one of the people), their status 
as an elite and/or their relationship to other elites. This is based on the legitimacy of the 
individual, either as a “true” insider – being Caesar – or their involvement with political elites 
and the governing process in some respect – being close to Caesar – as a means of dethroning 
the rival individual or maintaining their seat on their respective throne. They present their 
experience, research, and findings as unique: offering alternative interpretations to the 
“mainstream” academy and departing from the conventional dogma which, many lament, 
clouds the objectivity of scholarship - thereby enabling them to truly understand Caesar. Yet 
despite intra and inter-tribal conflicts and competing claims to the truth, all our scholars 
demonstrate a commitment to the process itself; the analysis of which (although contested at 
times) is successfully expanding the knowledge base.     
 This Game of Thrones in which academics compete supersedes their efforts to discover 
the “truth”. As the internal divisions and polarization of society stand in the way of realizing 
this, each respective camp and the individuals within them seek confirmation: affirming their 
status as both insider and outsider; validating ideas and information pointing to this truth; and 
discrediting the ideas and information of others. This results in the members of each group 
scanning, reviewing and gathering data, to find ammunition for a campaign against the 
respective “other”. Shirlow’s observation that “academics love to argue” holds credence. Yet 
while this process may play out in a contested, often conflicting way, scholars maintain enough 
interaction and dialogue to keep these debates going: avoiding a state of all-out war and 
expanding the knowledge base. The ability to and love of argument is a way through which 
academics can come together.   
The linking element or boundary which allows these scholars to define themselves and 
provides the basis for all analysis (and arguments) is the peace process. This institutionalizes 
rivalry between differing camps and sub-disciplines; links scholars’ commitment to peace in 
Northern Ireland and its maintenance; defines the boundaries of such debates, and prevents 
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them from deteriorating into all-out warfare. It is, in other words, “something all scholars can 
get behind”.   
REFLECTIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FINAL THOUGHTS 
 This dissertation has been concerned with an epistemic community, which developed 
out of a conflict; or to put it more accurately, out of a peace process seeking to respond to a 
conflict. This community largely reflects the society it endeavours to understand; and like those 
touched by The Troubles, has struggled to adapt and come to terms with a changing 
environment and landscape.  
 In reflecting on the outcomes of this research and its findings, it is apparent that 
communities are complex, develop slowly, and the relationships between members have the 
potential to be contentious, competitive, collaborative and cooperative. Like all relationships, 
those between academics are defined and shaped by a complex, at times confusing, 
combination of biography, sociology, location and situation. These communities not only 
develop out of, alongside, or within institutions; but shape their institutions: shifting often 
unknowingly between the roles of pilot and passenger.   
 This was the major challenge which became apparent in the method, navigation and 
articulation of this research: how to account for and be sensitive to such a complex pattern of 
variables. Looking back over this thesis, the choice of narrative stories certainly helped 
navigate a path which was constantly shifting underneath us. This was apparent during the 
initial approach of scholars: it quickly became clear that, like all individuals, they are 
complicated, with diverse, at times contradictory experiences, beliefs, and ideas. Academics 
are often sensitive and tend to be reactive (allergically so) to personal reflexivity regarding 
their own lives and especially, their own work; yet the amount of resistance and reluctance 
which this research met with still came as something of a surprise.  
Having said this, it was clear that much of this resistance and reluctance was because 
of how close many of the academics were to the region they studied (both biographically and 
geographically). Many of them bear the scars of having lived through the Troubles; some losing 
friends, family members, and colleagues. It was moving and, at times, heart breaking to hear 
some of these accounts. It was clear that, to at least some extent, these experiences shaped 
many of their lives and the direction of their research. However, I never stopped being 
impressed by these individuals’ ability to hold themselves (and others) accountable for their 
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biases. It was on these points that individuals’ professionalism and academic training was really 
on display. Most were keenly aware of their biases and able to acknowledge and account for 
them in the interviews and after. One account with Henry Patterson stands out. Though hyper 
critical (and outspoken) about Brendan O’Leary in his interview: Patterson, following his 
interview, emailed me to thank me for our discussion and acknowledged that he may have been 
overly critical of O’Leary. In this exchange, he acknowledged his contribution to the discipline 
but noted that “I liked him better when he was a Marxist historian” (Patterson, 2015). This 
showed me that though scholars disagree there is a level of professional respect they hold for 
one another. Though at times they sometimes cross these lines. Academics are passionate 
people. One must be if they are to dedicate large portions of their professions and life to writing 
and researching on one subject or area. I have learned this first hand over the past four years. 
Looking back, much of the resistance from scholars in participating in this research was based 
on their concerns that speaking frankly about these issues might disrupt or break with this 
professionalism.       
The sample number of respondents was more than adequate to identify themes among 
the narratives, the point of emergence of this community, the problems it had faced in (and 
before) its emergence, and how it had evolved and adapted to a changing environment. 
However, this sample could have benefited from more of a female presence, as well as a larger 
proportion of pioneering scholars.  
 As noted above, many academics, particularly female and more senior ones, were 
adamantly opposed to (if not clearly offended by the prospect of) participating. They were 
resistant at best to what might involve personal commentary or opinions on other academics or 
themselves; or even downright annoyed at the prospect of being affiliated with the Northern 
Ireland epistemic community, or political science discipline. In some cases, the reassurances 
of confidentiality, anonymity, and agency – in terms of editing texts – insisted upon proved 
painstaking indeed. This was particularly true of female scholars: who either refused to 
participate or were legitimately fearful that their identities might be compromised.  
These all comprised substantial obstacles. This means there is only limited insight on 
what this community can tell us about the role (or lack thereof) of women in the emergence 
and evolution of the Northern Ireland epistemic community; and their role and representation 
in political science in the U.K. and Ireland generally. We must therefore acknowledge the lack 
of a feminist critique within this research. Our hope is that further works will delve deeper into 
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these issues, investigating questions such as: what role do women play in the emergence of an 
epistemic community? How have feminist scholars shaped the evolution of the political science 
discipline in the U.K. and Ireland? And to what extent does the dominance of patriarchal-
oriented interpretation and analysis of Northern Ireland contribute to the perpetuation of 
conflict within the discipline? This would help provide greater nuance on the how of an 
epistemic community’s emergence and development; as well as insight into whether the 
dominance of roosters alters the chickens’ relationship with the egg.  
 Similarly, the inclusion of more senior, pioneering scholars would have painted a more 
in-depth, colourful account of the pre-epistemic community environment; and provided more 
detail on the personal obstacles faced by academics when attempting to research this subject 
during The Troubles, and how they overcame (or otherwise) these. This would have also given 
us further insight on the evolution of the discipline, and how scholarship on Northern Ireland 
was so dramatically altered by the peace process and signing of the Agreement in 1998.  
Other research should look at the role of politicians and civil servants within the 
discipline. Political figures such as Jeffrey Donaldson, Bertie Ahern, George Mitchell and 
Jonathan Powell, have become sources of “expert” advice, often establishing consultancies, 
think tanks, and resting on the board of research institutes and universities. How these political 
actors see the epistemic community is important: do they see a different episteme, do they 
value its input, what boundaries between the academic and scientific worlds do they recognise?  
From a methodological and research design perspective, survey questionnaires and 
more structured interviews might therefore have soothed anxieties regarding issues which 
participants deemed sensitive or difficult. It would have enabled a further level of 
anonymization for respondents: structured questionnaires would have made it possible to 
depersonalize often quite personal discussions and reflections; and generated a variety of 
numerically measurable data. 
Yet by the same token, this would have diminished the research’s ability to thematize 
and identify “turning points” in scholars’ personal narratives. Indeed, it must be doubtful 
whether such an approach would have delivered the insights, complexities and contradictions 
which made up our participants’ stories 
The last point on which I would like to reflect is concerning the production of 
knowledge in academic disciplines. What this research displayed was that the production of 
 221 
knowledge and the development and emergence of a knowledge community was largely the 
result of an emergent demand within the international, political, and academic landscape. Here 
I would reassert what I have claimed throughout this research is that both structure and agency 
are important! Northern Ireland academics, for example, DO have agency in the sense that once 
this demand has been established it is up to them to decide how and in what ways they will 
look to meet those demands and adjust to the new academic market, for lack of better words. 
In this way, they help shape the structure once it has been established.  
In this respect, I think Northern Ireland is similar not only to other areas of protracted 
conflict in the post-Cold War era but also other scientific disciplines. I’m sure, for instance, 
that if one were to look at the study of Bosnia and compare it to the Northern Ireland experience 
the parallels would be quite similar. But I hope future studies will look at research disciplines 
surrounding the emergence of epistemic communities around issues of say climate change and 
medical issues, like research around the AIDS epidemic in the early 1980’s and 1990’s. It is 
likely that upon investigation one might find that structural demands largely shaped and 
accounted for the emergence of these epistemic communities. Particularly around socially 
taboo issues such as the AIDS epidemic in the 1980’s it would be interesting to know what the 
sexuality and overall make-up of the scientists studying these issues were and what their 
interests were in challenging existing paradigms around this issue. Also, it is likely that these 
actors and disciplines emerged because of social, political, and financial demands which then 
impacted (both positively and negatively) academic institutions creating opportunities for 
actors to exert agency in ways which weren’t possible before. How would these events and 
actors shape and determine such structures and how do such structures, in turn, shape these 
actors?  
It is my hope that future research will look to answer such questions and bring them 
into further light and understanding. In this research, we have sought to look at one community, 
the Northern Ireland political science community. I have shown that these communities 
develop slowly and painfully. I hope that the pains of other communities are explored and that, 
through this, we gain further insights into the nature of knowledge; how we shape it and, 




APPENDIX 1: LIST OF INTERVIEWEE’S (IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER)  
Interviewee Date of Interview Interview Place Role and Univeristy
Anonymous 1 16-Oct-15 Anonymous Anonymous 
Anonymous 2 19-Oct-15 Anonymous Anonymous 
Aaron Edwards 11-Nov-15 Sandhurst Lecturer, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst
Andrew Mumford 22-Oct-14 Skype Lecturer, University of Nottingham
Anthony McIntrye 04-Sep-15 Skype Activist, Writer: Pensive Quill
Arthur Aughey 06-Oct-15 Belfast Professor of Politics, Ulster University
Brendan O'Duffy 01-Jun-15 London Professor, Queen Mary Univeristy
Brendan O'Leary 12-May-15 Belfast Professor, University of Pennsylvania
Cathal McCall 27-Feb-15 Belfast Professor, Queens University Belfast
Cillian McGrattan 17-Jan-15 Belfast Lecturer of Politics, Ulster University
Dawn Walsh 03-Apr-15 Birmingham Post-Doc, Political Science, Univeristy of Birmingham
Eamonn O'Kane 11-Nov-14 London Reader in Conflict Studies, Univeristy of Wolverhampton
Etain Tannam 03-Nov-14 Dublin Assistant Professor, International Peace Studies, Trinity College Dublin
Henry Patterson 27-Feb-15 Belfast Emeritus Professor of Politics, Ulster University
Jim Hughes 10-Jan-16 London Professor of Comparative Politics, London School of Economics
Joanne McEvoy 27-Feb-15 Aberdeen Senior Lecturer, University of Aberdeen
John Bew 12-Oct-15 London Professor of History and Foreign Policy, Kings College London
John Coakley 03-Sep-15 Belfast Professor of Politics, University College Dublin
John Doyle 02-Oct-15 Dublin Dean of Humanities and Social Sciences, Dublin City University
John McGarry 05-Apr-15 Skype Professor of Political Studies, Queens University, Canada
Jonathan Tonge 22-Oct-15 London Professor of Politics, University of Liverpool
Katy Hayward 04-Apr-15 Belfast Senior Lecturer in Social Sciences, Queens University Belfast
Lord Paul Bew 06-Jul-15 London Emeritus Professor of Politics, Queens University Belfast
Maria Power 11-Nov-14 London Lecturer Institute of Irish Studies, University of Liverpool
Michael Kerr 12-Jan-15 London Professor of Conflict Studies, Kings College London
Niall O Dochartaigh 11-Nov-14 Galway Senior Lecturer in Political Science and Sociology, NUI Galway
Paul Arthur 04-Jun-15 London Emeritus Professor of Politics, Ulster University
Paul Dixon 09-Sep-15 London Reader in Politics and International Studies, Kingston University London
Paul Mitchell 03-Mar-15 London Professor of Political Science, London School of Economics
Pete Shirlow 05-Feb-15 Belfast Director, Institute of Irish Studies, Univeristy of Liverpool
Richard English 25-Feb-15 St Andrews Professor of Politics, University of St Andrews
Rupert Taylor 01-May-15 Skype Professor of Political Studies, University of the Witwatersrand
Sandra Buchanan 13-Mar-15 Skype Trainer, Donegal Education & Training Board (ETB)









APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS  
 
PERSONAL BACKGROUND 
• Place and year of birth 
• What was it like growing up during the time of “the Troubles” in this area? 
• Most interesting memories during school/growing up? 
• What were the topics of discussion and subjects that interested you? 
• Do you think that your parents’ job, life style or conversations became one of the models 
for your life? 
INTEREST AND ENTRY TO THE DISCIPLINE 
• PhD  - university, topic, supervisor 
• What was it that motivated/provoked you to begin studying in this subject? 
• What barriers and/or obstacles did you face in initially addressing this topic?  
• How did you overcome them? 
• What and where was your first academic post?  
• What was the academic/university environment like for you upon your entry into it?   
• If you have ever paid attention to what other scholars thought about you and your work, 
what did they say?  
• What did try to do to affect change in this area or influence the thinking around the conflict 
at this time? 
PRIOR TO THE PEACE PROCESS 
1. Background and beginnings 
• What, in your own experience, was the intellectual climate in the UK and Ireland like 
concerning Northern Ireland before and leading up to the peace process? (An example) 
• How did you come to develop your views and theories on possible causes and solutions to 
the Northern Ireland Conflict, what events/experiences shaped/formed these ideas?  
• How often did you interact and gather with other academics on this subject during this time 
(i.e. participation/attendance at conferences, collaboration with research projects, and 
participation in research institutes)?    
• What/How would PEACE have looked to you at this time?   
 
2. Issues of Disagreement 
• What were the main areas of disagreement between yourself and other academics around 
the conflict? Which of these were seen as critical? Why?  
• What, from your own experiences, was at the root of the conflict about the conflict between 
academics (yourself included) at this time? 
• Were there institutional problems like morally wrong management, discrimination, bias or 
mistrust? 





• How much interaction did you have with political actors/organizations/institutions 
at this time?  
• What was the nature of this interaction?  
• What was the role of universities and/or research centres in these interactions? 
• What were the barriers/challenges (real or perceived) in these interactions?  
• How, from your experience, was Irish studies and research concerning the Northern 
Ireland conflict treated at this time?  
• How often did you (attempt to) publish and/or write on the conflict? What was the 
nature of such publications? What did you explore in them? Where were they 
published at? 
• Did you find difficulties getting articles on this subject published during this time? 
(example) 
• How did you navigate/overcome such difficulties?   
PEACE PROCESS 
 
1. Early Stages 
• How did you view the peace process in its early stages? Was this view shared by 
others academics?  
• What were the mains points of contentions between academics concerning the 
peace process? Concerning proposed political solutions for Northern Ireland?  
• What were your views on this? How did you come to develop such views?  
• What role, if any, did you play in the peace process?  
• Did this process create a new role for academics that had not previously existed? 
How so?  
• Did the frequency of interaction between academics on this subject increase during 
this time, as opposed to previously?  
• How did this process affect the academic material being produced on Northern 
Ireland?  
• What, from your experience, did the peace process do for the discipline of Irish 
studies and academics – such as yourself – who researched the conflict? 
• What did you find challenging/surprising/interesting during this time? (Examples) 
 
2. The way to resolve conflicts 
• If you needed conversation/interactions with the opposite group(s), what were the 
typical patterns and outcomes of these? How had this differed from before?  
• What were the personal rules or principles that influenced how you perceived, 
analysed, and decided on the direction of studying the conflict during this time? 
• What were the important issues, if any, in reconciling your relationships with 
opposite groups? What was your effort? 
• How did you handle inter/intra personal/departmental/institutional conflicts 
concerning notions of power sharing and/or other political solutions?  
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• When people distrusted, attacked, or competed with each other (or you), how did 
you work practically to reconcile these differences? That is, what did you DO?   
• How did you talk to and interact with individuals – pro and con – to your 
opposition? 
• What did you learn from these interactions?  




• What were your reactions/responses/thoughts in regards to GFA? 
• How have these changed over time? 
• Would you say these reactions were shared by your peers and colleagues?  
• How did GFA differ from your previous notions of peace, if at all?  
• What affect did GFA – from an epistemological standpoint – have on the way you 
approached and analysed the conflict? Was there a paradigm shift?   
• Would you say this was shared by others in the discipline?(examples)  
• What affects did GFA have on Irish and British academics and academic 
institutions? How?   
• Where they noticeable and, if so, in what way? (Examples) 
• How has GFA affected you in your career/professional (i.e. did/has it provided 
opportunities for you and other academics that might not have existed before)?  
• Would you say GFA offer(s/ed) a framework which yourself and other academics 
are reconciled to?  
 
POST-GFA & TODAY 
 
• How you say the discipline of political science has changed in relation to NI? How 
have you changed as a political scientist?  What forces – economic, institutional, 
etc would you say are responsible for this? 
• Do you see and or experience a changing role in the relationship between politics 
and political science?  Does this differ from before? How so, example?  
• Does your definition and/or understanding of peace now differ than that of what 
you started out?  
• What relevance do you see in NI and its peace process in political science today? 
The role of power sharing in other conflict zones?  
 
Reflecting back on your role in this process what have you learned about yourself as both an 
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Callon, M. (1999). Réseau et coordination. Paris: Economica. 
 229 
Callon, M., & Commission of the European Communities. Directorate General XII: Science 
Research and Development. (1989). Evaluation des programmes publics de recherche 
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